fix(vision): unified image-source resolver + terminal-backend confinement

Salvage of #35362, evolved to also close the vision sandbox-escape
(GHSA-gpxw-6wxv-w3qq). The two were the same root cause — vision read image
bytes host-side while every other tool reads through the terminal backend —
so one resolver fixes both the delivery gaps and the escape.

Delivery (from #35362, re-authored against current main since the branch was
4140 commits stale and vision_tools.py had been rewritten on both sides):
- tools/image_source.py: one resolver for data:/http(s)/file/local/container
  image sources, returning raw bytes through a single magic-byte-sniff +
  50MB-ingest chokepoint. Fixes 'no image attached' / 'Invalid image source'
  for every source type (#7571, #25118, #29643, #22328, #32709, #9077).
- tools/credential_files.py: from_agent_visible_cache_path, the container->host
  cache reverse-map (inverse of the existing forward twin).
- tools/vision_tools.py: both vision sites route through the resolver with
  task_id threaded from the handler; resolved bytes are materialized to a temp
  file so main's evolved encode/resize/embed-cap pipeline is reused verbatim
  (kept over the PR's older bytes-core resize to avoid touching browser_tool /
  conversation_compression callers).

Security (fills #35362's deliberately-stubbed _within_allowed_roots seam):
- Under a non-local terminal backend the file tools are confined to the sandbox
  (SECURITY.md 2.2), but vision read host-side — a prompt-injected
  vision_analyze('/etc/passwd') exfiltrated host secrets, and read_file even
  redirects the model to vision_analyze for image paths. The resolver now
  enforces the same boundary: local backend reads any host path (chosen
  posture); non-local backend host-reads ONLY the media caches under
  HERMES_HOME (where the gateway/download media lives) and routes every other
  path to an in-sandbox base64 exec-read — which reads the CONTAINER's file,
  the same one 'cat' would, never the host's. Paths are resolve()-d so a
  symlink can't escape a cache; fail-closed when no sandbox env exists.
  This closes the escape AND delivers container-only images (#32709) with the
  same mechanism.

Tests: unified resolver + confinement model (tests/tools/test_image_source.py,
incl. proof a non-cache host path under Docker yields container bytes not the
host secret); existing vision tests updated to the resolver boundary; Docker
integration test verified green against a real daemon (exec-read of a tmpfs
/workspace file, a root-owned mode-600 file, and the host-secret invariant).

