The thread's bottom clearance is composer + status-stack + 2rem, and both
inputs are measured by JS onto the owning [data-chat-surface]. The surface-var
helpers fell back to document.documentElement when they couldn't resolve one —
but :root is where every surface's DEFAULTS live, so a single stale write there
becomes a global floor under every thread's clearance until reload.
An unowned publisher has nowhere to publish to, so it now publishes nowhere.
The Windows-footgun linter caught a real bug in the new update lock. On
Windows os.kill(pid, 0) is not a no-op: CPython routes sig=0 to
GenerateConsoleCtrlEvent, which sends Ctrl+C to the target's entire
console process group (bpo-14484). The liveness probe would have killed
the very updater it was asking about -- and any sibling sharing that
console.
Delegate to gateway.status._pid_exists, the project's existing no-kill
probe, which uses psutil (OpenProcess/GetExitCodeProcess on Windows) and
also reports zombies as dead. Any pid we cannot evaluate still counts as
dead so a corrupt marker cannot wedge the lock.
Follow-up hardening on the request-id grant path.
approve_request took the same lockout treatment as approve_code: gated by
it, and recording a miss toward it. But the two paths defend different
things. The lockout exists to stop guessing at the 8-char code space over a
messaging channel; a request id is only ever obtained by an admin already
authenticated to the store, so a miss means the row they clicked went stale.
Counting those let a handful of clicks on a stale list lock the operator out
of `hermes pairing approve` for an hour — the GUI DoSing the CLI.
Also drops the `code`/`code_hash_prefix` compat fields from list_pending.
The hash prefix is what admin surfaces mistook for an approvable code in the
first place, and re-exporting the request id under the old `code` key just
preserves the ambiguity; both consumers in the tree read `request_id` now.
The 16-hex sniffing that had been copy-pasted into the CLI and the endpoint
(where a chained conditional consulted it against the wrong field) moves to
one owner, PairingStore.looks_like_request_id.
The endpoint no longer reports a 429 on the request-id path, where lockout
can't apply — a stale id surfaced as a bogus "locked out" while the platform
sat locked for something else entirely.
approve_code()'s success path never cleared _failures:{platform}. The
counter is incremented on every non-matching code, persisted in
_rate_limits.json, and only ever reset to 0 when it reaches
MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS (firing the lockout). So it counts failures over the
gateway's entire lifetime, not consecutive ones.
An owner who mistypes a pairing code on a handful of separate occasions
— each time immediately retyping it correctly and successfully pairing —
accumulates those isolated typos. A later single fresh typo then hits
MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS and locks the whole platform out for an hour, at
which point _is_locked_out gates approve_code and even the *correct*
code is rejected.
Reset the counter on a successful approval, matching standard
brute-force-guard semantics (the counter tracks consecutive failures).
This does not weaken protection: an attacker cannot produce a success
without a valid code, and 5 consecutive wrong attempts still lock out.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The updater keeps a Tauri/Cocoa event loop alive while it relaunches the
desktop, and that loop can outlive app.exit(0). Relying on Drop alone
left a *successful* update looking active -- a live pid holding a fresh
marker -- which blocked desktop startup and, now that the marker is also
the cross-process update lock, every subsequent updater until the age
ceiling expired.
Release explicitly once all install-tree mutations are done, before the
relaunch. complete() is idempotent so Drop still covers the failure and
panic paths. Arms a process-exit fallback so a wedged event loop cannot
leave a finished updater lingering as a live pid.
Co-authored-by: nateEc <nateEc@users.noreply.github.com>
UpdateMarkerGuard::acquire overwrote the in-progress marker
unconditionally, so a Tauri update launched while a dashboard-spawned
"hermes update" was mid-flight simply took the marker and ran a second
updater over the same checkout. That is the race behind the reported
Windows failure: install-mode bootstrap rewound the tree while the
dashboard's updater was still running npm install against it.
acquire now returns Result and refuses when a live foreign owner holds
the marker, and Drop no longer deletes a marker this process does not
own. Liveness matches the Python and Electron readers of the same file:
dead pid or past the shared age ceiling means stale and reclaimable, so
a crashed updater cannot wedge future updates.
