hermes-agent/tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_auth_ws_auth.py
Ben c3104195b8 fix(dashboard-auth): bypass loopback WS peer check in gated mode
When the OAuth gate is active, start_server runs uvicorn with
proxy_headers=True so the dashboard can honour X-Forwarded-Proto from
Fly's TLS terminator (cookies, redirect URI reconstruction). A side
effect: ws.client.host is rewritten to the X-Forwarded-For value, which
on Fly is the real internet client IP — never loopback. The loopback
peer guard in _ws_client_is_allowed then rejected every WS upgrade in
gated mode (4403 close) even after a successful OAuth round trip and
ticket consumption, silently breaking /api/pty, /api/ws, /api/pub, and
/api/events.

Fix: in gated mode, bypass the peer-IP check. The OAuth gate +
single-use ticket is the auth. The Host/Origin guard in
_ws_host_origin_is_allowed still runs and is what protects against
DNS-rebinding here, not the peer IP.

Loopback mode behaviour is unchanged: the legacy ?token= path is the
only auth there and we don't want LAN hosts guessing tokens.

Regression coverage: TestWsRequestIsAllowedGated pins all four
behaviours — non-loopback peer allowed in gated mode, non-loopback peer
rejected in loopback mode, loopback peer allowed in loopback mode, and
the Host/Origin guard still firing on a rebinding attempt with gated
mode + matching peer.
2026-05-27 02:12:27 -07:00