Fixes GHSA-gpxw-6wxv-w3qq.
Co-authored-by: banditburai <promptsiren@gmail.com>

tests/integration/test_vision_docker_resolve.py

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+"""Docker integration tests for the vision image-source resolver.
+
+Exercises the in-sandbox exec-read path that unit tests can only mock. Two
+scenarios that ONLY the container filesystem can serve:
+
+  * a tmpfs ``/workspace`` file with no host path at all, and
+  * a root-owned mode-600 file the host user cannot read,
+
+both delivered by the resolver's ``base64`` exec-read fallback
+(``tools/image_source._resolve_container_fallback``). This is the same path
+that provides terminal-backend confinement for GHSA-gpxw-6wxv-w3qq: under a
+non-local backend a non-cache path is read INSIDE the container, never on the
+host.
+
+Gating follows the repo convention: the ``integration`` marker excludes these
+from the default suite (``addopts = -m 'not integration'`` in pyproject.toml);
+they run under ``pytest -m integration`` when a Docker daemon is available and
+skip cleanly when it is not. Container spin-up exceeds the 30s suite default,
+so the timeout is bumped to 180s.
+
+Run:  pytest -m integration tests/integration/test_vision_docker_resolve.py
+"""
+import base64
+import shutil
+import subprocess
+
+import pytest
+
+
+def _docker_available() -> bool:
+    """True iff a docker CLI is on PATH and the daemon answers."""
+    if shutil.which("docker") is None:
+        return False
+    try:
+        return subprocess.run(
+            ["docker", "info"], capture_output=True, timeout=5
+        ).returncode == 0
+    except (subprocess.TimeoutExpired, OSError):
+        return False
+
+
+pytestmark = [
+    pytest.mark.integration,
+    pytest.mark.timeout(180),
+    pytest.mark.skipif(not _docker_available(), reason="Docker daemon not available"),
+]
+
+# A real 1x1 PNG.
+_TINY_PNG = base64.b64decode(
+    "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNk+M9QDwADhgGAWjR9awAAAABJRU5ErkJggg=="
+)
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def docker_backend(request, monkeypatch):
+    """A live DockerEnvironment registered so ``get_active_env`` finds it.
+
+    Unique task_id per test: DockerEnvironment derives the container name from
+    the task_id, so a shared id would make one test's teardown remove the
+    other's container.
+    """
+    from tools import terminal_tool
+    from tools.environments import docker as docker_env
+
+    # The resolver keys the exec-read off TERMINAL_ENV=docker.
+    monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
+
+    task_id = f"vision-docker-resolve-{request.node.name}"
+    env = docker_env.DockerEnvironment(
+        image="python:3.11-slim",
+        cwd="/workspace",
+        timeout=120,
+        task_id=task_id,
+        volumes=[],
+        network=False,
+    )
+    # Register under the raw task_id; get_active_env() falls back to the raw
+    # key after trying the _resolve_container_task_id() mapping.
+    with terminal_tool._env_lock:
+        terminal_tool._active_environments[task_id] = env
+    try:
+        env._task_id = task_id
+        yield env
+    finally:
+        with terminal_tool._env_lock:
+            terminal_tool._active_environments.pop(task_id, None)
+        try:
+            env.cleanup()
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+
+
+def _write_png_in_container(env, path, *, mode=None):
+    b64 = base64.b64encode(_TINY_PNG).decode()
+    cmd = f"printf %s {b64} | base64 -d > {path}"
+    if mode:
+        cmd += f" && chmod {mode} {path}"
+    res = env.execute(cmd)
+    assert res.get("returncode", 1) == 0, res
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_resolves_tmpfs_workspace_file(docker_backend):
+    """A container-only path (no host file) is delivered via exec-read."""
+    from tools.image_source import ResolveContext, resolve_image_source
+
+    _write_png_in_container(docker_backend, "/workspace/shot.png")
+    res = await resolve_image_source(
+        "/workspace/shot.png", ResolveContext(task_id=docker_backend._task_id))
+    assert res.origin == "container"
+    assert res.mime == "image/png"
+    assert res.data == _TINY_PNG
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_resolves_root_owned_mode600_file(docker_backend):
+    """Root-owned mode-600 (host user can't read it) is served in-container."""
+    from tools.image_source import ResolveContext, resolve_image_source
+
+    _write_png_in_container(docker_backend, "/workspace/secret.png", mode="600")
+    res = await resolve_image_source(
+        "/workspace/secret.png", ResolveContext(task_id=docker_backend._task_id))
+    assert res.origin == "container"
+    assert res.mime == "image/png"
+    assert res.data == _TINY_PNG
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_host_secret_path_reads_container_not_host(docker_backend, tmp_path):
+    """The GHSA-gpxw invariant, end-to-end against real Docker.
+
+    A path that exists on the HOST with secret bytes but does NOT exist in the
+    container must resolve to the container read (which fails to find it) —
+    never to the host bytes. Proves vision cannot exfiltrate a host file under
+    a sandbox backend even when the exact path is real on the host.
+    """
+    from tools.image_source import (
+        ImageResolutionError,
+        ResolveContext,
+        resolve_image_source,
+    )
+
+    # A real host file outside any media cache, holding a secret.
+    host_secret = tmp_path / "id_rsa"
+    host_secret.write_bytes(b"HOST-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK")
+
+    # That path does not exist inside the fresh container, so the exec-read
+    # finds nothing and the resolver refuses. The exact failure shape depends
+    # on the container's base64 build (some exit non-zero -> SourceNotFound,
+    # some print an error to stderr and exit 0 with empty stdout -> NotAnImage);
+    # both are ImageResolutionError. What matters for GHSA-gpxw: the resolver
+    # never returns the HOST bytes.
+    with pytest.raises(ImageResolutionError) as excinfo:
+        await resolve_image_source(
+            str(host_secret), ResolveContext(task_id=docker_backend._task_id))
+    # Belt and suspenders: the host secret must not appear anywhere in the error.
+    assert b"HOST-PRIVATE-KEY".decode() not in str(excinfo.value)

