mirror of
https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent.git
synced 2026-05-29 06:31:32 +00:00
a618789dba
Two parallel public-path allowlists drifted: _PUBLIC_API_PATHS in
hermes_cli/web_server.py (legacy _SESSION_TOKEN middleware) and
_GATE_PUBLIC_PREFIXES in hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/middleware.py
(OAuth gate). The legacy list included /api/status (documented as a
non-sensitive read-only liveness target); the OAuth gate's list did not.
Effect: every wildcard-subdomain agent surfaced as STARTING/down to the
portal even though the dashboard was serving correctly. Nous account
service (src/server/agents/fly-provider.ts
getInstanceRuntimeStatus) fetches ``/api/status`` without a cookie
as its sole liveness probe; the OAuth gate's 401 looked identical to
'agent dead' on the portal side.
Fix: lift the allowlist into hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/public_paths.py
and have both middlewares import it. _path_is_public now consults
the shared frozenset first, then falls back to the gate's
auth-bootstrap/static prefix list. Future additions to the public list
hit both gates automatically.
Endpoint inventory (verified safe to remain public):
* /api/status — version, gateway state, active session count,
auth-gate shape. Portal liveness probe target.
* /api/config/defaults — config-defaults feed for the SPA's Config page
* /api/config/schema — config schema for the SPA's Config page
* /api/model/info — model catalogue metadata (context windows)
* /api/dashboard/themes — theme manifests for the skin engine
* /api/dashboard/plugins — plugin manifests for the dashboard
No user data, no session content, no secrets. Same shape an external
monitoring agent would hit on /healthz.
Tests:
* New: test_gated_status_is_public (regression guard with the NAS
fly-provider.ts liveness-probe rationale spelled out in the docstring)
* New: test_other_public_api_paths_are_public_under_gate (parametrised
over the rest of PUBLIC_API_PATHS — proves 401 / 302-to-login is
never the response)
* New: docker integration check #3 in
test_dashboard_oauth_gate_engaged_by_default — /api/status
remains 200 under the gate AND reports auth_required=True so the
portal can distinguish modes
* Updated: test_full_login_round_trip_unlocks_gated_api now probes
/api/sessions instead of /api/status (status is public, so it
can no longer distinguish 'logged in' from 'gate accidentally
disabled')
* Updated: TestApi401Envelope (the no-cookie / invalid-cookie /
dead-cookie tests) probes /api/sessions for the same reason
* Updated: docker integration check #2 in
test_dashboard_oauth_gate_engaged_by_default probes
/api/sessions to prove the gate is intercepting
* Removed: dead _login() helper in
test_dashboard_auth_status_endpoint.py (no longer needed since
/api/status is reachable cold)
Companion to docs/handover/hermes-agent-dashboard-s6-insecure-fix.md
(the --insecure flag fix that shipped earlier).
49 lines
2.2 KiB
Python
49 lines
2.2 KiB
Python
"""Shared allowlist of ``/api/*`` paths that bypass dashboard auth.
|
|
|
|
Two middlewares enforce dashboard auth and previously kept independent
|
|
copies of this list:
|
|
|
|
* ``hermes_cli.web_server.auth_middleware`` — loopback / ``--insecure``
|
|
mode, gates on the ephemeral ``_SESSION_TOKEN``.
|
|
* ``hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.middleware.gated_auth_middleware`` —
|
|
non-loopback mode, gates on the OAuth session cookie.
|
|
|
|
When the lists drifted, ``/api/status`` ended up public under the legacy
|
|
gate but 401'd under the OAuth gate. That broke the portal's wildcard
|
|
liveness probe (``nous-account-service`` ``fly-provider.ts``
|
|
``getInstanceRuntimeStatus``), which fetches ``/api/status`` without a
|
|
cookie as its sole signal of "agent dashboard is alive": every healthy
|
|
wildcard-subdomain agent surfaced as STARTING/down in the portal UI even
|
|
though the dashboard was serving correctly.
|
|
|
|
Centralising the allowlist here so both middlewares import the same
|
|
frozenset prevents the next drift. Keep this list minimal — only truly
|
|
non-sensitive, read-only endpoints belong here. As a sanity check, every
|
|
entry should be safe to expose to:
|
|
|
|
* external uptime probes (Pingdom, Better Stack, NAS),
|
|
* the dashboard SPA before the user has logged in,
|
|
* anyone who happens to ``curl`` the hostname.
|
|
|
|
If a new endpoint doesn't pass all three tests, it should be gated and
|
|
the SPA should bootstrap it after login instead.
|
|
"""
|
|
from __future__ import annotations
|
|
|
|
PUBLIC_API_PATHS: frozenset[str] = frozenset({
|
|
# Liveness probe target. Returns version, gateway state, active
|
|
# session count, and the dashboard auth-gate shape. No bodies, no
|
|
# session content, no secrets. Documented as the portal's wildcard
|
|
# liveness probe in
|
|
# ``docs/agent-dashboard-public-url-contract.md`` (NAS side).
|
|
"/api/status",
|
|
# Read-only config-defaults / schema feeds for the SPA's Config page.
|
|
"/api/config/defaults",
|
|
"/api/config/schema",
|
|
# Read-only model metadata (context windows, etc.) — same shape as
|
|
# provider catalogs already exposed on the public internet.
|
|
"/api/model/info",
|
|
# Read-only theme + plugin manifests for the dashboard skin engine.
|
|
"/api/dashboard/themes",
|
|
"/api/dashboard/plugins",
|
|
})
|