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fda771498e
The Buzz Desktop section covered discovery only. The combination that actually needs stating: the hermes-acp toolset carries terminal and execute_code, and buzz-acp answers session/request_permission itself with allow_once instead of surfacing it. A Hermes agent in Buzz runs shell commands on the host unattended. Buzz defaults every agent to owner-only and that default holds through to the spawned process env, so nobody reaches the open state by accident. But Anyone is one dropdown change away with no warning shown, and it hands channel-wide shell access to the host. Also record that the two obvious mitigations do not work: approvals.mode manual raises the request but Buzz auto-approves it anyway, and platform_toolsets.acp does not narrow the ACP toolset. Both verified by running rm -rf through the ACP path under each setting. Amend the Approvals section too — it promised prompts route back to the editor, which is only true for hosts that choose to surface them. en + zh-Hans. Signed-off-by: SHL0MS <SHL0MS@users.noreply.github.com> |
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| .. | ||
| egress | ||
| features | ||
| messaging | ||
| secrets | ||
| skills | ||
| _category_.json | ||
| checkpoints-and-rollback.md | ||
| cli.md | ||
| configuration.md | ||
| configuring-models.md | ||
| desktop.md | ||
| docker.md | ||
| git-worktrees.md | ||
| import-from-other-agents.md | ||
| managed-scope.md | ||
| multi-profile-gateways.md | ||
| profile-distributions.md | ||
| profiles.md | ||
| security.md | ||
| sessions.md | ||
| tui.md | ||
| windows-native.md | ||
| windows-wsl-quickstart.md | ||