hermes-agent/hermes_cli/web_server.py
Teknium 9acc4b47f5
perf(state): external-content FTS + tool-row-free trigram index (schema v23) (#65798)
* fix(desktop): refresh repo status on session switch with unchanged cwd (#68208)

fix(desktop): refresh repo status on session switch with unchanged cwd

* fix(checkpoints): honor gateway config and task cwd (#68195)

* fix(gateway): wire checkpoint config into agents

* fix(checkpoints): resolve gateway file paths by task cwd

* ci: live-updating PR review comment with structured job statuses

Replace the static comment-pending + comment-results two-job pattern
with a live-updating comment system that polls the GitHub Actions API
every 15s, re-assembles the review comment from whatever results are
available, and upserts it via the <!-- hermes-ci-review-bot --> marker.
The comment updates in real time as each job finishes — no waiting for
the full pipeline.

Every CI job that wants to appear in the review comment emits a
review_status output — a JSON array of objects, each with a source
and a results array:

    [
      {
        "source": "review-label-gate",
        "results": [
          {"kind": "action_required", "title": "...", "summary": "...",
           "how_to_fix": "..."},
          {"kind": "info", "title": "...", "summary": "..."}
        ]
      },
      {
        "source": "ci timing",
        "results": [
          {"kind": "warning", "title": "CI timings", "summary": "...",
           "detail": "...", "link": "..."}
        ]
      }
    ]

One job can emit multiple results of different kinds. The source field
is used to exclude the corresponding job from the synthesized error
list (case-insensitive, hyphen-normalized matching against GitHub
Actions job display names).

| job                        | source                   | kind (on failure)         | section              |
|----------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|
| review-labels              | review label gate        | action_required / info    | Action required      |
| lockfile-diff              | lockfile-diff            | action_required           | Action required      |
| ci-timings                 | ci timing                | warning / info            | Warnings             |
| supply-chain scan          | supply chain             | error / (none)            | Job failures         |
| supply-chain dep-bounds    | supply chain             | action_required / (none)  | Action required      |
| osv-scanner                | osv scan                 | warning / (none)          | Warnings             |
| uv-lockfile-check          | uv.lock check            | action_required / (none)  | Action required      |
| history-check              | unrelated histories      | action_required           | Action required      |
| contributor-check          | contributor attribution  | action_required           | Action required      |

Jobs that find nothing emit [] (empty array) — no noise info items.

A single comment-live job polls the GitHub Actions API every 15s,
classifies jobs into (completed, pending), assembles the comment, and
upserts it. Merges review_status outputs from all needs jobs via
toJSON(needs.*.outputs.review_status), and downloads the ci-timings
artifact when it becomes available. Shows commit SHA + message below
the header.

The assembler has ZERO job-specific knowledge. It just:
1. collect_from_statuses() — flattens all nested status objects into ReviewItems
2. collect_failed_jobs() — synthesizes errors for failed jobs with no declared status
3. _attach_job_urls() — fills in per-job log links for ALL items
4. render_comment() — groups by severity, renders with group headers

Each item shows links inline next to the title: View report (job-emitted
URL) and View job (auto-attached logs link). Each info item is its own
collapsible <details> block.

    # ૮ >ﻌ< ა ci review

    running on abc1234 — commit message first line

    ##  Job failures
    ### {title} · [View job](url)
    {summary}

    ## ⚠️ Action required
    ### {title} · [View job](url)
    {summary}
    **How to fix:**
    {how_to_fix}

    ## ⚠️ Warnings
    ### {title} · [View report](url) · [View job](url)
    {summary}
    {detail}

    <details><summary>{title}</summary>
    {content}
    </details>

    Still running 3 jobs: ci-timings, docker

- test_assemble_review_comment.py (48 tests): collect_from_statuses,
  collect_failed_jobs with exclude_sources, _attach_job_urls,
  render_comment (group headers, inline links, commit info, per-item
  details, pending footer), assemble integration
- test_live_comment.py (16 tests): classify_jobs pure function
- test_timings_report.py (10 tests): generate_review_status nested format
- test_lockfile_diff.py (6 tests)
- test_classify_changes.py (32 tests, pre-existing)

* ci: migrate AUTOFIX_BOT_PAT to GitHub App token

Replace the long-lived fine-grained PAT (AUTOFIX_BOT_PAT) with short-lived
(1-hour) installation access tokens minted via a new get-app-token composite
action wrapping actions/create-github-app-token@v3.2.0.

The PAT was used in 13 spots across 8 workflow files for gh CLI / GitHub API
calls. The per-repo GITHUB_TOKEN (1,000 req/hr) was getting rate-limited when
multiple workflows fire concurrently (deploy-site, skills-index, ci-timings,
supply-chain-audit, js-autofix). App installation tokens get 5,000 req/hr
per installation and are scoped to the App's permissions, not a user account.

New composite action: .github/actions/get-app-token/
  - Wraps actions/create-github-app-token@bcd2ba49 (v3.2.0, SHA-pinned)
  - Reads APP_ID + APP_PRIVATE_KEY repo secrets
  - Outputs a 1hr installation token via steps.app-token.outputs.token

Requires two new repo secrets (set after creating the GitHub App):
  - APP_ID: the App's numeric ID
  - APP_PRIVATE_KEY: the PEM private key

App installation permissions needed:
  contents: write    (js-autofix push, pypi release upload)
  pull-requests: write (js-autofix PR create/merge, supply-chain comment)
  issues: write       (skills-index-freshness issue creation)
  actions: write     (skills-index workflow trigger)
  workflows: write   (skills-index triggers deploy-site.yml)

The AUTOFIX_BOT_PAT secret can be deleted once CI passes on this PR.
The comment in js-autofix.yml noting that PAT pushes trigger downstream
workflows is updated — App tokens have the same property (they are not
GITHUB_TOKEN), so the concurrency-cancel loop logic is unchanged.

* style(desktop): satisfy merged eslint/prettier config

The SSH modules predate the stricter lint config that landed on main (curly, no-empty, perfectionist sorting, prettier). Mechanical lint:fix + fmt pass, empty catch blocks filled with the codebase's void-0 convention, and inline no-control-regex disables on the three deliberate control-char patterns (same pattern as lib/ansi.ts).

* fix(ci): pass App secrets as inputs to composite action

Composite actions cannot access the secrets context — the runner's
template engine rejects secrets.* references at load time with
'Unrecognized named-value: secrets'.

Move APP_ID and APP_PRIVATE_KEY from direct secrets.* references inside
the composite action to inputs passed by each calling workflow. The
fallback logic (GITHUB_TOKEN when APP_ID is empty, for fork PRs) stays
in the composite action's check step.

* fix(ci): add detect to all-checks-pass needs so its failure blocks merge

If detect fails, all downstream sub-workflows get SKIPPED (they have
needs: detect). all-checks-pass used if: always() and only checked the
sub-workflows — which all showed as 'skipped' (= success) — so it passed
even though the root cause (detect) failed. This made the PR mergeable
despite a broken CI pipeline.

Add detect to all-checks-pass needs so its failure propagates to the
gate job and blocks the merge.

* fix(desktop): bump skills test timeout to fix cold-start flake (#68235)

Test 1 in skills/index.test.tsx pays the full cold-start cost (jsdom env
init + module transform + the @/hermes/@/store/profile import graph),
which pushed past vitest's 5000ms default under load — caught at 8871ms
on one run, 6.6s pure test time on another. Tests 2-4 are ~30-130ms
each because all that setup is already cached, so only test 1 was at
risk of timing out.

Bump the describe-level timeout to 15s. Verified with 10 consecutive
runs, 4 of which took 5.5-6.6s of test time and would have hard-failed
under the old 5s default.

* feat(desktop): open multiple full app windows (electron)

Add createInstanceWindow() — a full-chrome peer of the primary that
renders the complete app (sidebar, routing, its own draft) against the
shared backend, so several GUI windows can run at once. Mirrors the
primary's window options + chatWindowWebPreferences (backgroundThrottling
stays off so a streamed answer never stalls when blurred) but never
overwrites the mainWindow global and doesn't respawn the backend — the
renderer's getConnection() joins the running one. New windows cascade off
their source via the pure, tested instanceWindowBounds().

Exposed via the hermes🪟openInstance IPC and a "New Window" File
menu item. Per-window fullscreen state now targets the window itself, and
titlebar/native-theme repaints reach every open chat window instead of
only the primary.

Retires the now-orphaned compact new-session pop-out (its only caller was
⌘⇧N, repointed in the follow-up commit): drops createNewSessionWindow,
the hermes🪟openNewSession handler, and the newSession/new=1 URL
flag.

* feat(desktop): wire New Window to ⌘⇧N + command palette

Repoint session.newWindow (⌘⇧N) from the compact new-session pop-out to
openNewWindow(), which opens a full peer instance via the new openWindow
bridge, and add a "New Window" entry to the ⌘K palette (shown with its
hotkey hint, gated on canOpenNewWindow()). Relabel the action "New window".

Drops the retired openNewSessionWindow bridge and the vestigial
isNewSessionWindow()/new=1 flag; renames the shared opener helper.

* fix(desktop): de-dupe cross-window cues so peers don't spam

With multiple full windows, each renderer independently reacts to the
same backend event, so one-shot cues fired N times: OS notifications
(the per-renderer throttle can't see other windows), the turn-end sound
(playCompletionSound runs on every message.complete, ungated by focus),
and auto-spoken replies (double voice when a chat is open in two windows).

