mirror of
https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent.git
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Rewrite all import statements, patch() targets, sys.modules keys, importlib.import_module() strings, and subprocess -m references to use hermes_agent.* paths. Strip sys.path.insert hacks from production code (rely on editable install). Update COMPONENT_PREFIXES for logger filtering. Fix 3 hardcoded getLogger() calls to use __name__. Update transport and tool registry discovery paths. Update plugin module path strings. Add legacy process-name patterns for gateway PID detection. Add main() to skills_sync for console_script entry point. Fix _get_bundled_dir() path traversal after move. Part of #14182, #14183
146 lines
5.9 KiB
Python
146 lines
5.9 KiB
Python
"""Tests for GHSA-ppp5-vxwm-4cf7 — Host-header validation.
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DNS rebinding defence: a victim browser that has the dashboard open
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could be tricked into fetching from an attacker-controlled hostname
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that TTL-flips to 127.0.0.1. Same-origin / CORS checks won't help —
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the browser now treats the attacker origin as same-origin. Validating
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the Host header at the application layer rejects the attack.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import sys
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from pathlib import Path
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import pytest
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_repo = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1])
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if _repo not in sys.path:
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class TestHostHeaderValidator:
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"""Unit test the _is_accepted_host helper directly — cheaper and
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more thorough than spinning up the full FastAPI app."""
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def test_loopback_bind_accepts_loopback_names(self):
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from hermes_agent.cli.web_server import _is_accepted_host
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for bound in ("127.0.0.1", "localhost", "::1"):
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for host_header in (
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"127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.1:9119",
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"localhost", "localhost:9119",
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"[::1]", "[::1]:9119",
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):
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assert _is_accepted_host(host_header, bound), (
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f"bound={bound} must accept host={host_header}"
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)
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def test_loopback_bind_rejects_attacker_hostnames(self):
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"""The core rebinding defence: attacker-controlled hosts that
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TTL-flip to 127.0.0.1 must be rejected."""
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from hermes_agent.cli.web_server import _is_accepted_host
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for bound in ("127.0.0.1", "localhost"):
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for attacker in (
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"evil.example",
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"evil.example:9119",
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"rebind.attacker.test:80",
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"localhost.attacker.test", # subdomain trick
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"127.0.0.1.evil.test", # lookalike IP prefix
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"", # missing Host
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):
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assert not _is_accepted_host(attacker, bound), (
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f"bound={bound} must reject attacker host={attacker!r}"
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)
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def test_zero_zero_bind_accepts_anything(self):
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"""0.0.0.0 means operator explicitly opted into all-interfaces
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(requires --insecure). No Host-layer defence is possible — rely
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on operator network controls."""
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from hermes_agent.cli.web_server import _is_accepted_host
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for host in ("10.0.0.5", "evil.example", "my-server.corp.net"):
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assert _is_accepted_host(host, "0.0.0.0")
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assert _is_accepted_host(host + ":9119", "0.0.0.0")
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def test_explicit_non_loopback_bind_requires_exact_match(self):
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"""If the operator bound to a specific non-loopback hostname,
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the Host header must match exactly."""
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from hermes_agent.cli.web_server import _is_accepted_host
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assert _is_accepted_host("my-server.corp.net", "my-server.corp.net")
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assert _is_accepted_host("my-server.corp.net:9119", "my-server.corp.net")
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# Different host — reject
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assert not _is_accepted_host("evil.example", "my-server.corp.net")
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# Loopback — reject (we bound to a specific non-loopback name)
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assert not _is_accepted_host("localhost", "my-server.corp.net")
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def test_case_insensitive_comparison(self):
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"""Host headers are case-insensitive per RFC — accept variations."""
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from hermes_agent.cli.web_server import _is_accepted_host
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assert _is_accepted_host("LOCALHOST", "127.0.0.1")
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assert _is_accepted_host("LocalHost:9119", "127.0.0.1")
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class TestHostHeaderMiddleware:
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"""End-to-end test via the FastAPI app — verify the middleware
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rejects bad Host headers with 400."""
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def test_rebinding_request_rejected(self):
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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from hermes_agent.cli.web_server import app
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# Simulate start_server having set the bound_host
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app.state.bound_host = "127.0.0.1"
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try:
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client = TestClient(app)
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# The TestClient sends Host: testserver by default — which is
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# NOT a loopback alias, so the middleware must reject it.
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resp = client.get(
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"/api/status",
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headers={"Host": "evil.example"},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 400
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assert "Invalid Host header" in resp.json()["detail"]
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finally:
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# Clean up so other tests don't inherit the bound_host
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if hasattr(app.state, "bound_host"):
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del app.state.bound_host
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def test_legit_loopback_request_accepted(self):
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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from hermes_agent.cli.web_server import app
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app.state.bound_host = "127.0.0.1"
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try:
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client = TestClient(app)
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# /api/status is in _PUBLIC_API_PATHS — passes auth — so the
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# only thing that can reject is the host header middleware
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resp = client.get(
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"/api/status",
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headers={"Host": "localhost:9119"},
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)
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# Either 200 (endpoint served) or some other non-400 —
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# just not the host-rejection 400
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assert resp.status_code != 400 or (
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"Invalid Host header" not in resp.json().get("detail", "")
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)
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finally:
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if hasattr(app.state, "bound_host"):
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del app.state.bound_host
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def test_no_bound_host_skips_validation(self):
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"""If app.state.bound_host isn't set (e.g. running under test
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infra without calling start_server), middleware must pass through
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rather than crash."""
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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from hermes_agent.cli.web_server import app
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# Make sure bound_host isn't set
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if hasattr(app.state, "bound_host"):
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del app.state.bound_host
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client = TestClient(app)
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resp = client.get("/api/status")
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# Should get through to the status endpoint, not a 400
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assert resp.status_code != 400
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