Adds a cfg(unix) libc dependency for the signal-0 liveness probe; the
Windows path uses OpenProcess/GetExitCodeProcess.
Three surfaces start updates against one checkout: a terminal
"hermes update", the dashboard's Update button (which spawns that same
command detached), and the desktop's, which hands off to the Tauri
updater. Only the Tauri updater published the in-progress marker, and
only Electron read it -- to gate backend startup, not to stop a second
updater. So a dashboard-spawned update and an installer-driven git
checkout could mutate the same tree concurrently, rewriting source under
a live interpreter.
Claim the same marker from cmd_update rather than adding a second
mechanism: same path, same pid+started_at payload the Rust and Electron
readers already parse. A marker only counts as live when its pid is alive
and it is inside the shared age ceiling, so a crashed updater self-heals
instead of wedging every future update. Release only removes a marker we
still own, leaving a handoff partner's claim intact.
Refusing exits 2, matching the existing concurrent-instance contract the
Tauri updater already recognizes.
Main's 243c9182b1/a16fd675df/7142dc4580 added load_config_readonly
sibling stubs across 38 files; our pruned versions of 11 of those files
kept only the load_config stubs. Re-applied the pairing at every
surviving site (26 patch()/setattr sites) — same return_value/
side_effect as the adjacent load_config stub. 494 tests green across
the 11 files.
hermes-setup.exe bakes its build-time commit into the binary
(BUILD_PIN_COMMIT) and passes it as -Commit on every install-mode run,
including the retry the desktop's "Update didn't finish" screen kicks
off. The repository stage checked that SHA out unconditionally, so an
installer built months earlier rewound a current managed checkout to its
build commit -- 9,160 commits in the reported case -- leaving ancient
source against a current venv. npm then failed on workspaces that did not
exist yet at that commit, and every later update ran against the wrong
tree.
Skip the pin when its target is already an ancestor of HEAD. Fresh clones
have no such ancestry so reproducible/CI pinning is unchanged, and
--force-commit / -ForceCommit still rolls back on purpose.
The #71637 prune fix cut one stage of -w startup, but the base-ref
resolution right after it still ran an uncapped-in-practice
'git fetch origin main' (timeout=30) on every launch — and on a flaky
smart-HTTP connection that fetch intermittently stalled to the full 30s,
then cascaded into step 2's SECOND 30s fetch. Measured: back-to-back
fetches of 0.9s, 1.0s, 63.5s on the same box with healthy TLS (~185ms).
_resolve_worktree_base now:
- skips the fetch entirely when FETCH_HEAD is < 5 min old and the
tracking ref exists (repeat launches pay zero network cost)
- caps the fetch at 5s and falls back to the locally-known tracking
ref (labelled 'cached') on timeout/failure instead of cascading into
a second fetch — genuine staleness stays backstopped by the pre-push
stale-base gate
- caps 'git remote show origin' the same way
Worst case drops ~60s -> ~5s; warm path is ~0.02s (was up to 30.8s).
sync_base=False and the offline HEAD fallback are unchanged.
Final pass: per_model_threshold_init_ordering, memory_provider_init,
plugin_context_engine_init, api_max_retries_config,
invalid_context_length_warning, tool_call_guardrail_runtime all stub
agent_init config reads that now resolve through load_config_readonly().
Verified by running the complete 59-file suspect list (every test file
that stubs load_config in string or attribute form and intersects the
swapped modules): 3,063 tests, 0 failed.
Second stub shape the first sweep missed: monkeypatch.setattr(config_mod,
"load_config", ...) — attribute-form instead of string-form. Four files
(compression_max_attempts, preflight_compression_cap_e2e,
codex_gpt55_autoraise_notice, proactive_prune_config) stub agent_init
config reads that now go through load_config_readonly(). Swept the whole
tree for the attribute form; remaining hits stub modules that still use
the mutable loader. 1,210 tests green across the 19-file re-sweep.