Add a single race-free owner in the main process (electron/event-dedupe.ts):
main handles IPC serially, so the first window to claim a key within a
short window wins and peers stay quiet. Notifications collapse at the
hermes:notify choke point; the sound and spoken replies claim via a new
hermes:ambient:claim IPC (keyed by session / reply id). Off Electron the
claim falls back to "emit", preserving single-window behavior.

The sound's mute check runs before the claim so a muted window can't win
the cue and silence an audible peer.

* refactor(desktop): tidy the cross-window deduper

Drop the unused DEDUPE_WINDOW_MS export and rename its interval so
"window" isn't overloaded against BrowserWindow in a multi-window
feature (windowMs → intervalMs). DRY the completion-sound play path.
No behavior change.

* nix: add cage to devDeps

* fix(desktop): avoid false remote gateway reauthentication (#68250)

* fix(desktop): avoid false remote gateway reauthentication

Co-authored-by: Rod-fernandez <rodrigo@nxtlevelsaas.com>
Co-authored-by: David Andrews (LexGenius.ai) <david@lexgenius.ai>

* fix(desktop): harden remote revalidation state

---------

Co-authored-by: Rod-fernandez <rodrigo@nxtlevelsaas.com>
Co-authored-by: David Andrews (LexGenius.ai) <david@lexgenius.ai>

* fix(desktop): keep composer draft across compression tip rotation (#68079)

* fix(desktop): keep composer draft across compression tip rotation

Auto-compression swaps the live stored session id while the user may still
be typing. Scope the composer/queue key on the lineage root and migrate any
tip-keyed draft/queue entries onto that durable key when the tip rotates so
the in-progress prompt does not vanish when the response lands.

* test(desktop): cover draft survival across compression tip rotation

Add regression coverage for migrateSessionDraft, lineage-scoped composer
keys, and the rotation path that previously wiped an in-progress draft.

* fmt(js): `npm run fix` on merge (#68305)

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(desktop): Stop parks the queue instead of firing the next queued prompt

Interrupting a busy turn with the Stop button (or Esc) settles the
session to idle, and the edge-independent auto-drain immediately submits
the head of the composer queue. The user pressed Stop to halt the agent,
but it looks like Stop skipped the current turn and kept going — and the
queued text is hard to find, since its only surface is the collapsed
'N queued' pill above the composer.

The old userInterruptedRef latch (a23728dcc) fixed this but was removed
in #40221 because it also suppressed the drain that send-now-while-busy
depends on. This reintroduces the halt with source awareness instead of
a blanket latch:

- Explicit halts (Stop button, composer Esc, chat-focus Esc, the
  streaming message's hover Stop, runtime cancel) park the session's
  queue before interrupting. Parked queues are skipped by both
  auto-drain paths (mounted ChatBar + background drainer).
- Interrupts that exist to advance the queue (send-now-while-busy)
  unpark first, so the settle drain they rely on still flows.
- The park lifts on any renewed intent: resume, a manual drain (Enter
  on empty composer or the per-row send arrow), queueing a new prompt,
  or emptying the queue. It migrates with entries on a runtime re-key
  and is deliberately not persisted (a fresh process starts unparked).
- The queue panel expands on park, switches to 'N Queued — paused' with
  a pause icon, and grows a Resume action, so the held prompts are
  visible instead of reading as vanished.

Store contract, hook wiring, and background-drain coverage included;
docs updated.

* fix(cli,tui): recall real paste content on up-arrow

Large pastes collapse to a placeholder in the composer, but input history
stored the placeholder — so up-arrow recall showed a truncated reference
(CLI) or lost the content entirely (TUI, where the `[[…]]` label has no
backing snip after submit).

Store the expanded content in history instead:
- CLI: `_inline_pastes()` expands `[Pasted text #N -> file]` into the buffer
  before `reset(append_to_history=True)`; also reused by the external editor
  (dedup). History nav suppresses re-collapse of recalled content.
- TUI: `dispatchSubmission` pushes `expandSnips(pasteSnips)(full)`; idempotent
  on label-free text so re-submitting a recalled entry stays stable.

* fix(cli): suppress CPR on POSIX local TTYs under load

Delayed ESC[6n replies leak as ^[[row;colR into the classic CLI on
SSH/slow PTYs (#13870) and on local POSIX TTYs under heavy subagent
load. Suppress CPR on non-Windows platforms (layout hint only); keep
native Windows on prompt_toolkit's default pending native coverage.
Wire selection through _select_classic_cli_pt_output.

* test(cli): prove local CPR leak and Application CPR-disabled wiring

Add a delayed-CPR PTY harness (no SSH) plus selection/Application
assertions for POSIX local and Windows preserve-default. Update the
gating unit test to the new contract.

* refactor: drop platform kwarg, fix PTY test cleanup

- Remove redundant platform= test seam from _terminal_may_leak_cpr();
  use monkeypatch.setattr(sys, 'platform', ...) consistently in both
  test files.
- Wrap PTY tests in try/finally for fd cleanup on assertion failure.
- Guard select.select() in terminal thread against OSError after fd
  close (fixes PytestUnhandledThreadExceptionWarning).
- Trim PR-number reference from test module docstring.

* docs(portal): remove retired Nous Chat references

* fix(web/ddgs): isolate DuckDuckGo search in a disposable process

ThreadPoolExecutor timeouts cannot fire when primp holds the GIL in
native code (#68096). Run each search in a child process the parent can
terminate/kill, and honor tools.interrupt between polls.

* test(web/ddgs): cover GIL-hold timeout, interrupt, and worker reap

Regression tests for #68096: native GIL-hold and sleep hooks must time
out or interrupt promptly with no orphaned search workers.

* fix: sanitize subprocess env for DDGS worker

os.environ.copy() passes all Hermes secrets (gateway tokens, API keys,
dashboard session tokens) into the DDGS child process. Use
_sanitize_subprocess_env() to strip Hermes-managed secrets before
spawning the worker.

* fix(agent): pass persisted-prefix boundary when rotation flushes on cold resume (#68196)

The legacy rotation branch in agent/conversation_compression.py flushes the
current turn to the OLD session before ending it (#47202) via
_flush_messages_to_session_db(messages) with no conversation_history boundary.

On the first turn after a cold Desktop resume, the restored transcript rows
live in the message list as plain dicts that have not yet been stamped with
_DB_PERSISTED_MARKER — the normal turn flush that stamps them runs after
preflight compression. With no boundary, _flush_messages_to_session_db builds
an empty history_ids set and treats every restored row as new, durably
re-appending the whole transcript to the parent session. Repeated
restart/resume + threshold compression keeps growing the parent transcript.

Pass messages[:_persist_user_message_idx] (the already-durable prefix that
turn_context anchors before preflight runs, guarded for int/bounds) as
conversation_history so the flush skips the persisted rows by identity and
writes only the current turn's new messages.

Adds a regression test that pre-populates SQLite, cold-loads the transcript,
appends one current user row, and forces rotating compression: it fails before
this change (parent grows to 5 rows) and passes after (parent holds the two
originals plus the single new turn).

* fix(desktop): prevent contentEditable composer input from visually collapsing to near-zero height

Fix #68095

The composer input box (contentEditable div) randomly shrank to a tiny/pixelated
size when typing character-by-character (paste worked fine). Root cause: during
per-keystroke input, the normalizeComposerEditorDom cleanup could briefly leave
the contentEditable with zero child nodes, and without intrinsic content the
browser collapsed it visually despite the CSS min-height.

Two-pronged fix:
1. Add min-h-[1.625rem] bracket syntax alongside the CSS variable min-height
   to ensure the minimum height is enforced even if the CSS variable resolution
   is delayed or overridden by browser defaults.
2. In normalizeComposerEditorDom, ensure the contentEditable always has at
   least one <br> child when empty, giving it intrinsic height that the browser
   cannot collapse. This is a belt-and-suspenders approach with the CSS min-height.

Closes #68095

* fix(agent): circuit-break AttributeError from commit-splice and detect code skew

Fix #68178

The git-install auto-updater rewrites source while the desktop backend
is live. Because agent/conversation_loop.py is imported lazily on the
first API call, a process can end up running two different commits
spliced together — one commit's AIAgent against another commit's
conversation_loop. When the interface differs, every turn fails
permanently with an AttributeError, and the loop retries indefinitely,
burning provider API calls (576 failures, 149 wasted API calls observed).

Three-prong fix:

1. Circuit-break AttributeError on agent objects: the outer-loop error
   classifier now detects AttributeError targeting agent/run_agent
   modules and breaks immediately instead of continuing the retry loop.

2. Code skew detection for desktop/serve backend: run_agent.py now
   snapshots the checkout revision at import time and exposes a cheap
   per-iteration check that the conversation loop uses to refuse new
   work with a clear 'restart required' message before the lazy import
   can crash.

3. Informative error message: when code skew is detected, the user
   gets a clear explanation of the mismatch (boot revision vs current
   revision) and actionable guidance to restart the application.

* fix(telegram): preserve fatal recovery handoff

Release the current polling-recovery task's ownership before invoking
the fatal-error handler. The runner bounds adapter cleanup in a child
task; disconnect() cancels the tracked polling-recovery task, so
retaining the current notifier in _polling_error_task would cancel the
fatal callback before the runner can finish its reconnect-queue or
shutdown decision.

The new _handoff_polling_fatal_error() helper clears
_polling_error_task only when it is the current notifier. Other
recovery tasks remain tracked and are still cancelled and awaited
during teardown.

