hermes-agent/plugins
Frowtek 1d7db1ba17 fix(slack): neutralize prompt injection in thread-context backfill
`SlackAdapter._fetch_thread_context` formats each prior thread message as
`{name}: {msg_text}` and joins them with newlines into the block the call
site prepends *raw* into the model turn (`text = thread_context + text`).
Both fields are attacker-influenceable — any thread participant sets their
own Slack display name and message text — and neither was neutralized, so
an embedded newline let a thread message break out of its line and pose as
a fresh markdown section (a fake "## SYSTEM" / "## Override" heading) inside
the context the model reads when first mentioned mid-thread.

This is the same indirect-prompt-injection vector already closed for the
sibling untrusted sinks: the sender-name prefix
(`neutralize_untrusted_inline_text`), the reply quote, and the relay
channel-context renderer. The Slack thread-context backfill — the default
whenever the bot is mentioned in a thread with no active session — was the
missed sink. (The existing `[unverified]` tagging marks *who* a message is
from; it does nothing about newline structure, so an authorized sender can
inject just as easily.)

Flatten both fields with `neutralize_untrusted_inline_text` before
interpolation. The body uses `max_chars=0` so message text is not truncated
(thread context caps the message *count*, never per-message length); the
display name keeps the default bound. `parent_text` keeps the raw message
(its own reply-context sink neutralizes separately). A well-behaved message
is preserved byte-for-byte.

Adds a regression test covering a hostile display name, a hostile message
body, benign passthrough, and the no-truncation guarantee.
2026-07-23 11:44:43 -07:00
..
browser fix: guard int(os.getenv()) casts against malformed env vars (#40598) 2026-06-07 06:14:24 -07:00
context_engine feat(context-engine): host contract for external context engines 2026-05-28 01:45:30 -07:00
cron_providers fix(cron): harden execution attempt ledger 2026-07-17 04:58:35 -07:00
dashboard_auth feat(dashboard_auth): support confidential clients (client_secret) in self-hosted OIDC (#55344) 2026-06-30 13:32:51 +10:00
disk-cleanup docs(disk-cleanup): clarify cron output-root protection is exact-match 2026-07-01 15:42:04 +05:30
google_meet refactor(setup): route dependency installs through the canonical uv→pip→ensurepip ladder 2026-07-07 04:09:35 -07:00
hermes-achievements fix(achievements): stop card hover click loop 2026-07-16 04:34:57 -07:00
image_gen fix(deepinfra): harden multimodal provider routing 2026-07-14 02:59:39 +05:30
kanban feat(kanban): per-task model dropdown — set/override worker model+provider from the board (#69876) 2026-07-22 22:23:24 -07:00
memory fix(memory): preserve genuine pre-delimiter content in merged compaction rows 2026-07-22 06:59:14 -07:00
model-providers feat(nous): send top-level session_id for provider sticky routing (#69253) 2026-07-22 04:39:20 -07:00
observability fix(nemo-relay): align dynamic plugin configuration 2026-07-13 17:01:08 -06:00
platforms fix(slack): neutralize prompt injection in thread-context backfill 2026-07-23 11:44:43 -07:00
security-guidance plugins: add security-guidance — pattern-matched warnings on dangerous code writes (#33131) 2026-05-27 02:07:21 -07:00
spotify chore: prune unused imports and duplicate import redefinitions 2026-05-28 22:26:25 -07:00
teams_pipeline fix(teams-pipeline): reject dot-only recording display_name 2026-07-01 02:03:48 -07:00
video_gen fix(video-gen): omit duration for range-based FAL families when unspecified 2026-07-16 04:24:10 -07:00
web fix: sanitize subprocess env for DDGS worker 2026-07-21 11:51:01 +05:30
__init__.py feat(memory): pluggable memory provider interface with profile isolation, review fixes, and honcho CLI restoration (#4623) 2026-04-02 15:33:51 -07:00
plugin_utils.py fix(plugins): thread-safe lazy-singleton helpers; fix honcho TOCTOU (#24759) (#42150) 2026-06-08 09:35:22 -07:00