mirror of
https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent.git
synced 2026-07-01 12:02:05 +00:00
3483424aaa
git remote set-url with an embedded password (https://PASSWORD@github.com) leaked the credential into agent output — the redaction engine only masked user:pass@ DB connection strings, never the colon-less bare-token userinfo form a git remote uses. Add _URL_BARE_TOKEN_RE: scheme://TOKEN@host for web/transport schemes (http/https/wss/git/ssh/ftp), 8+ char floor to skip short usernames, token class forbidding /:@ so an @ in a path/query is never treated as userinfo. Deliberately scoped to the bare-token form only. The user:pass@ colon form and query-string tokens stay passing through (#34029, 'pass web URLs through unchanged') so magic-link / OAuth round-trip skills keep working — a bare credential in userinfo is never a workflow token (those live in the query string), so masking it can't break a skill.
888 lines
37 KiB
Python
888 lines
37 KiB
Python
"""Tests for agent.redact -- secret masking in logs and output."""
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import logging
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import pytest
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from agent.redact import redact_sensitive_text, RedactingFormatter
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@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
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def _ensure_redaction_enabled(monkeypatch):
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"""Ensure HERMES_REDACT_SECRETS is not disabled by prior test imports."""
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monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_REDACT_SECRETS", raising=False)
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# Also patch the module-level snapshot so it reflects the cleared env var
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monkeypatch.setattr("agent.redact._REDACT_ENABLED", True)
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class TestKnownPrefixes:
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def test_openai_sk_key(self):
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text = "Using key sk-proj-abc123def456ghi789jkl012"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "sk-pro" in result
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assert "abc123def456" not in result
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assert "..." in result
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def test_openrouter_sk_key(self):
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text = "OPENROUTER_API_KEY=sk-or-v1-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz1234567890"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "abcdefghijklmnop" not in result
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def test_github_pat_classic(self):
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result = redact_sensitive_text("token: ghp_abc123def456ghi789jkl")
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assert "abc123def456" not in result
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def test_github_pat_fine_grained(self):
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result = redact_sensitive_text("github_pat_abc123def456ghi789jklmno")
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assert "abc123def456" not in result
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def test_slack_token(self):
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token = "xoxb-" + "0" * 12 + "-" + "a" * 14
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result = redact_sensitive_text(token)
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assert "a" * 14 not in result
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def test_google_api_key(self):
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result = redact_sensitive_text("AIzaSyB-abc123def456ghi789jklmno012345")
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assert "abc123def456" not in result
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def test_perplexity_key(self):
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result = redact_sensitive_text("pplx-abcdef123456789012345")
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assert "abcdef12345" not in result
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def test_fal_key(self):
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result = redact_sensitive_text("fal_abc123def456ghi789jkl")
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assert "abc123def456" not in result
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def test_notion_internal_integration_token(self):
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result = redact_sensitive_text("ntn_abc123def456ghi789jkl")
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assert "abc123def456" not in result
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def test_short_token_fully_masked(self):
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result = redact_sensitive_text("key=sk-short1234567")
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assert "***" in result
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class TestEnvAssignments:
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def test_export_api_key(self):
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text = "export OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-proj-abc123def456ghi789jkl012"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "OPENAI_API_KEY=" in result
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assert "abc123def456" not in result
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def test_quoted_value(self):
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text = 'MY_SECRET_TOKEN="supersecretvalue123456789"'
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "MY_SECRET_TOKEN=" in result
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assert "supersecretvalue" not in result
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def test_non_secret_env_unchanged(self):
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text = "HOME=/home/user"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert result == text
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def test_path_unchanged(self):
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text = "PATH=/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert result == text
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def test_lowercase_python_variable_token_unchanged(self):
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# Regression: #4367 — lowercase 'token' assignment must not be redacted
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text = "before_tokens = response.usage.prompt_tokens"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert result == text
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def test_lowercase_python_variable_api_key_unchanged(self):
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# Regression: #4367 — lowercase 'api_key' must not be redacted
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text = "api_key = config.get('api_key')"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert result == text
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def test_typescript_await_token_unchanged(self):
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# Regression: #4367 — 'await' keyword must not be redacted as a secret value
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text = "const token = await getToken();"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert result == text
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def test_typescript_await_secret_unchanged(self):
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# Regression: #4367 — similar pattern with 'secret' variable
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text = "const secret = await fetchSecret();"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert result == text
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def test_export_whitespace_preserved(self):
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# Regression: #4367 — whitespace before uppercase env var must be preserved
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text = "export SECRET_TOKEN=mypassword"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert result.startswith("export ")
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assert "SECRET_TOKEN=" in result
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assert "mypassword" not in result
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class TestJsonFields:
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def test_json_api_key(self):
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text = '{"apiKey": "sk-proj-abc123def456ghi789jkl012"}'
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "abc123def456" not in result
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def test_json_token(self):
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text = '{"access_token": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.longtoken.here"}'
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIs" not in result
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def test_json_non_secret_unchanged(self):
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text = '{"name": "John", "model": "gpt-4"}'
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert result == text
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class TestAuthHeaders:
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def test_bearer_token(self):
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text = "Authorization: Bearer sk-proj-abc123def456ghi789jkl012"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "Authorization: Bearer" in result
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assert "abc123def456" not in result
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def test_case_insensitive(self):
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text = "authorization: bearer mytoken123456789012345678"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "mytoken12345" not in result
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def test_basic_auth_credentials_masked(self):
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# base64 of "user:longpassword1234" — leaks user:pass if not redacted.
