Make Photon iMessage a first-class persistent-connection channel like
Discord/Slack, using the spectrum-ts gRPC stream for both directions.
- Inbound: the sidecar forwards the SDK's app.messages gRPC stream to the
adapter over a loopback GET /inbound (NDJSON) instead of webhooks. Drops
the aiohttp webhook server, HMAC signature verification, public URL, and
PHOTON_WEBHOOK_* config; adapter reconnects with backoff.
- Management plane: device login uses client_id=photon-cli against the
single dashboard host (Bearer), matching the official photon-hq/cli;
find-or-create "Hermes Agent" project, enable Spectrum, rotate secret,
register user (with phone dedup), surface the assigned iMessage line.
- SDK projectId is the project's spectrumProjectId, not the dashboard id;
runtime creds persist to ~/.hermes/.env like every other channel.
- CLI: 6-step setup, webhook subcommands removed.
- Tests/docs updated for the gRPC flow; sidecar pins spectrum-ts ^1.17.1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Salvage of PR #27978 cherry-picked onto current main, resolving conflicts
with main's intervening SimpleX plugin fixes (resp-envelope normalization,
health-monitor reconnect-churn fix, bare-form DM addressing).
What's new:
- Group support via SIMPLEX_GROUP_ALLOWED (comma-separated IDs or '*');
inbound items surface chat_id=group:<id> + chat_type=group. Disabled by
default so a bot in a group doesn't process every member's traffic.
- Inbound files/voice via rcvFileDescrReady (immediate /freceive) deferred
through _pending_file_transfers, replayed on rcvFileComplete. Voice notes
-> MessageType.VOICE.
- Native outbound media: send_image (PNG/JPEG + inline thumbnail), send_voice
(msgContent.type=voice), send_video, send_document. All addressed by numeric
ID via /_send ... json [...].
- MEDIA:<path> tags in agent replies stripped and dispatched as voice/document.
- Text-burst batching (HERMES_SIMPLEX_TEXT_BATCH_DELAY, default 0.8s).
- Auto-accept contact requests (SIMPLEX_AUTO_ACCEPT, default true).
- Group send path uses structured /_send #<id> json form (the bracket
#[<id>] form is parsed as display-name lookup and silently drops).
plugin.yaml bumped to 1.1.0; docs updated. All inside plugins/platforms/simplex/
- no core edits.
Co-authored-by: Juraj Bednar <juraj@bednar.io>
Photon now exposes attachment send (Ray Sun, photon-nousresearch), so
the Photon plugin gains outbound media to match the BlueBubbles iMessage
channel.
- sidecar: new /send-attachment endpoint wrapping space.send(attachment())
/ space.send(voice()); caption sent as a trailing text bubble.
- adapter: override send_image/send_image_file/send_voice/send_video/
send_document/send_animation. URL helpers cache to a local path first
(cache_image_from_url), file helpers pass through. Defense-in-depth
path re-validation before the path reaches the Node sidecar.
- _standalone_send (cron): send text first, then each media_file as a
/send-attachment call (is_voice -> voice builder).
- docs/README: flip the 'outbound attachments not wired' note.
Adds the last missing parity piece vs the established channels: group
chats can be made opt-in via a mention wake word, exactly like the
BlueBubbles iMessage channel.
- require_mention + mention_patterns, read from config.extra (config.yaml
via the generic gateway bridge) or PHOTON_REQUIRE_MENTION /
PHOTON_MENTION_PATTERNS env vars. Same shapes BlueBubbles accepts
(list / JSON / comma / newline), same default Hermes wake words.
- _dispatch_inbound drops unmatched group messages and strips the leading
wake word from matched ones; DMs are never gated.
- plugin.yaml + docs document both knobs and the config.yaml form.
- New test_mention_gating.py (8 tests): default-off, group drop/pass,
wake-word strip, DM bypass, custom patterns, env comma-list, invalid
regex skip.
The config.yaml -> extra bridge needed no core change — the generic
shared-key loop in gateway/config.py already iterates plugin platforms
(_shared_loop_targets += plugin_entries()), so require_mention /
mention_patterns flow through automatically.
Note: outbound media is the one capability Photon still can't reach —
Photon exposes no HTTP send-attachment endpoint yet (documented API
limitation), so the sidecar can't send files. Not faked.
Validation: 34/34 photon tests; E2E confirms config.yaml require_mention
+ custom mention_patterns bridge through load_gateway_config into a live
adapter and gate/strip correctly.
Brings Photon in line with how every other Hermes gateway channel
behaves, instead of being a one-off with its own surfaces.
- gateway setup: register a `setup_fn` so Photon appears in
`hermes gateway setup` (the unified wizard) and runs the same
device-login + project + user + sidecar flow as `hermes photon setup`.
Adds `cli.gateway_setup()` as the zero-arg entry point.
- PII redaction: flip `pii_safe` False -> True. The comment already
said iMessage E.164 numbers should be redacted; the value contradicted
it. Now matches BlueBubbles (the other iMessage channel) which is in
_PII_SAFE_PLATFORMS — phone numbers are stripped before reaching the LLM.
- Pairing/authz: already worked via the registry's allowed_users_env /
allow_all_env generic path in authz_mixin; documented it. The adapter
forwards unauthorized DMs to the gateway (no intake gating), so the
pairing handshake fires and `hermes pairing approve photon <CODE>` works.
