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Contract V1 of nous-account-service PR #180 ships no refresh tokens, so the original Phase 6 silent-refresh design is replaced with a thinner '401 → redirect to /login' UX. The dashboard's gated middleware now emits a structured envelope on any auth failure; the SPA's fetch wrapper sees it and full-page-navigates the user through re-auth. hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/cookies.py: set_session_cookies(refresh_token='') SKIPS writing the hermes_session_rt cookie. Forward-compat: a non-empty refresh_token still emits the cookie unchanged, so a future Portal contract that starts issuing RTs flips the persistence on with no other change. clear_session_cookies still emits a Max-Age=0 deletion for the RT cookie so stale cookies from earlier deployments get flushed on logout / session expiry. Deprecation marker + rationale in module docstring per the user's docstring-only deprecation pattern. hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/middleware.py: _unauth_response now builds a structured JSON envelope for API 401s: { error: 'session_expired' | 'unauthenticated', detail: 'Unauthorized', reason: <internal>, login_url: '/login?next=<safe-path>' } HTML redirects also carry next= so a user landing on /sessions without a cookie bounces back to /sessions after re-auth. _safe_next_target validates same-origin: drops protocol-relative paths (//evil.com), absolute URLs, and any /login or /auth/* loop. Dead cookies are cleared on the 401 path so the browser stops replaying invalid tokens. hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/routes.py: /auth/callback accepts next= query param and validates via _validate_post_login_target (same rules as the gate's _safe_next_target — defence-in-depth because next= survived a full IDP round trip and attacker-controlled state can re-enter via the callback URL). Open-redirect attempts land at '/' instead. web/src/lib/api.ts: fetchJSON parses the 401 envelope and full-page-navigates to body.login_url ONLY on the known session-expiry error codes. Domain-level 401s (e.g. permission errors) bubble up as regular errors. credentials: 'include' added so cookie auth works for all fetches routed through this wrapper. sessionStorage.lastLocation is preserved for future use by AuthWidget / hermes_status. Test files marked with pytest.mark.xdist_group so the four files that mutate web_server.app.state.auth_required serialize onto the same xdist worker — eliminates 'works locally, fails in CI' app-state bleed. 20 new tests in test_dashboard_auth_401_reauth.py: - set_session_cookies(refresh_token='') skips RT cookie - clear_session_cookies still emits RT deletion - 401 envelope shape (unauthenticated vs session_expired) - dead cookie cleared on invalid-token 401 - login_url carries next= for deep paths - login loop avoided when path is /login/auth/api-auth - protocol-relative URL rejected - _safe_next_target unit tests (accept same-origin, reject loops/abs) - /auth/callback respects safe next= but rejects open redirects 2 pre-existing tests updated to accept the new /login?next=%2F shape. Full dashboard-auth suite: 168 passed, 1 skipped (Phase 0 pre-existing).
141 lines
4.9 KiB
Python
141 lines
4.9 KiB
Python
"""Cookie helpers for dashboard auth.
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Three cookies in play:
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- hermes_session_at: the OAuth access token
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(HttpOnly, lifetime = token TTL)
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- hermes_session_rt: the OAuth refresh token
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(HttpOnly, lifetime = 30 days)
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**DEPRECATED in OAuth contract v1** — Nous Portal
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does not issue refresh tokens; we keep the cookie
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name and clear semantics for forward compatibility
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and to flush stale cookies from old browsers.
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- hermes_session_pkce: short-lived PKCE state + CSRF nonce + provider
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hint (HttpOnly, lifetime = 10 minutes)
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All three are ``SameSite=Lax`` (browser will send on cross-site GET
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top-level navigation, which we need for the IDP redirect back to
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``/auth/callback``) and ``Path=/``. ``Secure`` is set ONLY when the
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dashboard was reached over HTTPS — detected via the request URL scheme,
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which honours ``X-Forwarded-Proto`` upstream of Fly's TLS terminator
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when uvicorn is configured with ``proxy_headers=True``. Loopback dev
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traffic is always HTTP so ``Secure`` would lock the cookies out of
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the browser.