tests/tools/test_image_source.py

@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+"""Tests for tools/image_source.py — the unified vision image-source resolver.
+
+Covers the delivery contract (data:/http/file/local/container source handling,
+size cap, magic-byte sniff) AND the terminal-backend confinement security model
+(GHSA-gpxw-6wxv-w3qq): under a non-local backend, host reads are confined to the
+media caches and every other path is read inside the sandbox via exec-read.
+"""
+
+import base64
+import importlib
+from pathlib import Path
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+import pytest
+
+
+PNG = b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n" + b"\x00" * 64
+JPEG = b"\xff\xd8\xff" + b"\x00" * 64
+
+
+def _reload(monkeypatch, hermes_home: Path):
+    monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(hermes_home))
+    import hermes_constants
+    importlib.reload(hermes_constants)
+    import tools.image_source as isrc
+    importlib.reload(isrc)
+    return isrc
+
+
+class TestDataUrl:
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_valid_data_url_resolves_to_bytes(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+        isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
+        b64 = base64.b64encode(PNG).decode()
+        res = await isrc.resolve_image_source(
+            f"data:image/png;base64,{b64}", isrc.ResolveContext())
+        assert res.data == PNG
+        assert res.mime == "image/png"
+        assert res.origin == "data"
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_non_image_data_url_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+        isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
+        b64 = base64.b64encode(b"not an image").decode()
+        with pytest.raises(isrc.NotAnImage):
+            await isrc.resolve_image_source(
+                f"data:text/plain;base64,{b64}", isrc.ResolveContext())
+
+
+class TestLocalBackend:
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_local_backend_reads_any_host_path(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+        isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
+        monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "local")
+        img = tmp_path / "outside" / "pic.png"
+        img.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
+        img.write_bytes(PNG)
+        res = await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(img), isrc.ResolveContext())
+        assert res.data == PNG
+        assert res.origin == "file"
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_file_uri_scheme_stripped(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+        isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
+        monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "local")
+        img = tmp_path / "pic.jpg"
+        img.write_bytes(JPEG)
+        res = await isrc.resolve_image_source(f"file://{img}", isrc.ResolveContext())
+        assert res.mime == "image/jpeg"
+
+
+class TestNonLocalBackendConfinement:
+    """The security model: under a sandbox backend, host reads are confined to
+    the media caches; every other path is read inside the sandbox."""
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_media_cache_path_host_read(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+        home = tmp_path / "hermes"
+        isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
+        monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
+        cached = home / "cache" / "images" / "inbound.png"
+        cached.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
+        cached.write_bytes(PNG)
+        # No sandbox env needed — a cache path is host-read directly.
+        res = await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(cached), isrc.ResolveContext())
+        assert res.data == PNG
+        assert res.origin == "file"
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_host_secret_outside_cache_routes_to_sandbox_not_host(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+        """A non-cache host path (e.g. /etc/passwd) must NOT be host-read — it
+        routes to the in-sandbox exec-read, which reads the CONTAINER's file."""
+        home = tmp_path / "hermes"
+        isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
+        monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
+
+        # A real host file outside the caches, holding a "secret".
+        secret = tmp_path / "id_rsa"
+        secret.write_bytes(b"HOST-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK")
+
+        # Fake sandbox env: its exec-read returns a *different* (container) image,
+        # proving we read the container filesystem, not the host secret.
+        container_png_b64 = base64.b64encode(PNG).decode()
+        calls = {}
+
+        def fake_execute(cmd, **kw):
+            calls["cmd"] = cmd
+            return {"returncode": 0, "output": container_png_b64}
+
+        with patch("tools.image_source._get_active_env",
+                   return_value=SimpleNamespace(execute=fake_execute)):
+            res = await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(secret), isrc.ResolveContext(task_id="t1"))
+
+        # Read came from the sandbox exec-read, returning the container image —
+        # the host secret bytes never appear.
+        assert res.origin == "container"
+        assert res.data == PNG
+        assert b"HOST-PRIVATE-KEY" not in res.data
+        assert "base64 --" in calls["cmd"]  # option-injection-safe form
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_non_cache_path_fails_closed_without_sandbox(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+        """No active sandbox env -> refuse rather than fall back to a host read."""
+        home = tmp_path / "hermes"
+        isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
+        monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
+        secret = tmp_path / "id_rsa"
+        secret.write_bytes(b"HOST-PRIVATE-KEY")
+
+        with patch("tools.image_source._get_active_env", return_value=None):
+            with pytest.raises(isrc.SourceNotFound):
+                await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(secret), isrc.ResolveContext(task_id="t1"))
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_symlink_in_cache_pointing_outside_is_not_host_read(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+        """A symlink planted inside a cache dir that points at a host secret must
+        not be host-read (resolve() escapes the cache) — it routes to sandbox."""
+        home = tmp_path / "hermes"
+        isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
+        monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
+        secret = tmp_path / "outside" / "id_rsa"
+        secret.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
+        secret.write_bytes(b"HOST-PRIVATE-KEY")
+        cache_dir = home / "cache" / "images"
+        cache_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
+        link = cache_dir / "sneaky.png"
+        try:
+            link.symlink_to(secret)
+        except (OSError, NotImplementedError):
+            pytest.skip("symlinks unsupported")
+
+        # Fails closed (no sandbox) rather than host-reading the symlink target.
+        with patch("tools.image_source._get_active_env", return_value=None):
+            with pytest.raises(isrc.SourceNotFound):
+                await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(link), isrc.ResolveContext(task_id="t1"))
+
+
+class TestExecReadSafety:
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_exec_read_uses_option_terminator(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+        """Leading-dash paths must not be parsed as base64 options."""
+        home = tmp_path / "hermes"
+        isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
+        monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
+        captured = {}
+
+        def fake_execute(cmd, **kw):
+            captured["cmd"] = cmd
+            return {"returncode": 0, "output": base64.b64encode(PNG).decode()}
+
+        with patch("tools.image_source._get_active_env",
+                   return_value=SimpleNamespace(execute=fake_execute)):
+            await isrc.resolve_image_source(
+                "/workspace/-i-etc-shadow.png", isrc.ResolveContext(task_id="t1"))
+        assert "base64 -- " in captured["cmd"]
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_exec_read_nonzero_returncode_raises(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+        home = tmp_path / "hermes"
+        isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
+        monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
+
+        def fake_execute(cmd, **kw):
+            return {"returncode": 1, "output": ""}
+
+        with patch("tools.image_source._get_active_env",
+                   return_value=SimpleNamespace(execute=fake_execute)):
+            with pytest.raises(isrc.SourceNotFound):
+                await isrc.resolve_image_source(
+                    "/workspace/nope.png", isrc.ResolveContext(task_id="t1"))

tests/tools/test_vision_native_fast_path.py

@@ -119,7 +119,9 @@ class TestVisionAnalyzeNative:
         assert isinstance(result, str)
         parsed = json.loads(result)
         assert parsed.get("success") is False
-        assert "Invalid image source" in parsed.get("error", "")
+        # Unified resolver: unrecognized/non-existent local source.
+        err = parsed.get("error", "").lower()
+        assert "not reachable" in err or "unrecognized image source" in err or "no active sandbox" in err
 
     def test_empty_image_url_returns_error(self):
         result = asyncio.get_event_loop().run_until_complete(

tests/tools/test_vision_tools.py

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 """Tests for tools/vision_tools.py — URL validation, type hints, error logging."""
 
