The Cloud setup wizard and docs tell operators to set
WHATSAPP_CLOUD_ALLOWED_USERS (and WHATSAPP_CLOUD_ALLOW_ALL_USERS), but the
adapter DM intake gate only read WHATSAPP_CLOUD_ALLOW_FROM + WHATSAPP_CLOUD_DM_POLICY
(default open, opted-in only via GATEWAY_/WHATSAPP_ALLOW_ALL_USERS). So an
allowlist set via the documented var silently dropped every inbound
(_should_process_message -> None -> HTTP 200, no dispatch, no log line).
- _allow_from also reads WHATSAPP_CLOUD_ALLOWED_USERS
- dm_policy defaults to allowlist when an allowlist is present (else open)
- _open_dm_opted_in() also honors WHATSAPP_CLOUD_ALLOW_ALL_USERS
Explicit DM_POLICY / ALLOW_FROM still win -> backward compatible.
_do_reconnect() succeeded but never called
YuanbaoAdapter.set_active(adapter), leaving get_active()
permanently returning None after any WS disconnect/reconnect
cycle. This caused cron delivery to silently fail because
_send_yuanbao() checks get_active_adapter() and gives up
immediately when it returns None.
Fix: call set_active(adapter) after successful reconnect,
matching the pattern in connect().
Fixes#58363
Post-#48648, oversized mid-stream edits truncate to a 4096-char preview
instead of splitting. But when rich messages raise the consumer's overflow
budget to 32k, the consumer keeps accumulating past 4096 and keeps issuing
progressive edits every edit_interval — each one truncating to the SAME
preview text. Telegram counts every one of those no-op requests against the
flood budget: a long streamed reply fires ~1 identical edit per 0.8s for
the rest of the stream, trips flood control (200s+ penalties), and the
final delivery hangs behind inline flood sleeps. Users see the bot stuck
'streaming' and the chat unresponsive.
Fix at the chokepoint: track the last truncated preview per
(chat_id, message_id) and skip the API call when the new truncation is
identical. Previews still update when the visible prefix actually changes
(e.g. chunk-count marker 1/2 → 1/3). State clears on finalize and when
content shrinks back under the cap, so dedup can never mask a real edit.
Live repro: 19,956-char streamed reply, transport=edit, rich available —
4x flood-control hits within ~700ms, 250s penalties, hung final delivery.
E2E harness on the same stream: 14 edit calls on main vs 7 with the fix
(the delta is pure no-op duplicates; scales with stream length).
Self-review (3-agent + codex) findings on the async QueueListener change:
1. (HIGH) The os._exit shutdown backstop called flush_log_queue(), whose
stop() joins the listener thread unbounded. If that thread is wedged on
the rotation lock — the exact failure this change survives — shutdown
re-freezes. Add drain_log_queue(timeout): stop-only, bounded via a
throwaway joiner thread. Also release PID/runtime locks BEFORE the drain
so a slow drain can't strand them.
2. (MED) _log_queue/_queue_listener/_queued_file_handlers were read-modify-
written without a lock across register/stop/flush/reset; a gateway-init
race with a plugin/CLI path could leave two live listeners. Guard all
four globals with a single _queue_state_lock.
3. (MED) _NonFormattingQueueHandler.prepare() enqueued the same LogRecord a
synchronous handler on the emitting thread may still format/mutate.
Return copy.copy(record) (preserves msg/args/exc_info for deferred
RedactingFormatter) to remove the cross-thread mutation race.
E2E-verified: bounded drain returns in ~500ms on a permanently-wedged
listener; 4x20 concurrent flushes single-listener no-crash; args still
format and secrets still redact through the copied record.
The QueueListener change routes rotating file handlers through an
in-memory queue drained on a dedicated thread, with an atexit hook to
flush on shutdown. But _exit_after_graceful_shutdown() uses os._exit,
which bypasses atexit — so on the early-exit and #53107 hard-exit paths
the queued records (including the shutdown reason) were silently lost.
Explicitly flush_log_queue() before os._exit, and correct the now-stale
comment that claimed handlers are synchronous with nothing pending.
On Windows every Hermes process (gateway, serve, TUI/slash workers, MCP
servers, CLI commands) writes the shared rotating logs through
concurrent-log-handler's cross-process rotation lock. When the emitting
thread is an asyncio event loop, a lock wait blocks the loop — stalling it
for seconds and dropping WebSocket clients (the 'gateway keeps going down'
symptom seen in #58265).