Covers both network retry exhaustion and polling-conflict exhaustion.
Replaces the misleading "Restarting gateway" message with "Escalating
to gateway recovery".

Fixes #68406.

* fix(telegram): widen fatal handoff to heartbeat watchdog path

The wedged-recovery heartbeat watchdog (line 2526) calls
_notify_fatal_error() directly from the heartbeat task. disconnect()
cancels _polling_heartbeat_task unconditionally (no current_task guard,
unlike _polling_error_task). Same bug class as #68406: the child
disconnect cancels the heartbeat parent before the runner can queue
reconnect.

Widen _handoff_polling_fatal_error() to also clear
_polling_heartbeat_task when it is the current task, and route the
heartbeat watchdog call site through the handoff helper.

Co-authored-by: Imgaojp <6065749+Imgaojp@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(tests): make the live-system-guard canary fail closed

tests/test_live_system_guard_self_test.py executes real kill primitives
(os.kill(-1, SIGTERM), os.killpg, pkill -f python) and depends entirely on
the autouse _live_system_guard fixture in tests/conftest.py to intercept
them. That makes the canary fail-OPEN: in any collection context where the
file is present but its home conftest is not — a published sdist that ships
tests/ but not tests/conftest.py, a tree assembled by copying test*.py (that
glob does not match conftest.py), pytest --noconftest, or a foreign rootdir —
the primitives fire for real, and os.kill(-1, SIGTERM) SIGTERMs every process
the invoking user owns (a full desktop-session kill was reported in the field).

Add an autouse fixture that refuses to run any canary test unless the guard is
provably active. The one thing the canary can detect about its own safety is
that the guard monkeypatches os.kill with a plain Python function, whereas the
unguarded primitive is a C builtin — so the probe keys off that. Tests marked
@pytest.mark.live_system_guard_bypass still opt out, matching the guard's own
bypass contract (e.g. test_bypass_marker_disables_guard). With the guard loaded
every canary test behaves exactly as before; without it each test refuses at
setup with zero side effects.

Fixes #68311

* fix(billing): rename user-facing "terminal billing" copy to Remote Spending (#68355)

* fix(billing): rename user-facing "terminal billing" copy to Remote Spending

The capability was renamed Remote Spending on the portal (consent CTA:
"Allow Remote Spending"; per-terminal states Granted/Stopped), but the
terminal, desktop, and docs still said "terminal billing" everywhere.

- Feature name: Remote Spending in titles/labels, lowercase mid-sentence.
- Step-up action verb is now "allow", matching the portal consent CTA.
- Kill-switch-off recovery copy points at the actual control ("a billing
  admin can turn it on from the portal's Hermes Agent page") instead of
  the dead-end "manage it on the portal".
- Per-terminal revoke copy uses the portal vocabulary ("stopped").
- Wire identifiers (cli_billing_enabled, cli_billing_disabled, ...) are
  unchanged; copy, comments, docs, and test expectations only.

* fix(billing): correct the post-step-up denial diagnosis + finish the desktop rename

Adversarial review findings: (1) a repeated insufficient_scope after a
successful step-up is a per-terminal authorization failure, but the copy
blamed the org kill-switch and pointed at the wrong recovery control —
now: "Remote Spending still isn't active for this terminal — the
authorization didn't take. Retry, or make this change on the portal."
(2) the desktop step-up flow started in Remote Spending vocabulary but
finished in "billing management access" — renamed both end states.
(3) prettier formatting on the touched files (matches the post-merge
fmt bot).

* feat(tui): show the plan catalog in /subscription on Free (#68357)

* feat(tui): show the plan catalog in /subscription on Free

The server returns the tier list even with no subscription, but the
overlay hid the picker behind can_change_plan && !isFree, so a Free
account got only "Start a subscription" with no idea what the plans
cost. Now:

- Overview on Free offers "Choose a plan" whenever the catalog has
  enabled paid tiers.
- The picker on Free lists each plan as name · price · monthly credits
  (no upgrade/downgrade hints — there is nothing to move from), and
  picking one opens the portal, where starting a subscription actually
  happens (card capture + checkout live there; the upgrade RPC requires
  an existing subscription).
- Paid-plan behavior (preview → confirm → apply) is unchanged.

* refactor(tui): compute the picker row suffix once

Review feedback: the isFree fork duplicated the label template and run
handler; only the suffix differs.

* fix(tui): arm the busy guard before the Free portal handoff

Adversarial review: the Free branch returned before setting busyRef, so
a double-Enter could open the portal twice; and the picker narrated a
handoff that openManageLink already narrates (duplicate on success,
contradictory on failure). Guard first, let the helper do the talking.

* fix(tui): monthly credits are dollars — label them as such

The Free picker showed "1000 credits/mo" for what is $1,000 of monthly
credit — render "$1,000 credits/mo" (grouped, dollar-signed).

* feat(tui): render the Free-plan catalog inline in the /subscription overview

Sid ruling: the upsell belongs where the user already is — no
intermediate "Choose a plan" hop. On Free the overview lists each paid
plan (name · $/mo · $credits/mo) as a pickable row; picking opens the
portal (openManageLink narrates). The generic "Start a subscription"
row survives only when the catalog is empty. The picker reverts to its
original change-only form (Free never reaches it).

* feat(desktop): tier catalog chips on the Subscription row

Desktop parity with the TUI inline catalog (Sid ruling): accounts that
can act see the plans where they already are — Free gets the upsell
list (every chip opens the portal), a subscriber sees all tiers with
the current one marked inert. Members and team contexts see no chips.
Chips learn an optional url (portal handoff) in the shared row model.

* chore(tui): fixture harness mirrors the live tier catalog

The dev screenshot fixtures showed invented plans ($50 Super / $99
Ultra, "1,000 credits"); align with the real catalog ($20/$100/$200
with $22/$110/$220 monthly credits) so fixture renders cannot be
mistaken for product truth. The overlay itself always reads tiers from
the subscription API.

* chore: trim narration comments

* fmt(js): `npm run fix` on merge (#68462)

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(relay): attach metadata.user_id on guild replies for egress fallback (#68320)

The relay adapter re-attaches an egress discriminator on outbound replies
so the connector can resolve the owning tenant. It captured scope_id for
scoped (guild) messages and user_id for DMs, but as MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE:
a scoped inbound hit an early return, so the author's user_id was never
recorded, and _with_scope only attached user_id when there was no
scope_id. Guild replies therefore went out with scope_id only.

That's fine while the guild has a provision-time route row. But a MANAGED
Discord agent joins guilds dynamically (the shared bot is added to /
removed from servers at runtime), and GATEWAY_RELAY_ROUTE_KEYS — the only
thing that writes guild route rows — is a self-hosted, static field never
stamped for managed agents. So their guild has no route row, the
connector's guild-route lookup misses, and with no user_id on the frame
there's nothing to fall back to → every guild reply is declined
"discord egress declined: target not routed to an onboarded tenant"
even though INBOUND resolved the same guild fine (via the author-first
SharedSocketRouter.targets() fallback).

Fix: capture the authentic author user_id for EVERY inbound (DM and
scoped alike) and re-attach it on the outbound reply alongside scope_id.
The connector consults it only on a route/scope miss, so carrying both
never overrides routing-table resolution. This is the gateway half of the
paired gateway-gateway change (makeDiscordTenantOf guild-route-miss
author-binding fallback); together they make guild replies resolve the
same observed-author way inbound already does.

Tests (tests/gateway/relay/test_relay_adapter.py): a guild reply now
carries both scope_id AND user_id; a scoped inbound with no author still
yields scope_id only (never invents one). Verified fail-without /
pass-with.

* build: declare pywin32 as a direct win32 dependency

hermes_cli/windows_ssh_runtime.py imports win32security/win32file/etc.
directly but pywin32 only arrived transitively via concurrent-log-handler
-> portalocker. Declare it with a sys_platform gate so the Windows SSH
runtime doesn't depend on the logging dep chain. Review follow-up on
PR #68130.

* fix(desktop): preserve dragging with empty titlebar slots

* Revert "fix(agent): circuit-break AttributeError from commit-splice and detect code skew"

This reverts commit 3a9b9d65d5.

* fix(context): revalidate Codex OAuth context windows

* test(context): document Codex cache persistence coverage

* fix(context): scope Codex catalogue cache by credential

* test(context): cover Codex context rollback

* fix(compression): report live-resolved Codex window in the autoraise notice

The autoraise banner hardcoded '272K' for the gpt-5.4/5.5/5.6 family, but
the Codex /models catalog is authoritative and shifts server-side (gpt-5.6
served 372K during July 9-18, 2026 before OpenAI rolled it back). Pass the
compressor's live-resolved context_length through so the notice reports the
window the session actually got; the static 272K/128K text remains as the
fallback when no resolved value is available.

* fix(codex): send ChatGPT-Account-Id on /models probes

The Codex backend returns the per-account model catalog only when the
ChatGPT-Account-Id header is present. Without it, GET /backend-api/codex/models
responds 200 OK with {"models":[]} and the picker silently degrades to the
hardcoded fallback list — which is stale or wrong for the active plan
(no GPT-5.6 family, wrong context windows).

This was the upstream bug behind slow first responses and HTTP 520/120s SSE
hangs: Hermes was sending invalid slugs because the probe never saw them in
the catalog, and Codex's request builder also depends on the same JWT claim
that's now being threaded through both probe paths.