- Docs: fixed the `hermes photon status` output block to match the real
labels (project key / webhook key, not project secret / webhook secret),
added the missing PHOTON_API_HOST / PHOTON_DASHBOARD_HOST /
PHOTON_HOME_CHANNEL_NAME env vars, and added gateway-setup +
authorize-users sections mirroring the other channel docs.
Validation: 26/26 photon tests, 6504/6504 gateway+plugins tests, registry
E2E confirms setup_fn dispatch + pii_safe + authz envs all wired.
First-class iMessage support via Photon's managed Spectrum platform.
Targeted as a successor to the BlueBubbles adapter — Photon allocates
the iMessage line, handles delivery, and abuse-prevention so users
don't have to run their own Mac relay. Free tier uses Photon's shared
line pool.
Architecture:
- Inbound: signed JSON webhooks (X-Spectrum-Signature, HMAC-SHA256)
delivered to a local aiohttp listener. Dedupes on message.id,
rejects deliveries with >5min timestamp drift.
- Outbound: small supervised Node sidecar that runs the spectrum-ts
SDK. Photon does not currently expose a public HTTP send-message
endpoint; the sidecar is the only way to call Space.send() today.
When Photon ships an HTTP send endpoint we collapse the sidecar
into _sidecar_send and drop the Node dep — every other layer of
the plugin stays the same.
- Setup: 'hermes photon login' runs the RFC 8628 device-code flow;
'hermes photon setup' creates a Spectrum-enabled project, creates
a shared user (free tier), installs the sidecar's npm deps.
- Webhook management: 'hermes photon webhook register|list|delete'.
- Credentials persisted under credential_pool.photon /
credential_pool.photon_project in ~/.hermes/auth.json.
Plugin path (not built-in) — per current policy (May 2026), all new
platforms ship under plugins/platforms/. Registers itself via
ctx.register_platform() + ctx.register_cli_command(), zero edits to
core gateway code.
Tests cover:
- HMAC-SHA256 signature verification (happy path, tampered body,
wrong secret, drift, missing v0 prefix, empty inputs, non-integer
timestamp)
- Inbound dispatch for text DMs, group ids (any;+;...), and
attachment metadata markers
- Deduplication window
- check_requirements gating when Node is absent
- Device-code flow: request, header-based token return,
body-fallback token return, access_denied propagation
- Project/user/webhook API clients with mocked httpx
Known limitations (current Photon API):
- Attachments are metadata only — no download URL yet
- Outbound attachment send not wired (sidecar can add easily)
- Reactions / message effects not exposed yet
Docs: website/docs/user-guide/messaging/photon.md + sidebar entry.
The TUI docs presented HERMES_TUI_GATEWAY_URL + /api/ws as a supported
'attach the TUI to a standalone running gateway' workflow. It isn't.
/api/ws exists only inside the dashboard's FastAPI server
(hermes_cli/web_server.py), which spawns its own embedded TUI child and
injects the var as an internal wiring detail. The OpenAI-compat API
server (api_server platform) deliberately does not serve /api/ws, so the
documented ws://host:port/api/ws workflow 404s — the cause of #32882 and
the two PRs (#32904, #32955) that tried to add the route to the wrong
surface.
Rewrites the section in en + zh-Hans to describe the var accurately and
point users at shared state.db / dashboard embedded chat for multi-surface
session sharing.
* fix(plugins): add thread-safe lazy-singleton helpers, fix honcho TOCTOU (#24759)
get_honcho_client() and fal's _load_fal_client() used unlocked
check-then-init: racing threads both ran the expensive build and the
loser's client (open connection) leaked.
Rather than one-off locks, add plugins/plugin_utils.py with two
reusable primitives every plugin author can drop in:
- lazy_singleton: decorator for zero-arg accessors
- SingletonSlot: manual slot for config-keyed accessors (first wins)
Both use double-checked locking; factory runs at most once; failed
builds aren't cached. honcho is the reference consumer; fal's sibling
TOCTOU gets a matching double-checked lock. Plugin dev guide documents
the pattern so future plugins don't reintroduce the race.
Closes#24759
* test(honcho): update reset test for SingletonSlot internals
test_reset_clears_singleton poked the removed _honcho_client module
global directly. Assert through the slot's public peek() surface
instead, matching the #24759 refactor.
The curator's idle-archival path (apply_automatic_transitions under
prune_builtins) could archive the bundled `plan` skill, killing the
/plan slash command silently — typing /plan then returned 'Unknown
command' with no signal that a skill had vanished. The archived skill's
hash stays in .bundled_manifest, so 'hermes update' wouldn't re-seed it.
Add PROTECTED_BUILTIN_SKILLS ({plan}) enforced at the master gate
is_curation_eligible() (covers archive_skill + the transition walk) and
in the candidate enumerator (so the LLM consolidation pass never sees
them). Immune to prune_builtins, pin state, and LLM judgment.
* fix(memory): make overflow errors instruct in-turn consolidation + retry
When bounded memory is full, the add/replace overflow errors now explicitly
tell the model to consolidate (merge/remove/shorten) and retry the write in
the same turn, matching the documented behavior. The replace-overflow path
now also echoes current_entries + usage for parity with add-overflow, so the
model has the same context to act on.
