The runtime cron prompt scanner (added in #3968 to plug the
"malicious skill carrying an injection payload" gap) reuses the same
critical-severity patterns as the create-time user-prompt scan against
the *assembled* prompt — which includes loaded skill markdown.
That works fine for narrow patterns like "ignore previous instructions"
which never legitimately appear in prose. It catastrophically false-
positives on command-shape patterns like `cat ~/.hermes/.env`,
`authorized_keys`, `/etc/sudoers`, and `rm -rf /`, which routinely
appear in security postmortems and runbooks as **descriptive prose**
about attacks, not as actual commands.
Concrete failure: the bundled `hermes-agent-dev` skill contains a
security postmortem section saying "the attacker could just
`cat ~/.hermes/.env`". Every PR-scout cron job that loaded this skill
was silently blocked with `Blocked: prompt matches threat pattern
'read_secrets'`. All 11 scout jobs failed for weeks.
Fix: split the scanner into two tiers and route by context:
- `_scan_cron_prompt` (strict, unchanged behavior) runs against
the small user-authored cron prompt at create/update and as a
runtime defense-in-depth when no skills are attached. A legit
user prompt has no business saying `cat .env`, so the strict
patterns still apply there.
- `_scan_cron_skill_assembled` (new, looser) runs against the
assembled prompt when skills are attached. It only catches
unambiguous prompt-injection directives ("ignore previous
instructions", "disregard your rules", "system prompt override",
"do not tell the user") plus invisible-unicode markers. Command-
shape patterns are dropped because they false-positive on prose.
This is defense-in-depth, not the only line of defense. Skill bodies
are already scanned at install time by `skills_guard.py`; the runtime
cron scan exists purely as a tripwire for an obvious injection
directive surviving a malicious install. Catching prose mentions of
commands was never the goal of #3968 — the test that planted a skill
containing `cat ~/.hermes/.env` was the wrong shape of test for the
threat model.
Tests:
- `_scan_cron_prompt` strict behavior preserved (56 existing tests
unchanged: bare `cat .env`, `rm -rf /`, etc. still block).
- New `TestScanCronSkillAssembled` class verifies the looser scanner:
injection / disregard / system-override / do-not-tell-the-user /
invisible-unicode still block; descriptive prose about attack
commands is allowed; GitHub auth-header allowlist still works.
- `test_skill_with_env_exfil_payload_raises` (planted `cat .env`
in skill body) replaced with `test_skill_with_env_exfil_command
_in_prose_is_allowed` documenting the new correct behavior with
the real-world postmortem-style example that triggered the bug.
- All 11 originally-failing PR-scout jobs validated end-to-end via
`_build_job_prompt` — assembled prompts now build successfully
with the `hermes-agent-dev` skill attached.
Total: 75/75 tests in cron + cronjob_tools + threat scanner pass;
544/544 across the wider cron / memory / threat-pattern surface.
ccd899318e