The readonly swaps mean agent/ modules now read config through
load_config_readonly(); tests that stubbed only load_config stopped
intercepting those reads. Added sibling readonly stubs (same
return_value/side_effect/lambda) at every affected site across 11 test
files, found via a tree-wide sweep of load_config stubs cross-referenced
against the swapped modules. 3,915 tests green across the 38-file
sibling sweep.
agent_init's config reads now go through load_config_readonly(); 8
tests that stubbed only load_config stopped intercepting them. Each of
the 10 patch sites gains a sibling readonly patch with the same
return_value. 461/461 file-local tests green.
Pins the audit findings: normalizer never mutates its input
(api_key_env + camelCase forms), providers-dict round-trips leave a
cached config byte-identical, and the normalized models mapping does
not alias the caller's dict.
Salvaged from #56085 (@Stoltemberg), rebased onto current main: sites
main had already converted (credential_pool, auxiliary_client MoA
paths, model_metadata, moa_loop, agent_runtime_helpers) resolve to
main's versions; the remaining ~29 read-only sites across 16 agent/
files swap to the no-deepcopy readonly loader (~135us saved per call).
Full per-site mutation audit performed (every enclosing function read,
escapes traced): 23 SAFE, 5 ESCAPES with read-only consumers, 1 UNSAFE
path (init_agent -> get_compatible_custom_providers -> normalizer
in-place alias writes) fixed by the preceding no-mutate commits, which
make the normalizer copy-safe for ALL callers.
Companion to the no-mutate fix: normalized['models'] retained a
reference to the caller's (possibly cached) models dict, and the
normalized entry escapes into long-lived runtime state
(agent._custom_providers). Shallow-copy so runtime writes can never
reach the shared config cache.
The normalizer writes alias keys into the entry it is given
(entry['key_env'] = entry['api_key_env'] and entry[snake] =
entry[camel]) while building its normalized copy. Two of its three
callers — get_compatible_custom_providers and
providers_dict_to_custom_providers — pass live sub-dicts straight
from load_config_readonly()'s shared cache (only
_custom_provider_entry_to_provider_config defends with dict(entry)).
A config written with the documented camelCase / api_key_env aliases
therefore gets its cached copy polluted with injected duplicate keys,
violating the cache's explicit no-mutation contract; every later
load_config() deepcopy inherits the duplicates, and any
save_config(load_config()) flow (setup wizard, dashboard writes,
model persist) writes them back to config.yaml. The aux-client TLS
resolution runs this on every auxiliary client build, so the
mutation also happens unlocked on worker threads against a shared
object.
Shallow-copy the entry up front; the function's return value is a
separately-built dict, so behavior is otherwise unchanged.
Buzz Desktop v0.5.1 now renders Hermes' ACP model menu in agent runtime
settings. Add a short note under the Buzz Desktop host section explaining
where the list comes from (the shared authenticated-provider inventory),
the provider:model / custom:<name>:<model> ID shapes, and that a pick is
session-scoped rather than a Hermes-wide default change.
The 1.0s sleep between sequential tool calls has been present since the
initial commit with no documented rationale. It sleeps between local
tool executions — the next LLM request goes out only after the whole
batch — so it rate-limits nothing, and the parallel read-only path
already runs with no delay. Every multi-tool turn pays (N-1) seconds
of dead time. Remove the sleep, the internal tool_delay plumbing, and
dead test assignments. AIAgent.__init__ keeps tool_delay as a
deprecated no-op keyword for one release so existing programmatic
callers construct cleanly; passing it emits a DeprecationWarning.
- Remove tests/-shadowing sys.path.insert(dirname/'..') from 11 test files:
it prepended the tests/ dir itself to sys.path, so 'import agent' /
'import hermes_cli' resolved to the test packages and collection died
with ModuleNotFoundError depending on import order (2 files failed in
every full-suite run; 9 more were latent).
- Patch call_llm in 5 context-compressor tests that called compress()
unmocked: each burned ~50s attempting live LLM traffic through the
relay before falling back (572s file — the slowest in the suite, and
flaky under the 300s per-file timeout). File now runs in ~5s.
