mirror of
https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent.git
synced 2026-07-24 16:54:43 +00:00
1d7db1ba17
`SlackAdapter._fetch_thread_context` formats each prior thread message as
`{name}: {msg_text}` and joins them with newlines into the block the call
site prepends *raw* into the model turn (`text = thread_context + text`).
Both fields are attacker-influenceable — any thread participant sets their
own Slack display name and message text — and neither was neutralized, so
an embedded newline let a thread message break out of its line and pose as
a fresh markdown section (a fake "## SYSTEM" / "## Override" heading) inside
the context the model reads when first mentioned mid-thread.
This is the same indirect-prompt-injection vector already closed for the
sibling untrusted sinks: the sender-name prefix
(`neutralize_untrusted_inline_text`), the reply quote, and the relay
channel-context renderer. The Slack thread-context backfill — the default
whenever the bot is mentioned in a thread with no active session — was the
missed sink. (The existing `[unverified]` tagging marks *who* a message is
from; it does nothing about newline structure, so an authorized sender can
inject just as easily.)
Flatten both fields with `neutralize_untrusted_inline_text` before
interpolation. The body uses `max_chars=0` so message text is not truncated
(thread context caps the message *count*, never per-message length); the
display name keeps the default bound. `parent_text` keeps the raw message
(its own reply-context sink neutralizes separately). A well-behaved message
is preserved byte-for-byte.
Adds a regression test covering a hostile display name, a hostile message
body, benign passthrough, and the no-truncation guarantee.
|
||
|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| dingtalk | ||
| discord | ||
| feishu | ||
| google_chat | ||
| homeassistant | ||
| irc | ||
| line | ||
| matrix | ||
| mattermost | ||
| ntfy | ||
| photon | ||
| raft | ||
| simplex | ||
| slack | ||
| sms | ||
| teams | ||
| telegram | ||
| wecom | ||