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text = "Authorization: Basic dXNlcjpsb25ncGFzc3dvcmQxMjM0"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "Authorization: Basic" in result
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assert "dXNlcjpsb25ncGFzc3dvcmQxMjM0" not in result
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def test_token_scheme_masked(self):
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text = "Authorization: token opaque-credential-1234567890"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "Authorization: token" in result
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assert "opaque-credential" not in result
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def test_proxy_authorization_masked(self):
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text = "Proxy-Authorization: Basic dXNlcjpzdXBlcnNlY3JldDEyMzQ="
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "dXNlcjpzdXBlcnNlY3JldDEyMzQ=" not in result
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def test_authorization_prose_unchanged(self):
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# "authorization" without a colon-delimited value is plain prose.
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text = "the authorization model is fully open"
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assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text
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def test_token_flush_against_double_quote_preserves_quote(self):
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# Regression for #43083: a token sitting flush against a closing
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# double quote must NOT pull that quote into the mask. Greedy \S+
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# used to eat it, turning value corruption into syntax corruption
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# (unterminated quote → shell EOF).
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text = 'curl -H "Authorization: Bearer sk-abcdef1234567890"'
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "sk-abcdef1234567890" not in result
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assert result.count('"') == 2, result # both quotes survive
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assert result.endswith('"'), result
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def test_token_flush_against_single_quote_preserves_quote(self):
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# Regression for #43083: same as above with single quotes (Python
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# f-string context). The closing ' must survive the mask.
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text = "auth = f'Authorization: Bearer {placeholder}'"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert result.count("'") == 2, result
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assert result.endswith("'"), result
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class TestApiKeyHeaders:
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def test_x_api_key_header_masked(self):
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text = "x-api-key: opaque-provider-key-1234567890"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "x-api-key:" in result
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assert "opaque-provider-key" not in result
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def test_x_api_key_in_curl_command_masked(self):
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text = 'curl -H "x-api-key: sk-local-VERYsecret-999888" https://api.example.com'
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "VERYsecret" not in result
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assert "https://api.example.com" in result
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def test_api_key_header_masked(self):
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text = "api-key: anotherOpaqueSecret1234567"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "anotherOpaqueSecret" not in result
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class TestTelegramTokens:
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def test_bot_token(self):
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text = "bot123456789:ABCDEfghij-KLMNopqrst_UVWXyz12345"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "ABCDEfghij" not in result
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assert "123456789:***" in result
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def test_raw_token(self):
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text = "12345678901:ABCDEfghijKLMNopqrstUVWXyz1234567890"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "ABCDEfghij" not in result
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class TestPassthrough:
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def test_empty_string(self):
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assert redact_sensitive_text("") == ""
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def test_none_returns_none(self):
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assert redact_sensitive_text(None) is None
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def test_non_string_input_int_coerced(self):
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assert redact_sensitive_text(12345) == "12345"
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def test_non_string_input_dict_coerced_and_redacted(self):
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result = redact_sensitive_text({"token": "sk-proj-abc123def456ghi789jkl012"})
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assert "abc123def456" not in result
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def test_normal_text_unchanged(self):
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text = "Hello world, this is a normal log message with no secrets."
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assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text
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def test_code_unchanged(self):
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text = "def main():\n print('hello')\n return 42"
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assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text
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def test_url_without_key_unchanged(self):
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text = "Connecting to https://api.openai.com/v1/chat/completions"
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assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text
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class TestRedactingFormatter:
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def test_formats_and_redacts(self):
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formatter = RedactingFormatter("%(message)s")
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record = logging.LogRecord(
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name="test",
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level=logging.INFO,
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pathname="",
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lineno=0,
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msg="Key is sk-proj-abc123def456ghi789jkl012",
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args=(),
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exc_info=None,
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)
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result = formatter.format(record)
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assert "abc123def456" not in result
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assert "sk-pro" in result
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class TestPrintenvSimulation:
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"""Simulate what happens when the agent runs `env` or `printenv`."""
