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https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent.git
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1f28b1a9b9
Tirith redacts its own findings, but the approval-request callbacks built the
operator prompt from the RAW command string, so a credential-shaped value
Tirith flagged was sent verbatim to clients, undoing the redaction one layer up.
Two egress transports carried the leak; both are fixed via a shared
module-level seam _redact_approval_command() (redact_sensitive_text force=True):
1. chat platforms — _approval_notify_sync (gateway/run.py): redact before
both the button path (send_exec_approval) and the plain-text /approve
fallback.
2. SSE/API stream — _approval_notify (gateway/platforms/api_server.py):
redact event['command'] before it is enqueued to API/desktop clients.
(whole-bug-class: sibling call path on a separate transport.)
force=True so the prompt — a hard secret-egress boundary — honors redaction
even when security.redact_secrets is off. Clean commands pass through unchanged.
Tests bind the seam (synthetic credential-format fixtures, force-when-disabled) AND assert
BOTH callbacks ASSIGN the redacted result before the send/enqueue sink, via an
AST contract that rejects a discarded-result call. All mutation-checked.
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| .. | ||
| assets | ||
| builtin_hooks | ||
| platforms | ||
| relay | ||
| __init__.py | ||
| authz_mixin.py | ||
| channel_directory.py | ||
| config.py | ||
| delivery.py | ||
| display_config.py | ||
| hooks.py | ||
| kanban_watchers.py | ||
| memory_monitor.py | ||
| message_timestamps.py | ||
| mirror.py | ||
| pairing.py | ||
| platform_registry.py | ||
| response_filters.py | ||
| restart.py | ||
| rich_sent_store.py | ||
| run.py | ||
| runtime_footer.py | ||
| session.py | ||
| session_context.py | ||
| shutdown_forensics.py | ||
| slash_access.py | ||
| slash_commands.py | ||
| status.py | ||
| sticker_cache.py | ||
| stream_consumer.py | ||
| stream_dispatch.py | ||
| stream_events.py | ||
| whatsapp_identity.py | ||