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f378f00bfb
When FEISHU_VERIFICATION_TOKEN is configured, an unauthenticated remote could previously prove endpoint control by sending a url_verification payload with any attacker-controlled challenge string — the handler reflected the challenge BEFORE running the token check. Move the verification_token check ahead of the url_verification echo so the challenge response is gated on a valid token. Add a regression test covering the wrong-token case. Also fix the stale test_connect_webhook_mode_starts_local_server fixture to set FEISHU_VERIFICATION_TOKEN (post #30746 webhook mode requires a secret). Salvaged from PR #29663 by @m0n3r0 — kept the url_verification reorder and its regression test; dropped the host-conditional weakening of the #30746 secret guard (we want webhook secrets required regardless of bind host, not only on 0.0.0.0/::). Docs updated to call out the gating. Co-authored-by: teknium1 <127238744+teknium1@users.noreply.github.com> |
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| .. | ||
| assets | ||
| builtin_hooks | ||
| platforms | ||
| __init__.py | ||
| channel_directory.py | ||
| config.py | ||
| delivery.py | ||
| display_config.py | ||
| hooks.py | ||
| memory_monitor.py | ||
| mirror.py | ||
| pairing.py | ||
| platform_registry.py | ||
| restart.py | ||
| run.py | ||
| runtime_footer.py | ||
| session.py | ||
| session_context.py | ||
| shutdown_forensics.py | ||
| slash_access.py | ||
| status.py | ||
| sticker_cache.py | ||
| stream_consumer.py | ||
| whatsapp_identity.py | ||