+import base64
 import json
 import logging
 import os
@@ -381,26 +382,20 @@ class TestErrorLoggingExcInfo:
     @pytest.mark.asyncio
     async def test_cleanup_error_logs_exc_info(self, tmp_path, caplog):
         """Temp file cleanup failure should log warning with exc_info."""
-        # Create a real temp file that will be "downloaded"
-        temp_dir = tmp_path / "temp_vision_images"
-        temp_dir.mkdir()
-
-        async def fake_download(url, dest, max_retries=3):
-            """Simulate download by writing file to the expected destination."""
-            dest.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-            dest.write_bytes(b"\xff\xd8\xff" + b"\x00" * 16)
-            return dest
+        # A data: URL resolves to bytes without any network, materializes to a
+        # vision temp file, then the analysis runs — exercising the temp-cleanup
+        # path in the finally block. A tiny valid JPEG (magic bytes) passes the
+        # resolver's magic-byte sniff.
+        jpeg_b64 = base64.b64encode(b"\xff\xd8\xff" + b"\x00" * 32).decode("ascii")
+        data_url = f"data:image/jpeg;base64,{jpeg_b64}"
 
         with (
-            patch("tools.vision_tools._validate_image_url_async", new_callable=AsyncMock, return_value=True),
-            patch("tools.vision_tools._download_image", side_effect=fake_download),
             patch(
                 "tools.vision_tools._image_to_base64_data_url",
                 return_value="",
             ),
             caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="tools.vision_tools"),
         ):
-            # Mock the async_call_llm function to return a mock response
             mock_response = MagicMock()
             mock_choice = MagicMock()
             mock_choice.message.content = "A test image description"
@@ -409,16 +404,12 @@ class TestErrorLoggingExcInfo:
             with (
                 patch("tools.vision_tools.async_call_llm", new_callable=AsyncMock, return_value=mock_response),
             ):
-                # Make unlink fail to trigger cleanup warning
-                original_unlink = Path.unlink
-
+                # Make unlink fail to trigger the cleanup warning.
                 def failing_unlink(self, *args, **kwargs):
                     raise PermissionError("no permission")
 
                 with patch.object(Path, "unlink", failing_unlink):
-                    result = await vision_analyze_tool(
-                        "https://example.com/tempimg.jpg", "describe", "test/model"
-                    )
+                    result = await vision_analyze_tool(data_url, "describe", "test/model")
 
             warning_records = [
                 r
@@ -500,7 +491,8 @@ class TestVisionSafetyGuards:
             result = json.loads(await vision_analyze_tool(str(secret), "extract text"))
 
         assert result["success"] is False
-        assert "Only real image files are supported" in result["error"]
+        # The unified resolver's magic-byte sniff rejects non-images.
+        assert "not a recognized image" in result["error"]
         mock_llm.assert_not_awaited()
 
     @pytest.mark.asyncio
@@ -513,8 +505,8 @@ class TestVisionSafetyGuards:
         }
 
         with (
-            patch("tools.vision_tools.check_website_access", return_value=blocked),
-            patch("tools.vision_tools._validate_image_url_async", new_callable=AsyncMock, return_value=True),
+            patch("tools.website_policy.check_website_access", return_value=blocked),
+            patch("tools.url_safety.is_safe_url", return_value=True),
             patch("tools.vision_tools._download_image", new_callable=AsyncMock) as mock_download,
         ):
             result = json.loads(await vision_analyze_tool("https://blocked.test/cat.png", "describe"))
@@ -1258,7 +1250,7 @@ class TestVisionCpuBurstCap:
                     enc_inflight -= 1
             return ""
 
-        async def fake_native(image_url, question):
+        async def fake_native(image_url, question, task_id=None):
             nonlocal calls_inflight, calls_peak
             calls_inflight += 1
             calls_peak = max(calls_peak, calls_inflight)

tools/credential_files.py

@@ -402,6 +402,30 @@ def map_cache_path_to_container(
     return None
 
 
+def from_agent_visible_cache_path(
+    container_path: str,
+    container_base: str = "/root/.hermes",
+) -> str:
+    """Translate a sandbox/container cache path back to its host path.
+
+    Inverse of :func:`to_agent_visible_cache_path`. Returns the input unchanged
+    when the active backend is not Docker, or when the path is not under any
+    auto-mounted cache directory — the caller then treats a still-container
+    path as "no host file" and falls back to an in-container read.
+    """
+    if os.environ.get("TERMINAL_ENV", "local") != "docker":
+        return container_path
+
+    path = Path(container_path)
+    for mount in get_cache_directory_mounts(container_base=container_base):
+        try:
+            rel = path.relative_to(mount["container_path"])
+        except ValueError:
+            continue
+        return str(Path(mount["host_path"]) / rel)
+    return container_path
+
+
 def to_agent_visible_cache_path(
     host_path: str,
     container_base: str = "/root/.hermes",

