The media-delivery denylist in gateway/platforms/base.py enumerated only
.env/auth.json/credentials/config.yaml under HERMES_HOME, so other
credential stores that live at the root fell through and could be
auto-attached to chat replies. The reported case: the Google Workspace
skill's google_token.json refreshes every turn, bumping its mtime to
'now', which kept passing the strict-mode recency window and re-sent the
OAuth token on every reply.
Extend the explicit per-file denylist to mirror the canonical credential
set already enforced by the read/write guards in agent/file_safety.py:
google_token.json, google_oauth_pending.json, auth/google_oauth.json,
.anthropic_oauth.json, webhook_subscriptions.json, cache/bws_cache.json,
auth.lock, and the pairing/ token directory.
Targeted per-file additions (not a blanket ~/.hermes deny, which was
declined in #32090/#34425 because it would block skills/, logs/, and
ad-hoc agent-written deliverables). mcp-tokens/ (#37222) and
state.db/kanban.db (#41071) are left to their sibling targeted PRs.
Reported-by: xxxigm (#50912)
100e7be20e