Second, deeper pass over tools/gateway/hermes_cli plus first pass over
the trees wave 1 missed (acp, acp_adapter, skills, computer_use, docker,
dashboard, conformance, monitoring, secret_sources, hermes_state,
providers). Same rubric as wave 1 (AGENTS.md test policy); security,
alternation/caching invariants, issue-number regressions, and E2E kept.
Real test-quality fixes found and rooted out along the way:
- tests/tools/test_command_guards.py made real auxiliary-LLM HTTPS calls
(DEFAULT_CONFIG smart-approval leaked in) — pinned approval
mode=manual via autouse fixture: 17.4s → 0.4s.
- test_model_switch_custom_providers.py / test_user_providers_model_switch.py
silently probed live provider catalogs (~2s/test) — stubbed
cached_provider_model_ids/provider_model_ids/fetch_api_models.
- test_telegram_noise_filter.py: 15-platform copy-paste matrix over
shared gateway.run logic → 3 representative platforms (55s → 3.9s).
- test_gateway_shutdown.py: stop()'s 5s interrupt-deadline loop spun on
MagicMock agents — interrupt.side_effect now clears _running_agents
(22s → 1.0s).
- test_gateway_inactivity_timeout.py poll-harness timings shrunk 3-5x
(24s → 1.1s); test_mcp_stability.py backoff/SIGTERM-grace sleeps
patched (15.4s → 2.5s); test_async_delegation.py negative-drain wait
5s → 0.5s.
- test_telegram_init_deadline.py: loop-block margin restored to 1.0s
with rationale comment — the watchdog-dump assertion needs the loop
blocked well past deadline+grace under parallel load (flaked once in
the 40-worker verification run at a 0.2s margin).
Verification: full hermetic suite via scripts/run_tests.sh —
2,438 files, 21,718 tests passed, 0 failed, 293.9s wall.
Suite totals vs original baseline: 46,820 → 19,757 test functions
(−57.8%), wall 583.5s → 293.9s (−50%), subprocess CPU 13,564s → 11,623s.
text_to_speech_tool accepts an explicit output_path. Without a traversal
guard, a path containing '..' components (whether prompt-injection-
controlled, from a confused skill, or just a buggy caller) could escape
its declared base and write the audio to a system location — e.g.
`output_path='audio/../../etc/cron.d/x'` lands the file outside the
intended audio cache.
Reject '..' components in the user-supplied path. Explicit absolute
paths are unchanged (the agent legitimately writes audio wherever the
user/caller asks); only traversal-style escapes are blocked. The
terminal tool can still write anywhere with approval — this just keeps
the unattended TTS surface from materializing files via traversal.
Regression tests cover: '..' in the middle (audio/../../etc/...),
bare '..' prefix, and the negative cases (absolute paths + relative
paths without '..' both pass through unchanged).
Salvaged from PR #6693 by @aaronlab. The original PR confined output to
DEFAULT_OUTPUT_DIR-or-cwd, which broke 9 existing tests that legitimately
write to tmp_path locations. The traversal-only check covers the actual
threat (path-escape via '..' from prompt injection) without restricting
where users can choose to write their audio.
The remaining pieces of #6693 (skill_commands rglob symlink rejection,
delegate_tool batch prefix display) are dropped:
- skill_commands rglob: breaks the documented design supporting
~/.hermes/skills/<name> as a symlink to a checked-out skill elsewhere
(see comment at agent/skill_commands.py:73-75)
- delegate_tool batch prefix: pure UX, doesn't belong in a security PR
Co-authored-by: teknium1 <127238744+teknium1@users.noreply.github.com>
