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316e77517e
Salvage of #35362, evolved to also close the vision sandbox-escape (GHSA-gpxw-6wxv-w3qq). The two were the same root cause — vision read image bytes host-side while every other tool reads through the terminal backend — so one resolver fixes both the delivery gaps and the escape. Delivery (from #35362, re-authored against current main since the branch was 4140 commits stale and vision_tools.py had been rewritten on both sides): - tools/image_source.py: one resolver for data:/http(s)/file/local/container image sources, returning raw bytes through a single magic-byte-sniff + 50MB-ingest chokepoint. Fixes 'no image attached' / 'Invalid image source' for every source type (#7571, #25118, #29643, #22328, #32709, #9077). - tools/credential_files.py: from_agent_visible_cache_path, the container->host cache reverse-map (inverse of the existing forward twin). - tools/vision_tools.py: both vision sites route through the resolver with task_id threaded from the handler; resolved bytes are materialized to a temp file so main's evolved encode/resize/embed-cap pipeline is reused verbatim (kept over the PR's older bytes-core resize to avoid touching browser_tool / conversation_compression callers). Security (fills #35362's deliberately-stubbed _within_allowed_roots seam): - Under a non-local terminal backend the file tools are confined to the sandbox (SECURITY.md 2.2), but vision read host-side — a prompt-injected vision_analyze('/etc/passwd') exfiltrated host secrets, and read_file even redirects the model to vision_analyze for image paths. The resolver now enforces the same boundary: local backend reads any host path (chosen posture); non-local backend host-reads ONLY the media caches under HERMES_HOME (where the gateway/download media lives) and routes every other path to an in-sandbox base64 exec-read — which reads the CONTAINER's file, the same one 'cat' would, never the host's. Paths are resolve()-d so a symlink can't escape a cache; fail-closed when no sandbox env exists. This closes the escape AND delivers container-only images (#32709) with the same mechanism. Tests: unified resolver + confinement model (tests/tools/test_image_source.py, incl. proof a non-cache host path under Docker yields container bytes not the host secret); existing vision tests updated to the resolver boundary; Docker integration test verified green against a real daemon (exec-read of a tmpfs /workspace file, a root-owned mode-600 file, and the host-secret invariant). Fixes GHSA-gpxw-6wxv-w3qq. Co-authored-by: banditburai <promptsiren@gmail.com> |
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| .. | ||
| __init__.py | ||
| test_batch_runner.py | ||
| test_checkpoint_resumption.py | ||
| test_daytona_terminal.py | ||
| test_ha_integration.py | ||
| test_modal_terminal.py | ||
| test_vision_docker_resolve.py | ||
| test_voice_channel_flow.py | ||
| test_web_tools.py | ||