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39975613b1
Second, deeper pass over tools/gateway/hermes_cli plus first pass over the trees wave 1 missed (acp, acp_adapter, skills, computer_use, docker, dashboard, conformance, monitoring, secret_sources, hermes_state, providers). Same rubric as wave 1 (AGENTS.md test policy); security, alternation/caching invariants, issue-number regressions, and E2E kept. Real test-quality fixes found and rooted out along the way: - tests/tools/test_command_guards.py made real auxiliary-LLM HTTPS calls (DEFAULT_CONFIG smart-approval leaked in) — pinned approval mode=manual via autouse fixture: 17.4s → 0.4s. - test_model_switch_custom_providers.py / test_user_providers_model_switch.py silently probed live provider catalogs (~2s/test) — stubbed cached_provider_model_ids/provider_model_ids/fetch_api_models. - test_telegram_noise_filter.py: 15-platform copy-paste matrix over shared gateway.run logic → 3 representative platforms (55s → 3.9s). - test_gateway_shutdown.py: stop()'s 5s interrupt-deadline loop spun on MagicMock agents — interrupt.side_effect now clears _running_agents (22s → 1.0s). - test_gateway_inactivity_timeout.py poll-harness timings shrunk 3-5x (24s → 1.1s); test_mcp_stability.py backoff/SIGTERM-grace sleeps patched (15.4s → 2.5s); test_async_delegation.py negative-drain wait 5s → 0.5s. - test_telegram_init_deadline.py: loop-block margin restored to 1.0s with rationale comment — the watchdog-dump assertion needs the loop blocked well past deadline+grace under parallel load (flaked once in the 40-worker verification run at a 0.2s margin). Verification: full hermetic suite via scripts/run_tests.sh — 2,438 files, 21,718 tests passed, 0 failed, 293.9s wall. Suite totals vs original baseline: 46,820 → 19,757 test functions (−57.8%), wall 583.5s → 293.9s (−50%), subprocess CPU 13,564s → 11,623s.
73 lines
2.5 KiB
Python
73 lines
2.5 KiB
Python
"""Regression: text_to_speech_tool output_path must reject '..' traversal.
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The TTS surface accepts agent/user-supplied absolute paths (writing to a
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chosen file is the whole point). What it must reject is paths that use
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``..`` components to escape their declared base — those are almost
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always either a bug or prompt-injection-controlled
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(e.g. ``output_path="audio/../../etc/cron.d/x"``).
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"""
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import json
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from tools.tts_tool import text_to_speech_tool
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def test_output_path_rejects_traversal_escape():
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"""A path with '..' components must be rejected before any provider work."""
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result = json.loads(text_to_speech_tool(
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text="hello",
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output_path="audio/../../etc/cron.d/malicious",
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))
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assert result["success"] is False
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assert "traversal" in result["error"].lower()
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def test_output_path_rejects_bare_dotdot():
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"""Bare '..' prefix must be rejected."""
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result = json.loads(text_to_speech_tool(
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text="hello",
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output_path="../escape.mp3",
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))
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assert result["success"] is False
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assert "traversal" in result["error"].lower()
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def test_output_path_rejects_hermes_oauth_store(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""TTS output_path must not bypass the shared protected-file write guard."""
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import agent.file_safety as file_safety
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hermes_home = tmp_path / "hermes-home"
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hermes_home.mkdir()
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monkeypatch.setattr(file_safety, "_hermes_home_path", lambda: hermes_home)
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monkeypatch.setattr(file_safety, "_hermes_root_path", lambda: hermes_home)
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target = hermes_home / ".anthropic_oauth.json"
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result = json.loads(text_to_speech_tool(
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text="hello",
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output_path=str(target),
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))
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assert result["success"] is False
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assert "protected credential" in result["error"]
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assert not target.exists()
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def test_output_path_rejects_mcp_token_directory(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""TTS output_path must not write synthesized audio over MCP token files."""
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import agent.file_safety as file_safety
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hermes_home = tmp_path / "hermes-home"
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token_dir = hermes_home / "mcp-tokens"
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token_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
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monkeypatch.setattr(file_safety, "_hermes_home_path", lambda: hermes_home)
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monkeypatch.setattr(file_safety, "_hermes_root_path", lambda: hermes_home)
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target = token_dir / "server.mp3"
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result = json.loads(text_to_speech_tool(
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text="hello",
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output_path=str(target),
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))
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assert result["success"] is False
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assert "protected credential" in result["error"]
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assert not target.exists()
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