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def test_full_env_dump(self):
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env_dump = """HOME=/home/user
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PATH=/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin
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OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-proj-abc123def456ghi789jkl012mno345
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OPENROUTER_API_KEY=sk-or-v1-reallyLongSecretKeyValue12345678
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FIRECRAWL_API_KEY=fc-shortkey123456789012
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TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN=bot987654321:ABCDEfghij-KLMNopqrst_UVWXyz12345
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SHELL=/bin/bash
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USER=teknium"""
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result = redact_sensitive_text(env_dump)
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# Secrets should be masked
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assert "abc123def456" not in result
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assert "reallyLongSecretKey" not in result
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assert "ABCDEfghij" not in result
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# Non-secrets should survive
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assert "HOME=/home/user" in result
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assert "SHELL=/bin/bash" in result
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assert "USER=teknium" in result
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class TestSecretCapturePayloadRedaction:
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def test_secret_value_field_redacted(self):
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text = '{"success": true, "secret_value": "sk-test-secret-1234567890"}'
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "sk-test-secret-1234567890" not in result
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def test_raw_secret_field_redacted(self):
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text = '{"raw_secret": "ghp_abc123def456ghi789jkl"}'
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "abc123def456" not in result
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class TestElevenLabsTavilyExaKeys:
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"""Regression tests for ElevenLabs (sk_), Tavily (tvly-), and Exa (exa_) keys."""
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def test_elevenlabs_key_redacted(self):
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text = "ELEVENLABS_API_KEY=sk_abc123def456ghi789jklmnopqrstu"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "abc123def456ghi" not in result
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def test_elevenlabs_key_in_log_line(self):
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text = "Connecting to ElevenLabs with key sk_abc123def456ghi789jklmnopqrstu"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "abc123def456ghi" not in result
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def test_tavily_key_redacted(self):
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text = "TAVILY_API_KEY=tvly-ABCdef123456789GHIJKL0000"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "ABCdef123456789" not in result
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def test_tavily_key_in_log_line(self):
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text = "Initialising Tavily client with tvly-ABCdef123456789GHIJKL0000"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "ABCdef123456789" not in result
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def test_exa_key_redacted(self):
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text = "EXA_API_KEY=exa_XYZ789abcdef000000000000000"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "XYZ789abcdef" not in result
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def test_exa_key_in_log_line(self):
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text = "Using Exa client with key exa_XYZ789abcdef000000000000000"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "XYZ789abcdef" not in result
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def test_all_three_in_env_dump(self):
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env_dump = (
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"HOME=/home/user\n"
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"ELEVENLABS_API_KEY=sk_abc123def456ghi789jklmnopqrstu\n"
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"TAVILY_API_KEY=tvly-ABCdef123456789GHIJKL0000\n"
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"EXA_API_KEY=exa_XYZ789abcdef000000000000000\n"
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"SHELL=/bin/bash\n"
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)
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result = redact_sensitive_text(env_dump)
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assert "abc123def456ghi" not in result
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assert "ABCdef123456789" not in result
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assert "XYZ789abcdef" not in result
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assert "HOME=/home/user" in result
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assert "SHELL=/bin/bash" in result
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class TestJWTTokens:
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"""JWT tokens start with eyJ (base64 for '{') and have dot-separated parts."""
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def test_full_3part_jwt(self):
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text = (
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"Token: eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9"
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".eyJpc3MiOiI0MjNiZDJkYjg4MjI0MDAwIn0"
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".Gxgv0rru-_kS-I_60EJ7CENTnBh9UeuL3QhkMoQ-VnM"
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)
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "Token:" in result
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# Payload and signature must not survive
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assert "eyJpc3Mi" not in result
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assert "Gxgv0rru" not in result
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def test_2part_jwt(self):
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text = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "eyJzdWIi" not in result
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def test_standalone_jwt_header(self):
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text = "leaked header: eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9 here"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "IkpXVCJ9" not in result
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assert "leaked header:" in result
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def test_jwt_with_base64_padding(self):
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text = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0=.abc123def456ghij"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "abc123def456" not in result
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def test_short_eyj_not_matched(self):
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"""eyJ followed by fewer than 10 base64 chars should not match."""
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text = "eyJust a normal word"
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assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text
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def test_jwt_preserves_surrounding_text(self):
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text = "before eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0 after"
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert result.startswith("before ")
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assert result.endswith(" after")
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def test_home_assistant_jwt_in_memory(self):
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"""Real-world pattern: HA token stored in agent memory block."""