Route every file handler through a single QueueListener on a dedicated
thread: loggers only enqueue (non-blocking); the listener does the file I/O
and rotation-lock wait off the hot path. The QueueHandler funnels via the
root logger; per-handler levels and component filters are preserved by
respect_handler_level + handler.handle on the listener thread. An atexit
hook stops the listener before logging.shutdown closes the file handlers.
- _NonFormattingQueueHandler passes the raw record (in-process queue) so
target handlers apply their own RedactingFormatter/filters.
- flush_log_queue() drains synchronously (shutdown + tests).
- rotating_file_handlers() exposes the handlers now behind the listener;
tests updated to use it.
Extends the #58265 fix: the provider-key warn-storm was one amplifier of
this contention; this takes the contention off the event loop entirely.
_normalize_custom_provider_entry() runs on every load_picker_context()
call (per picker/inventory request) and warned each time for (a) the
redundant `provider` key that Hermes' own config writer emits into
provider entries and (b) any other unknown key. On Windows the serve
launcher+worker pair share one rotating log via concurrent-log-handler's
cross-process lock, so that per-load warning volume drove 'Cannot acquire
lock after 20 attempts' retries that pegged a core, stalled the event
loop ~14s, and dropped every desktop/TUI WebSocket while /health stayed
green (gateway looked down; dashboard looked fine).
- Accept `provider` as a known key (silently ignored) so self-written
legacy configs don't warn.
- Deduplicate the normalizer's warnings per (provider, signature) so a
static config quirk is surfaced once, not on every inventory load.
Adds regression tests for both.
Fixes#58265
After a config change (e.g. switching model provider), the /new command
must clear the per-session _last_resolved_model cache so the next turn
resolves the model from the updated config instead of falling back to
the stale cached value.
Without this fix, if a transient config-cache miss occurs on the first
post-/new turn, the #35314 recovery path serves the old model from the
cache — the user sees the old model being used even though they changed
config.yaml and explicitly ran /new.
Fix applies to both call sites that reset session model state:
- GatewaySlashCommandsMixin._handle_reset_command (slash_commands.py)
- GatewayRunner compression-exhausted auto-reset (run.py)
Fixes#58403
Per-session /model overrides supplied api_key and provider but omitted
credential_pool, so billing rotation never ran on HTTP 402. Wire the pool
on fast override, rehydrate, and apply paths; backfill from provider for
legacy persisted overrides. Regression tests in tests/gateway/.
- package-lock.json changes in #58451 were unrelated peer-flag churn
- CANONICAL_PROVIDERS 'poolside' entry from #58374 has no ProviderConfig
in hermes_cli/auth.py and no setup flow, so the picker entry would be
dead; the wire-format coercions stand on their own
When OpenRouter routes to an endpoint that does not support tool/function
calling, it returns HTTP 404 with the message 'No endpoints found that
support tool use. Try disabling "browser_back".'
The raw error body does not contain 'model not found' or any other
_MODEL_NOT_FOUND_PATTERNS entry, so it falls through to FailoverReason.unknown
with retryable=True. The retry loop wastes 3-5 attempts on the same
deterministic rejection, then surfaces a confusing generic error instead of
automatically failing over to a fallback model or provider.
Adding the OpenRouter phrase to _MODEL_NOT_FOUND_PATTERNS classifies it as
model_not_found (retryable=False, should_fallback=True), which triggers the
client-error fast-fallback path in conversation_loop.py: the agent switches
to a configured fallback model/provider before the user sees the error.
Existing buffered guidance in conversation_loop.py (the 'support tool use'
hint at line ~2967) remains intact and surfaces only if every fallback
exhausts.
_try_anthropic() hard-failed (return None, None) when the anthropic
credential pool was present but had no selectable entry — e.g. the pooled
OAuth token expired and its refresh_token had gone stale, so
_select_pool_entry("anthropic") returned (True, None). This wedged every
auxiliary task routed to Anthropic (goal judge surfaced "no auxiliary
client configured") even when a perfectly valid ANTHROPIC_TOKEN /
credentials-file token was available. The main session stayed healthy
because it resolves the env token directly.
The openrouter path (_try_openrouter) and codex path already fall through
to their standalone credential on (True, None); anthropic was the only
provider that hard-failed. Make _try_anthropic fall through to
resolve_anthropic_token() on that branch so the three paths are symmetric:
a temporarily dead pool entry must not block auxiliary tasks when a valid
standalone credential exists.