- agent/redact.py: fix two catastrophically-backtracking regexes hit by
the compressor's redaction pass on large payloads —
_STRICT_URL_USERINFO_RE anchors on the mandatory '//' (optional-scheme
prefix backtracked O(n^2): ~55s on a 320KB payload, now sub-ms;
output-equivalence fuzz-verified on 20k random strings), and the
_CFG_DOTTED_RE/_CFG_ANCHORED_RE subs gain an exact linear keyword
pre-gate so secret-free text skips the quadratic pattern entirely.
- tests/gateway/test_feishu.py: version-guard the extra_ua_tags SDK
signature check; the repo pins lark-oapi==1.6.8 but stale local
installs (1.5.3) fail the assertion — skip below the pin.
- tests/tools/test_managed_browserbase_and_modal.py: stub
agent.redact + agent.credential_persistence in the fake agent package
(empty __path__ blocks all real agent.* imports added since the fake
was written).
- tests/gateway/test_startup_restart_race.py: raise wait_for timeouts
2s -> 30s; 2s wall-clock on a loaded 40-worker box flaked in the
baseline run (passes instantly when the box is quiet).
Follow-up to the salvaged #62026 ownership fix, folding in #72054's
CancelledError rule by @adurham: start() already cancels/reaps its own
run task when the caller's connect timeout cancels start() itself, so
_connect_server() must propagate cancellation without awaiting a
redundant shutdown() inside a cancelled context. Non-cancellation
failures on the unclaimed (standalone probe) path still reap the parked
task, now with the reap failure logged instead of raising over the real
error.
Also maps mrz@mrzlab630.pw for the attribution check.
Co-authored-by: Adam Durham <amdnative@gmail.com>
_stop_mcp_loop() stopped and closed the background loop without reaping
the tasks still on it. A task left suspended is resumed later by the GC,
whose finalizer drives its cleanup against the now-closed loop:
Exception ignored in: <coroutine object MCPServerTask.run ...>
File "tools/mcp_tool.py", line 2947, in run
parked = await self._wait_for_reconnect_or_shutdown(
File "tools/mcp_tool.py", line 2161, in _wait_for_reconnect_or_shutdown
t.cancel()
RuntimeError: Event loop is closed
shutdown_mcp_servers() only reaps servers held in _servers, so a server
that parked after exhausting its initial-connect budget — never inserted
there, because start() raises _error before the caller registers it — has
no owner to signal it and stays suspended until the loop is gone.
Drain the loop the way asyncio.run() does: cancel the remaining tasks and
gather them while the loop is still open, so each runs its own finally.
Cancel alone is not enough — Task.cancel() only schedules the throw.
This resolves the reported traceback, but not the ownership bug that
strands the task in the first place; that needs a follow-up. Deliberately
not using "Fixes" so #60197 stays open for it.
Addresses #60197
Addresses #66113
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Second, deeper pass over tools/gateway/hermes_cli plus first pass over
the trees wave 1 missed (acp, acp_adapter, skills, computer_use, docker,
dashboard, conformance, monitoring, secret_sources, hermes_state,
providers). Same rubric as wave 1 (AGENTS.md test policy); security,
alternation/caching invariants, issue-number regressions, and E2E kept.
Real test-quality fixes found and rooted out along the way:
- tests/tools/test_command_guards.py made real auxiliary-LLM HTTPS calls
(DEFAULT_CONFIG smart-approval leaked in) — pinned approval
mode=manual via autouse fixture: 17.4s → 0.4s.
- test_model_switch_custom_providers.py / test_user_providers_model_switch.py
silently probed live provider catalogs (~2s/test) — stubbed
cached_provider_model_ids/provider_model_ids/fetch_api_models.
- test_telegram_noise_filter.py: 15-platform copy-paste matrix over
shared gateway.run logic → 3 representative platforms (55s → 3.9s).
- test_gateway_shutdown.py: stop()'s 5s interrupt-deadline loop spun on
MagicMock agents — interrupt.side_effect now clears _running_agents
(22s → 1.0s).
- test_gateway_inactivity_timeout.py poll-harness timings shrunk 3-5x
(24s → 1.1s); test_mcp_stability.py backoff/SIGTERM-grace sleeps
patched (15.4s → 2.5s); test_async_delegation.py negative-drain wait
5s → 0.5s.