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text = (
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"Home Assistant API Token: "
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"eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9"
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".eyJpc3MiOiJhYmNkZWYiLCJleHAiOjE3NzQ5NTcxMDN9"
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".Gxgv0rru-_kS-I_60EJ7CENTnBh9UeuL3QhkMoQ-VnM"
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)
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result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
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assert "Home Assistant API Token:" in result
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assert "Gxgv0rru" not in result
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assert "..." in result
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class TestDiscordMentions:
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"""Discord mention snowflakes (<@ID> / <@!ID>) are public syntax, not
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secrets — they must pass through the redactor unchanged so multi-bot
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@-pings (DISCORD_ALLOW_BOTS=mentions) keep resolving. See issue #35611."""
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def test_normal_mention_passes_through(self):
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text = "Hello <@222589316709220353>"
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assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text
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def test_nickname_mention_passes_through(self):
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text = "Ping <@!1331549159177846844>"
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assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text
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def test_multiple_mentions_pass_through(self):
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text = "<@111111111111111111> and <@222222222222222222>"
|
|
assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text
|
|
|
|
def test_short_id_passes_through(self):
|
|
text = "<@12345>"
|
|
assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text
|
|
|
|
def test_slack_mention_passes_through(self):
|
|
text = "<@U024BE7LH>"
|
|
assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text
|
|
|
|
def test_preserves_surrounding_text(self):
|
|
text = "User <@222589316709220353> said hello"
|
|
assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TestWebUrlsNotRedacted:
|
|
"""Web URLs (http/https/wss) pass through unchanged — magic-link
|
|
checkouts, OAuth callbacks the agent is meant to follow, and pre-signed
|
|
share URLs must reach the tool intact. Known credential shapes inside
|
|
URLs (sk-, ghp_, JWTs) are still caught by the prefix and JWT regexes.
|
|
DB connection-string passwords are still caught by _DB_CONNSTR_RE.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
def test_oauth_callback_code_passes_through(self):
|
|
text = "GET https://api.example.com/oauth/cb?code=abc123xyz789&state=csrf_ok"
|
|
assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text
|
|
|
|
def test_access_token_query_passes_through(self):
|
|
text = "Fetching https://example.com/api?access_token=opaque_value_here_1234&format=json"
|
|
assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text
|
|
|
|
def test_magic_link_checkout_passes_through(self):
|
|
text = "Open https://checkout.example.com/resume?magic=ABCDEF123456&customer=42"
|
|
assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text
|
|
|
|
def test_presigned_signature_passes_through(self):
|
|
text = "https://s3.amazonaws.com/bucket/k?signature=LONG_PRESIGNED_SIG&id=public"
|
|
assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text
|
|
|
|
def test_https_userinfo_passes_through(self):
|
|
text = "URL: https://user:supersecretpw@host.example.com/path"
|
|
assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text
|
|
|
|
def test_websocket_url_query_passes_through(self):
|
|
text = "wss://api.example.com/ws?token=opaqueWsToken123"
|
|
assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text
|
|
|
|
def test_http_access_log_request_target_passes_through(self):
|
|
text = (
|
|
'INFO aiohttp.access: 127.0.0.1 "POST '
|
|
'/bluebubbles-webhook?password=webhookSecret123&event=new-message '
|
|
'HTTP/1.1" 200 173 "-" "test-client"'
|
|
)
|
|
assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text
|
|
|
|
def test_known_prefix_inside_url_still_redacted(self):
|
|
"""sk-/ghp_/JWT-shaped values inside a URL are still caught by
|
|
_PREFIX_RE / _JWT_RE — the carve-out is for opaque tokens only."""
|
|
text = "https://evil.com/steal?key=sk-" + "a" * 30
|
|
result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
|
|
assert "sk-" + "a" * 30 not in result
|
|
|
|
def test_db_connstr_password_still_redacted(self):
|
|
"""DB schemes (postgres/mysql/mongodb/redis/amqp) keep their
|
|
userinfo redaction via _DB_CONNSTR_RE — connection strings are
|
|
not web URLs the agent navigates to."""
|
|
text = "postgres://admin:dbpass@db.internal:5432/app"
|
|
result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
|
|
assert "dbpass" not in result
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TestBareTokenUserinfoRedaction:
|
|
"""Regression tests for #6396 — a bare credential in URL userinfo
|
|
(``scheme://TOKEN@host``, no ``user:pass`` colon) is redacted. This is the
|
|
git-remote-with-embedded-password shape. The colon form ``user:pass@`` and
|
|
query-string tokens are deliberately left to pass through (#34029) so
|
|
magic-link / OAuth round-trip skills keep working — see
|
|
TestWebUrlsNotRedacted for those invariants.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
def test_git_remote_bare_password_redacted(self):
|
|
"""Exact bug scenario: password in a git remote URL."""