Adds a regression test covering: (1) pool present + no entry + valid env
token -> client built from the env token, (2) pool present + no entry + no
resolvable token -> clean (None, None), (3) base_url defaults correctly
when falling through with pool_present=True.
The container exec-read piped the whole file through base64 with no size
guard — the 50MB cap was only enforced host-side AFTER the full payload
had already streamed into host memory. A prompt-injected read of a huge
container file (or /dev/zero) could balloon the gateway process.
head -c (cap+1) bounds the read inside the sandbox; the +1 byte lets the
host distinguish at-cap from over-cap and reject with SourceTooLarge.
Input redirect replaces 'base64 --' (no argv exposure at all for
leading-dash paths). Docker integration tests re-verified live.
The salvaged #52688 rasterizer shell-out predates the TUI subprocess
stdin= guard; a rasterizer that prompts on stdin could hang the tool
under prompt_toolkit. DEVNULL it.
- _normalize_to_supported_image: ensure cache/vision exists before writing
the converted PNG (fresh HERMES_HOME had no dir -> FileNotFoundError).
- resolver: SVG passes through as image/svg+xml instead of erroring; the
call sites rasterize to PNG via the salvaged normalize step (cairosvg /
svglib / rsvg-convert / inkscape, best-effort with actionable error).
- normalization offloaded via asyncio.to_thread at both call sites.
- tests: resolver pass-through + rasterization + no-converter error paths.
- AUTHOR_MAP: jonathan@mintrx.com -> JAlmanzarMint (PR #52688 salvage).
vision_analyze embedded SVG (and BMP/TIFF) tool-results into conversation
history with media_type image/svg+xml. Anthropic only accepts jpeg/png/
gif/webp, so the request fails with a non-retryable 400. Because the image
is baked into immutable history and re-sent every turn, the session is
permanently wedged on resume — retries re-send the same bad bytes.
Add _normalize_to_supported_image(): SVG is rasterized to PNG (best-effort
via cairosvg/svglib/rsvg-convert/inkscape), other non-supported raster
formats are re-encoded to PNG via Pillow, and if conversion is impossible
the tool returns an actionable error instead of a session-wedging payload.
Wired into both the native-vision fast path and the auxiliary-API path so
the whole bug class is covered, not just the one call site.
All 99 existing vision tests pass.
- resolve_image_source: bare cwd-relative filenames ('pic.png') resolve
again (main accepted them; the path-shape gate regressed them — review
by egilewski). Unknown explicit schemes (ftp://, s3://) still rejected.
- Local backend: nonexistent path now raises a clean 'image file not
found' instead of a misleading sandbox-fallback message.
- W4: remove the now-dead path-based _detect_image_mime_type (suffix-trust
SVG acceptance) so future callers can't reintroduce it.
- W3: SVG sources rejected with a dedicated actionable message + test.
- Polish: host read_bytes / temp-file write_bytes offloaded via
asyncio.to_thread (matches the container exec-read); unused
ResolveContext.cfg/extra_roots fields dropped; duplicate policy check
documented as intentional pre-flight short-circuit.
Salvage of #35362, evolved to also close the vision sandbox-escape
(GHSA-gpxw-6wxv-w3qq). The two were the same root cause — vision read image
bytes host-side while every other tool reads through the terminal backend —
so one resolver fixes both the delivery gaps and the escape.
Delivery (from #35362, re-authored against current main since the branch was
4140 commits stale and vision_tools.py had been rewritten on both sides):
- tools/image_source.py: one resolver for data:/http(s)/file/local/container
image sources, returning raw bytes through a single magic-byte-sniff +
50MB-ingest chokepoint. Fixes 'no image attached' / 'Invalid image source'
for every source type (#7571, #25118, #29643, #22328, #32709, #9077).
- tools/credential_files.py: from_agent_visible_cache_path, the container->host
cache reverse-map (inverse of the existing forward twin).
- tools/vision_tools.py: both vision sites route through the resolver with
task_id threaded from the handler; resolved bytes are materialized to a temp
file so main's evolved encode/resize/embed-cap pipeline is reused verbatim
(kept over the PR's older bytes-core resize to avoid touching browser_tool /
conversation_compression callers).
