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Mission-control style deploys reverse-proxy the dashboard at a path
prefix (e.g. mission-control.tilos.com/hermes/* -> :9119) and inject
X-Forwarded-Prefix: /hermes on every request. The SPA mount already
honoured this for asset URLs and the bootstrap __HERMES_BASE_PATH__,
but the OAuth gate didn't:
1. The gate's Location: header to /login and the 401 envelope's
login_url were built bare ("/login?next=..."). Under a /hermes
prefix the browser follows that to mission-control.tilos.com/login
which the proxy doesn't route to the dashboard.
2. _redirect_uri (the OAuth callback URL handed to the IDP) used
request.url_for() which doesn't honour X-Forwarded-Prefix
(Starlette/uvicorn only proxy_headers Host + Proto + For). The
IDP redirects back to /auth/callback instead of /hermes/auth/
callback → 404 in the user's browser.
3. Cookies were set with Path=/ which leaks them to other apps on
the same origin and won't be sent back on requests under the
prefix in the first place.
Fix threads the normalised prefix through every boundary:
* New hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/prefix.py — single source of truth
for X-Forwarded-Prefix parsing. web_server._normalise_prefix
becomes a re-export so the SPA mount, the gate, and the cookies
helper all agree.
* middleware._unauth_response builds login_url = f"{prefix}/login".
* routes._redirect_uri splices the prefix into the path component
of the IDP-bound URL (with full validation of the header).
* cookies.{set,clear}_{session,pkce}_cookie now take prefix="".
Path attribute switches to /hermes when set; cookie name switches
name variant (see below). Every caller passes the request's
normalised prefix.
Cookie hardening (Teknium's lesser-note #1 in the PR review): adopt
the __Host- / __Secure- cookie name prefixes per draft-west-cookie-
prefixes. The variant is selected from (use_https, prefix):
* Loopback HTTP → bare "hermes_session_at" (both prefixes require
Secure, incompatible with HTTP).
* HTTPS, direct deploy (Path=/) → "__Host-hermes_session_at".
Strongest spec: bound to exact origin, no Domain attribute, Secure
required.
* HTTPS, behind a proxy prefix (Path=/hermes) →
"__Secure-hermes_session_at". __Host- forbids Path != "/"; the
explicit Path=/hermes covers same-origin app isolation.
Setter and reader BOTH consult the prefix because the cookie *name*
changes — a reader that looked up the bare name when the setter wrote
__Secure- would never find the value. The reader falls back across
all three variants so a request whose shape changed mid-session (e.g.
post-deploy from no-prefix to /hermes) still picks up the existing
cookie until it expires.
Test coverage:
- tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_auth_prefix.py — new file. 11 tests
pinning:
• Location: /hermes/login on the gate's HTML redirect
• 401 envelope login_url carries the prefix
• Malformed X-Forwarded-Prefix is ignored (header-injection
defence; the script-tag value is normalised to empty string)
• _redirect_uri splices /hermes into the path (the property
that prevents the IDP-returns-to-404 failure)
• PKCE cookie uses Path=/hermes + __Secure- when proxied
• Session cookies use __Host- when direct, __Secure- when
proxied, bare on loopback HTTP
• End-to-end round trip with hand-managed PKCE cookie carriage
(TestClient can't simulate a Path=/hermes cookie automatically)
- tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_auth_cookies.py — rewritten to pin
each (use_https, prefix) shape produces its expected cookie name,
plus reader-side coverage that __Host- and __Secure- variants are
both recognised.
- Existing tests across middleware / 401-reauth / etc. updated to
match the new cookie names (substring contains instead of
startswith).
Mutation-tested: reverting _unauth_response to build the bare
"/login" URL trips exactly the two tests that pin the prefix
carriage, confirming the suite discriminates the regression.
207 lines
7.5 KiB
Python
207 lines
7.5 KiB
Python
"""Auth-gate middleware for the dashboard.
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Engaged when ``app.state.auth_required is True``. The gate's job:
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1. Allow a small set of routes through unauthenticated (login page,
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``/auth/*`` OAuth round trip, ``/api/auth/providers``, static
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assets).
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2. For everything else, demand a valid session cookie and attach the
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verified :class:`Session` to ``request.state.session``.
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3. On HTML routes, redirect missing/invalid cookies to ``/login``.
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On ``/api/*`` routes, return 401 JSON.
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The middleware is a no-op when ``auth_required`` is False (loopback
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mode); the legacy ``_SESSION_TOKEN`` ``auth_middleware`` handles those
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binds.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import logging
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from typing import Awaitable, Callable
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from fastapi import Request
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from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse, RedirectResponse, Response
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth import list_providers
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.audit import AuditEvent, audit_log
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.base import ProviderError
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.cookies import read_session_cookies
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_log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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# Paths that bypass the auth gate. Order matters: prefix match.
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_GATE_PUBLIC_PREFIXES: tuple[str, ...] = (
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"/auth/login",
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"/auth/callback",
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"/auth/logout",
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"/login",
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"/api/auth/providers",
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"/assets/",
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"/favicon.ico",
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"/ds-assets/",
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"/fonts/",
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"/fonts-terminal/",
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)
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def _path_is_public(path: str) -> bool:
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return any(
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path == prefix or path.startswith(prefix)
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for prefix in _GATE_PUBLIC_PREFIXES
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)
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def _client_ip(request: Request) -> str:
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fwd = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for", "")
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if fwd:
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return fwd.split(",")[0].strip()
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return request.client.host if request.client else ""
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def _unauth_response(request: Request, *, reason: str) -> Response:
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"""API routes → 401 JSON with ``login_url``; HTML routes → 302 → /login.