Closes#23378 (working-as-documented; this sharpens runtime to match docs).
* fix(memory): broaden overflow remediation hint beyond 'stale'
Say 'stale or less important' — entries don't have to be stale to be the
right ones to drop when making room.
Inspired by Claude Code's /simplify. A bundled skill that captures recent
changes via git diff, fans out three focused reviewers (reuse, quality,
efficiency) via delegate_task batch mode, then aggregates findings and
applies the fixes worth applying.
Zero core changes — orchestrates existing tools (terminal/git, search_files,
delegate_task). Supports focus, dry-run, and scoped-diff modifiers.
Closes#379.
SIMPLEX_ALLOWED_USERS silently denied every contact when operators
listed display names instead of numeric contactIds. The SimpleX UI
never surfaces the numeric id, so display names are what operators
naturally put in the env var. _is_user_authorized only compared
source.user_id (the contactId), so the allowlist never matched.
Expand check_ids to include source.user_name for the simplex platform,
mirroring the existing WhatsApp phone-LID aliasing pattern. Adds doc +
setup-prompt clarification and three regression tests.
Salvaged from PR #40393. Adds manishbyatroy to release.py AUTHOR_MAP.
The dashboard font is now selectable from the UI, not just YAML. A new Font
section in the header theme picker overrides the UI font of whatever theme is
active; the choice is orthogonal to the theme and survives theme switches.
Each theme keeps its own font as the default — picking "Theme default" clears
the override.
- web/src/themes/fonts.ts: curated font catalog (system + Google Fonts across
sans/serif/mono), each with a family stack and optional webfont URL. The
catalog is the only injected-font surface — no free-text URL box, so the
injected <link> origins stay fixed.
- web/src/themes/context.tsx: font-override state (localStorage + server),
applied after theme typography so it wins; theme apply re-asserts it, and
clearing re-runs theme apply to restore the theme's own font. Mono is left
to the theme so code/terminal are untouched.
- web/src/components/ThemeSwitcher.tsx: Font section with grouped, self-
previewing font rows and a "Theme default" clear option.
- hermes_cli/web_server.py: GET/PUT /api/dashboard/font persisting to
config.yaml dashboard.font, with a server-side id allow-list (unknown ids
coerce to the theme sentinel).
- i18n + types, api client methods, tests, and docs.
Validation: 6 new backend endpoint tests pass; tsc + vite build clean; live
browser test confirmed pick/persist/survive-theme-switch/clear all work.
The ChatGPT Codex OAuth backend hard-caps gpt-5.5 at a 272K context window
(verified live: a ~330K-token request to chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex/responses
is rejected with context_length_exceeded while ~250K succeeds; the same slug
exposes 1.05M on the direct OpenAI API / OpenRouter and 400K on Copilot). At the
default 50% trigger, auto-compaction fires at ~136K — half the usable window.
Raise the trigger to 85% (~231K) on this exact route only, gated by a new
compression.codex_gpt55_autoraise config flag (default true). When it fires,
emit a one-time notice (CLI inline print + gateway status_callback replay) with
the exact opt-back-out command. gpt-5.5 on any other provider keeps the user's
global threshold.
- _is_codex_gpt55() matches the 5.5 family only on provider=openai-codex
- _compression_threshold_for_model() now provider-aware + opt-out param
- config key + _config_version bump (27->28) for backfill
- docs + tests (40 cases in test_arcee_trinity_overrides.py)
* feat: uninstall the Chat GUI without removing the agent (CLI + desktop UI)
Adds a GUI-only uninstall path so people can remove the desktop Chat GUI
while keeping the Hermes agent + their config/sessions/.env, and surfaces
the three CLI uninstall modes inside the desktop app's Settings → About.
CLI:
- New hermes_cli/gui_uninstall.py: cross-platform discovery + removal of the
desktop GUI's artifacts (source-built dist/release/node_modules + build
stamp, the packaged app bundle, and the Electron userData dir) on Linux,
macOS, and Windows. Never touches the agent source, venv, or user data.
- `hermes uninstall --gui` removes only the Chat GUI; `--gui-summary` prints a
JSON install snapshot (used by the desktop UI to gate options + detect a
missing agent for a future lite client).
- `hermes uninstall --yes` / `--full --yes` now run non-interactively, sharing
the destructive sequence via a new _perform_uninstall() helper. The keep-data
and full flows also sweep the GUI artifacts.
Desktop:
- electron/desktop-uninstall.cjs: pure helpers mapping each mode (gui/lite/full)
to CLI flags, resolving the running app bundle per OS, and building the
detached cleanup script that waits for the app to exit, runs the Python
uninstall, and removes the bundle.
- IPC hermes:uninstall:summary / :run, preload bridge, and types.
- Settings → About "Danger zone" with the three options; agent-removing
options hide when no local agent is detected.
Tests: tests/hermes_cli/test_gui_uninstall.py (22 pass with the existing
uninstall tests), electron/desktop-uninstall.test.cjs (17 pass, wired into
test:desktop:platforms). Docs: desktop.md "Uninstalling" + cli-commands.md.