Security (fills #35362's deliberately-stubbed _within_allowed_roots seam):
- Under a non-local terminal backend the file tools are confined to the sandbox
(SECURITY.md 2.2), but vision read host-side — a prompt-injected
vision_analyze('/etc/passwd') exfiltrated host secrets, and read_file even
redirects the model to vision_analyze for image paths. The resolver now
enforces the same boundary: local backend reads any host path (chosen
posture); non-local backend host-reads ONLY the media caches under
HERMES_HOME (where the gateway/download media lives) and routes every other
path to an in-sandbox base64 exec-read — which reads the CONTAINER's file,
the same one 'cat' would, never the host's. Paths are resolve()-d so a
symlink can't escape a cache; fail-closed when no sandbox env exists.
This closes the escape AND delivers container-only images (#32709) with the
same mechanism.
Tests: unified resolver + confinement model (tests/tools/test_image_source.py,
incl. proof a non-cache host path under Docker yields container bytes not the
host secret); existing vision tests updated to the resolver boundary; Docker
integration test verified green against a real daemon (exec-read of a tmpfs
/workspace file, a root-owned mode-600 file, and the host-secret invariant).
Fixes GHSA-gpxw-6wxv-w3qq.
Co-authored-by: banditburai <promptsiren@gmail.com>
Add unit tests for resolve_placeholder_terminal_cwd and extend the config
bridge simulation for docker mount-on vs mount-off vs local fallback.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Split placeholder TERMINAL_CWD resolution into three cases: local falls
back to MESSAGING_CWD/home; docker without workspace mount leaves cwd unset;
docker with mount enabled preserves an explicit host MESSAGING_CWD path for
terminal_tool's /workspace mapping. Stops leaking host Path.home() into
containers without breaking the mount contract.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
The conflict-retry ladder schedules a background recovery task via
loop.create_task(self._handle_polling_conflict(...)) on each failed
start_polling. test_polling_conflict_becomes_fatal_after_retries never
cancelled the last one, so under a loaded scheduler a leaked task could
get a turn, re-drive the counter into the fatal branch, and fire
_notify_fatal_error a second time — breaking assert_awaited_once()
non-deterministically. The bounded updater.stop() guard added in this
salvage introduced an extra await/scheduling yield that surfaced the
latent leak in CI slice 3. Cancel the leaked task before the fatal
assertions so the test is deterministic regardless of scheduler timing.
The salvaged fix (#58272) guarded the primary network-error reconnect path.
Issue #58270's Scope section names three more unguarded await updater.stop()
sites that can hang identically on a CLOSE-WAIT socket:
- conflict handler (before the retry back-off sleep)
- conflict-retries-exhausted teardown (before the fatal notify)
- disconnect() teardown (would hang gateway shutdown/restart)
Each is now wrapped in asyncio.wait_for(..., _UPDATER_STOP_TIMEOUT) with a
warning on timeout, matching the primary path, so no reconnect/teardown ladder
can wedge on a dead socket.
Also hoist the shared 15.0s bound to a single module constant
_UPDATER_STOP_TIMEOUT (self-documenting + DRY across all 4 sites), and update
the CLOSE-WAIT regression test to patch that constant instead of monkeypatching
asyncio.wait_for process-wide.
Fatal-notify idempotency: bounding the conflict-exhausted teardown stop() adds
an await AFTER _set_fatal_error, which yields the loop and lets a concurrent
retry task (scheduled by an earlier conflict, already suspended past the entry
guard) reach the fatal branch too — double-firing the fatal handler (surfaced
as a Python 3.11 CI failure in test_polling_conflict_becomes_fatal_after_retries).
Snapshot the pre-transition fatal state and only notify on the first transition.
When the TCP connection enters CLOSE-WAIT the PTB polling task is blocked
on epoll on a dead socket and never wakes. updater.stop() awaits that task
and therefore hangs indefinitely.
Consequence: _polling_error_task stays alive-but-blocked forever; every
subsequent heartbeat probe sees it as "in-flight" and skips triggering a
new reconnect; the gateway silently drops messages for hours until a manual
restart. Field incident: 11-hour outage on 2026-07-04 UTC despite the
heartbeat loop firing a reconnect at 01:11 — stop() blocked the entire
ladder.
Fix: wrap the updater.stop() call inside asyncio.wait_for(timeout=15).
On TimeoutError log a warning and continue to _drain_polling_connections()
+ start_polling() — same recovery path, just unblocked.
The heartbeat loop (PR #48496) correctly detects the dead socket and fires
_handle_polling_network_error. This commit is the missing second half:
ensuring the reconnect itself always completes.
Test: test_handle_polling_network_error_updater_stop_timeout() simulates
a hang by making stop() sleep forever and verifies that drain + start_polling
are still reached after the timeout.