Fixes the probe-side paths in hermes_cli/codex_models.py and
agent/model_metadata.py by extracting chatgpt_account_id from the OAuth JWT
(mirroring the request-side logic already in auxiliary_client.py) and sending
it as a header.

Verified live:
- _fetch_models_from_api now returns the 10-model catalog (gpt-5.6-sol,
  gpt-5.6-terra, gpt-5.6-luna, gpt-5.5, gpt-5.4, gpt-5.4-mini,
  gpt-5.3-codex-spark, 3x -pro variants) instead of [].
- _fetch_codex_oauth_context_lengths resolves all 8 account models to 272K
  context (matches direct API probes of the same account).
- end-to-end: hermes chat -m gpt-5.6-sol -q 'Reply with one word: pong'
  returns 'pong' cleanly via the openai-codex route.

Same class of bug as PR #64760.

* test(codex): cover ChatGPT-Account-Id header on /models probe

Add regression tests locking in the new behavior: a JWT carrying a
chatgpt_account_id claim causes the probe to send ChatGPT-Account-Id,
while a malformed token omits the header instead of crashing.

* fix(tools): make the tool-search context gate provider-aware (#68589)

_resolve_active_context_length() called get_model_context_length() with the
model id alone, so provider-enforced windows (e.g. Codex OAuth's 272K for
gpt-5.x vs the direct API's 1.05M) never reached the tool-search activation
gate — it sized against generic metadata for the same slug.

Resolve the runtime provider for the configured model and pass provider,
base_url, and api_key through. If credential resolution fails (offline, no
keys), degrade to a provider+base_url-only lookup so the static
provider-aware fallbacks still apply; explicit model.context_length keeps
short-circuiting as before (#46620). Gap flagged during review of #16735.

* feat(skills): bundle docx, xlsx, and pdf office skills; refresh powerpoint (#68595)

Non-technical users asking for Word docs, spreadsheets, or PDF work had
no bundled skill coverage — docx/xlsx creation required discovering and
installing hub skills, and PDF manipulation had no skill at all beyond
OCR extraction and nano-pdf edits.

- skills/productivity/docx: create (docx-js), edit (unzip -> XML -> zip),
  tracked changes, comments, validation. Adapted from anthropics/skills.
- skills/productivity/xlsx: openpyxl creation/editing, mandatory
  LibreOffice recalc gate, formula-compatibility rules, financial-model
  conventions. Points at optional excel-author for finance-grade work.
- skills/productivity/pdf: merge/split/rotate/watermark/encrypt, form
  filling (AcroForm + flat overlay scripts), text/table extraction,
  reportlab creation, forms.md + reference.md companions.
- skills/productivity/powerpoint: synced to current upstream pptx skill —
  richer pptxgenjs corruption footguns, template workflow, validate.py +
  validators + thumbnail.py, font-substitution QA guidance; drops the
  stale pack.py/editing.md/pptxgenjs.md workflow files.
- Cross-linked ocr-and-documents, nano-pdf, excel-author via
  related_skills so each office skill routes to its siblings.
- deliverable-mode docs mention the new skills; regenerated per-skill
  docs pages, catalogs, and sidebar.
- tests/skills/test_office_document_skills.py: frontmatter contracts,
  referenced-script existence, schema-map integrity, cross-link
  resolution, script compilation.

E2E validated: docx create->render->edit->validate, xlsx recalc
(SUM + _xlfn.TEXTJOIN evaluate correctly), pdf create->merge->extract,
pptx generate->validate->thumbnail.

* fix(approval): raise gateway approval timeout to 300s, honest stale-tap UX, offer Always on mixed prompts (#68597)

Three related messaging-approval fixes:

1. approvals.timeout default 60 -> 300. PR #63501 collapsed the gateway
   wait onto the canonical approvals.timeout (previously
   gateway_timeout=300), silently shrinking messaging approval windows
   to 60s. Push-notification approvals routinely arrive later than a
   minute; taps landed after the wait had already failed closed.

2. Stale-tap honesty: adapters resolved the approval AFTER rendering
   '<checkmark> Approved by <user>' (Telegram/Discord/Slack), or ignored a zero
   resolve count (WhatsApp Cloud/Feishu). A tap on an expired prompt
   claimed approval while the command had already been denied. All
   button paths now resolve first and render 'Approval expired -
   command was not run' when nothing was waiting.

3. Mixed-warning prompts (dangerous pattern + tirith finding) now offer
   Always: the persistence layer already permanently allowlists the
   pattern key and downgrades the tirith key to session scope, but the
   UI hid Always whenever ANY tirith warning was present. Pure-tirith
   prompts still withhold Always (content findings are session-max by
   design), and Smart-DENY overrides remain once-only.

* feat(secrets): one-command token rotation + actionable startup errors for all secret sources (#68605)

* feat(secrets): one-command token rotation + actionable startup errors for all secret sources

When a Bitwarden machine-account token expired, users saw a raw Rust
error dump (invalid_client + Location: + backtrace hints) and the only
fix was manually editing .env or re-running the whole setup wizard.

- New `hermes secrets bitwarden token` / `hermes secrets onepassword
  token`: paste a new token (masked prompt or flag), the command probes
  the backend BEFORE persisting — a rejected token changes nothing; a
  good one is written to .env and the fetch caches are cleared.
- New optional SecretSource.remediation(kind, cfg) hook: startup
  warnings now print a '→ Run `hermes secrets <name> token`…' fix-it
  line after any fetch error, for bundled AND plugin sources (generic
  per-ErrorKind defaults in the ABC).
- bws stderr is summarized to its cause line (Location:/backtrace noise
  dropped) and invalid_client/invalid_grant/400 identity rejects are
  now classified AUTH_FAILED (was INTERNAL) with a plain-English
  explanation naming the token env var.
- op whoami probe accepts a candidate token so rotation validates the
  NEW credential, not the ambient one.

Additive hook with defaults — no SECRET_SOURCE_API_VERSION bump.

* docs: fix MDX parse error in secret-source-plugin hook table

Escaped backticks around a <name> placeholder made MDX parse it as an
unclosed JSX tag, breaking the docs-site build.  Use a plain code span
instead.

* feat(desktop): configure repository discovery (supersedes #67630) (#68642)

* feat(desktop): configure repository discovery

* fix(config): preserve additive default migration

* fix(desktop): stabilize session-actions-menu gateway mock for repo-scan subscribe

projects.ts now runs $gateway.subscribe(syncReposScanning) at module load, and
nanostores fires the subscriber synchronously. session-actions-menu.test.ts
reaches projects.ts transitively via the session store but mocked
@/store/gateway without $gateway, crashing the whole desktop vitest suite
("No \ export is defined"). Simply adding $gateway: atom(null) exposed a
second issue: the synchronous subscriber calls the mock's activeGateway()
during the transitive import, before the module-level const initializes (TDZ).

Hoist the mock fns via vi.hoisted() so activeGateway is defined before the
hoisted vi.mock factory runs, and add $gateway: atom(null) to the mock. Mirrors
the self-contained mock pattern already used in projects.test.ts. Also maps the
PR author's commit email for attribution.

Supersedes #67630; incorporates review feedback from that PR.

Co-authored-by: Rudimar Ronsoni <rudimar@outlook.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Rudimar Ronsoni <rudimar@outlook.com>
Co-authored-by: Austin Pickett <austinpickett@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(desktop): ⌘W closes visible file tab when preview selection is stale (#68639)

* fix(desktop): make ⌘W close visible file tab on stale preview selection

When the live preview target is gone but $rightRailActiveTabId still points
at preview, file tabs remain on screen while ⌘W fell through to a workspace
no-op. Close the visible file tab instead.

* test(desktop): cover ⌘W close for file tabs and ghost preview selection

Lock the happy path and the stale-preview regression so ⌘W keeps closing
the file tab the rail is actually showing.

* fmt(js): `npm run fix` on merge (#68681)

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(billing): plan chips and rows deep-link their tier (#68666)

* fix(desktop): drop the decorative top-up credits bar (#68649)

The bar rendered full-or-empty (value 1|0) because top-ups have no
denominator — the wire carries only the current balance and the pool is
open-ended, so a fill fraction is fiction. Show the amount alone;
subscription credits and the monthly cap keep their bars (real
denominators).

* fix(ci): route critical supply-chain findings through review gate (#68833)

Let the scanner report critical findings without failing. The review-label
gate owns the action-required status and blocking result, allowing the
ci-reviewed label rerun to clear both CI and the PR comment.

* fix: `tool_calls` double-encoding on import (#68856)

* nix: add `cage` to devShell

* test(desktop): add pre-filled sessions support

Exports createSandbox, writeMockProviderConfig, writeEnvFile,
buildAppEnv, findElectron, and launchDesktop from fixtures.ts so
specs can compose their own seeded-backend fixtures without duplicating
the sandbox/config/launch logic.

* test(desktop): auto-fail e2e tests on error banner

Adds a shared test fixture (e2e/test.ts) that wraps @playwright/test's
page with an error-banner guard. When any [role="alert"] element
(error notification toast) appears in the DOM during a test, the test
fails with the error message text.

The guard uses:
- A MutationObserver (injected via addInitScript) that watches for
  [role="alert"] elements appearing at any point during the test
- A final DOM scan in afterEach for alerts still visible at teardown
- Deduplication so the same error text only fires once

All existing e2e specs updated to import { test, expect } from './test'
instead of '@playwright/test'. No per-spec setup needed — the guard is
auto-installed on every page via the extended fixture.

This catches issues like the "resume failed" error banner that can
appear during session loading — previously the test would pass while
an error toast was silently visible on screen.