* fix(desktop): tear down backend process tree before GUI uninstall (Windows lock safety)
The desktop uninstall cleanup script waited only on the desktop app's own
PID, but a backend grandchild (gateway / pty terminal / hermes REPL) can
outlive it and keep hermes.exe + venv files mandatory-locked on Windows —
making the script's rmdir half-fail and leaving a partial install, the same
failure class as the self-update path's #37532.
- main.cjs: runDesktopUninstall now awaits releaseBackendLock() before
spawning the cleanup script — tree-kills every backend PID the desktop owns
(primary + pool) via taskkill /T /F and polls the venv shim until unlocked.
Extracted the shared core out of releaseBackendLockForUpdate so both the
update hand-off and the uninstaller use the identical, incident-hardened
teardown. No-op on macOS/Linux (no mandatory locks).
- desktop-uninstall.cjs: Windows cleanup script removes the bundle via a
bounded rmdir retry loop (10x, 1s) instead of a single rmdir, since Windows
releases directory handles lazily even after the holding process exits.
- Dropped a fragile tasklist|findstr reap-by-path attempt; the Electron-side
tree-kill-by-PID is the reliable mechanism.
Tests: desktop-uninstall.test.cjs updated for the retry-loop output (17 pass).
* fix(desktop): address review on GUI uninstall (venv self-delete, gates, wait-loop)
Resolves @OutThisLife's review on #40355:
1. full mode now gated on agent presence (needsAgent: true). It removes the
agent + user data, so on a lite client with no local agent it's hidden
like lite — no more offering to remove an agent that isn't there.
2. (Finding 3, the real bug) lite/full no longer rmtree the venv from the
venv's OWN python. On Windows a running python.exe is mandatory-locked, so
that half-fails. New lightweight 'python -m hermes_cli.uninstall --mode X'
entrypoint (stdlib-only imports) lets the desktop run agent-removing modes
under the SYSTEM python (findSystemPython) with PYTHONPATH=<agentRoot>, so
import hermes_cli resolves from source while the venv is torn down. Falls
back to venv python + logs when no system python (gui-only unaffected).
3. Windows wait-loop is now bounded (60 tries, matching POSIX) and matches the
PID as a whole space-delimited token via findstr (no substring 99->990
trap, no redundant bare find). set HERMES_HOME/PID/PYTHONPATH now quoted.
4. Renamed the misleading 'returns null for dev run' test — the dev-run safety
is shouldRemoveAppBundle(isPackaged=false), which the test now asserts.
Docs: note that --gui on a source checkout also sweeps node_modules/build
output. Tests: 18 python + 19 desktop pass.
* docs: remove --include-desktop install instructions
Drop the --include-desktop curl one-liner from the desktop app docs.
The flag remains in scripts/install.sh; these docs now point to the
desktop installer / website and the 'hermes desktop' path instead.
* docs: remove --include-desktop from install docs
Drop the redundant 'Hermes Desktop installer on Linux' block (which
used --include-desktop) from quickstart, installation, and index docs.
The website installer covers macOS/Windows desktop; the CLI-only path
covers Linux. Removes the flag from all user-facing docs.
* Revert "fix(update): require managed marker before destructive clean"
This reverts commit c8e80cd0bf.
* Revert "fix(update): stop stash/restore from clobbering desktop source on managed clones (#38542)"
This reverts commit 8a19884bf3.
* chore(install): keep npm ci desktop-build fix after stash revert
The destructive-clean reverts (#38542/#39568) pulled the desktop
workspace install back to bare `npm install`. The npm ci -> npm install
fallback is orthogonal build-correctness (avoids the Windows
workspace-hoisting flake where install reports up-to-date against a
stale marker while node_modules is empty, breaking tsc -b). Preserve it.
* feat(update): settable stash-or-discard for non-interactive local changes
Adds updates.non_interactive_local_changes (stash | discard, default
stash). Governs ONLY non-interactive updates (desktop/chat app, gateway,
--yes) — interactive terminal updates always stash-and-ask, unchanged.
- config.py: new key under existing updates section; _config_version 26->27.
- main.py: _cmd_update_impl detects non-interactive (gateway/--yes/no-TTY),
reads the setting; new _discard_stashed_changes() drops the stash
(stash-and-drop, never reset --hard/clean -fd, so ignored paths survive).
Post-pull restore site branches on it; the bail-out and up-to-date
restores always preserve work.
- web_server.py + apps/desktop settings: exposes it as a stash/discard
select (Advanced section, In-App Update Local Changes).
- docs + tests (discard drops, stash restores, interactive ignores setting,
missing section defaults to stash).
* fix(install.ps1): stash/restore instead of reset --hard on Windows update
The PR reverted the destructive update path to stash/restore everywhere
except scripts/install.ps1, whose managed-clone update path still ran
`git reset --hard HEAD` before checkout — silently destroying agent-edited
tracked source on Windows (the same #38542 data-loss class the PR fixes).
- Replace `git reset --hard HEAD` with stash-before-checkout +
restore-after-checkout, mirroring install.sh. Untracked files are
included so agent-created dirs (e.g. tinker-atropos/) survive.
- Keep `core.autocrlf false` (it prevents the phantom CRLF dirt that made
the stash necessary; it's also load-bearing for a clean restore).
- Wrap all three checkout modes (Commit/Tag/Branch); Branch case now uses
`git pull --ff-only` so local commits are never clobbered.