320 lines
13 KiB
Python

"""Tests for the WS-upgrade auth helper (Phase 5 task 5.2).
The dashboard's four WS endpoints (``/api/pty``, ``/api/ws``, ``/api/pub``,
``/api/events``) share an auth gate: ``_ws_auth_ok``. In loopback mode it
accepts ``?token=<_SESSION_TOKEN>``; in gated mode it accepts a single-use
``?ticket=`` minted by ``POST /api/auth/ws-ticket``.
These tests exercise the helper at the unit level (no actual WS upgrade)
plus the ticket-mint endpoint under realistic gated-mode setup. We don't
test the full WS upgrade because the starlette TestClient WS path has a
pre-existing regression unrelated to dashboard-auth.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from types import SimpleNamespace
from unittest.mock import patch
import pytest
# Phase 5 / Phase 6: these tests mutate ``web_server.app.state.auth_required``
# at module level. Run them in the same xdist worker so they don't race
# against each other (and against any other file that also touches
# ``app.state``) — the marker name is shared across all dashboard-auth test
# files that gate the app.
pytestmark = pytest.mark.xdist_group("dashboard_auth_app_state")
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from hermes_cli import web_server
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth import clear_providers, register_provider
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.ws_tickets import (
TicketInvalid,
_reset_for_tests,
consume_ticket,
mint_ticket,
)
from tests.hermes_cli.conftest_dashboard_auth import StubAuthProvider
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Fixtures
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.fixture
def gated_app():
"""web_server.app configured for gated mode + stub provider registered."""
_reset_for_tests()
clear_providers()
register_provider(StubAuthProvider())
prev_host = getattr(web_server.app.state, "bound_host", None)
prev_port = getattr(web_server.app.state, "bound_port", None)
prev_required = getattr(web_server.app.state, "auth_required", None)
web_server.app.state.bound_host = "fly-app.fly.dev"
web_server.app.state.bound_port = 443
web_server.app.state.auth_required = True
client = TestClient(web_server.app, base_url="https://fly-app.fly.dev")
yield client
clear_providers()
_reset_for_tests()
web_server.app.state.bound_host = prev_host
web_server.app.state.bound_port = prev_port
web_server.app.state.auth_required = prev_required
@pytest.fixture
def loopback_app():
"""web_server.app configured for loopback mode (gate OFF)."""
_reset_for_tests()
clear_providers()
prev_host = getattr(web_server.app.state, "bound_host", None)
prev_port = getattr(web_server.app.state, "bound_port", None)
prev_required = getattr(web_server.app.state, "auth_required", None)
web_server.app.state.bound_host = "127.0.0.1"
web_server.app.state.bound_port = 8080
web_server.app.state.auth_required = False
client = TestClient(web_server.app, base_url="http://127.0.0.1:8080")
yield client
_reset_for_tests()
web_server.app.state.bound_host = prev_host
web_server.app.state.bound_port = prev_port
web_server.app.state.auth_required = prev_required
def _logged_in(client: TestClient) -> None:
"""Drive the stub OAuth round trip so the client holds session cookies."""
r1 = client.get("/auth/login?provider=stub", follow_redirects=False)
assert r1.status_code == 302
state = r1.headers["location"].split("state=")[1]
r2 = client.get(
f"/auth/callback?code=stub_code&state={state}", follow_redirects=False
)
assert r2.status_code == 302
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# POST /api/auth/ws-ticket — the mint endpoint
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestWsTicketEndpoint:
def test_authenticated_session_can_mint(self, gated_app):
_logged_in(gated_app)
r = gated_app.post("/api/auth/ws-ticket")
assert r.status_code == 200
body = r.json()
assert "ticket" in body
assert isinstance(body["ticket"], str)
assert len(body["ticket"]) >= 32
assert body["ttl_seconds"] == 30
def test_unauthenticated_returns_401_or_redirect(self, gated_app):
r = gated_app.post("/api/auth/ws-ticket", follow_redirects=False)
# gated_auth_middleware short-circuits before the route — it
# returns either 401 or 302. Either is fine.
assert r.status_code in (302, 401)
def test_each_call_returns_a_distinct_ticket(self, gated_app):
_logged_in(gated_app)
tickets = {gated_app.post("/api/auth/ws-ticket").json()["ticket"]
for _ in range(5)}
assert len(tickets) == 5
def test_get_method_is_not_allowed(self, gated_app):
_logged_in(gated_app)
r = gated_app.get("/api/auth/ws-ticket", follow_redirects=False)
# GET must not mint a ticket (which would be cookie-replayable via
# <img src=…> from a malicious origin). Accepted responses:
# 401 — gated middleware allowlist-miss
# 404 — SPA catch-all swallowed it
# 405 — Method Not Allowed (route only registered for POST)
# 200 — SPA index.html was served (catch-all caught the path)
# In every case the JSON body of a successful ticket mint must
# NOT be present. The assertion below holds even when the SPA
# shell happens to serve a 200.
body = r.text
assert "ticket" not in body or '"ttl_seconds"' not in body, (
f"GET /api/auth/ws-ticket leaked a ticket (status={r.status_code}, "
f"body[:200]={body[:200]!r})"
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# _ws_auth_ok — unit-level (synthetic WebSocket-shaped object)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _fake_ws(*, query: dict, client_host: str = "127.0.0.1", path: str = "/api/pty"):
"""Build a stand-in for starlette.WebSocket good enough for _ws_auth_ok."""
class _QP:
def __init__(self, q):
self._q = q
def get(self, k, default=""):
return self._q.get(k, default)
return SimpleNamespace(
query_params=_QP(query),
client=SimpleNamespace(host=client_host),
url=SimpleNamespace(path=path),
)
class TestWsAuthOkLoopback:
"""Gate OFF — legacy token path."""
def test_correct_token_accepted(self, loopback_app):
ws = _fake_ws(query={"token": web_server._SESSION_TOKEN})