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The JSON envelope carries a ``login_url`` field with a ``next=`` query
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string so the SPA's global 401 handler can drop the user back where
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they were after re-auth. The contract is intentionally simple so any
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fetch-wrapper can implement the redirect without parsing details:
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if response.status === 401 && body.error in ("unauthenticated",
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"session_expired"):
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window.location.assign(body.login_url);
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HTML redirects also carry the ``next=`` query string so direct
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navigation to ``/sessions`` (etc.) without a cookie comes back to
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``/sessions`` after login.
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Under a reverse proxy with ``X-Forwarded-Prefix: /hermes``, the
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``login_url`` is prefixed (``/hermes/login?next=...``) so the
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browser's window.location.assign / Location: follow lands on the
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proxied login page rather than the bare ``/login`` (which the
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proxy doesn't route to the dashboard).
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"""
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.prefix import prefix_from_request
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path = request.url.path
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next_param = _safe_next_target(request)
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prefix = prefix_from_request(request)
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login_url = (
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f"{prefix}/login?next={next_param}" if next_param
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else f"{prefix}/login"
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)
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if path.startswith("/api/"):
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# API routes never get redirects: the browser fetch() API would
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# follow a 302 into the cross-origin OAuth dance opaquely. Return
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# 401 with a structured envelope so the SPA can full-page-navigate
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# to login_url.
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error_code = (
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"session_expired"
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if reason == "invalid_or_expired_session"
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else "unauthenticated"
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)
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return JSONResponse(
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{
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"error": error_code,
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"detail": "Unauthorized",
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"reason": reason,
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"login_url": login_url,
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},
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status_code=401,
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)
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return RedirectResponse(url=login_url, status_code=302)
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def _safe_next_target(request: Request) -> str:
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"""Build the URL-encoded ``next`` query value, or empty string.
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Only same-origin relative paths are accepted; absolute URLs or
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``//evil.com`` open-redirect attempts are silently dropped. The empty
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string return means the caller produces a bare ``/login`` URL — fine,
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user lands at the dashboard root after re-auth.
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"""
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path = request.url.path
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# Reject anything that doesn't start with "/" or starts with "//"
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# (protocol-relative URL — would open-redirect to an attacker host).
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if not path or not path.startswith("/") or path.startswith("//"):
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return ""
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# Don't redirect back to the auth routes themselves — that loops.
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if any(
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path == p or path.startswith(p)
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for p in ("/login", "/auth/", "/api/auth/")
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):
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return ""
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# Preserve query string if present (e.g. /sessions?page=2).
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query = request.url.query
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target = f"{path}?{query}" if query else path
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# urlencode the whole thing as a single value.
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from urllib.parse import quote
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return quote(target, safe="")
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async def gated_auth_middleware(
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request: Request,
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call_next: Callable[[Request], Awaitable[Response]],
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) -> Response:
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"""Engaged only when ``app.state.auth_required is True``.
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No-op pass-through in loopback mode so the legacy auth_middleware can
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handle those binds via ``_SESSION_TOKEN``.
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"""
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if not getattr(request.app.state, "auth_required", False):
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return await call_next(request)
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path = request.url.path
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if _path_is_public(path):
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return await call_next(request)
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at, _rt = read_session_cookies(request)
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if not at:
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return _unauth_response(request, reason="no_cookie")
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# Try every registered provider's verify_session in turn. Providers
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# MUST return None for tokens they don't recognise (not raise). This
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# lets multiple providers stack — the first one that recognises a
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# token wins.
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session = None
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for provider in list_providers():
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try:
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session = provider.verify_session(access_token=at)
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except ProviderError as e:
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_log.warning(
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"dashboard-auth: provider %r unreachable during verify: %s",
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provider.name, e,
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)
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audit_log(
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AuditEvent.SESSION_VERIFY_FAILURE,
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provider=provider.name,
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reason="provider_unreachable",
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ip=_client_ip(request),
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)
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return JSONResponse(
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{"detail": f"Auth provider {provider.name!r} unreachable"},
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status_code=503,
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)
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if session is not None:
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break
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if session is None:
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audit_log(
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AuditEvent.SESSION_VERIFY_FAILURE,
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reason="no_provider_recognises",
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ip=_client_ip(request),
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)
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response = _unauth_response(request, reason="invalid_or_expired_session")
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# Clear the dead cookie so the browser doesn't keep sending it.
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# Contract v1: no refresh token to retry with, so the only correct
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# next step is full re-auth via /login. Importing locally avoids a
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# cycle with cookies → middleware at module load. Pass the active
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# prefix so the deletion's Path matches the set-Path (otherwise
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# the browser ignores it).
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.cookies import clear_session_cookies
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.prefix import prefix_from_request
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clear_session_cookies(response, prefix=prefix_from_request(request))
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return response
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request.state.session = session
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return await call_next(request)
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