|
|
text = (
|
|
"git remote set-url origin "
|
|
"https://MYPASSWORDWASDISLAYEDHERE@github.com/unclehowell/FCUK.git"
|
|
)
|
|
result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
|
|
assert "MYPASSWORDWASDISLAYEDHERE" not in result
|
|
assert "@github.com" in result
|
|
assert "unclehowell/FCUK.git" in result
|
|
|
|
def test_ssh_bare_token_redacted(self):
|
|
text = "ssh://longtoken1234567@gitlab.com/project.git"
|
|
result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
|
|
assert "longtoken1234567" not in result
|
|
assert "@gitlab.com" in result
|
|
|
|
def test_ftp_bare_token_redacted(self):
|
|
text = "ftp://ftptoken123456@ftp.example.com/files"
|
|
result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
|
|
assert "ftptoken123456" not in result
|
|
|
|
def test_bare_token_with_query_redacts_token_only(self):
|
|
text = "https://abcdef1234567@host.com/path?foo=bar"
|
|
result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
|
|
assert "abcdef1234567" not in result
|
|
assert "?foo=bar" in result
|
|
|
|
def test_user_pass_form_still_passes_through(self):
|
|
"""The ``user:pass@`` colon form must NOT be redacted (#34029)."""
|
|
text = "URL: https://user:supersecretpw@host.example.com/path"
|
|
assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text
|
|
|
|
def test_short_username_not_redacted(self):
|
|
"""Short userinfo (git, admin, deploy) below the 8-char floor passes."""
|
|
for text in (
|
|
"https://git@github.com/user/repo.git",
|
|
"https://admin@example.com/x",
|
|
"https://deploy@host.com/y",
|
|
):
|
|
assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text
|
|
|
|
def test_email_in_path_not_redacted(self):
|
|
"""An ``@`` in a path/query is not userinfo — the token class stops at
|
|
``/``, so emails after the first slash are never treated as a credential."""
|
|
for text in (
|
|
"https://example.com/search?q=user@example.com",
|
|
"https://example.com/users/john@doe.com/profile",
|
|
):
|
|
assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text
|
|
|
|
def test_plain_url_unchanged(self):
|
|
text = "https://github.com/user/repo.git"
|
|
assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text
|
|
|
|
def test_long_bare_token_preserves_head_tail(self):
|
|
token = "abcdef" + "x" * 20 + "wxyz"
|
|
text = f"https://{token}@github.com/u/r.git"
|
|
result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
|
|
assert token not in result
|
|
assert "abcdef" in result # head preserved
|
|
assert "wxyz" in result # tail preserved
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TestFormBodyRedaction:
|
|
"""Form-urlencoded body redaction (k=v&k=v with no other text)."""
|
|
|
|
def test_pure_form_body(self):
|
|
text = "password=mysecret&username=bob&token=opaqueValue"
|
|
result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
|
|
assert "mysecret" not in result
|
|
assert "opaqueValue" not in result
|
|
assert "username=bob" in result
|
|
|
|
def test_oauth_token_request(self):
|
|
text = "grant_type=password&client_id=app&client_secret=topsecret&username=alice&password=alicepw"
|
|
result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
|
|
assert "topsecret" not in result
|
|
assert "alicepw" not in result
|
|
assert "client_id=app" in result
|
|
|
|
def test_non_form_text_unchanged(self):
|
|
"""Sentences with `&` should NOT trigger form redaction."""
|
|
text = "I have password=foo and other things" # contains spaces
|
|
result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
|
|
# The space breaks the form regex; passthrough expected.
|
|
assert "I have" in result
|
|
|
|
def test_multiline_text_not_form(self):
|
|
"""Multi-line text is never treated as form body."""
|
|
text = "first=1\nsecond=2"
|
|
# Should pass through (still subject to other redactors)
|
|
assert "first=1" in redact_sensitive_text(text)
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TestLowercaseDottedConfigKeys:
|
|
"""Issue #16413 — config-file passwords in lowercase/dotted/colon keys
|
|
must be redacted. The uppercase _ENV_ASSIGN_RE missed these, leaking
|
|
`spring.datasource.password=...` and `password: ...` from `cat`'d config
|
|
files. Carve-outs: prose, code (#4367), and web URLs are left untouched.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
def test_spring_dotted_password_assignment(self):
|
|
text = "spring.datasource.password=Sup3rS3cret!"