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.. deprecated:: contract v1
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``set_session_cookies`` accepts ``refresh_token=""`` (the contract-v1
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default) and silently skips writing ``hermes_session_rt`` in that case.
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``clear_session_cookies`` still emits a Max-Age=0 deletion for the RT
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cookie so users carrying a stale cookie from an earlier deployment get
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it cleared on logout / session expiry. The full refresh-flow machinery
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was rewritten as "401 → redirect to /login" in Phase 6.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from typing import Optional, Tuple
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from fastapi import Request
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from fastapi.responses import Response
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SESSION_AT_COOKIE = "hermes_session_at"
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SESSION_RT_COOKIE = "hermes_session_rt"
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PKCE_COOKIE = "hermes_session_pkce"
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# 30 days — matches Portal's REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS
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_RT_MAX_AGE = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60
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_PKCE_MAX_AGE = 10 * 60
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def _common_attrs(use_https: bool) -> dict:
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attrs: dict = {
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"httponly": True,
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"samesite": "lax",
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"path": "/",
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}
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if use_https:
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attrs["secure"] = True
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return attrs
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def set_session_cookies(
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response: Response,
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*,
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access_token: str,
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refresh_token: str,
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access_token_expires_in: int,
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use_https: bool,
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) -> None:
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"""Set the session cookies on the response.
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``access_token_expires_in`` is in seconds. Use the provider's reported
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TTL for the access token.
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``refresh_token`` is accepted for backward / forward compatibility but
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SKIPPED when empty — Nous Portal contract v1 issues no refresh tokens
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so a ``Session.refresh_token == ""`` from the provider means we don't
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persist anything. If a future contract revision starts emitting refresh
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tokens, this helper will write the RT cookie again with no other change.
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"""
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response.set_cookie(
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SESSION_AT_COOKIE, access_token,
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max_age=access_token_expires_in,
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**_common_attrs(use_https),
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)
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# Contract v1: empty refresh token means "don't persist RT cookie".
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# Keeping a literal empty-value cookie around would be dead state at
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# best, attack surface at worst.
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if refresh_token:
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response.set_cookie(
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SESSION_RT_COOKIE, refresh_token,
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max_age=_RT_MAX_AGE,
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**_common_attrs(use_https),
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)
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def clear_session_cookies(response: Response) -> None:
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"""Emit Max-Age=0 deletions for both session cookies."""
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# Path must match the set-path for the delete to apply.
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response.set_cookie(
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SESSION_AT_COOKIE, "", max_age=0,
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path="/", httponly=True, samesite="lax",
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)
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response.set_cookie(
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SESSION_RT_COOKIE, "", max_age=0,
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path="/", httponly=True, samesite="lax",
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)
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def set_pkce_cookie(response: Response, *, payload: str, use_https: bool) -> None:
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response.set_cookie(
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PKCE_COOKIE, payload,
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max_age=_PKCE_MAX_AGE,
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**_common_attrs(use_https),
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)
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def clear_pkce_cookie(response: Response) -> None:
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response.set_cookie(
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PKCE_COOKIE, "", max_age=0,
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path="/", httponly=True, samesite="lax",
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)
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def read_session_cookies(request: Request) -> Tuple[Optional[str], Optional[str]]:
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"""Returns (access_token, refresh_token), either may be None."""
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at = request.cookies.get(SESSION_AT_COOKIE)
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rt = request.cookies.get(SESSION_RT_COOKIE)
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return at, rt
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def read_pkce_cookie(request: Request) -> Optional[str]:
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return request.cookies.get(PKCE_COOKIE)
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def detect_https(request: Request) -> bool:
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"""Decide whether to set the ``Secure`` cookie flag.
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Reads ``request.url.scheme`` — under uvicorn's ``proxy_headers=True``
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(which start_server enables when the gate is active), this honours
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``X-Forwarded-Proto`` from Fly's TLS terminator. Loopback traffic is
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always HTTP so this returns False there.
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"""
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return request.url.scheme == "https"
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