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The agent-facing cronjob tool scans the user prompt with _scan_cron_prompt()
before creating/updating a job (tools/cronjob_tools.py); the REST cron
endpoints (POST /api/jobs, PATCH /api/jobs/{id}) validated length but not
content. This adds the same scan to both handlers so an exfiltration/injection
prompt is rejected the same way regardless of which surface created the job.
NOT a security boundary, defense-in-depth / parity only: the REST cron
endpoints are authenticated (every handler runs _check_auth, and connect()
refuses to start without API_SERVER_KEY), and _scan_cron_prompt is a documented
in-process heuristic, not a containment boundary (SECURITY.md 3.2).
Raised externally via GHSA-fr3q-rjg3-x6mf (DNS-rebinding pre-auth RCE). The
report's load-bearing 'no auth by default' premise was already closed three
weeks after it was filed by the API_SERVER_KEY-required guard (commit
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|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| assets | ||
| builtin_hooks | ||
| platforms | ||
| __init__.py | ||
| channel_directory.py | ||
| config.py | ||
| delivery.py | ||
| display_config.py | ||
| hooks.py | ||
| memory_monitor.py | ||
| mirror.py | ||
| pairing.py | ||
| platform_registry.py | ||
| restart.py | ||
| run.py | ||
| runtime_footer.py | ||
| session.py | ||
| session_context.py | ||
| shutdown_forensics.py | ||
| slash_access.py | ||
| status.py | ||
| sticker_cache.py | ||
| stream_consumer.py | ||
| stream_dispatch.py | ||
| stream_events.py | ||
| whatsapp_identity.py | ||