- Only prompt to restore when a real console is attached (UserInteractive
+ non-redirected stdin/stdout + ConsoleHost); the desktop Update button
and bootstrap have no usable console, so they default to restore and
never hang on Read-Host.
- On restore conflict or a failed update, the stash is preserved with
recovery instructions — work is never silently dropped.
Validated on Windows (PowerShell 5.1, git 2.54): AST parse clean;
E2E non-conflicting restore applies+drops cleanly with ignored paths
(node_modules) untouched; conflicting restore preserves the stash.
---------
Co-authored-by: alt-glitch <balyan.sid@gmail.com>
* fix: respect disabled auto-compaction on context overflow
Port from anomalyco/opencode#30749.
When compression.enabled is false, NO automatic compaction trigger may
fire. The proactive token-threshold paths (preflight + post-response
should_compress gate) already honoured the setting, but the three
provider-overflow recovery paths in the agent loop — long-context-tier
429, 413 payload-too-large, and context-overflow — called
_compress_context() unconditionally, silently compressing and rotating
the session against the user's explicit choice.
Add a single guard at the top of the overflow-recovery dispatch: when
compression is disabled and the error is one of those three overflow
classes, surface a terminal error (compaction_disabled: True) telling the
user to /compress manually, /new, switch to a larger-context model, or
reduce attachments. Manual /compress (force=True) is unaffected — it never
enters this loop.
Tests: new TestOverflowWithCompactionDisabled (413 + 400 overflow don't
compress when disabled; control case still compresses when enabled).
Existing overflow-recovery tests updated to enable compaction explicitly
(they verify the recovery fires); fixture defaults flipped to True to
match production (compression.enabled defaults to True).
* feat(delegation): uncap max_spawn_depth to match max_concurrent_children
Removed the hard ceiling of 3 on delegation.max_spawn_depth. Depth now has
a floor of 1 and no upper limit, mirroring max_concurrent_children. Cost
(each level multiplies API spend) is the practical limiter, not a constant.
- delegate_tool.py: drop _MAX_SPAWN_DEPTH_CAP, _get_max_spawn_depth() floors
at 1 instead of clamping to [1,3]; depth-limit error string reworded
- config.py / cli-config.yaml.example: doc comments say floor 1, no ceiling
- docs (configuration, delegation, delegation-patterns): range 1-3 -> >=1
- tests: convert clamp-above-3 change-detector into a no-ceiling invariant,
drop the _MAX_SPAWN_DEPTH_CAP==3 snapshot assert, fix warning-text assert
* feat(discord): voice-channel mixer — ambient idle bed + verbal acks that overlap TTS
Discord voice mode can now feel conversational: the bot speaks a short
acknowledgement before it starts working, and a subtle ambient 'thinking' bed
plays underneath while tools run, ducking under speech and swelling back — the
Grok-voice-mode feel.
discord.py plays only one audio stream per voice connection, so this adds a
software mixer (VoiceMixer, a discord.AudioSource) installed once per guild on
join. It sums an ambient loop, verbal acks, and TTS replies into that single
20ms/48kHz/stereo stream (numpy int16 add + clip), so they overlap instead of
stop-and-swap. Speech ducks the ambient gain down and releases it smoothly.
- plugins/platforms/discord/voice_mixer.py: VoiceMixer + MixerChild (gain,
loop, fade, duck/release), decode_to_pcm (ffmpeg), synth_ambient_pcm (no
asset needed — synthesised pad).
- adapter: install mixer on join, tear down on leave, route
play_in_voice_channel through the mixer (legacy one-shot path kept as
fallback), play_ack_in_voice, voice_mixer_active. Defensive getattr for the
object.__new__ test helpers.
- gateway/run.py: tool_start_callback fires a one-time verbal ack on the first
tool call of a turn when in a voice channel (independent of the text
tool-progress gate). No system-prompt or message-flow changes.
- config: discord.voice_fx.* (OFF by default; ambient/duck/speech gains, ack
phrases). All in config.yaml, not .env.
- docs + tests (mixer unit + adapter integration).
Verified: 19 new tests pass, existing voice suite green (2 pre-existing
davey-module env failures unchanged), and a real-mixer E2E confirms ambient
streams, TTS overlaps it, acks layer in, and teardown is clean.
* fix(discord): make voice mixer numpy import lazy (numpy is voice-extra-only)
numpy ships in the optional 'voice' extra, not [all,dev], so a module-level
'import numpy' broke CI test collection (and would break the always-imported
Discord adapter on any install without the voice extra). Defer numpy to the
functions that actually mix audio via _require_numpy(); guard the test module
with pytest.importorskip('numpy').
* docs(dashboard): clarify auth provider suitability + document dashboard registration
- Add a 'Registering a dashboard' subsection under the Nous Research
provider covering both the 'hermes dashboard register' CLI command
and the Portal /local-dashboards GUI page.
- Note that the Nous provider is the one suitable for public-internet
exposure (logins verified against your Nous account).
- Add a warning that the username/password provider is for trusted
networks / VPN only and is not suitable for direct public-internet
exposure; point readers to the Nous / OIDC / custom OAuth providers.
- Surface the same distinction in the two-provider intro list.