Fixes#58270
Strict providers (DeepSeek) reject a payload where the same tool_call_id
appears more than once with HTTP 400 'Duplicate value for tool_call_id'.
The issue was filed as an 'orphaned tool message' compression bug, but the
pasted error is a DUPLICATE tool_call_id — orphans are already handled on
main; duplicates were not. Reproduced live on main: both shapes leaked
through repair_message_sequence and sanitize_api_messages.
Two chokepoints, two shapes:
- repair_message_sequence: consume the id from known_tool_ids on first
match so a SECOND tool result reusing it falls into the drop branch
(duplicate tool-result shape). This is @Robinlovelace's kernel from
#55436 (applied manually — that PR was ~800 commits stale and bundled
an unrelated duplicate-DB-write change for #860, which is dropped here).
- sanitize_api_messages (final pre-API pass): add a dedup pass covering
BOTH (a) duplicate tool_calls sharing an id WITHIN one assistant message
(the message[6] shape) and (b) later tool result messages reusing an
already-seen id. #55436 covered neither of these at this chokepoint.
Tests: duplicate-tool-result dedup at both functions, duplicate-assistant-
tool_call-id collapse, and a negative control proving distinct ids are
never dropped (no over-dedup).
Credit: @Robinlovelace (#55436) for the repair_message_sequence dedup kernel.
Closes#58327.
Contributor of the salvaged PR #58276 fix commit. Required so the
contributor attribution CI check passes on the rebase-merge that
preserves their authorship.
Replace the inline dict-copy + _db_persisted pop in
_ensure_compressed_has_user_turn with the canonical
_fresh_compaction_message_copy helper (the same primitive the compressor's
own protected-head/tail assembly uses), so the persistence-marker strip
stays consistent across all compaction copy sites (#57491). Expand the
docstring to record the alternation-safety and end-placement rationale.
22c5048d9 restored Anthropic-style cache_control for two of MoA's three
call paths: the acting aggregator (MoAChatCompletions.create, the
persistent `provider: moa` model) and the advisor fan-out (_run_reference).
aggregate_moa_context() -- the /moa <prompt> one-shot command's synthesis
call -- is the third, independent call path and was never covered: its
call_llm(task="moa_aggregator", ...) sent a single undecorated user message
containing the full joined reference output, re-billing the entire input on
every invocation even when the resolved aggregator slot is a cache-honoring
route (Claude on OpenRouter/native Anthropic, MiniMax, Qwen/DashScope).
- Generalize _maybe_apply_advisor_cache_control to
_maybe_apply_moa_cache_control (it never had advisor-specific logic --
same policy function, same breakpoint layout as the main loop, judged
purely on the passed-in runtime) and reuse it in aggregate_moa_context
the same way _run_reference already does.
- Compute _slot_runtime(aggregator) once and reuse it for both the
decoration call and the call_llm kwargs, instead of calling it twice.
Mutation-verified: reverting the moa_loop.py change makes the new
regression test fail by asserting a plain string aggregator-message
content where the cache-honoring case expects native cache_control
content blocks.
Follow-up to @msh01's wall-deadline init-timeout fix.
- Resource leak: on timeout the initialize() task is abandoned without
awaiting its (shielded, possibly-never-completing) cancellation, so the
half-built PTB app's httpx client / connection pool was never closed —
up to 8x across the retry ladder. Add an optional on_abandon cleanup to
_await_with_thread_deadline that best-effort app.shutdown()s the abandoned
app, run detached + exception-swallowed so it can never re-block or re-hang
the ladder (mirrors _close_client_on_timeout in agent/auxiliary_client.py).
- Cover the helper itself: the salvaged test monkeypatched out the real
_await_with_thread_deadline, so its abandonment/cleanup path was untested.
Add direct tests for happy-path return, prompt-timeout-with-cleanup, and
cleanup-error-swallowed; the wedged coroutines swallow cancellation for a
bounded window (proving the helper returns before cancellation completes,
the #58236 shielded-scope behavior) without leaving an immortal task that
would wedge pytest teardown. Widen the salvaged stub to accept on_abandon.
- Attribution: add yingwaizhiying@gmail.com -> msh01 to AUTHOR_MAP (bare
gmail does not auto-resolve the check-attribution gate).
Known follow-up (not addressed here): the retry ladder reuses the same
self._app across all 8 attempts; a fresh app per attempt would fully close
the coherence risk if an abandoned initialize() completes in the background.
That is a larger restructure of the ~130-line builder+handler setup, left
for a separate change.