- test_telegram_init_deadline.py: loop-block margin restored to 1.0s
with rationale comment — the watchdog-dump assertion needs the loop
blocked well past deadline+grace under parallel load (flaked once in
the 40-worker verification run at a 0.2s margin).
Verification: full hermetic suite via scripts/run_tests.sh —
2,438 files, 21,718 tests passed, 0 failed, 293.9s wall.
Suite totals vs original baseline: 46,820 → 19,757 test functions
(−57.8%), wall 583.5s → 293.9s (−50%), subprocess CPU 13,564s → 11,623s.
Resolves the PR's conflict with main (2252 commits). Two conflicts, both
"each side added an independent block in the same place" — kept both:
- gateway/run.py — the housekeeping loop. This branch adds the Skill Sync
pulls inside the CURATOR_EVERY branch (12-space indent); main adds a
stale-session auto-archive as a sibling `if` at loop level (8-space).
Different scopes, so the naive union would have mis-nested the archive
block into the curator branch; kept each at its own indent level.
- tools/skill_manager_tool.py — the _edit_skill result dict. This branch
appends the org auto-propose note; main appends
_add_description_prompt_preview(). Independent, order-insensitive.
No behaviour dropped from either side.
Verified: 3552 passed / 0 failed across 63 suites (scope regenerated to
include main's new maybe_auto_archive / _add_description_prompt_preview
consumers) via scripts/run_tests.sh. `hermes sync` and `hermes sync status`
still work against a live token, resolving the production plane default.
The Pyright Optional-parameter warnings in skill_manager_tool.py are
pre-existing on main (`content: str = None` etc.), not introduced here.
The voice-interruption fix (5081551f0) covered the Python surfaces (CLI +
TUI gateway) but the desktop app has its own mic path in voice-barge-in.ts,
which still had both bugs on Windows:
- HALF-DUPLEX GAP: the barge monitor only opened when TTS playback started;
during LLM generation no mic was listening at all.
- PLAYBACK DEAFNESS: the monitor calibrated its noise floor while the
speakers were already playing TTS, baking bleed into the floor. On
Windows, Chromium echoCancellation does not reliably cancel same-app
output (measured live: quiet floor ~35-50 RMS vs playback bleed
600-1700 RMS), making the trigger unreachable.
Changes mirror tools/voice_mode.full_duplex_listen:
- voice-barge-in.ts: phase-aware full-duplex monitor — quiet-only
calibration (floor held through playback, never recalibrated against
bleed), playback min-trigger clamp + ceiling, 500ms grace on playback
onset only, windowed-majority detection.
- use-voice-conversation.ts: monitor arms at turn submit and spans
generation + playback (ensureBargeMonitor, idempotent). Mid-generation
speech fires the new onInterrupt callback; spoken stop-word during a
barge ends the conversation; submit waits for the interrupt to settle.
- use-composer-voice.ts + composer/index.tsx: plumb onInterrupt: haltRun
(same seam as the Stop button).
Tests: use-voice-conversation.test.tsx (6 tests) covering monitor lifecycle
across generation + playback, mid-generation interrupt, stop-word handling.
npm run typecheck + eslint clean; remaining desktop vitest failures
reproduce on a clean tree (pre-existing Windows env failures).
Salvaged from #31671 (@Shizoqua). The config-cache half of that PR was
superseded on main (9b8b054c2d gave _load_config_safe a readonly path),
but this cron-scanner half is still live: _strip_cron_safe_constructs
used re.search + a single str.replace, which only scrubbed occurrences
IDENTICAL to the first match. A cron job loading several GitHub skills
carries heterogeneous auth-header curl forms (-H vs --header, quoting,
token var names) — every non-identical block tripped the
exfil_curl_auth_header detector on every tick, blocking legitimate
GitHub cron jobs.
Now re.sub scrubs every occurrence; the trailing [^\n]* consumes the
URL path so no dangling fragment remains. Sabotage-verified: the old
implementation false-blocks the heterogeneous two-skill prompt the new
regression test pins; exfil to a non-GitHub host is still blocked.
79/79 cron tool tests green.