* docs(dashboard): count three bundled auth providers, add self-hosted OIDC to intro
'Two providers ship in the box' undercounted — the bundled
plugins/dashboard_auth/self_hosted (generic OpenID Connect) is a third.
List all three in the gated-mode intro and link each to its section.
* docs(dashboard): extend auth provider updates to Docker and Desktop pages
- docker.md: list all three bundled gate providers (was username/password
+ OAuth only), adding the self-hosted OIDC provider and its env vars,
and note username/password is not for public-internet exposure.
- desktop.md: reframe the remote-backend connection so OAuth (Nous Portal)
is the preferred option for any backend reachable beyond the local
machine, with username/password positioned for local / trusted-network
use only. Cover the 'Sign in with <provider>' OAuth flow in the in-app
steps and scope the VPN warning to the password path.
* docs(dashboard): align env-var, CLI, and remote-Desktop recipe with provider changes
- environment-variables.md: reframe the Web Dashboard & Hermes Desktop
intro (OAuth preferred for remote/public, username/password for
trusted networks), add the self-hosted OIDC env vars
(HERMES_DASHBOARD_OIDC_*) that were missing from the table, and note
hermes dashboard register provisions the OAuth client_id.
- cli-commands.md: document the 'hermes dashboard register' subcommand
(flags, behavior, /local-dashboards GUI alternative).
- web-dashboard.md: apply the OAuth-preferred reframe to the bottom
'Connecting Hermes Desktop to a remote backend' recipe and scope its
VPN warning to the username/password path, matching desktop.md.
* docs(dashboard): move 'recommended remote Desktop path' framing from username/password to OAuth
The gated-mode intro list claimed the username/password provider was the
recommended path for a remote Hermes Desktop connection, contradicting the
OAuth-preferred framing established elsewhere. Move that recommendation onto
the OAuth (Nous Portal) item so the docs are consistent: OAuth is the
recommended provider for any remote/internet-facing backend; username/password
is for trusted networks only.
* docs(dashboard): drop unreleased managed/hosted-install provisioning notes
Remove the 'not available in managed/hosted installs, where the client id is
provisioned by the hosting platform' line from the dashboard register docs
(web-dashboard.md, cli-commands.md) and the 'provisioned by the Nous Portal for
hosted deploys' clause from the HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID env-var row —
that platform-provisioning path is unreleased.
* docs(dashboard): drop --portal-url / HERMES_DASHBOARD_PORTAL_URL from user docs
The portal-URL override targets a non-production Nous Portal and only works
for internal Nous usage — it won't function for end users (the access token
must be issued by the same portal). Remove it from the register CLI flags,
the Nous-provider config/env tables, and the verify-the-gate example so users
aren't pointed at an option that can't work for them.
* docs(dashboard): add worked examples for Nous and username/password providers
The self-hosted OIDC provider already had a full 'Worked example: Keycloak'
walkthrough; the Nous and username/password providers only had scattered
config snippets. Add parallel '#### Worked example' sections for both
(register/run/login + /api/status verification), mirroring the Keycloak
example's structure so all three bundled providers read consistently.
* docs(env): move HERMES_DESKTOP_REMOTE_URL to end of the dashboard auth table
It was sitting between the HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_* block and the
HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH/OIDC block, splitting the dashboard-side vars. As the
only desktop-side var in the table, it belongs at the end so the dashboard
provider vars (basic, OAuth, OIDC) stay grouped together.
* docs(dashboard): remove Fly.io references from dashboard auth docs
Fly.io is the internal hosting implementation for hosted Hermes — it shouldn't
leak into user-facing dashboard auth docs. Reword the OAuth provider intro,
the env-var-path rationale, the public-URL-override section, the cookie Secure
note, and the verify-the-gate example to generic 'hosting platform' / 'reverse
proxy' / 'TLS terminator' phrasing.
Left the legitimate user-facing Fly.io mentions in telegram.md (a deliberate
cloud-deployment walkthrough) and work-with-skills.md (a generic example)
untouched.
Some VPS providers (Hetzner Cloud and others) offer a browser-based
console for managing hosts. These consoles transmit special characters
incorrectly — ':' may arrive as ';', '@' may be mis-rendered, and
non-English keyboard layouts fare worse — which silently corrupts
'docker run' arguments like '-v ~/.hermes:/opt/data', '-e KEY=value',
and pasted API keys / tokens.
Adds a :::caution admonition above the Quick start 'docker run' block
in website/docs/user-guide/docker.md recommending SSH for copy-paste-
safe command entry, with manual-typing guidance as a fallback.
Pure docs change, no code touched.
Closes#36279
Co-authored-by: Bedirhan Celayir <bedirhancode@users.noreply.github.com>
Both the desktop and web-dashboard remote-backend sections now state up front
that the 'remote backend' is a running 'hermes dashboard' process the desktop
app attaches to (it does not start it for you), and that the gateway is a
separate process needed only for messaging channels.
* Revert "fix(gateway): anchor Google Chat OAuth client secret to default Hermes root"
This reverts commit fff0561441.
* Revert "fix(cli): honor global-root active_provider fallback for named profiles"
This reverts commit 3858cf4307.
