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When TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_URL was set but TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET was not, python-telegram-bot received secret_token=None and the webhook endpoint accepted any HTTP POST. Anyone who could reach the listener could inject forged updates — spoofed user IDs, spoofed chat IDs, attacker-controlled message text — and trigger handlers as if Telegram delivered them. The fix refuses to start the adapter in webhook mode without the secret. Polling mode (default, no webhook URL) is unaffected — polling is authenticated by the bot token directly. BREAKING CHANGE for webhook-mode deployments that never set TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET. The error message explains remediation: export TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET="$(openssl rand -hex 32)" and instructs registering it with Telegram via setWebhook's secret_token parameter. Release notes must call this out. Reported in GHSA-3vpc-7q5r-276h by @bupt-Yy-young. Hardening — not CVE per SECURITY.md §3 "Public Exposure: Deploying the gateway to the public internet without external authentication or network protection" covers the historical default, but shipping a fail-open webhook as the default was the wrong choice and the guard aligns us with the SECURITY.md threat model.
100 lines
4 KiB
Python
100 lines
4 KiB
Python
"""Tests for GHSA-3vpc-7q5r-276h — Telegram webhook secret required.
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Previously, when TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_URL was set but TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET
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was not, python-telegram-bot received secret_token=None and the webhook
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endpoint accepted any HTTP POST.
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The fix refuses to start the adapter in webhook mode without the secret.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import re
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import sys
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from pathlib import Path
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import pytest
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_repo = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2])
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if _repo not in sys.path:
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sys.path.insert(0, _repo)
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class TestTelegramWebhookSecretRequired:
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"""Direct source-level check of the webhook-secret guard.
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The guard is embedded in TelegramAdapter.connect() and hard to isolate
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via mocks (requires a full python-telegram-bot ApplicationBuilder
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chain). These tests exercise it via source inspection — verifying the
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check exists, raises RuntimeError with the advisory link, and only
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fires in webhook mode. End-to-end validation is covered by CI +
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manual deployment tests.
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"""
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def _get_source(self) -> str:
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path = Path(_repo) / "gateway" / "platforms" / "telegram.py"
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return path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
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def test_webhook_branch_checks_secret(self):
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"""The webhook-mode branch of connect() must read
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TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET and refuse when empty."""
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src = self._get_source()
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# The guard must appear after TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_URL is set
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assert re.search(
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r'TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET.*?\.strip\(\)\s*\n\s*if not webhook_secret:',
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src, re.DOTALL,
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), (
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"TelegramAdapter.connect() must strip TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET "
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"and raise when the secret is empty — see GHSA-3vpc-7q5r-276h"
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)
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def test_guard_raises_runtime_error(self):
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"""The guard raises RuntimeError (not a silent log) so operators
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see the failure at startup."""
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src = self._get_source()
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# Between the "if not webhook_secret:" line and the next blank
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# line block, we should see a RuntimeError being raised
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guard_match = re.search(
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r'if not webhook_secret:\s*\n\s*raise\s+RuntimeError\(',
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src,
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)
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assert guard_match, (
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"Missing webhook secret must raise RuntimeError — silent "
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"fall-through was the original GHSA-3vpc-7q5r-276h bypass"
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)
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def test_guard_message_includes_advisory_link(self):
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"""The RuntimeError message should reference the advisory so
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operators can read the full context."""
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src = self._get_source()
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assert "GHSA-3vpc-7q5r-276h" in src, (
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"Guard error message must cite the advisory for operator context"
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)
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def test_guard_message_explains_remediation(self):
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"""The error should tell the operator how to fix it."""
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src = self._get_source()
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# Should mention how to generate a secret
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assert "openssl rand" in src or "TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET=" in src, (
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"Guard error message should show operators how to set "
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"TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET"
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)
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def test_polling_branch_has_no_secret_guard(self):
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"""Polling mode (else-branch) must NOT require the webhook secret —
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polling authenticates via the bot token, not a webhook secret."""
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src = self._get_source()
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# The guard should appear inside the `if webhook_url:` branch,
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# not the `else:` polling branch. Rough check: the raise is
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# followed (within ~60 lines) by an `else:` that starts the
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# polling branch, and there's no secret-check in that polling
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# branch.
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webhook_block = re.search(
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r'if webhook_url:\s*\n(.*?)\n else:\s*\n(.*?)\n',
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src, re.DOTALL,
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)
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if webhook_block:
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webhook_body = webhook_block.group(1)
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polling_body = webhook_block.group(2)
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assert "TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET" in webhook_body
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assert "TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET" not in polling_body
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