tools/image_source.py

@@ -0,0 +1,292 @@
+"""Single resolver for every vision_analyze image source -> bytes + mime.
+
+All source handling (data:/http(s)/file/local/container) funnels through
+:func:`resolve_image_source` so size and magic-byte checks are enforced exactly
+once.  Returns raw bytes (not a path): the downstream step is base64 -> data URL
+(RFC 2397) and provider base64 content blocks.
+
+Security (terminal-backend confinement, GHSA-gpxw-6wxv-w3qq): under a non-local
+terminal backend the file tools are confined to the sandbox (SECURITY.md 2.2),
+but vision read images host-side. This resolver enforces the same boundary:
+
+  * local backend            -> read any host path (chosen posture, unchanged)
+  * non-local backend:
+      path in a media cache   -> host-read (the gateway/download caches live on
+                                 the host and are bind-mounted into the sandbox)
+      path anywhere else      -> read the bytes *inside the sandbox* via exec-read
+                                 (the agent can already ``cat`` any container file;
+                                 this stays within the sandbox boundary and never
+                                 reaches the host's ``/etc/passwd`` / ``~/.ssh``).
+
+So a prompt-injected ``vision_analyze('/etc/passwd')`` under Docker reads the
+*container's* file (what every other tool sees), not the host's — no escape —
+while container-only images (tmpfs ``/workspace``, root-owned) are still
+deliverable. This is the unified delivery + confinement model: the same
+mechanism that fixes "vision can't see container files" also closes the escape.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import base64
+import os
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any, Optional
+
+# Raw-bytes INGEST budget — what the resolver will load before handing off.
+# This is deliberately the 50MB download cap (tools/vision_tools._VISION_MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES),
+# NOT the 20MB provider payload cap. The 20MB cap (_MAX_BASE64_BYTES) is a
+# *post-resize* limit enforced at the call sites: an oversized raw image must
+# still reach the resizer so it can be downscaled under the payload cap. Capping
+# raw bytes at 20MB here would reject every 20-50MB photo before resize can run.
+_MAX_INGEST_BYTES = 50 * 1024 * 1024
+
+
+class ImageResolutionError(Exception):
+    def __init__(self, message: str, *, src: str = "", origin: str = ""):
+        super().__init__(message)
+        self.src, self.origin = src, origin
+
+
+class UnsupportedScheme(ImageResolutionError):
+    pass
+
+
+class SourceUnsafe(ImageResolutionError):  # SSRF / path-allowlist
+    pass
+
+
+class SourceTooLarge(ImageResolutionError):
+    pass
+
+
+class SourceNotFound(ImageResolutionError):
+    pass
+
+
+class NotAnImage(ImageResolutionError):
+    pass
+
+
+@dataclass
+class ResolveContext:
+    task_id: Optional[str] = None
+    cfg: Optional[dict[str, Any]] = None
+    extra_roots: tuple = field(default_factory=tuple)
+
+
+@dataclass
+class ResolvedImage:
+    data: bytes
+    mime: str
+    origin: str  # one of: data | http | file | local | container
+
+
+async def resolve_image_source(src: str, ctx: ResolveContext) -> ResolvedImage:
+    if not isinstance(src, str) or not src.strip():
+        raise SourceNotFound("image_url is required", src=str(src))
+    s = src.strip()
+    if s.startswith("data:"):
+        data, mime = _resolve_data_url(s)
+        return _finalize(data, mime, "data", s)
+    if s.startswith(("http://", "https://")):
+        reason = _http_block_reason(s)
+        if reason:
+            raise SourceUnsafe(reason, src=s)
+        return _finalize(await _download_to_bytes(s), "", "http", s)
+
+    candidate = s[len("file://"):] if s.startswith("file://") else s
+    if s.startswith("file://") or _looks_like_path(candidate):
+        p = Path(os.path.expanduser(candidate))
+        # Confinement decision (see module docstring). Under a non-local backend
+        # a path is host-readable ONLY if it lands in a media cache (after
+        # translating a container-visible cache path back to its host mount);
+        # every other path is read inside the sandbox via exec-read, so a host
+        # path outside the caches never yields the host's bytes.
+        host_target = _permitted_host_read_target(p, ctx)
+        if host_target is not None and host_target.is_file():
+            return _finalize(host_target.read_bytes(), "", "file", s)
+        # Not a permitted host read (or the host file is absent) -> read the
+        # bytes inside the sandbox. On the local backend this reaches the same
+        # host file; under a sandbox it reads the container's filesystem.
+        return await _resolve_container_fallback(p, ctx, s)
+
+    raise UnsupportedScheme(
+        "Unrecognized image source. Use an http(s) URL, a local file path, "
+        "a file:// URI, or a data: URL.",
+        src=s,
+    )
+
+
+def _resolve_data_url(s: str) -> tuple[bytes, str]:
+    header, _, payload = s.partition(",")
+    if ";base64" not in header:
+        raise NotAnImage("data: URL must be base64-encoded", src=s[:64])
+    declared = header[len("data:"):].split(";", 1)[0].strip() or "application/octet-stream"
+    # Cheap pre-decode size gate on the encoded length (~4/3 expansion).
+    if (len(payload) * 3) // 4 > _MAX_INGEST_BYTES:
+        raise SourceTooLarge("data: URL exceeds size limit", src=s[:64])
+    try:
+        data = base64.b64decode(payload, validate=True)
+    except Exception as exc:
+        raise NotAnImage(f"invalid base64 in data: URL: {exc}", src=s[:64])
+    return data, declared  # real mime verified in _finalize via magic bytes
+
+
+def _http_block_reason(url: str) -> Optional[str]:
+    """Return a human-readable block reason, or None when the URL is allowed.
+
+    Preserves the specific website-policy message (rather than collapsing it to
+    a generic string) so the agent sees *why* a fetch was refused.
+    """
+    from tools.url_safety import is_safe_url
+    from tools.website_policy import check_website_access
+
