hermes-agent/.github/workflows/supply-chain-audit.yml

name: Supply Chain Audit

# Narrow, high-signal scanner. Only fires on critical indicators of supply
# chain attacks (e.g. the litellm-style payloads). Low-signal heuristics
# (plain base64, plain exec/eval, dependency/Dockerfile/workflow edits,
# Actions version unpinning, outbound POST/PUT) were intentionally
# removed — they fired on nearly every PR and trained reviewers to ignore
# the scanner. Keep this file's checks ruthlessly narrow: if you find
# yourself adding WARNING-tier patterns here again, make a separate
# advisory-only workflow instead.
#
# Path-gating is handled centrally by the ``ci.yml`` orchestrator's
# ``detect`` job. The orchestrator passes ``scan`` / ``deps`` /
# ``mcp_catalog`` booleans as inputs; this workflow's jobs gate on those
# inputs instead of re-computing the diff.

on:
  workflow_call:
    inputs:
      event_name:
        description: The event name from the calling orchestrator.
        type: string
        required: true
      scan:
        description: Whether supply-chain-relevant files changed.
        type: boolean
        required: true
      deps:
        description: Whether pyproject.toml changed.
        type: boolean
        required: true
      mcp_catalog:
        description: Whether the MCP catalog / installer changed.
        type: boolean
        required: true

permissions:
  pull-requests: write
  contents: read

jobs:
  scan:
    name: Scan PR for critical supply chain risks
    if: inputs.scan
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - name: Checkout
        uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
        with:
          fetch-depth: 0

      - name: Scan diff for critical patterns
        id: scan
        env:
          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
        run: |
          set -euo pipefail

          BASE="${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}"
          HEAD="${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}"

          # Added lines only, excluding lockfiles.
          # Three-dot diff (base...head) diffs from the merge base to HEAD,
          # so only changes introduced by this PR are included — not changes
          # that landed on main after the PR branched off.
          DIFF=$(git diff "$BASE"..."$HEAD" -- . ':!uv.lock' ':!*.lock' ':!package-lock.json' ':!yarn.lock' || true)

          FINDINGS=""

          # --- .pth files (auto-execute on Python startup) ---
          # The exact mechanism used in the litellm supply chain attack:
          # https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/issues/24512
          PTH_FILES=$(git diff --name-only "$BASE"..."$HEAD" | grep '\.pth$' || true)
          if [ -n "$PTH_FILES" ]; then
            FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
          ### 🚨 CRITICAL: .pth file added or modified
          Python \`.pth\` files in \`site-packages/\` execute automatically when the interpreter starts — no import required.

          **Files:**
          \`\`\`
          ${PTH_FILES}
          \`\`\`
          "
          fi

          # --- base64 decode + exec/eval on the same line (the litellm attack pattern) ---
          B64_EXEC_HITS=$(echo "$DIFF" | grep -n '^+' | grep -iE 'base64\.(b64decode|decodebytes|urlsafe_b64decode)' | grep -iE 'exec\(|eval\(' | head -10 || true)
          if [ -n "$B64_EXEC_HITS" ]; then
            FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
          ### 🚨 CRITICAL: base64 decode + exec/eval combo
          Base64-decoded strings passed directly to exec/eval — the signature of hidden credential-stealing payloads.

          **Matches:**
          \`\`\`
          ${B64_EXEC_HITS}
          \`\`\`
          "
          fi

          # --- subprocess with encoded/obfuscated command argument ---
          PROC_HITS=$(echo "$DIFF" | grep -n '^+' | grep -E 'subprocess\.(Popen|call|run)\s*\(' | grep -iE 'base64|\\x[0-9a-f]{2}|chr\(' | head -10 || true)
          if [ -n "$PROC_HITS" ]; then
            FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
          ### 🚨 CRITICAL: subprocess with encoded/obfuscated command
          Subprocess calls whose command strings are base64- or hex-encoded are a strong indicator of payload execution.

          **Matches:**
          \`\`\`
          ${PROC_HITS}
          \`\`\`
          "
          fi

          # --- Install-hook files (setup.py/sitecustomize/usercustomize/__init__.pth) ---
          # These execute during pip install or interpreter startup.
          # Anchored at repo root: only the top-level setup.py/setup.cfg run during
          # `pip install`, and only top-level sitecustomize.py/usercustomize.py are
          # auto-loaded by the interpreter via site.py. Any nested file with the
          # same name (e.g. hermes_cli/setup.py — the CLI setup wizard) is unrelated
          # and produced false positives that trained reviewers to ignore the scanner.
          SETUP_HITS=$(git diff --name-only "$BASE"..."$HEAD" | grep -E '^(setup\.py|setup\.cfg|sitecustomize\.py|usercustomize\.py|__init__\.pth)$' || true)
          if [ -n "$SETUP_HITS" ]; then
            FINDINGS="${FINDINGS}
          ### 🚨 CRITICAL: Install-hook file added or modified
          These files can execute code during package installation or interpreter startup.