* fix(state): parse tool_calls JSON string before re-serializing

_insert_message_rows and append_message both do json.dumps(tool_calls)
to serialize the field for SQLite storage. But when tool_calls arrives
as a JSON string (from import_sessions / export_session, which store it
as TEXT), json.dumps double-encodes it — wrapping the already-serialized
string in quotes and escaping the inner quotes.

When _rows_to_conversation later does json.loads(row['tool_calls']),
the double-encoded string parses back to a plain string (not a list).
_history_to_messages then iterates this string character-by-character,
calling tc.get('function', {}) on each char — 'str' object has no
attribute 'get'.

This was a pre-existing bug (on main), but only triggered by the
import_sessions path (the live agent always passes tool_calls as a
Python list). The e2e error-banner guard caught it via the 'Resume
failed' notification toast.

Fix: in both append_message and _insert_message_rows, parse tool_calls
with json.loads first if it's a string, then re-serialize.

* fix(desktop): exempt boot-failure from error guard

- boot-failure: add allowErrorBanners() beforeEach — these tests
  deliberately trigger boot errors, so error toasts are expected
- test.ts: export allowErrorBanners() opt-out + reset flag in afterEach

* feat(status-bar): add /battery toggle for a color-coded battery read-out

Add an opt-in battery indicator to the CLI and TUI status bars, shown as
the first element and colour-coded by charge (green/yellow/orange/red, or
green while charging). Off by default and a no-op on machines without a
battery.

- agent/battery.py: shared psutil-backed reader with a short TTL cache,
  category bucketing, and a compact 🔋/ label. Fails open to
  "unavailable" everywhere.
- CLI: /battery [on|off|status] toggle persisted to display.battery,
  rendered first in every status-bar width tier.
- TUI: /battery slash command, config sync, a system.battery RPC polled
  while enabled, and a pinned first segment in StatusRule.

* fix(approval): restore session approval for Tirith-flagged commands

Adds an allow_session flag to the gateway approval payload so adapters
can render the session tier independently of the permanent tier. Matrix
gains a session reaction (🌀) and a reaction legend; pure-tirith prompts
now offer once/session/deny instead of collapsing to once/deny.

Salvaged from PR #67312, adapted to the allow_permanent semantics that
landed in #68597 (Always offered when any dangerous-pattern warning is
persistable; pure-tirith prompts stay session-max).

* fix(approval): honor allow_session across all button adapters

Widen the allow_session tier from Matrix to every adapter the gateway
notifies: Telegram, Discord, Slack, Feishu, and Teams gate their Session
button on it; WhatsApp Cloud and qqbot accept the kwarg (no session tier
in their button sets). Also thread allow_session through the plugin-
escalation gate, the execute_code guard payload, and the plain-text
fallback so every notify path carries the same capability flags.

* test(approval): cover allow_session tiers in Matrix reaction seeding and gateway payload

Update the Matrix reaction-seeding contract to the four-reaction default
(once/session/always/deny), add tirith-tier (session without always) and
no-session-tier cases, and assert allow_session=True in the tirith
gateway payload.

* fix(desktop): wrap missing sidebar icon-button tooltips (#67500)

* fix(desktop): wrap sidebar icon buttons in Tip tooltips

Several icon-only buttons in the sidebar (header actions, workspace
menu, project menu, session actions, load-more) had aria-label but
no visual tooltip on hover. Wrap them in the existing <Tip> component,
matching the pattern already used elsewhere (e.g. ProfilePill).

No behavioral changes -- purely wraps existing buttons.

Adds vitest coverage asserting the Tip wrapper (data-slot=tooltip-trigger)
for 6 of 7 files; index.tsx is a 1500+ line top-level page component and
was verified manually via screenshots instead.

* fix(desktop): satisfy consistent-type-imports lint rule in project-dialog test

* test(desktop): update session-row mocks for restored sessionColorById

* fix(desktop): compose Tip around the real trigger instead of inside it

Tip was being placed as SessionActionsMenu's/PlatformAvatar's DIRECT child,
which asChild then cloned instead of the actual button/span. Neither Tip nor
PlatformAvatar forwarded the injected onClick/ref, so both silently dropped
the wiring:

- session-actions-menu.tsx: Tip now wraps DropdownMenuTrigger internally
  (new 	ooltip prop) instead of the caller wrapping its children in Tip.
- platform-icon.tsx: PlatformAvatar now forwards ref and spreads rest props
  onto its span so a wrapping Tip's trigger actually attaches.
- session-row.tsx: updated call site to use the new tooltip prop.
- Added session-actions-menu.test.tsx exercising the real DropdownMenu open
  behavior end-to-end (no Tip/Dropdown mocks).
- session-row.test.tsx no longer mocks PlatformAvatar's behavior; it now
  exercises the real (fixed) component for the handoff-avatar tooltip.

* fix(desktop): compose Tip outside PopoverAnchor in ProjectMenu (#67500)

* test(desktop): update session-row test for the tooltip-prop composition (cbbbeb2fd)

* fix(desktop): satisfy consistent-type-imports in session-row.test.tsx mocks

* chore: retrigger CI

* test(desktop): stop mocking PlatformAvatar's behavior (#67500, third pass)

The mock was re-introduced by a prior edit that fixed an unrelated lint
error, silently undoing the earlier fix where this test started exercising
the real (forwardRef) PlatformAvatar. Removed the mock; updated the two
handoff-avatar tests to query the real component's rendered span instead of
text content, since it renders a brand SVG icon for known platforms rather
than the platform name as text.

* fmt(js): `npm run fix` on merge (#68867)

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(gateway): detect stale lock when macOS psutil returns valid start_time for recycled PID

On macOS, the lock record's start_time is None (no /proc at creation),
but psutil.Process(recycled_pid).create_time() returns a valid float
for the unrelated process that now owns the PID. The old condition
required both sides to be None before falling back to cmdline checking,
so the recycled PID was never detected as stale.

Change the fallback condition from AND to OR: when either side's
start_time is missing, fall back to cmdline-based gateway detection.

Fixes #53763

* fix(gateway): handle PermissionError on stale root-owned lock file

When the macOS launchd service runs in a Background session, the gateway
process spawns as root and creates a root-owned gateway.lock. On restart
as the normal user, open() on that file raises PermissionError, crashing
the gateway immediately and entering a launchd crash loop.

Catch PermissionError in is_gateway_runtime_lock_active(), remove the
stale lock file, and return False so the new process can start cleanly.

Fixes #42685

* fix(gateway): guard acquire_gateway_runtime_lock against root-owned lock PermissionError

Widen the PermissionError handling from is_gateway_runtime_lock_active
(#42689) to the sibling open() in acquire_gateway_runtime_lock: a stale
root-owned gateway.lock left by a launchd Background session previously
crashed the acquiring process. Unlink the stale file and retry once; if
the unlink or retry fails, return False cleanly instead of raising.

* fix(gateway): make stale scoped-lock removal atomic via tombstone rename

Replace the unlink()+O_EXCL sequence in acquire_scoped_lock with an
atomic os.replace() of the stale lock to a <lock>.stale tombstone
followed by the existing O_EXCL create. With plain unlink(), two racing
starters could both judge the lock stale and the second unlink() would
silently delete the first racer's freshly-created lock — both would then
'win'. os.replace() guarantees exactly one racer claims the stale file;
the loser gets FileNotFoundError and falls through to O_EXCL, which
admits at most one winner. Tombstones are cleaned up immediately;
behavior is otherwise identical.

* fix(gateway): detect stale gateway_state.json in `gateway status` (TTL + PID liveness)

Verified: applies cleanly and the patched module compiles. Tests are
described in the PR body (not bundled in this commit).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(gateway): cover stale gateway_state.json detection (TTL + PID liveness)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(gateway): take over live platform-lock token holders once

When --replace misses a cross-HERMES_HOME Telegram token holder, platform
connect used to retry forever. Terminate a verified gateway holder once
(with the takeover marker) and re-acquire the scoped lock (#65176).

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* chore(contributors): map jaretbottoms@gmail.com -> jbbottoms (PR #65178 salvage)

* fix(gateway): reap the replaced gateway's orphaned children on POSIX

Builds on jbbottoms's #65178 takeover fix (cherry-picked as the previous
commit). Windows --replace already tree-kills via taskkill /T, but the
POSIX paths signalled only the recorded gateway PID — adapter
subprocesses that outlived their parent kept holding scoped token locks
and blocked the replacement gateway.

- gateway/status.py: _snapshot_gateway_children() captures the old
  gateway's descendants (psutil, recursive) while it is still alive;
  reap_gateway_children() SIGTERMs verified orphans after the main PID
  is confirmed dead, waits bounded, SIGKILLs survivors. Identity-aware
  (psutil is_running is PID+create-time), skips zombies and children
  whose ppid still equals the old gateway (parent actually alive), and
  never raises — best-effort with debug/info logging only.
- take_over_scoped_lock_holder() snapshots before terminating and reaps
  only on a confirmed successful handoff.
- gateway/run.py: start_gateway --replace snapshots before SIGTERM and
  reaps after the old PID is confirmed gone, mirroring taskkill /T.
- tests/gateway/test_replace_child_reap.py: reap/skip/never-raise unit
  coverage plus end-to-end --replace ordering (snapshot → terminate →
  reap) and the no---replace path never touching the old process.