+    if not is_safe_url(url):
+        return "blocked: unsafe or private URL"
+    blocked = check_website_access(url)
+    if blocked:
+        return blocked.get("message") or "blocked by website policy"
+    return None
+
+
+async def _download_to_bytes(url: str) -> bytes:
+    import tempfile
+
+    from tools.vision_tools import _download_image
+
+    with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(suffix=".img", delete=False) as tf:
+        tmp = Path(tf.name)
+    try:
+        await _download_image(url, tmp)  # enforces the 50MB stream cap + redirect SSRF guard
+        return tmp.read_bytes()
+    finally:
+        tmp.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+
+
+def _looks_like_path(s: str) -> bool:
+    return s.startswith(("/", "~", "./", "../")) or (len(s) > 1 and s[1] == ":")
+
+
+def _is_local_terminal_backend() -> bool:
+    """True when the terminal backend runs directly on the host.
+
+    Mirrors ``tools.browser_tool._is_local_backend`` and terminal_tool's own
+    dispatch, which key off ``TERMINAL_ENV``.
+    """
+    return os.getenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "local").strip().lower() in ("local", "")
+
+
+def _media_cache_roots() -> list:
+    """Agent-managed media cache directories under HERMES_HOME (host side).
+
+    The only host paths vision may read under a non-local backend: gateway-
+    downloaded inbound media and the tools' own URL-download temp dirs. Covers
+    the consolidated ``cache/`` layout and the legacy flat directories.
+    """
+    from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home
+
+    home = get_hermes_home()
+    return [
+        home / "cache",  # cache/images, cache/vision, cache/video(s), cache/audio
+        home / "image_cache",
+        home / "audio_cache",
+        home / "video_cache",
+        home / "temp_vision_images",
+        home / "temp_video_files",
+    ]
+
+
+def _permitted_host_read_target(p: Path, ctx: ResolveContext) -> Optional[Path]:
+    """Return the host path to read, or ``None`` if a host read is not permitted.
+
+    - Local backend: any path is permitted (chosen posture). Returns ``p``.
+    - Non-local backend: permitted only if the path resolves inside a media
+      cache root. A container-visible cache path (e.g. ``/root/.hermes/cache/
+      images/x.png``) is first translated back to its host mount; anything that
+      is not under a cache returns ``None`` so the caller routes it to the
+      in-sandbox exec-read instead of reading the host filesystem.
+    """
+    if _is_local_terminal_backend():
+        try:
+            return p.resolve()
+        except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001 — unresolved path: let is_file() fail downstream
+            return p
+
+    from tools.credential_files import from_agent_visible_cache_path
+
+    host_candidate = Path(from_agent_visible_cache_path(str(p)))
+    try:
+        real = host_candidate.resolve()
+    except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001 — cannot resolve -> not a safe host read
+        return None
+    for root in _media_cache_roots():
+        try:
+            real.relative_to(root.resolve())
+            return real
+        except ValueError:
+            continue
+    return None
+
+
+def _get_active_env(task_id: Optional[str]):
+    if not task_id:
+        return None
+    try:
+        from tools.terminal_tool import get_active_env
+
+        return get_active_env(task_id)
+    except Exception:
+        return None
+
+
+async def _resolve_container_fallback(p: Path, ctx: ResolveContext, src: str) -> ResolvedImage:
+    """Read the image bytes inside the sandbox (fail-closed when none exists).
+
+    Reached when a host read is not permitted or the host file is absent. The
+    agent can already ``cat`` any container file (file_operations.py reads
+    root-owned mode-600 files this way), so this stays within the same sandbox
+    boundary and never touches the host filesystem. ``--`` stops a leading-dash
+    path from being parsed as a ``base64`` option; ``base64 -w0`` is GNU-only,
+    so pipe through ``tr -d`` for BusyBox.
+
+    Fail-closed: if there is no active sandbox env we refuse rather than falling
+    back to a host read, so a non-cache host path under a sandbox never leaks.
+    """
+    import asyncio
+    import shlex
+
+    env = _get_active_env(ctx.task_id)
+    if env is None:
+        raise SourceNotFound(
+            f"'{p}' is not reachable inside the sandbox and no active sandbox "
+            f"session is available to read it",
+            src=src, origin="container")
+
+    # env.execute is a blocking backend exec; keep it off the event loop so a
+    # multi-MB base64 read doesn't stall every other coroutine.
+    res = await asyncio.to_thread(
+        env.execute, f"base64 -- {shlex.quote(str(p))} | tr -d '\\n'")
+    if res.get("returncode", 1) != 0:
+        raise SourceNotFound(f"could not read '{p}' inside the sandbox", src=src, origin="container")
+    try:
+        data = base64.b64decode(res.get("output", ""), validate=True)
+    except Exception as exc:
+        raise NotAnImage(f"sandbox returned non-image data for '{p}': {exc}", src=src)
+    return _finalize(data, "", "container", src)
+
+
+def _finalize(data: bytes, declared_mime: str, origin: str, src: str) -> ResolvedImage:
+    """Intrinsic-correctness chokepoint: ingest byte cap + magic-byte sniff.
+
+    The cap here is the generous 50MB *ingest* budget, not the 20MB provider
+    payload cap — a 20-50MB image must survive this step so the call site can
+    resize it under the payload cap. See ``_MAX_INGEST_BYTES``.
+    """
+    from tools.vision_tools import _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes
+
+    if len(data) > _MAX_INGEST_BYTES:
+        raise SourceTooLarge("image exceeds size limit", src=src, origin=origin)
+    sniffed = _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes(data)
+    if sniffed is None:
+        raise NotAnImage("source is not a recognized image", src=src, origin=origin)
+    return ResolvedImage(data=data, mime=sniffed, origin=origin)

