hermes-agent/tests/agent/test_file_safety_credentials.py
briandevans 567ea61298 fix(file-safety): block auth.json read via TERMINAL_CWD relative path
read_file_tool resolves relative paths against TERMINAL_CWD (or the
task's live terminal cwd), but the prior call passed the original
unresolved string to get_read_block_error. That function's own
resolve() is anchored at the Python process cwd, so when a task's
TERMINAL_CWD pointed at HERMES_HOME and the agent issued read_file
on the relative path "auth.json", the credential-store denylist was
never reached and the file was read normally.

Pass the already-resolved absolute path string at the file_tools call
site, document the contract on get_read_block_error, and add a
read_file_tool-level regression test that pins the relative-path
case under TERMINAL_CWD == HERMES_HOME.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-22 20:15:09 -07:00

149 lines
5.1 KiB
Python

"""Tests for HERMES_HOME credential-file read blocking in file_safety.
Regression for https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/issues/17656 —
``read_file`` was previously only sandboxed against ``HERMES_HOME`` itself,
which left ``auth.json`` and ``.anthropic_oauth.json`` (plaintext provider
keys + OAuth tokens) readable by the agent. A prompt-injection reaching
``read_file`` could exfiltrate active credentials.
These tests verify that ``get_read_block_error`` returns a denial message
for the credential stores while leaving arbitrary ``HERMES_HOME`` files
readable, and that the existing ``skills/.hub`` deny still applies.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
@pytest.fixture()
def fake_home(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""Point ``_hermes_home_path()`` at a tmp dir for isolated checks."""
import agent.file_safety as fs
home = tmp_path / "hermes_home"
home.mkdir()
monkeypatch.setattr(fs, "_hermes_home_path", lambda: home)
return home
def _create(home: Path, rel: str | Path) -> Path:
"""Create the file (with parents) so realpath() resolves it."""
p = home / rel
p.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
p.write_text("dummy", encoding="utf-8")
return p
def test_auth_json_blocked(fake_home):
from agent.file_safety import get_read_block_error
auth = _create(fake_home, "auth.json")
err = get_read_block_error(str(auth))
assert err is not None
assert "credential store" in err
assert "auth.json" in err
def test_auth_lock_blocked(fake_home):
from agent.file_safety import get_read_block_error
lock = _create(fake_home, "auth.lock")
err = get_read_block_error(str(lock))
assert err is not None
assert "credential store" in err
def test_anthropic_oauth_json_blocked(fake_home):
from agent.file_safety import get_read_block_error
oauth = _create(fake_home, ".anthropic_oauth.json")
err = get_read_block_error(str(oauth))
assert err is not None
assert "credential store" in err
def test_arbitrary_hermes_home_file_not_blocked(fake_home):
"""Non-credential files inside HERMES_HOME stay readable."""
from agent.file_safety import get_read_block_error
safe = _create(fake_home, "session_log.txt")
assert get_read_block_error(str(safe)) is None
def test_subdirectory_named_auth_json_not_blocked(fake_home):
"""Only the top-level auth.json is the credential store; a file with the
same name in a subdirectory (e.g., a skill mock) must remain readable."""
from agent.file_safety import get_read_block_error
nested = _create(fake_home, Path("skills") / "my-skill" / "auth.json")
assert get_read_block_error(str(nested)) is None
def test_skills_hub_block_still_applies(fake_home):
"""Regression guard: the original skills/.hub deny must keep working."""
from agent.file_safety import get_read_block_error
hub_file = _create(fake_home, "skills/.hub/manifest.json")
err = get_read_block_error(str(hub_file))
assert err is not None
assert "internal Hermes cache file" in err
def test_path_traversal_resolves_to_blocked(fake_home, tmp_path):
"""A path that traverses through a sibling dir back into HERMES_HOME's
auth.json must still be caught — the check resolves through realpath."""
from agent.file_safety import get_read_block_error
_create(fake_home, "auth.json")
sibling = tmp_path / "elsewhere"
sibling.mkdir()
traversal = sibling / ".." / "hermes_home" / "auth.json"
err = get_read_block_error(str(traversal))
assert err is not None
assert "credential store" in err
def test_symlink_to_auth_json_blocked(fake_home, tmp_path):
"""A symlink pointing at HERMES_HOME/auth.json from outside the home
must be blocked — readlink-resolution catches the indirection."""
from agent.file_safety import get_read_block_error
target = _create(fake_home, "auth.json")
link = tmp_path / "shim.json"
try:
os.symlink(target, link)
except (OSError, NotImplementedError):
pytest.skip("symlinks not supported on this platform/filesystem")
err = get_read_block_error(str(link))
assert err is not None
assert "credential store" in err
def test_read_file_tool_blocks_relative_path_under_terminal_cwd(
fake_home, tmp_path, monkeypatch
):
"""Bypass guard: a relative path like ``"auth.json"`` resolved by
``read_file_tool`` against ``TERMINAL_CWD == HERMES_HOME`` must still
be blocked, even though ``get_read_block_error``'s own ``resolve()``
is anchored at the (different) Python process cwd.
"""
import json
import tools.file_tools as ft
_create(fake_home, "auth.json")
# Force the file_tools resolver to anchor relative paths at HERMES_HOME
# while the Python process cwd remains tmp_path (a different directory).
monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_CWD", str(fake_home))
monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
monkeypatch.setattr(
ft, "_get_live_tracking_cwd", lambda task_id="default": None
)
out = json.loads(ft.read_file_tool("auth.json"))
assert "error" in out
assert "credential store" in out["error"]