assert web_server._ws_auth_ok(ws) is True
def test_wrong_token_rejected(self, loopback_app):
ws = _fake_ws(query={"token": "not-the-real-token"})
assert web_server._ws_auth_ok(ws) is False
def test_missing_token_rejected(self, loopback_app):
ws = _fake_ws(query={})
assert web_server._ws_auth_ok(ws) is False
def test_ticket_param_ignored_in_loopback(self, loopback_app):
# Even if someone sneaks a ticket through, loopback mode only
# cares about ?token=. A naked ticket isn't a token.
ticket = mint_ticket(user_id="u1", provider="stub")
ws = _fake_ws(query={"ticket": ticket})
assert web_server._ws_auth_ok(ws) is False
class TestWsAuthOkGated:
"""Gate ON — ticket path only."""
def test_valid_ticket_accepted(self, gated_app):
ticket = mint_ticket(user_id="u1", provider="stub")
ws = _fake_ws(query={"ticket": ticket})
assert web_server._ws_auth_ok(ws) is True
def test_consumed_ticket_rejected(self, gated_app):
ticket = mint_ticket(user_id="u1", provider="stub")
ws_one = _fake_ws(query={"ticket": ticket})
ws_two = _fake_ws(query={"ticket": ticket})
assert web_server._ws_auth_ok(ws_one) is True
# Single-use — second consumption fails.
assert web_server._ws_auth_ok(ws_two) is False
def test_unknown_ticket_rejected(self, gated_app):
ws = _fake_ws(query={"ticket": "never-minted"})
assert web_server._ws_auth_ok(ws) is False
def test_missing_ticket_rejected(self, gated_app):
ws = _fake_ws(query={})
assert web_server._ws_auth_ok(ws) is False
def test_legacy_token_rejected_in_gated_mode(self, gated_app):
"""Critical: gated mode must NOT honour the legacy token path
even when someone has access to the in-process value of
_SESSION_TOKEN (e.g. a leaked log line)."""
ws = _fake_ws(query={"token": web_server._SESSION_TOKEN})
assert web_server._ws_auth_ok(ws) is False
def test_rejection_audit_logs(self, gated_app, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
# Point the audit log at a tmp dir so we can read what got written.
monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(tmp_path))
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth import audit as audit_mod
# The log path is resolved lazily on the first audit_log() call;
# bust any cached handler so it re-resolves.
if hasattr(audit_mod, "_LOGGER"):
monkeypatch.setattr(audit_mod, "_LOGGER", None, raising=False)
ws = _fake_ws(query={"ticket": "never-minted"})
assert web_server._ws_auth_ok(ws) is False
log_file = tmp_path / "logs" / "dashboard-auth.log"
# The audit module may write asynchronously through stdlib logging,
# but flush is synchronous. If the file doesn't exist yet, the
# logger may not have been initialized in this process — that's
# acceptable as long as the rejection path didn't crash.
if log_file.exists():
content = log_file.read_text()
assert "ws_ticket_rejected" in content
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# _build_sidecar_url — gated mode mints a server-internal ticket
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestWsRequestIsAllowedGated:
"""Bug fix: in gated mode, the WS peer-IP loopback check must be
bypassed.
When the OAuth gate is active, ``start_server`` runs uvicorn with
``proxy_headers=True`` so the dashboard can honour
``X-Forwarded-Proto`` from Fly's TLS terminator. A side effect is that
``ws.client.host`` is rewritten to the X-Forwarded-For value — the
real internet client IP, never loopback. The loopback peer guard
(intended only for unauthenticated loopback dev) must not also reject
those upgrades: the OAuth gate + single-use ticket is the auth.
Regression coverage: every WS endpoint (``/api/pty``, ``/api/ws``,
``/api/pub``, ``/api/events``) calls ``_ws_request_is_allowed`` after
``_ws_auth_ok``. If the peer-IP check rejects gated mode, the chat
tab + sidebar tool feed silently fail to connect even after a
successful OAuth login.
"""
def test_non_loopback_peer_allowed_in_gated_mode(self, gated_app):
ws = _fake_ws(query={}, client_host="203.0.113.7")
# Host header matches the bound host so the DNS-rebinding guard
# passes; only the peer-IP check is under test.
ws.headers = {"host": "fly-app.fly.dev"}
assert web_server._ws_request_is_allowed(ws) is True
def test_non_loopback_peer_rejected_in_loopback_mode(self, loopback_app):
"""Loopback mode still enforces the peer-IP guard — the legacy
token path is the only auth and we don't want random LAN hosts
guessing it."""
ws = _fake_ws(query={}, client_host="192.168.1.42")
ws.headers = {"host": "127.0.0.1:8080"}
assert web_server._ws_request_is_allowed(ws) is False
def test_loopback_peer_allowed_in_loopback_mode(self, loopback_app):
ws = _fake_ws(query={}, client_host="127.0.0.1")
ws.headers = {"host": "127.0.0.1:8080"}
assert web_server._ws_request_is_allowed(ws) is True
def test_host_origin_guard_still_runs_in_gated_mode(self, gated_app):
"""Bypassing the peer-IP check must not bypass the DNS-rebinding
Host header guard — that one still protects against attacker
sites resolving DNS to the public IP."""
ws = _fake_ws(query={}, client_host="203.0.113.7")
ws.headers = {"host": "evil.example.com"}
assert web_server._ws_request_is_allowed(ws) is False
class TestSidecarUrl:
def test_loopback_uses_session_token(self, loopback_app):
url = web_server._build_sidecar_url("ch-1")
assert url is not None
assert f"token={web_server._SESSION_TOKEN}" in url
assert "ticket=" not in url
def test_gated_uses_ticket(self, gated_app):
url = web_server._build_sidecar_url("ch-1")
assert url is not None
assert "token=" not in url
assert "ticket=" in url
# And the ticket should be live.
ticket = url.split("ticket=")[1].split("&")[0]
info = consume_ticket(ticket)
# Sidecar tickets are bound to the pseudo-user so audit logs can
# distinguish them from real browser tickets.
assert info["user_id"] == "pty-sidecar"
assert info["provider"] == "server-internal"
def test_no_bound_host_returns_none(self, gated_app):
web_server.app.state.bound_host = None
try:
assert web_server._build_sidecar_url("ch") is None
finally:
web_server.app.state.bound_host = "fly-app.fly.dev"