The per-session record store is now the ONLY cwd mechanism. Deleted:
- env.cwd_owner stamping + prev_owner threading (terminal_tool): the
shared env no longer carries ownership metadata at all
- _resolve_command_cwd's env/prev_owner params: resolution is
workdir > session record > config/override default
- file_tools._live_cwd_if_owned + _get_live_tracking_cwd: path
resolution never consults the shared env's live cwd
- file_tools._last_known_cwd + _remember_last_known_cwd +
_last_known_cwd_for: the #26211 preserved-anchor registry is
subsumed by the session record, which never lived on the env and
therefore cannot be lost to env cleanup. The _get_file_ops
stale-cache rescue now writes the record instead.
- env recreation (both _get_file_ops and terminal_tool) seeds the
fresh env from override > session record > config
Why no transition fallback: the legacy state was process-local and
in-memory exactly like the record store — after a restart both start
empty, and within a running process every legacy write site has been
dual-writing the record since step 1. There is no populated-legacy/
empty-record state to fall back for.
Tests updated to drive the record store instead of the deleted
mechanism; the cross-session isolation suite now asserts the same
behavior contracts (no leak, cd isolation, #26211 persistence)
against the new architecture, plus a new "session C inherits nothing"
case that the old ownership guard could not express.
get_read_block_error() only blocked internal Hermes cache files but
allowed reading project-local secret-bearing environment files (.env,
.env.production, .env.local, etc.) through both read_file and ACP
fs/read_text_file paths.
Add a basename deny set for common secret-bearing .env variants.
.env.example remains readable as documentation.
Fixes#20734
Extends @briandevans's PR #17659 from {auth.json, auth.lock,
.anthropic_oauth.json} to also cover:
- HERMES_HOME/.env (provider API keys)
- HERMES_HOME/webhook_subscriptions.json (per-route HMAC secrets)
- HERMES_HOME/mcp-tokens/ (OAuth token directory; dir
+ everything inside)
…AND iterates over both _hermes_home_path() AND _hermes_root_path()
so profile-mode runs (HERMES_HOME = <root>/profiles/<name>) also block
<root>/{auth.json, .env, mcp-tokens/, ...}. Same widening shape as the
write-deny side already does (#15981, #14157).
Explicitly NOT a security boundary. Per the personal-assistant trust
model, the terminal tool runs as the same OS user and can `cat
auth.json` directly. This read-deny exists as defense-in-depth:
- Models that respect tool denials empirically tend to stop rather
than reach for the shell.
- The denial surfaces an audit trail when something tries to read
credentials — easier to spot in logs than a generic `cat`.
Docstring + error message both flag this as defense-in-depth so future
contributors don't mistake it for a real security boundary and don't
re-decline reports that propose the same fix shape.
Absorbs the .env and mcp-tokens/ coverage from @tomqiaozc's parallel
PR #8055 (closed-as-duplicate, credited).
Co-authored-by: Tom Qiao <zqiao@microsoft.com>
read_file_tool resolves relative paths against TERMINAL_CWD (or the
task's live terminal cwd), but the prior call passed the original
unresolved string to get_read_block_error. That function's own
resolve() is anchored at the Python process cwd, so when a task's
TERMINAL_CWD pointed at HERMES_HOME and the agent issued read_file
on the relative path "auth.json", the credential-store denylist was
never reached and the file was read normally.
Pass the already-resolved absolute path string at the file_tools call
site, document the contract on get_read_block_error, and add a
read_file_tool-level regression test that pins the relative-path
case under TERMINAL_CWD == HERMES_HOME.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`get_read_block_error` previously only denied reads inside
`${HERMES_HOME}/skills/.hub`, which left `auth.json` (provider OAuth
state + plaintext API keys) and `.anthropic_oauth.json` (Anthropic PKCE
tokens) directly readable by the agent. A prompt-injection reaching
`read_file` could exfiltrate active provider credentials in plaintext.
Mode-0600 file permissions only protect against *other Unix users* —
the agent runs as the file's owner, so `read_file` is unaffected.
Extend the existing deny list with the three credential paths
identified in #17656 (`auth.json`, `auth.lock`, `.anthropic_oauth.json`).
The check uses the same `Path.resolve()` pattern as `skills/.hub`, so
symlink/path-traversal indirection is caught too. The agent doesn't
need to read these directly — `auxiliary_client` and `credential_pool`
consume them through process env / OAuth flows that bypass `read_file`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