tools/vision_tools.py

@@ -221,11 +221,14 @@ async def _validate_image_url_async(url: str) -> bool:
     return await async_is_safe_url(url)
 
 
-def _detect_image_mime_type(image_path: Path) -> Optional[str]:
-    """Return a MIME type when the file looks like a supported image."""
-    with image_path.open("rb") as f:
-        header = f.read(64)
+def _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes(data: bytes) -> Optional[str]:
+    """Magic-byte MIME sniff on raw bytes (authoritative; no extension trust).
 
+    Returns ``None`` for anything without a recognized image header — including
+    SVG, which has no magic bytes and is not ingestible as vision by any
+    provider. Callers that accept SVG-by-text (path-based) layer that on top.
+    """
+    header = data[:64]
     if header.startswith(b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n"):
         return "image/png"
     if header.startswith(b"\xff\xd8\xff"):
@@ -236,11 +239,18 @@ def _detect_image_mime_type(image_path: Path) -> Optional[str]:
         return "image/bmp"
     if len(header) >= 12 and header[:4] == b"RIFF" and header[8:12] == b"WEBP":
         return "image/webp"
-    if image_path.suffix.lower() == ".svg":
+    return None
+
+
+def _detect_image_mime_type(image_path: Path) -> Optional[str]:
+    """Return a MIME type when the file looks like a supported image."""
+    with image_path.open("rb") as f:
+        mime = _detect_image_mime_type_from_bytes(f.read(64))
+    if mime is None and image_path.suffix.lower() == ".svg":
         head = image_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="ignore")[:4096].lower()
         if "<svg" in head:
             return "image/svg+xml"
-    return None
+    return mime
 
 
 def _is_retryable_download_error(error: Exception) -> bool:
@@ -817,13 +827,14 @@ async def _vision_concurrency_slot():
 async def _vision_analyze_native(
     image_url: str,
     question: str,
+    task_id: Optional[str] = None,
 ) -> Any:
     """Fast path for vision-capable main models.
 
-    Loads the image (local file OR remote URL), base64-encodes it, and
-    returns a multimodal tool-result envelope. The agent loop unwraps it;
-    provider adapters serialize it into the right tool-result-with-image
-    shape for each backend.
+    Loads the image (data: / http(s) / file:// / local path / sandbox-container
+    path) via the unified resolver, base64-encodes it, and returns a multimodal
+    tool-result envelope. The agent loop unwraps it; provider adapters serialize
+    it into the right tool-result-with-image shape for each backend.
 
     Returns:
         A ``_multimodal`` envelope dict on success.
@@ -840,38 +851,28 @@ async def _vision_analyze_native(
         if is_interrupted():
             return tool_error("Interrupted", success=False)
 
-        # Resolve the image source (mirrors vision_analyze_tool's logic
-        # exactly so behaviour is consistent).
-        resolved_url = image_url
-        if resolved_url.startswith("file://"):
-            resolved_url = resolved_url[len("file://"):]
-        local_path = Path(os.path.expanduser(resolved_url))
+        # Resolve the source to raw bytes through the single resolver (unifies
+        # data:/http/file/local/container and enforces terminal-backend
+        # confinement). Materialize to a temp file so the existing path-based
+        # encode/resize/embed-cap pipeline below is reused verbatim.
+        from tools.image_source import (
+            ImageResolutionError,
+            ResolveContext,
+            resolve_image_source,
+        )
 
-        if local_path.is_file():
-            temp_image_path = local_path
-            should_cleanup = False
-        elif await _validate_image_url_async(image_url):
-            blocked = check_website_access(image_url)
-            if blocked:
-                return tool_error(blocked["message"], success=False)
-            temp_dir = get_hermes_dir("cache/vision", "temp_vision_images")
-            temp_image_path = temp_dir / f"temp_image_{uuid.uuid4()}.jpg"
-            await _download_image(image_url, temp_image_path)
-            should_cleanup = True
-        else:
-            return tool_error(
-                "Invalid image source. Provide an HTTP/HTTPS URL or a "
-                "valid local file path.",
-                success=False,
-            )
+        try:
+            resolved = await resolve_image_source(image_url, ResolveContext(task_id=task_id))
+        except ImageResolutionError as exc:
+            return tool_error(str(exc), success=False)
 
