Fix variable name breakage (run_agent, hermes_constants, etc.) where
import rewriter changed 'import X' to 'import hermes_agent.Y' but
test code still referenced 'X' as a variable name.
Fix package-vs-module confusion (cli.auth, cli.models, cli.ui) where
single files became directories.
Fix hardcoded file paths in tests pointing to old locations.
Fix tool registry to discover tools in subpackage directories.
Fix stale import in hermes_agent/tools/__init__.py.
Part of #14182, #14183
Rewrite all import statements, patch() targets, sys.modules keys,
importlib.import_module() strings, and subprocess -m references to use
hermes_agent.* paths.
Strip sys.path.insert hacks from production code (rely on editable install).
Update COMPONENT_PREFIXES for logger filtering.
Fix 3 hardcoded getLogger() calls to use __name__.
Update transport and tool registry discovery paths.
Update plugin module path strings.
Add legacy process-name patterns for gateway PID detection.
Add main() to skills_sync for console_script entry point.
Fix _get_bundled_dir() path traversal after move.
Part of #14182, #14183
DNS rebinding attack: a victim browser that has the dashboard (or the
WhatsApp bridge) open could be tricked into fetching from an
attacker-controlled hostname that TTL-flips to 127.0.0.1. Same-origin
and CORS checks don't help — the browser now treats the attacker origin
as same-origin with the local service. Validating the Host header at
the app layer rejects any request whose Host isn't one we bound for.
Changes:
hermes_cli/web_server.py:
- New host_header_middleware runs before auth_middleware. Reads
app.state.bound_host (set by start_server) and rejects requests
whose Host header doesn't match the bound interface with HTTP 400.
- Loopback binds accept localhost / 127.0.0.1 / ::1. Non-loopback
binds require exact match. 0.0.0.0 binds skip the check (explicit
--insecure opt-in; no app-layer defence possible).
- IPv6 bracket notation parsed correctly: [::1] and [::1]:9119 both
accepted.
scripts/whatsapp-bridge/bridge.js:
- Express middleware rejects non-loopback Host headers. Bridge
already binds 127.0.0.1-only, this adds the complementary app-layer
check for DNS rebinding defence.
Tests: 8 new in tests/hermes_cli/test_web_server_host_header.py
covering loopback/non-loopback/zero-zero binds, IPv6 brackets, case
insensitivity, and end-to-end middleware rejection via TestClient.
Reported in GHSA-ppp5-vxwm-4cf7 by @bupt-Yy-young. Hardening — not
CVE per SECURITY.md §3. The dashboard's main trust boundary is the
loopback bind + session token; DNS rebinding defeats the bind assumption
but not the token (since the rebinding browser still sees a first-party
fetch to 127.0.0.1 with the token-gated API). Host-header validation
adds the missing belt-and-braces layer.