* docs(google_chat): describe OAuth client secret as profile-scoped, not host-wide
The setup docs, oauth docstring, and the adapter's 'no credentials'
error message all described the Google Chat OAuth client secret as
host-wide shared infrastructure. That contradicts profile isolation:
profiles are separate auth boundaries, so two profiles can point at
different Google OAuth apps / accounts. Reword all three to say the
secret is profile-scoped and each profile registers its own.
* docs(guides): add "Run Nemotron 3 Ultra free in Hermes Agent" launch guide
Day-0 NVIDIA Nemotron 3 Ultra availability on Nous Portal (free June 4-18,
in partnership with NVIDIA + Nebius). Quick Setup walkthrough for selecting
the nvidia/nemotron-3-ultra:free tier, plus switching/troubleshooting notes.
Registered at the top of Guides & Tutorials.
* docs(guides): reword Nemotron lead-in to match launch copy
Frame as Nemotron Coalition induction (working with NVIDIA) + Nebius
partnership for the free tier, rather than a direct NVIDIA partnership,
to avoid overstating the relationship.
* docs(guides): lead Nemotron guide with desktop app, CLI second
Add a one-click desktop-app install track (download → Nous Portal
recommended sign-in → pick the Free-tier nemotron-3-ultra model) as the
recommended path for non-terminal users, and keep the CLI curl flow as
Option B. Update switching/troubleshooting to cover both surfaces.
The WeCom adapter delivers each response as a single complete message
via aibot_respond_msg / aibot_send_msg — it does not stream tokens
incrementally (no edit_message override) and send_typing is a no-op.
Reword the 'Reply-mode streaming' feature bullet to 'Reply correlation',
retitle the section to 'Reply-Mode Responses', and add a note clarifying
that neither token streaming nor typing indicators are supported.
The documented path for connecting Hermes Desktop to a remote backend was
`--insecure` + a pinned HERMES_DASHBOARD_SESSION_TOKEN — an unauthenticated
bind plus a copy-pasted token. Replace it everywhere with the bundled
username/password dashboard-auth provider: set HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_*,
run `hermes dashboard --host 0.0.0.0` (the non-loopback bind engages the auth
gate), and Sign in from the app.
- desktop.md: rewrite 'Connecting to a remote backend' for the user/pass + Sign in flow
- web-dashboard.md: rewrite both remote-backend sections (overview + dedicated);
reframe the auth-gate section so --insecure is a discouraged escape hatch, not a
co-equal use case; drop the removed --tui flag from the systemd example
- environment-variables.md: lead with HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_*; drop the
session-token / HERMES_DESKTOP_REMOTE_TOKEN remote-connect entries
- docker.md: mention the username/password provider as the simplest gate provider
Adds a bundled dashboard-auth provider plugin that authenticates the
web dashboard against any conformant self-hosted OpenID Connect server
(Authentik, Keycloak, Zitadel, Authelia, Auth0, Okta, Google, …) using
standard OIDC — no per-IDP code.
It's a pure drop-in plugin implementing the DashboardAuthProvider
protocol; it touches no core auth/runtime/login paths. Mechanics:
- OIDC discovery from {issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration
(cached; issuer pinned; endpoints required HTTPS, loopback http
allowed for local-dev IDPs)
- authorization-code + PKCE (S256), public client
- verifies the OIDC ID token (RS256/ES256) against the discovered
jwks_uri with iss/aud pinned to the configured issuer/client_id, and
maps standard claims (sub/email/name/preferred_username, groups→org)
onto a Session
- standard refresh_token grant for silent re-auth; RFC 7009 revocation
on logout when advertised
Verifies the ID token (not the access token) because OIDC guarantees the
ID token is a signed JWT carrying identity, while access-token format is
opaque to the client per spec — the only universally-correct choice
across self-hosted IDPs.
Config via dashboard.oauth.self_hosted.{issuer,client_id,scopes} in
config.yaml or HERMES_DASHBOARD_OIDC_{ISSUER,CLIENT_ID,SCOPES} env vars
(env-wins-config, empty-is-unset — same convention as the nous plugin).
Confidential clients (client_secret) left as a documented TODO seam.
Docs: adds a Self-hosted OIDC section to the web-dashboard guide,
including a copy-paste Keycloak worked example (realm import + docker
run + dashboard wiring + login walkthrough).
Tests: 65 cases covering construction, discovery (incl. issuer
mismatch + https enforcement), start_login/PKCE, complete_login, ID
token verification, refresh/revoke, and env/config precedence.
The dashboard's embedded Chat surface (/chat, /api/ws, /api/pty) was gated
behind `hermes dashboard --tui` / HERMES_DASHBOARD_TUI=1. The desktop app and
the dashboard's own Chat tab both drive the agent over the /api/ws + /api/pty
WebSockets, so a dashboard started without the flag would pass the /api/status
health check but slam the chat WebSocket shut with WS code 4403 — the app
connects, reports "ready", and chat stays dead. This was the root cause behind
multiple user reports of the desktop app failing to connect to a self-hosted
gateway/dashboard, and it bit Docker and host installs alike.
Make the embedded chat unconditional:
- web_server.py: _DASHBOARD_EMBEDDED_CHAT_ENABLED defaults to True; drop the
embedded_chat parameter and the runtime reassignment from start_server().
The WS gates still read the constant (now always true) so the seam — and its
"rejects when disabled" contract test — stays meaningful.