|
|
result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
|
|
assert "Sup3rS3cret!" not in result
|
|
assert "spring.datasource.password=" in result
|
|
|
|
def test_dotted_api_key_split_keyword(self):
|
|
# 'api.key' splits the keyword across a dot — must still match.
|
|
text = "app.api.key=ak_live_998877"
|
|
result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
|
|
assert "ak_live_998877" not in result
|
|
assert "app.api.key=" in result
|
|
|
|
def test_bare_lowercase_password_at_line_start(self):
|
|
text = "password=mysecretvalue123"
|
|
result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
|
|
assert "mysecretvalue123" not in result
|
|
|
|
def test_quoted_lowercase_value(self):
|
|
text = "password='mysecretvalue123'"
|
|
result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
|
|
assert "mysecretvalue123" not in result
|
|
|
|
def test_yaml_unquoted_password(self):
|
|
text = "password: Sup3rS3cret!"
|
|
result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
|
|
assert "Sup3rS3cret!" not in result
|
|
assert "password:" in result
|
|
|
|
def test_yaml_indented_dotted(self):
|
|
text = "spring:\n datasource:\n password: hunter2pass"
|
|
result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
|
|
assert "hunter2pass" not in result
|
|
|
|
def test_properties_file_dump(self):
|
|
text = (
|
|
"server.port=8080\n"
|
|
"spring.datasource.username=admin\n"
|
|
"spring.datasource.password=Sup3rS3cret!\n"
|
|
"logging.level.root=INFO"
|
|
)
|
|
result = redact_sensitive_text(text)
|
|
assert "Sup3rS3cret!" not in result
|
|
assert "server.port=8080" in result # non-secret keys preserved
|
|
assert "username=admin" in result
|
|
|
|
# --- carve-outs: must NOT redact ---
|
|
|
|
def test_prose_mid_sentence_password_unchanged(self):
|
|
# Not line-anchored, not dotted → conversational text, leave alone.
|
|
text = "I have password=foo and other things"
|
|
assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text
|
|
|
|
def test_lowercase_code_assignment_unchanged(self):
|
|
# #4367 regression — spaces around '=' in code.
|
|
text = "const secret = await fetchSecret();"
|
|
assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text
|
|
|
|
def test_url_query_param_passes_through(self):
|
|
# Web URLs are intentionally hands-off (documented design).
|
|
text = "https://example.com/api?password=opaqueval123&format=json"
|
|
assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text
|
|
|
|
def test_prose_keyword_in_value_unchanged(self):
|
|
text = "note: secret meeting at noon"
|
|
assert redact_sensitive_text(text) == text
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TestXaiToken:
|
|
KEY = "xai-ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstu"
|
|
|
|
def test_bare_token_masked(self):
|
|
result = redact_sensitive_text(f"using key {self.KEY}", force=True)
|
|
assert self.KEY not in result
|
|
assert "xai-AB" in result
|
|
|
|
def test_env_assignment_masked(self):
|
|
result = redact_sensitive_text(f"XAI_API_KEY={self.KEY}", force=True)
|
|
assert self.KEY not in result
|
|
|
|
def test_too_short_not_masked(self):
|
|
short = "xai-tooshort"
|
|
result = redact_sensitive_text(f"text {short} here", force=True)
|
|
assert short in result
|
|
|
|
def test_company_name_not_masked(self):
|
|
result = redact_sensitive_text("xai is a company", force=True)
|
|
assert result == "xai is a company"
|
|
|
|
def test_prefix_visible_in_masked_output(self):
|
|
result = redact_sensitive_text(self.KEY, force=True)
|
|
assert result.startswith("xai-AB")
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TestDbConnstrCodeOutput:
|
|
"""Regression tests for issue #33801 — _DB_CONNSTR_RE corrupting code output.
|
|
|
|
Two distinct flaws, both confined to displayed tool OUTPUT (read_file /
|
|
terminal / execute_code), never the on-disk content:
|
|
|
|
1. The password group ``[^@]+`` was greedy across newlines, so on a
|
|
multi-line block it scanned past the DSN line to the next stray ``@``
|
|
(e.g. a Python ``@decorator``), replacing everything in between with
|
|
``***`` — dropping lines and concatenating the next one.
|
|
2. An f-string DSN template (``f"postgresql://{user}:{pass}@{host}"``) is
|
|
not a live credential, but was redacted anyway. Under ``code_file=True``
|
|
a pure ``{...}`` brace password is now preserved.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
MULTILINE = (
|
|
' return f"postgresql://{auth}@{self.pg_host}:'
|
|
'{self.pg_port}/{self.pg_database}"\n'
|
|
"\n"
|
|
' @model_validator(mode="after")\n'
|
|
' def _validate_critical_settings(self) -> "Settings":'
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
def test_multiline_block_not_corrupted(self):
|
|
"""The newline bound stops the greedy match from swallowing the
|
|
decorator line. Original exact repro from the issue thread."""