* chore(contributors): map emails for PRs #66906, #66420, #63398 salvage

* fix(state): probe FTS5 read path in _db_opens_cleanly so partial index corruption is detected (#66724)

`hermes sessions repair --check-only` opens cleanly on state.db files
with partial FTS5 index corruption — base tables read fine, the rolled-back
write probe from #50502 succeeds, and `PRAGMA integrity_check` returns
"ok". But every session_search / /resume title resolution / feature
backed by MATCH / snippet / rank queries errors out with
`database disk image is malformed` because internal shadow-table segments
are bad. The official repair tool then gives false confidence.

Add a representative FTS5 read probe against both `messages_fts` and
`messages_fts_trigram` (the latter backs title resolution). Empty MATCH
strings are accepted by every FTS5 index without requiring populated
content, so the probe is safe on a freshly-init'd DB; missing-table /
missing-column errors fall through to the existing "not yet a populated
DB" branch, matching the write-probe's behaviour. Any other OperationalError
is surfaced as the check reason, which sends `hermes sessions repair` to
its existing FTS 'rebuild' path (repair_state_db_schema, line 616).

Single-file change in hermes_state.py::_db_opens_cleanly. No public API
change. No new imports. Fixes #66724.

* fix(state): also catch sqlite3.DatabaseError in FTS5 read probe (#66724)

The FTS5 read probe in _db_opens_cleanly() only caught
sqlite3.OperationalError. But the corruption class #66724 actually
wants caught — partial shadow-table damage where MATCH / snippet / rank
queries raise DatabaseError("database disk image is malformed") — is a
DatabaseError, not OperationalError. Without this catch the probe
crashes the caller instead of returning a reason, which is exactly the
silent-fail mode the issue describes.

Move the try/except inside the for-loop so each FTS table is probed
independently (one table corrupted should still surface as a reason),
add a separate except clause for DatabaseError that surfaces the same
reason format, and use continue instead of pass so the loop still walks
both tables when only one is missing on a brand-new DB.

Tested by hand: with a corrupted messages_fts_trigram shadow table the
function now returns 'fts5 read probe failed on messages_fts_trigram:
database disk image is malformed' instead of crashing out. Without this
fix it would still crash.

* fix(state): preserve degraded-runtime read probe + use canonical FTS5 classifier

Two follow-ups on top of f842733 (the FTS5 read probe added in #66906):

1. The original probe query used MATCH '', which FTS5 rejects with
   'fts5: syntax error near '. Empty MATCH syntax is not valid FTS5.
   Switch to MATCH '""' — a quoted empty phrase that parses, scans
   zero rows, and exercises the same shadow-table read path the
   search tools use. The probe previously never reached the shadow
   segments at all on a healthy DB; the read-corruption class was
   only being detected because the existing write probe happens to
   fail first on a DatabaseError.

2. The probe's degraded-runtime branch only checked the substrings
   'no such table' / 'no such column'. On a SQLite build without the
   fts5 module, MATCH against a legacy messages_fts table raises
   'no such module: fts5' (a different OperationalError class). The
   substring check would misclassify that as corruption and trigger
   repair, whose final fallback deletes the messages_fts% schema
   (#66906 review). Use SessionDB._is_fts5_unavailable_error() — the
   canonical classifier already used by the degraded-runtime init
   path — to recognize both 'no such module: fts5' and
   'no such tokenizer: trigram' as capability errors.

Add tests covering:
- Partial shadow-table damage (read-corruption class)
- Repair brings reads back online
- Healthy degraded DB without fts5 module stays healthy (regression
  for the misclassification risk)
- Healthy degraded DB without trigram tokenizer stays healthy

Closes #66906 review feedback
Refs #66724

* fix(state): self-heal FTS corruption on the SessionDB search path too

Complements #66296 (self-heal on the write path): search_messages()'s main
FTS5 MATCH query caught only sqlite3.OperationalError (a query-syntax error →
return empty). A corrupt FTS index raises the malformed / "fts5: corrupt
structure record" class, which is a sqlite3.DatabaseError — the parent of
OperationalError, so it was NOT caught and propagated straight out of
search_messages, crashing session/history search.

The write path now rebuilds and retries on that class, but a read-only
session (cron/CLI history search, or a search issued before any write) never
triggers a write, so its search stayed broken until the next process restart
ran the offline repair.

Catch the DatabaseError corruption class on the search MATCH read too and
route it through the existing one-shot _try_runtime_fts_rebuild(), then retry
the query. The catch is moved outside `with self._lock` so rebuild_fts() can
re-acquire the lock (mirrors _execute_write). The one-shot guard is shared
with the write path, so a single instance never loops on a genuinely
unrecoverable index. OperationalError syntax handling is unchanged (caught
first).

Adds a regression test: with a corrupted messages_fts and no post-corruption
write, search_messages() rebuilds in place and returns the match; without the
fix it raises DatabaseError.

* fix(state): extend search-path FTS self-heal to the CJK/trigram branch

The trigram MATCH branch in search_messages() had the same
OperationalError-only catch that #66420 fixed on the main FTS5 branch: a
corrupt messages_fts_trigram shadow table raises the malformed /
'fts5: corrupt structure record' class (sqlite3.DatabaseError, parent of
OperationalError), which propagated straight out of search_messages and
crashed CJK session/history search for read-only sessions.

Route that class through the shared one-shot _try_runtime_fts_rebuild()
and retry the trigram query (catch moved outside self._lock so
rebuild_fts() can re-acquire it, mirroring the main branch). If the
rebuild is refused (guard consumed / FTS disabled / different error) or
the retry fails, fall through to the existing LIKE substring fallback —
which reads only the canonical messages table — instead of raising, so
CJK search degrades gracefully rather than crashing.

Adds two regression tests: trigram search self-heals in place after
shadow-table corruption (answers from the rebuilt trigram index, not the
LIKE fallback), and degrades to LIKE without raising when the one-shot
rebuild was already consumed.

Follow-up to #66420; refs #66296 #66724

* fix(state): add REINDEX strategy to repair stale B-tree indexes (#63386)

When PRAGMA integrity_check reports 'wrong # of entries in index' for
B-tree indexes (e.g. idx_sessions_handoff_state), the existing repair
strategies (FTS rebuild, sqlite_master dedup, drop-FTS+VACUUM) don't
address the mismatch. Add Strategy 0.5: run REINDEX to rewrite the
index b-tree from canonical table rows before escalating to more
destructive strategies.

* test(state): exercise REINDEX repair against a REAL stale B-tree index

Replace the mocked test for #63398's REINDEX strategy: the original
monkeypatched _db_opens_cleanly to return the corruption string, so the
REINDEX pass itself was never exercised against actual index corruption —
the test would pass even if REINDEX didn't fix anything.

New fixture _corrupt_btree_index() builds genuine on-disk staleness with a
writable_schema hack: rewrite the index definition to a partial index
(WHERE 0), REINDEX so the b-tree is rebuilt empty, then restore the full
definition. integrity_check then reports the real
'wrong # of entries in index idx_messages_session' / 'row N missing from
index' class from #63386 — no mocks anywhere.

The rewritten test asserts end-to-end with real function calls:
- the real _db_opens_cleanly detects the stale index,
- repair_state_db_schema repairs it with strategy 'reindex_btree',
- post-repair the detector and raw PRAGMA integrity_check both report
  healthy, and a query forced through the rebuilt index (INDEXED BY) sees
  every row.

Adds a second test asserting the REINDEX strategy is non-destructive
(all sessions/messages survive, readable via SessionDB).

Follow-up to #63398; refs #63386

* fix(kanban): auto-repair index-only kanban.db corruption via REINDEX

_guard_existing_db_is_healthy previously failed closed on ANY
integrity_check failure, including the index-scoped class ('wrong # of
entries in index <name>' / 'row N missing from index <name>') where the
table b-trees are intact and REINDEX rebuilds the damaged indexes
losslessly. Boards hit by that class were bricked until manual surgery
even though SQLite can fix them in-place.

Now, when integrity_check output consists ONLY of index-scoped errors
(index name parsed generically from the message — no hardcoded list):

  1. quarantine the corrupt bytes FIRST via the existing content-
     addressed _backup_corrupt_db,
  2. under the caller-held cross-process init flock, REINDEX each named
     index (falling back to bare REINDEX if a parsed name doesn't
     resolve),
  3. re-run integrity_check and proceed only if it comes back clean.

Any non-index error class (page corruption, malformed image, freelist
damage) — or a REINDEX whose re-check is still dirty — fails closed
exactly as before: backup + KanbanDbCorruptError, no silent recreation.
Transient OperationalError (locked/busy) still propagates raw with no
quarantine.

Tests build a real board DB and corrupt a live index via the
writable_schema/partial-index REINDEX trick to produce the genuine
'wrong # of entries in index' shape, then assert auto-repair recovers
with data intact, page corruption still raises, and a dirty re-check
fails closed.

* fix(kanban): cap corrupt-backup retention at 10 files per board DB

Content-addressed quarantine backups dedupe identical corrupt bytes,
but corruption that keeps mutating between failures (partial repairs,
further damage across dispatcher retries, multi-profile fleets) mints a
new sha-named backup every round — a user accumulated 124
.corrupt.*.bak files with no bound.

After each NEW backup is created, prune oldest-by-mtime backups beyond
_CORRUPT_BACKUP_RETENTION (module constant, default 10), including the
copied -wal/-shm sidecars. The just-created backup is always exempt
(copy2 preserves the source mtime, which can be older than existing
backups). Pruning is best-effort and never masks the corruption error
about to be raised; dedupe of identical corrupt bytes is unchanged.

