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39975613b1
Second, deeper pass over tools/gateway/hermes_cli plus first pass over the trees wave 1 missed (acp, acp_adapter, skills, computer_use, docker, dashboard, conformance, monitoring, secret_sources, hermes_state, providers). Same rubric as wave 1 (AGENTS.md test policy); security, alternation/caching invariants, issue-number regressions, and E2E kept. Real test-quality fixes found and rooted out along the way: - tests/tools/test_command_guards.py made real auxiliary-LLM HTTPS calls (DEFAULT_CONFIG smart-approval leaked in) — pinned approval mode=manual via autouse fixture: 17.4s → 0.4s. - test_model_switch_custom_providers.py / test_user_providers_model_switch.py silently probed live provider catalogs (~2s/test) — stubbed cached_provider_model_ids/provider_model_ids/fetch_api_models. - test_telegram_noise_filter.py: 15-platform copy-paste matrix over shared gateway.run logic → 3 representative platforms (55s → 3.9s). - test_gateway_shutdown.py: stop()'s 5s interrupt-deadline loop spun on MagicMock agents — interrupt.side_effect now clears _running_agents (22s → 1.0s). - test_gateway_inactivity_timeout.py poll-harness timings shrunk 3-5x (24s → 1.1s); test_mcp_stability.py backoff/SIGTERM-grace sleeps patched (15.4s → 2.5s); test_async_delegation.py negative-drain wait 5s → 0.5s. - test_telegram_init_deadline.py: loop-block margin restored to 1.0s with rationale comment — the watchdog-dump assertion needs the loop blocked well past deadline+grace under parallel load (flaked once in the 40-worker verification run at a 0.2s margin). Verification: full hermetic suite via scripts/run_tests.sh — 2,438 files, 21,718 tests passed, 0 failed, 293.9s wall. Suite totals vs original baseline: 46,820 → 19,757 test functions (−57.8%), wall 583.5s → 293.9s (−50%), subprocess CPU 13,564s → 11,623s.
97 lines
3.9 KiB
Python
97 lines
3.9 KiB
Python
"""Phase 7 — /api/status exposes auth-gate state + AuthWidget integration.
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The dashboard's status endpoint now reports ``auth_required`` and
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``auth_providers`` so the AuthWidget + StatusPage can render the
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correct "gated / loopback" badge without a separate round trip. This
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test asserts both shapes (gated and loopback).
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The AuthWidget itself is .tsx — no Python test here. The widget's
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behaviour (renders nothing on 401, shows truncated user_id, etc.) is
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documented in AuthWidget.tsx; covered manually via the Phase 4.2
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smoke test against staging Portal.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import pytest
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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from hermes_cli import web_server
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth import clear_providers, register_provider
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from tests.hermes_cli.conftest_dashboard_auth import StubAuthProvider
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@pytest.fixture
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def gated_client():
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clear_providers()
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register_provider(StubAuthProvider())
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prev_host = getattr(web_server.app.state, "bound_host", None)
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prev_port = getattr(web_server.app.state, "bound_port", None)
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prev_required = getattr(web_server.app.state, "auth_required", None)
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web_server.app.state.bound_host = "fly-app.fly.dev"
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web_server.app.state.bound_port = 443
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web_server.app.state.auth_required = True
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client = TestClient(web_server.app, base_url="https://fly-app.fly.dev")
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yield client
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clear_providers()
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web_server.app.state.bound_host = prev_host
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web_server.app.state.bound_port = prev_port
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web_server.app.state.auth_required = prev_required
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@pytest.fixture
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def loopback_client():
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clear_providers()
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prev_host = getattr(web_server.app.state, "bound_host", None)
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prev_port = getattr(web_server.app.state, "bound_port", None)
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prev_required = getattr(web_server.app.state, "auth_required", None)
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web_server.app.state.bound_host = "127.0.0.1"
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web_server.app.state.bound_port = 8080
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web_server.app.state.auth_required = False
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client = TestClient(web_server.app, base_url="http://127.0.0.1:8080")
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yield client
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web_server.app.state.bound_host = prev_host
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web_server.app.state.bound_port = prev_port
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web_server.app.state.auth_required = prev_required
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def test_status_reports_auth_required_in_gated_mode(gated_client):
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# No ``_login()`` call — ``/api/status`` is in the shared
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# ``PUBLIC_API_PATHS`` allowlist precisely so external probes (and
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# the SPA's pre-login bootstrap) can read the gate's shape without
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# a cookie. Hit it cold.
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r = gated_client.get("/api/status")
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assert r.status_code == 200
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body = r.json()
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assert body["auth_required"] is True
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assert body["auth_providers"] == ["stub"]
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# Host-local detail (absolute paths, PID, internal gateway URL) is deployment
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# recon a liveness probe never needs. ``/api/status`` bypasses dashboard auth
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# (it is in ``PUBLIC_API_PATHS``), so on a network-exposed bind it must not
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# leak that detail to anonymous callers.
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_HOST_DETAIL_FIELDS = frozenset({
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"hermes_home", "config_path", "env_path", "gateway_pid",
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"gateway_health_url",
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})
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def test_status_withholds_host_detail_in_gated_mode(gated_client):
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"""On a gated (non-loopback) bind, the public ``/api/status`` probe must
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expose only the liveness + auth-gate shape — never absolute host paths,
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the gateway PID, or the internal gateway health URL. The endpoint
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bypasses dashboard auth, so anyone who can reach the host hits it cold."""
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r = gated_client.get("/api/status")
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assert r.status_code == 200
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body = r.json()
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# Liveness / auth-gate shape stays public.
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for key in ("version", "gateway_state", "auth_required", "auth_providers"):
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assert key in body, f"liveness field {key!r} must stay public"
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# Deployment recon must be withheld from the anonymous public probe.
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leaked = _HOST_DETAIL_FIELDS & set(body.keys())
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assert not leaked, f"/api/status leaked host detail under the gate: {leaked}"
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