hermes-agent/website/docs/user-guide/secrets/index.md
Taylor H. Perkins 5c4c0e9d9b feat(secrets): add 1Password (op://) secret source
Resolve provider credentials from 1Password op://vault/item/field references
at startup via the official `op` CLI, alongside the existing Bitwarden source.
Users map env-var names to references in secrets.onepassword.env; after .env
loads, each is resolved with `op read` and injected into os.environ. Auth is
whatever `op` already uses (service-account token or desktop/interactive
session) — Hermes never authenticates or installs `op` itself.

Startup-safe and fail-open: a missing binary, expired auth, a bad reference,
or an empty value each warn and fall back to existing credentials, never
blocking startup. Successful, complete pulls are cached in-process and on disk
(<hermes_home>/cache/op_cache.json, 0600) via the shared DiskCache; only
secret values are stored, never the token (auth is fingerprinted into the
key). Adds `hermes secrets onepassword {setup,status,set,remove,sync,disable}`
(aliases op/1password), config defaults, the cli-config example, docs, and
hermetic tests.

Hardening applied across both backends in env_loader: each source runs in its
own guard, config sections are coerced to dict, and cache_ttl_seconds is
coerced defensively — so a malformed secrets: section can't abort startup.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 04:58:07 -07:00

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Markdown

# Secrets
Hermes can pull API keys from external secret managers at process startup instead of storing them in `~/.hermes/.env`. The bootstrap token for the secret manager lives in `.env`; every other provider key (OpenAI, Anthropic, OpenRouter, etc.) can stay in the manager and rotate centrally.
Supported:
- [Bitwarden Secrets Manager](./bitwarden) — `bws` CLI, lazy-installed, free tier works.
- [1Password](./onepassword) — `op://` references via the official `op` CLI; service-account or desktop session auth.
## Multiple sources at once
You can enable more than one secret source at the same time — for example a team Bitwarden project alongside a personal vault plugin. Sources compose per env var with a deterministic precedence ladder:
1. **Your `.env` / shell wins by default.** A source only replaces a pre-existing value when its own `override_existing: true` is set (Bitwarden defaults to true so central rotation works).
2. **Mapped sources beat bulk sources.** A source where you explicitly bind env vars to references (an `env:` map) outranks a source that injects a whole project of secrets implicitly, regardless of ordering.
3. **First source wins.** Within the same shape, the order of the optional `secrets.sources` list (or registration order) decides. Later claims on an already-claimed var are skipped — with a startup warning, never silently.
`override_existing` never lets one source overwrite a var another source already claimed, and no source can ever overwrite another source's bootstrap token (e.g. `BWS_ACCESS_TOKEN`).
```yaml
secrets:
sources: [bitwarden] # optional explicit ordering
bitwarden:
enabled: true
project_id: "..."
```
Every credential injected by a source is labelled with its origin — setup flows and `hermes model` show `(from Bitwarden)` next to detected keys so you always know where a value came from.
## Adding your own backend
Third-party secret managers ship as standalone plugins, not core PRs. A backend subclasses `agent.secret_sources.base.SecretSource` (one required method: `fetch(cfg, home_path) -> FetchResult`) and registers via `ctx.register_secret_source(MySource())` in the plugin's `register(ctx)`. The orchestrator owns precedence, conflict handling, timeouts, and provenance — your source only fetches. Contract rules: `fetch()` never raises, never prompts, and returns within its timeout budget; validate your implementation against the conformance kit in `tests/secret_sources/conformance.py`.
The bundled set is deliberately closed (same policy as memory providers): Bitwarden and 1Password ship in-tree. Everything else — Infisical, Proton Pass, HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, OS keystores — belongs in plugin repos; share them in the Nous Research Discord (`#plugins-skills-and-skins`).