* feat(kanban): periodic WAL checkpoint (TRUNCATE) on the dispatcher tick

Kanban connections set wal_autocheckpoint=100, but SQLite's passive
autocheckpoint backs off whenever any reader holds an open snapshot —
on a busy multi-process board the -wal file can grow without bound
between gateway restarts.

After each successful dispatch tick, while still holding the board's
single-writer dispatch flock, run PRAGMA wal_checkpoint(TRUNCATE)
best-effort at a coarse interval (>=5 min since this process last
checkpointed that board; module-level per-path monotonic timestamp, so
multi-board dispatchers checkpoint each board on its own clock).
Success and busy/locked skips are both logged at DEBUG; a failing
checkpoint can never fail the tick.

* feat(kanban): add `hermes kanban repair` CLI verb

Adds kanban_db.repair_db() — a structured, non-raising wrapper around
the same narrow repair policy as the connect-time guard: probe with
PRAGMA integrity_check under the board's cross-process init flock;
quarantine the corrupt bytes FIRST via the content-addressed backup;
REINDEX only when every integrity message is index-scoped; re-check;
report ok / repaired / corrupt / missing. Locked/busy OperationalError
still propagates raw (a locked healthy DB is not corruption and gets
no quarantine), and a repair invalidates the per-process healthy-path
cache so the next connect() re-probes.

The CLI verb reports status human-readably (or --json), exits 0 for
ok/repaired/missing and 1 when the DB is still corrupt (non-index
corruption stays fail-closed with manual-recovery guidance). It
dispatches BEFORE kanban_command's auto-init: init_db() raises
KanbanDbCorruptError on a corrupt board, which previously would have
made a repair verb unreachable on exactly the boards that need it.

CLI tests drive the real argparse surface (build_parser +
kanban_command) against real corrupted SQLite fixtures.

* fix(packaging): graft web_dist in MANIFEST.in and add sdist regression test

Wheels ship hermes_cli/web_dist via pyproject package-data, but the sdist
did not: MANIFEST.in had no graft and .gitignore excludes web_dist, so
source tarballs installed a dashboard-less package. Graft the directory
and add an sdist regression test that builds the tarball and asserts
index.html is inside.

Salvaged from #29661; the PR's [web]-extra 404-message change was dropped
per maintainer review (misleading guidance for source installs).

* fix(dashboard): attempt one recovery build when --skip-build finds no dist

--skip-build with a missing web_dist/index.html previously hard-failed
with sys.exit(1) (issue #59288). The desktop launcher passes
--build-mode skip on every boot, so a wiped or never-populated dist
bricked the dashboard until the user manually rebuilt.

Now the default-dist path logs a clear warning and attempts exactly ONE
recovery build through the existing _build_web_ui path. If the recovery
build also fails to produce index.html, the original fatal behavior is
preserved with a clear message. A custom HERMES_WEB_DIST stays fail-fast:
the build writes to the default dist location and cannot populate a
caller-managed directory.

Closes #59288

* fix(web): guard _serve_index against a missing or unreadable index.html

mount_spa degrades to a JSON 404 catch-all when the dist directory is
fully missing, but _serve_index read index.html unguarded — so a dist
dir that exists while index.html is missing (partial build, wiped dist,
permissions) raised FileNotFoundError on EVERY request instead of
returning a useful error.

Catch OSError around the read and return the same JSON 404 payload the
fully-missing-dist path uses, so clients get a consistent signal. The
route recovers automatically once a rebuild restores the file.

* fix(dashboard): content-hash web UI freshness check

Replace mtime-based web UI dist staleness with a content-hash stamp under HERMES_HOME, matching the desktop build freshness model.

This avoids false stale/fresh decisions when git operations rewrite source mtimes without changing bytes, while preserving the existing stale-dist fallback. Also treats malformed or missing stamp data as needing a rebuild.

* fix(cli): serialize concurrent web-UI builds with an exclusive flock

Concurrent dashboard boots (desktop retry loop) each spawned their own
npm install + vite build over the same tree; parallel builds starved
each other, the dist sentinel never advanced, and every boot re-triggered
the build — cascading into orphan backends, port collisions, and CPU
storms that also knocked out the Telegram gateway's heartbeat (2026-07-12).

One process now builds under flock; the rest serve the existing dist
(stale is acceptable) or wait for the first-ever build to finish.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(cli): run the web-UI staleness walk once, under the build lock

The flock wrapper checked _web_ui_build_needed twice (pre-lock fast path
and post-lock re-check) and _do_build_web_ui checks it again internally,
so a boot that actually built walked the whole web/ source tree three
times. The callee's own check already runs under the lock on every path
through the wrapper, so it alone is sufficient: drop both wrapper checks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(git): ignore the web UI build lock file

The cross-process build flock (.web_ui_build.lock at the repo root) is
an empty coordination file created on first dashboard boot; it must
never be tracked or show up as untracked noise. Also keeps it out of
the content-hash staleness digest, which skips gitignored paths.

* test(cli): cover the web UI build flock contention paths

PR #63455 shipped the flock without tests. Cover the three contention
paths: contended+dist serves stale without a second build, uncontended
builds under the lock (creating the lock file), and contended+no-dist
blocks then skips the rebuild because the staleness re-check runs under
the lock and sees the winner's stamp. Also pin the lock filename into
.gitignore via a regression assertion.

* style(cli): open the build lock file with explicit encoding (ruff PLW1514)

* chore(contributors): map eazye19@users.noreply.github.com -> eazye19 (PR #42387 salvage)

* fix(mcp): reconnect immediately on transport TaskGroup drop instead of backoff/park

Streamable-HTTP / SSE MCP transports run their stream pump inside an anyio
TaskGroup. A transient stream drop (idle timeout, brief backend blip,
server-side TCP close) surfaces as a BaseExceptionGroup escaping the
transport context manager. It reached run()'s error path, which applied
exponential backoff (1s..16s) and eventually parked the server for 300s and
deregistered its tools — turning a sub-second glitch into a multi-minute
tool outage even though the POST path was still healthy.

_run_http now wraps all three transport branches (SSE, new + deprecated
Streamable-HTTP) and routes a BaseExceptionGroup through a new
_reconnect_or_reraise_group() helper that returns 'reconnect' (immediate
rebuild, no backoff/park/deregister). It re-raises instead of masking when
shutdown is in progress, when the group carries a real CancelledError
(cancellation must propagate, cf. #9930), or when no live session was
established this attempt (a connect/handshake failure that should fall
through to run()'s backoff rather than hot-loop).

Fixes #66092

Co-authored-by: 雨哥 <hanyu1212@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(mcp): charge immediate reconnects against a rapid-drop budget (#62212)

Harden the immediate-reconnect path from #66271:

- _reconnect_or_reraise_group re-raises when the transport TaskGroup
  carries a KeyboardInterrupt / SystemExit leaf — fatal signals must
  propagate to the interpreter, never be converted into a reconnect.

- Rapid-drop budget: a completed handshake alone no longer clears
  _reconnect_retries/backoff on clean transport return. A session is
  UNPROVEN until it demonstrates real health — survived >=1 full
  keepalive interval (keepalive success path) or served >=1 successful
  tool call (_mark_session_proven). Unproven clean returns are charged
  against _MAX_RECONNECT_RETRIES, so a flapping transport that
  handshakes fine and drops moments later still reaches the park
  instead of respawning forever (#62212: 6212 spawns in 63h).
  Proven sessions keep the #57604 behaviour: budget clears, transient
  blips over a long-lived session never accumulate toward parking.

* fix(mcp): unwrap exception groups and park permanent failures immediately (#65673)

- Add module-level _unwrap_exception_group (ported from
  hermes_cli/mcp_config.py, adapted): handles nested groups, prefers
  non-cancellation leaves over the CancelledErrors anyio sprays across
  sibling tasks, and re-raises KeyboardInterrupt/SystemExit leaves.

- Add _classify_mcp_failure(exc) -> 'permanent'|'transient'.
  Permanent: auth 401/403, NonMcpEndpointError, InvalidMcpUrlError,
  FileNotFoundError/ENOENT on the stdio command. Transient: everything
  else (network/EOF/ClosedResource/TaskGroup drops). Permanent failures
  park immediately without burning the retry ladder — every retry
  against a missing binary or a revoked credential hits the same wall.

- Every log site in run() and the keepalive failure log now logs the
  unwrapped root cause as 'TypeName: message', so a dead stdio pipe
  says 'BrokenPipeError' instead of the opaque
  'unhandled errors in a TaskGroup (1 sub-exception)' (and empty
  str(exc) dead-pipe errors are no longer blank).

* fix(mcp): one WARNING per state transition, DEBUG retry chatter, jittered backoff

Log-storm hygiene for the reconnect machinery (#65673, #66092):

- State transitions carry exactly one WARNING each:
  connected → degraded (keepalive failure), degraded → parked
  (budget exhausted / rapid-drop park / permanent error),
  parked → connected (revival proven healthy, via
  _mark_session_proven).
- Per-attempt retry logs (initial-connect attempts, connection-lost
  reconnect attempts, per-cycle rebuild notices, park-wake probes)
  demoted to DEBUG.
- Backoff sleeps get +/-20% uniform jitter (_jittered) so a herd of
  servers that lost the same backend doesn't retry — and log — in
  lockstep.