          **Files:**
          \`\`\`
          ${SETUP_HITS}
          \`\`\`
          "
          fi

          if [ -n "$FINDINGS" ]; then
            echo "found=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
            echo "$FINDINGS" > /tmp/findings.md
          else
            echo "found=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
          fi

      - name: Post critical finding comment
        if: steps.scan.outputs.found == 'true'
        env:
          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
        run: |
          BODY="## 🚨 CRITICAL Supply Chain Risk Detected

          This PR contains a pattern that has been used in real supply chain attacks. A maintainer must review the flagged code carefully before merging.

          $(cat /tmp/findings.md)

          ---
          *Scanner only fires on high-signal indicators: .pth files, base64+exec/eval combos, subprocess with encoded commands, or install-hook files. Low-signal warnings were removed intentionally — if you're seeing this comment, the finding is worth inspecting.*"

          gh pr comment "${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}" --body "$BODY" || echo "::warning::Could not post PR comment (expected for fork PRs — GITHUB_TOKEN is read-only)"

      - name: Fail on critical findings
        if: steps.scan.outputs.found == 'true'
        run: |
          echo "::error::CRITICAL supply chain risk patterns detected in this PR. See the PR comment for details."
          exit 1

  dep-bounds:
    name: Check PyPI dependency upper bounds
    if: inputs.deps
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - name: Checkout
        uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
        with:
          fetch-depth: 0

      - name: Check for unbounded PyPI deps
        id: bounds
        run: |
          set -euo pipefail

          BASE="${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}"
          HEAD="${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}"

          # Only check added lines in pyproject.toml
          ADDED=$(git diff "$BASE"..."$HEAD" -- pyproject.toml | grep '^+' | grep -v '^+++' || true)

          if [ -z "$ADDED" ]; then
            echo "found=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
            exit 0
          fi

          # Match PyPI dep specs that have >= but no < ceiling.
          # Pattern: "package>=version" without a following ",<" bound.
          # Excludes git+ URLs (which use commit SHAs) and comments.
          UNBOUNDED=$(echo "$ADDED" | grep -oE '"[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+(\[[^\]]*\])?>=[ 0-9.]+"' | grep -v ',<' || true)

          if [ -n "$UNBOUNDED" ]; then
            echo "found=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
            echo "$UNBOUNDED" > /tmp/unbounded.txt
          else
            echo "found=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
          fi

      - name: Post unbounded dep warning
        if: steps.bounds.outputs.found == 'true'
        env:
          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
        run: |
          BODY="## ⚠️ Unbounded PyPI Dependency Detected

          This PR adds PyPI dependencies without a \`<next_major\` upper bound. Per our [supply chain policy](../blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#dependency-pinning-policy-supply-chain-hardening), all PyPI deps must be pinned as \`>=floor,<next_major\`.

          **Unbounded specs found:**
          \`\`\`
          $(cat /tmp/unbounded.txt)
          \`\`\`

          **Fix:** Add an upper bound, e.g. \`"package>=1.2.0,<2"\`

          ---
          *See PR #2810 and CONTRIBUTING.md for the full policy rationale.*"

          gh pr comment "${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}" --body "$BODY" || echo "::warning::Could not post PR comment (expected for fork PRs)"

      - name: Fail on unbounded deps
        if: steps.bounds.outputs.found == 'true'
        run: |
          echo "::error::PyPI dependencies without upper bounds detected. Add <next_major ceiling per CONTRIBUTING.md policy."
          exit 1

  mcp-catalog-review:
    name: MCP catalog security review
    if: inputs.mcp_catalog
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - name: Checkout
        uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
        with:
          fetch-depth: 0

      - name: Require explicit MCP catalog review label
        env:
          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
        run: |
          set -euo pipefail
          PR="${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}"
          LABELS=$(gh pr view "$PR" --json labels --jq '.labels[].name' || true)
          if echo "$LABELS" | grep -Fxq 'mcp-catalog-reviewed'; then
            echo "MCP catalog review label present."
            exit 0
          fi

          BODY="## ⚠️ MCP catalog security review required

          This PR changes the bundled MCP catalog or MCP catalog installer code. MCP entries can define local commands that users later install into \`mcp_servers\`, so this needs explicit maintainer review before merge.

          A maintainer should verify:
          - any new/changed \`optional-mcps/**/manifest.yaml\` command and args are expected,
          - stdio transports do not use shell+egress/exfiltration payloads,
          - git install refs are pinned and bootstrap commands are minimal,
          - requested env vars/secrets match the upstream MCP's documented needs.

          After review, add the \`mcp-catalog-reviewed\` label and re-run this check."

          gh pr comment "$PR" --body "$BODY" || echo "::warning::Could not post PR comment (expected for fork PRs)"
          echo "::error::MCP catalog changes require the mcp-catalog-reviewed label."
          exit 1