|
|
result = redact_sensitive_text(self.MULTILINE, code_file=True, force=True)
|
|
assert result == self.MULTILINE
|
|
# No line dropped, no concatenation onto the f-string line.
|
|
assert "@model_validator" in result
|
|
assert "_validate_critical_settings" in result
|
|
assert result.count("\n") == self.MULTILINE.count("\n")
|
|
|
|
def test_multiline_block_no_corruption_without_code_file(self):
|
|
"""Even without code_file, the newline bound alone prevents the
|
|
catastrophic line-dropping. The single-line template's {pass} group
|
|
is still masked here (code_file=False), but lines stay intact."""
|
|
result = redact_sensitive_text(self.MULTILINE, force=True)
|
|
assert "@model_validator" in result
|
|
assert "_validate_critical_settings" in result
|
|
assert result.count("\n") == self.MULTILINE.count("\n")
|
|
|
|
def test_fstring_template_preserved_with_code_file(self):
|
|
"""A single-line DSN f-string template is preserved under code_file."""
|
|
text = 'return f"postgresql://{user}:{password}@{host}:{port}/{db}"'
|
|
assert redact_sensitive_text(text, code_file=True, force=True) == text
|
|
|
|
def test_fstring_template_self_attr_preserved(self):
|
|
text = 'dsn = f"postgresql://{u}:{self.db_pass}@{h}:{p}/{d}"'
|
|
assert redact_sensitive_text(text, code_file=True, force=True) == text
|
|
|
|
def test_literal_connstr_still_redacted_with_code_file(self):
|
|
"""A real password in a literal DSN is still masked under code_file."""
|
|
text = "postgresql://admin:realpassword@db.internal:5432/app"
|
|
result = redact_sensitive_text(text, code_file=True, force=True)
|
|
assert "realpassword" not in result
|
|
assert "***" in result
|
|
|
|
def test_literal_connstr_redacted_all_schemes(self):
|
|
for scheme, secret in [
|
|
("postgres", "pgsecret1234"),
|
|
("mysql", "mysqlsecret99"),
|
|
("redis", "redissecret77"),
|
|
("mongodb+srv", "mongosecret55"),
|
|
("amqp", "amqpsecret33"),
|
|
]:
|
|
text = f"{scheme}://user:{secret}@host:1234/db"
|
|
result = redact_sensitive_text(text, code_file=True, force=True)
|
|
assert secret not in result, scheme
|
|
|
|
def test_literal_connstr_in_log_line_redacted(self):
|
|
text = "connected via postgres://user:s3cr3tpw@host:5432/db ok"
|
|
result = redact_sensitive_text(text, force=True)
|
|
assert "s3cr3tpw" not in result
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TestTerminalOutputRedaction:
|
|
"""is_env_dump_command + redact_terminal_output — issue #43025.
|
|
|
|
Terminal/process stdout must be redacted on every surface (foreground
|
|
`terminal` AND background `process(poll/log/wait)`). Env-dump commands get
|
|
the ENV-assignment pass so opaque tokens (no vendor prefix) are masked;
|
|
other commands stay on the code_file path to avoid false positives.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
def test_is_env_dump_command_detection(self):
|
|
from agent.redact import is_env_dump_command
|
|
assert is_env_dump_command("printenv")
|
|
assert is_env_dump_command("env")
|
|
assert is_env_dump_command("env | grep API")
|
|
assert is_env_dump_command("set")
|
|
assert is_env_dump_command("export")
|
|
assert is_env_dump_command("declare -x")
|
|
assert is_env_dump_command("cat /tmp/x && printenv")
|
|
assert not is_env_dump_command("python app.py")
|
|
assert not is_env_dump_command("cat config.py")
|
|
assert not is_env_dump_command("printf 'TOKEN=x'")
|
|
assert not is_env_dump_command("")
|
|
assert not is_env_dump_command(None)
|
|
|
|
def test_env_dump_masks_opaque_token(self):
|
|
from agent.redact import redact_terminal_output
|
|
out = "MY_SERVICE_TOKEN=abc123randomopaquetokenvalue999\nHOME=/home/u"
|
|
red = redact_terminal_output(out, "printenv")
|
|
assert "abc123randomopaquetokenvalue999" not in red
|
|
assert "HOME=/home/u" in red
|
|
|
|
def test_non_env_command_preserves_source_false_positives(self):
