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4f0ee4d3ff
Reworks the salvaged command module into a CommandSource(SecretSource) registered as the third bundled source, composing with Bitwarden and 1Password through the apply_all() orchestrator — enable any combination simultaneously. The original PR's secrets.provider single-selector is deliberately dropped: multi-source is first-class and a mutually exclusive provider switch would regress that. - fetch() only fetches; precedence/override/conflicts/environ writes stay in the orchestrator. ErrorKind classification + remediation hints. - apply_command_secrets() kept as a legacy shim (parser/security helpers unchanged: HERMES_SECRET_KEY data-only key passing, cross-key misroute guard, base64-padding disambiguation, timeout + output cap, structured- fields-only failure logging, stderr discarded). - Dispatch tests rewritten for the registry path incl. an explicit two-sources-compose test; selector tests removed with the selector. - cli-config.yaml.example + docs page (command.md), secrets index entry. - contributors mapping for mvalentin@valensys.net -> 0xr00tf3rr3t.
50 lines
4 KiB
Markdown
50 lines
4 KiB
Markdown
# Secrets
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Hermes can pull API keys from external secret managers at process startup instead of storing them in `~/.hermes/.env`. The bootstrap token for the secret manager lives in `.env`; every other provider key (OpenAI, Anthropic, OpenRouter, etc.) can stay in the manager and rotate centrally.
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Supported:
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- [Bitwarden Secrets Manager](./bitwarden) — `bws` CLI, lazy-installed, free tier works.
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- [1Password](./onepassword) — `op://` references via the official `op` CLI; service-account or desktop session auth.
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- [Command helper](./command) — any CLI vault (`keepassxc-cli`, `secret-tool`, `pass`, custom scripts) via a user-configured helper that prints `KEY=VALUE` lines.
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## Multiple sources at once
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You can enable more than one secret source at the same time — for example a team Bitwarden project alongside a personal vault plugin. Sources compose per env var with a deterministic precedence ladder:
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1. **Your `.env` / shell wins by default.** A source only replaces a pre-existing value when its own `override_existing: true` is set (Bitwarden defaults to true so central rotation works).
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2. **Mapped sources beat bulk sources.** A source where you explicitly bind env vars to references (an `env:` map) outranks a source that injects a whole project of secrets implicitly, regardless of ordering.
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3. **First source wins.** Within the same shape, the order of the optional `secrets.sources` list (or registration order) decides. Later claims on an already-claimed var are skipped — with a startup warning, never silently.
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`override_existing` never lets one source overwrite a var another source already claimed, and no source can ever overwrite another source's bootstrap token (e.g. `BWS_ACCESS_TOKEN`).
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```yaml
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secrets:
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sources: [bitwarden] # optional explicit ordering
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bitwarden:
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enabled: true
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project_id: "..."
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```
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Every credential injected by a source is labelled with its origin — setup flows and `hermes model` show `(from Bitwarden)` next to detected keys so you always know where a value came from.
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## Profiles and shared vaults
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Two orchestrator-level knobs make one shared vault safe across [profiles](../features/profiles):
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- **`secrets.preserve_existing`** — a list of env var names whose existing `.env` / shell value always wins, even against a source with `override_existing: true`. Use it for per-profile platform secrets (e.g. `FEISHU_APP_SECRET`) that intentionally differ across profiles while everything else rotates centrally:
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```yaml
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secrets:
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preserve_existing: [FEISHU_APP_SECRET, TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN]
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```
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- **Profile aliasing** (on by default, `secrets.profile_alias: false` to disable) — when Hermes runs under a named profile, a vault secret named `FOO_<PROFILE>` (credential-shaped suffixes only: `*_API_KEY`, `*_TOKEN`, `*_SECRET`, `*_KEY`, `*_PASSWORD`) also hydrates the canonical `FOO`. Store `TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN_MILLA` in the shared project and the `milla` profile's adapters — which read the fixed name `TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN` — get the right value automatically. A var the vault supplies directly under its canonical name always beats an alias.
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Both apply to every source — bundled and plugin — because they live in the orchestrator, not the backends.
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## Adding your own backend
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Third-party secret managers ship as standalone plugins, not core PRs. A backend subclasses `agent.secret_sources.base.SecretSource` (one required method: `fetch(cfg, home_path) -> FetchResult`) and registers via `ctx.register_secret_source(MySource())` in the plugin's `register(ctx)`. The orchestrator owns precedence, conflict handling, timeouts, and provenance — your source only fetches. Full guide with the contract rules, subprocess-safety helper, and conformance kit: [Building a Secret Source Plugin](/developer-guide/secret-source-plugin).
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The bundled set is deliberately closed (same policy as memory providers): Bitwarden and 1Password ship in-tree. Everything else — Infisical, Proton Pass, HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, OS keystores — belongs in plugin repos; share them in the Nous Research Discord (`#plugins-skills-and-skins`).
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