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docs(codex): document --sandbox danger-full-access for gateway bubblewrap failures (#40619)
Salvaged from #40435; re-verified on main, tightened, tested. Co-authored-by: ziwon <ziwon@users.noreply.github.com>
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@ -74,6 +74,25 @@ process(action="kill", session_id="<id>")
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| `exec "prompt"` | One-shot execution, exits when done |
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| `--full-auto` | Sandboxed but auto-approves file changes in workspace |
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| `--yolo` | No sandbox, no approvals (fastest, most dangerous) |
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| `--sandbox danger-full-access` | No Codex sandbox; useful when the host service context breaks bubblewrap |
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## Hermes Gateway Caveat
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When invoking the Codex CLI from a Hermes gateway/service context (for example,
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Telegram-driven agent sessions), Codex `workspace-write` sandboxing may fail even
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when the same command works in the user's interactive shell. A typical symptom is
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bubblewrap/user-namespace errors such as `setting up uid map: Permission denied`
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or `loopback: Failed RTM_NEWADDR: Operation not permitted`.
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In that context, prefer:
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```
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codex exec --sandbox danger-full-access "<task>"
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```
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Use process boundaries as the safety layer instead: explicit `workdir`, clean git
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status before launch, narrow task prompts, `git diff` review, targeted tests, and
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human/agent confirmation before committing broad changes.
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## PR Reviews
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@ -92,6 +92,25 @@ process(action="kill", session_id="<id>")
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| `exec "prompt"` | One-shot execution, exits when done |
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| `--full-auto` | Sandboxed but auto-approves file changes in workspace |
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| `--yolo` | No sandbox, no approvals (fastest, most dangerous) |
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| `--sandbox danger-full-access` | No Codex sandbox; useful when the host service context breaks bubblewrap |
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## Hermes Gateway Caveat
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When invoking the Codex CLI from a Hermes gateway/service context (for example,
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Telegram-driven agent sessions), Codex `workspace-write` sandboxing may fail even
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when the same command works in the user's interactive shell. A typical symptom is
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bubblewrap/user-namespace errors such as `setting up uid map: Permission denied`
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or `loopback: Failed RTM_NEWADDR: Operation not permitted`.
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In that context, prefer:
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```
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codex exec --sandbox danger-full-access "<task>"
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```
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Use process boundaries as the safety layer instead: explicit `workdir`, clean git
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status before launch, narrow task prompts, `git diff` review, targeted tests, and
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human/agent confirmation before committing broad changes.
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## PR Reviews
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