|
|
from agent.redact import redact_terminal_output
|
|
# code_file path: MAX_TOKENS=100 is source, must survive; real sk- masked.
|
|
out = "MAX_TOKENS=100\nOPENAI_API_KEY=sk-proj-abc123def456ghi789jkl012"
|
|
red = redact_terminal_output(out, "cat config.py")
|
|
assert "MAX_TOKENS=100" in red
|
|
assert "abc123def456" not in red
|
|
|
|
def test_unknown_command_uses_safe_code_file_path(self):
|
|
from agent.redact import redact_terminal_output
|
|
# No command → code_file=True; opaque non-prefix token NOT masked
|
|
# (safe default avoids mangling arbitrary output), prefix still masked.
|
|
out = "OPAQUE=plainvalue123\nKEY=sk-proj-abc123def456ghi789jkl012"
|
|
red = redact_terminal_output(out, None)
|
|
assert "abc123def456" not in red
|
|
|
|
def test_disabled_passes_through(self, monkeypatch):
|
|
from agent.redact import redact_terminal_output
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr("agent.redact._REDACT_ENABLED", False)
|
|
out = "CUSTOM_TOKEN=zzzopaque1234567890abcdef"
|
|
red = redact_terminal_output(out, "printenv")
|
|
assert "zzzopaque1234567890abcdef" in red
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TestFileReadNonReusableRedaction:
|
|
"""#35519: prefix-matched credentials in FILE CONTENT (read_file /
|
|
search_files / cat) must be redacted to a NON-REUSABLE sentinel — not a
|
|
head/tail mask that looks like a real-but-truncated key and gets written
|
|
back to config (corrupting the credential -> 401)."""
|
|
|
|
GHP = "ghp_S1abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0Pn2T" # realistic GitHub PAT shape
|
|
SK = "sk-proj-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789"
|
|
|
|
def test_file_read_uses_nonreusable_sentinel(self):
|
|
out = redact_sensitive_text(f"token: {self.GHP}", force=True, file_read=True)
|
|
# The sentinel marker is present and obviously a redaction...
|
|
assert "«redacted:ghp_…»" in out, out
|
|
# ...and the head/tail-preserving mask shape is NOT produced.
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assert "..." not in out
|
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# The agent can still tell which vendor credential is present.
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assert "ghp_" in out
|
|
|
|
def test_file_read_does_not_leak_secret_body(self):
|
|
"""Crucial: file_read must NOT expose the real key (no un-redact)."""
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out = redact_sensitive_text(f"token: {self.GHP}", force=True, file_read=True)
|
|
# No run of the secret body survives.
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|
assert "S1abcdefghij" not in out
|
|
assert self.GHP not in out
|
|
assert "Pn2T" not in out # not even the tail (the old mask kept it)
|
|
|
|
def test_file_read_sentinel_is_not_a_plausible_key(self):
|
|
"""The sentinel can't be mistaken for / written back as a usable key:
|
|
the old mask was a 13-char `ghp_S1...Pn2T` that broke GitHub auth when
|
|
an agent re-saved it. The sentinel is syntactically invalid as a token
|
|
(contains « » … and ':'), so it can't round-trip into a dead key."""
|
|
out = redact_sensitive_text(f"GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN: {self.GHP}",
|
|
force=True, file_read=True)
|
|
masked = out.split(": ", 1)[1].strip()
|
|
# Not a bare token: contains the sentinel delimiters.
|
|
assert masked.startswith("«") and masked.endswith("»")
|
|
assert "…" in masked
|
|
|
|
def test_default_mode_unchanged_keeps_headtail_mask(self):
|
|
"""Regression guard: NON-file_read (logs/display) keeps the existing
|
|
head/tail mask shape — only file content gets the sentinel. Uses a
|
|
bare-token context (no ``key:`` prefix) so this isolates the prefix
|
|
pass: a ``token: <key>`` line would additionally hit the YAML config
|
|
pass and collapse to ``***``, which is unrelated to this guard."""
|
|
out = redact_sensitive_text(f"see {self.GHP} here", force=True)
|
|
assert "«redacted" not in out # no sentinel in log mode
|
|
assert "ghp_" in out and "..." in out # head/tail mask preserved
|
|
|
|
def test_file_read_implies_code_file_no_env_falsepos(self):
|
|
"""file_read should skip the source-code ENV/JSON false-positive paths
|
|
(it's config/data). A bare ``MAX_TOKENS=8000`` must pass through."""
|
|
out = redact_sensitive_text("MAX_TOKENS=8000", force=True, file_read=True)
|
|
assert out == "MAX_TOKENS=8000"
|
|
|
|
def test_sk_prefix_also_sentinelized(self):
|
|
out = redact_sensitive_text(f"key: {self.SK}", force=True, file_read=True)
|
|
assert "«redacted:sk-…»" in out
|
|
assert self.SK not in out
|