-        image_size_bytes = temp_image_path.stat().st_size
-        detected_mime_type = _detect_image_mime_type(temp_image_path)
-        if not detected_mime_type:
-            return tool_error(
-                "Only real image files are supported for vision analysis.",
-                success=False,
-            )
+        detected_mime_type = resolved.mime
+        image_size_bytes = len(resolved.data)
+        temp_dir = get_hermes_dir("cache/vision", "temp_vision_images")
+        temp_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        temp_image_path = temp_dir / f"temp_image_{uuid.uuid4()}.img"
+        temp_image_path.write_bytes(resolved.data)
+        should_cleanup = True
 
         image_data_url = await _run_encode_on_cpu_executor(
             _image_to_base64_data_url,
@@ -935,6 +936,7 @@ async def vision_analyze_tool(
     image_url: str,
     user_prompt: str,
     model: str = None,
+    task_id: Optional[str] = None,
 ) -> str:
     """
     Analyze an image from a URL or local file path using vision AI.
@@ -996,42 +998,33 @@ async def vision_analyze_tool(
 
         logger.info("Analyzing image: %s", image_url[:60])
         logger.info("User prompt: %s", user_prompt[:100])
-        
-        # Determine if this is a local file path or a remote URL
-        # Strip file:// scheme so file URIs resolve as local paths.
-        resolved_url = image_url
-        if resolved_url.startswith("file://"):
-            resolved_url = resolved_url[len("file://"):]
-        local_path = Path(os.path.expanduser(resolved_url))
-        if local_path.is_file():
-            # Local file path (e.g. from platform image cache) -- skip download
-            logger.info("Using local image file: %s", image_url)
-            temp_image_path = local_path
-            should_cleanup = False  # Don't delete cached/local files
-        elif await _validate_image_url_async(image_url):
-            # Remote URL -- download to a temporary location
-            blocked = check_website_access(image_url)
-            if blocked:
-                raise PermissionError(blocked["message"])
-            logger.info("Downloading image from URL...")
-            temp_dir = get_hermes_dir("cache/vision", "temp_vision_images")
-            temp_image_path = temp_dir / f"temp_image_{uuid.uuid4()}.jpg"
-            await _download_image(image_url, temp_image_path)
-            should_cleanup = True
-        else:
-            raise ValueError(
-                "Invalid image source. Provide an HTTP/HTTPS URL or a valid local file path."
-            )
-        
+
+        # Resolve the source to raw bytes through the single resolver (unifies
+        # data:/http/file/local/container and enforces terminal-backend
+        # confinement). Materialize to a temp file so the existing path-based
+        # encode/resize pipeline below is reused verbatim.
+        from tools.image_source import (
+            ImageResolutionError,
+            ResolveContext,
+            resolve_image_source,
+        )
+
+        try:
+            resolved = await resolve_image_source(image_url, ResolveContext(task_id=task_id))
+        except ImageResolutionError as exc:
+            raise ValueError(str(exc))
+
+        detected_mime_type = resolved.mime
+        temp_dir = get_hermes_dir("cache/vision", "temp_vision_images")
+        temp_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        temp_image_path = temp_dir / f"temp_image_{uuid.uuid4()}.img"
+        temp_image_path.write_bytes(resolved.data)
+        should_cleanup = True
+
         # Get image file size for logging
-        image_size_bytes = temp_image_path.stat().st_size
+        image_size_bytes = len(resolved.data)
         image_size_kb = image_size_bytes / 1024
         logger.info("Image ready (%.1f KB)", image_size_kb)
-
-        detected_mime_type = _detect_image_mime_type(temp_image_path)
-        if not detected_mime_type:
-            raise ValueError("Only real image files are supported for vision analysis.")
-        
         # Convert image to base64 — send at full resolution first.
         # If the provider rejects it as too large, we auto-resize and retry.
         # Offloaded to the bounded vision CPU executor so a fan-out of encodes
@@ -1335,6 +1328,7 @@ VISION_ANALYZE_SCHEMA = {
 async def _handle_vision_analyze(args: Dict[str, Any], **kw: Any) -> str:
     image_url = args.get("image_url", "")
     question = args.get("question", "")
+    task_id = kw.get("task_id")
 
     # The fan-out cap lives inside the encode/resize step (offloaded to the
     # bounded _vision_cpu_executor), NOT around the whole analysis — so a
@@ -1349,7 +1343,7 @@ async def _handle_vision_analyze(args: Dict[str, Any], **kw: Any) -> str:
     # information loss, no extra latency.
     if _should_use_native_vision_fast_path():
         logger.info("vision_analyze: native fast path")
-        return await _vision_analyze_native(image_url, question)
+        return await _vision_analyze_native(image_url, question, task_id=task_id)
 
     # Legacy path: aux LLM describes the image and we return its text.
     full_prompt = (
@@ -1368,7 +1362,7 @@ async def _handle_vision_analyze(args: Dict[str, Any], **kw: Any) -> str:
         pass
     if not model:
         model = os.getenv("AUXILIARY_VISION_MODEL", "").strip() or None
-    return await vision_analyze_tool(image_url, full_prompt, model)
+    return await vision_analyze_tool(image_url, full_prompt, model, task_id=task_id)
 
 
 registry.register(