- main.py: remove the `--tui` argument from the dashboard subparser and the
`embedded_chat = args.tui or HERMES_DASHBOARD_TUI==1` derivation.
- web/: isDashboardEmbeddedChatEnabled() returns true unconditionally; drop the
deprecated __HERMES_DASHBOARD_TUI__ alias and the dead LEGACY_TUI_RE scrape in
the vite dev-token plugin.
- apps/desktop/electron/main.cjs: drop `--tui` from the spawned dashboardArgs
(it would now error with "unrecognized arguments: --tui") and the redundant
HERMES_DASHBOARD_TUI env injection.
- Docker: no s6 run-script change needed — the script never passed --tui; the
HERMES_DASHBOARD_TUI env var is now simply a no-op, so the image works out of
the box with no extra var.
- Docs: remove every dashboard --tui / HERMES_DASHBOARD_TUI reference across the
CLI reference, env-var reference, docker/desktop/web-dashboard guides, in-app
tips, and the zh-Hans translations. The terminal `hermes --tui` / HERMES_TUI
references are intentionally left untouched.
Tests: 270 passing across web_server, dashboard lifecycle, host-header,
auth-gate, and docker-override-scripts suites.
Add a 'Username/password provider (no OAuth IDP)' section to the web
dashboard guide (config.yaml + env surfaces, the explicit-secret caveat,
the rate-limit/generic-401 properties, and a 'write your own password
provider' pointer to the supports_password extension point), and list the
HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_* env vars in the environment-variables
reference.
* refactor(supermemory): session-level conversation ingest + kebab tool aliases
Salvaged from #32487 (by @MaheshtheDev), rebased onto current main.
- sync_turn now buffers cleaned turns; the full session is ingested once
at session end / switch / shutdown via the conversations endpoint
- ingest_conversation() accepts and forwards functional document metadata
(type, session_id, message_count, partial)
- register kebab-case tool aliases (supermemory-save/search/forget/profile)
alongside the snake_case names
- README + docs (EN/zh-Hans) updated for the simplified session model
Source/vendor-attribution removed per project policy (no telemetry):
dropped x-sm-source header, sm_source metadata, and sm_capture_mode tags.
Preserved the post-branch atomic_json_write(mode=0o600) hardening that the
PR's stale base had reverted. Updated provider tests for the new behavior
and added maheshthedev@gmail.com to release.py AUTHOR_MAP.
Co-authored-by: alt-glitch <balyan.sid@gmail.com>
* feat(supermemory): restore x-sm-source for Spaces routing
Reinstates x-sm-source: hermes (SDK default_headers + conversations POST)
and sm_source: hermes document metadata. Per @Dhravya (Supermemory), this
is a functional routing key, not telemetry: it groups Hermes writes into a
dedicated "Hermes" Space in the Supermemory app so users can filter and
bulk-manage memories per source agent.
sm_capture_mode remains dropped (appears analytics-only; Spaces are routed
by sm_source) pending confirmation. Adds README note + a unit test covering
_merge_metadata sm_source stamping and legacy source->type migration.
---------
Co-authored-by: Mahesh Sanikommu <maheshthedev@gmail.com>
Salvage of #35508 (@dchenk), rebased onto current main. Resolved the
tests/tools/test_stage2_hook_puid_pgid.py conflict (kept both the
envdir-creation regression test on main and the new config-migration
tests).
Docker image upgrades replace code under $INSTALL_DIR but preserve
$HERMES_HOME on the mounted volume, so the persisted config.yaml never
received the schema migrations that non-Docker `hermes update` runs
(#35406). This adds scripts/docker_config_migrate.py, invoked from
stage2-hook after first-boot seeding and before gateway services start:
it backs up config.yaml + .env, runs migrate_config(interactive=False),
and honors HERMES_SKIP_CONFIG_MIGRATION=1 for manual control.
Also fixes a latent bug in check_config_version(): it called load_config()
which deep-merges DEFAULT_CONFIG, so a legacy config with no raw
_config_version falsely reported as already-current. It now reads the raw
on-disk file so legacy configs are correctly detected for migration.
Differs from #35508 as submitted (Option B cleanup): dropped the
`_config_version` line added to cli-config.yaml.example and removed the
accompanying test_cli_config_example_declares_latest_version change-detector
test. The example is a copy-template and has no business asserting a schema
version; check_config_version() reads the user's real config.yaml, not the
example. This removes a second sync point that drifts on every version bump.
Closes#35508. Fixes#35406.
Co-authored-by: Dmitriy Cherchenko <17372886+dchenk@users.noreply.github.com>
The Desktop Chat section described chat-only and gave no signpost that
remote-hosted Hermes connection is documented. Adds a pointer to the
in-page remote-backend section and to the deeper Web Dashboard doc.
Desktop's readiness probe only checks GET /api/status (public), but the
live chat rides /api/ws, which is gated by --tui (4403), a matching
session token (4401), and a non-loopback bind. The web-dashboard doc
covered --tui and the OAuth gate but never the Desktop remote-connection
flow, so the three independent failure modes weren't documented together.
Adds a 'Connecting Hermes Desktop to a remote backend' section: pin
HERMES_DASHBOARD_SESSION_TOKEN, run with --host 0.0.0.0 --insecure --tui,
the curl token-verification one-liner, and WS close-code triage.