* fix(mcp): re-register tools during parked revival

* fix(mcp): isolate a single failing stdio server from the bridge (#50394)

* fix(mcp): clear connect-cooldown state on every shutdown path

Builds on trevorgordon981's #50589 (cherry-picked as the previous commit).
The #50394 cooldown reset only ran inside the async _shutdown coroutine,
which is skipped on the empty-_servers fast path — the most common state
when a server failed to connect (failed servers are never recorded in
_servers). It was also skipped when the MCP loop wasn't running.

Clear _server_connect_retry_after/_server_connect_failures on the fast
path and in a final unconditional sweep so a full shutdown/restart always
re-attempts every configured server immediately. Adds regression tests
for both paths.

* chore(contributors): map diffen77 + fazerluga-creator emails

For the #66547 and #66981 salvage cherry-picks in this branch.

* fix(mcp): reconnect message-less closed transports

* test(mcp): isolate resource error breaker state

* fix(mcp): harden nested interruption detection

* fix(mcp): make transport classification cycle safe

* fix(mcp): cycle-guard cause/context traversal in transport classifier

Builds on diffen77's #66547 (cherry-picked as the previous commits).
Extend _is_session_expired_error's iterative traversal to follow
__cause__/__context__ in addition to ExceptionGroup .exceptions — SDK
wrappers often raise a generic RuntimeError *from* the message-less
ClosedResourceError, leaving the transport signal reachable only via
the chain. The identity-visited set guards chain cycles (handlers
re-raising previously seen exceptions), and a bounded node budget
(_EXC_TRAVERSAL_MAX_NODES) caps pathological acyclic graphs.

Adds regression tests: cause/context chain detection, interruption
precedence through chains, cyclic cause/context termination, and
budget-bounded termination.

* fix(mcp): allow background discovery retry after a run that connected nothing

start_background_mcp_discovery() sets _mcp_discovery_started once and never
resets it. If the first background run exits without connecting any MCP
server (startup cancellation, OOM restart, transient network failure), every
later call returns immediately and the process is permanently stuck with
zero MCP tools until a full restart.

Fix: when discovery is marked started but the thread is dead and no server
is connected, reset the flag and spawn a fresh discovery thread. Also log a
WARNING when a discovery run completes with zero connected servers, so the
condition is visible instead of silent.

Caught in production on a long-running gateway fleet where a gateway
restarted under memory pressure and came back with all MCP tools missing.

* fix(tui): centralize stdio TUI MCP discovery on the shared owner

Review follow-up: the stdio hermes --tui path spawned its own one-shot
discovery thread, so the retry-after-zero-connected semantics added to
start_background_mcp_discovery() did not cover it.

Spawn TUI discovery through the shared owner and make the entry-side
wait_for_mcp_discovery() fall through to the shared owner when no local
thread exists (mcp_discovery_in_flight/join_mcp_discovery already consult
both owners). Keeps the cheap no-mcp-servers config guard on the TUI path.

Adds regression tests for the entry-side wait delegation.

* fix(tui): give the stdio TUI discovery a retry-after-zero-connected path

Builds on fazerluga-creator's #66981 (cherry-picked as the previous two
commits). start_background_mcp_discovery()'s retry allowance only fires
when the function is CALLED again, but tui_gateway/entry.py main() calls
it exactly once at startup — so a first discovery run that connected
nothing still latched the stdio TUI MCP-less for the whole session.

Re-invoke the idempotent spawn from wait_for_mcp_discovery() (the
per-agent-build wait) when the process is MCP-enabled, gated on a flag
set in main() so non-MCP sessions never pay the MCP import on the wait
path. Adds regression tests for both the retry re-invocation and the
non-MCP skip.

* fix(tui): gate the shared-owner MCP discovery wait on the stdio TUI flag

The TUI retry-allowance follow-up made tui_gateway.entry.wait_for_mcp_discovery
delegate to hermes_cli.mcp_startup unconditionally when no entry-local thread
exists. But server._make_agent already calls the startup wait directly for
dashboard /api/ws sessions, so every non-stdio agent build paid the bounded
wait twice (caught by test_make_agent_waits_for_shared_mcp_discovery). Gate
the retry-spawn AND the delegated wait on _mcp_discovery_enabled, which only
the stdio TUI arms in main().

* fix(status-bar): address Copilot review on /battery

- TUI /battery matches the CLI surface: adds `status` (live reading via
  system.battery), and the help/usage strings now consistently read
  [on|off|status].
- batteryLabel() renders `--` for an unknown percent so a null can never
  surface as "null%" even without the showBattery guard.
- Move the system.battery RPC out of the config section into
  "Methods: tools & system" where system.* RPCs belong.

* fix(dashboard): cap gateway health probe timeout

* fix(gateway): report runtime source version in /health, not stale dist-info metadata

/health and /health/detailed resolve the version via importlib.metadata
first, falling back to hermes_cli.__version__. On editable/source
checkouts — including the standard git-based install that hermes-setup
performs — hermes_agent-*.dist-info can survive a source update
unchanged, so the health endpoints keep reporting the previous release
even though the running code (CLI, dashboard, release tags) is newer.
Stale metadata does not raise, so the source fallback never fires.

Flip the preference: use hermes_cli.__version__ (the runtime source of
truth shared by the CLI and dashboard) first, and fall back to
distribution metadata only when the source import fails. The
never-raise contract of the version probe is unchanged.

Observed live: CLI, dashboard, and pyproject all reported 0.18.2 while
/health returned 0.18.0 from a stale hermes_agent-0.18.0.dist-info left
behind by a source update.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(api-server): count "stopping" runs as active in readiness work counts

_readiness_work_counts()'s active_api_runs set is {"queued", "running",
"waiting_for_approval"} — it excludes "stopping", the status
_handle_stop_run() sets while a run is being interrupted. Since the stop
is fully cooperative (the run stays "stopping" — doing real
executor-thread work — until the agent actually notices the interrupt and
the task settles to "cancelled", an unbounded window, not a fixed
timeout), /health/detailed's background_queues.active_api_runs
undercounts real active work for that whole duration.

Fix: add "stopping" to the active-status set. background_queues.status
itself is hardcoded "ok" (gateway/readiness.py), so this doesn't change
overall readiness — it only corrects the count value external monitoring
tooling reads from this endpoint.

* chore(contributors): map yingwaizhiying@gmail.com -> tianma-if (supersedes stale msh01 entry)

* feat(dashboard): component-level health rollup on /api/status (#68662)

The dashboard's own liveness surface could report healthy while every
authenticated request 500'd (e.g. wedged state DB) — /api/status carried
gateway-only fields, no storage/dashboard signal, and no middleware
counted unhandled exceptions.

- DashboardHealth state holder: rolling 5-min deque of unhandled-error
  timestamps + last self-test result. last_error_type/last_error_path
  are internal-only diagnostics — snapshot() exports counts/enums/
  timestamps exclusively (PUBLIC_API_PATHS no-secrets contract).
- Outermost @app.middleware('http') (registered last) wraps call_next
  in try/except: records + re-raises unhandled exceptions, and records
  responses with status >= 500.
- /api/status gains 'components' {gateway, storage, dashboard,
  platforms} + top-level 'overall' ok|degraded. storage reuses the
  gateway readiness state_db probe (read-only, 1s-bounded) in an
  executor; platforms derive ok/degraded from existing
  gateway_platforms states.
- Authenticated self-test task started in the lifespan: every 60s an
  in-process httpx ASGITransport GET of /api/sessions?limit=1 with the
  real _SESSION_TOKEN, feeding the dashboard component. Skips cleanly
  when httpx is unavailable and while the OAuth gate is engaged (the
  legacy token is not honoured there).

Tests: middleware increments on raising route and on 5xx, window
expiry, components shape + overall, storage degraded when the state_db
probe fails, dashboard degraded after an error, no secret-bearing
fields in the public payload, self-test pass/fail recording (mocked
client) + a real ASGI round trip.

* fix(status): make gateway_updated_at a stable RFC3339-or-null contract (#68657)

The /api/status gateway_updated_at field and the gateway /health/detailed
updated_at field passed through whatever gateway_state.json contained,
untyped. All current writers emit RFC3339 via _utc_now_iso(), but legacy
gateways wrote unix epoch floats, and a corrupt or hand-edited state file
can inject numbers or arbitrary garbage — while the frontend types
(web/src/lib/api.ts) declare string | null.

Add normalize_updated_at() in gateway/status.py as the single funnel:
- str: accepted iff datetime.fromisoformat parses (trailing Z tolerated);
  naive timestamps coerced to UTC; canonical isoformat returned
- int/float: treated as unix epoch seconds -> UTC ISO string, with a
  plausibility guard (reject < 2000-01-01, > now+1day, non-finite)
- bool: rejected explicitly (int subclass, but never a timestamp)
- anything else: None

Apply it at both emit sites: the dashboard /api/status handler (covers
both the local read_runtime_status() branch and the remote
/health/detailed cross-container fallback branch) and the gateway API
server's /health/detailed response.

Contract tests: parametrized /api/status normalization (epoch float/int,
garbage string, None, bool, dict, absent key), remote-health numeric and
garbage bodies, dashboard shape test round-trip assertion, direct
normalize_updated_at units (range guards, Z suffix, naive coercion,
non-finite floats), and a write_runtime_status -> read_runtime_status
round-trip proving the writer side stays tz-aware parseable.

* feat(desktop): type-to-focus the composer from empty chat chrome

Printable keys and soft `/`/Enter pull focus back to the composer when
nothing else owns the key (dialogs, terminal, buttons on Enter, …).

* feat(ui-tui): widget-grid 2-axis layout engine + overlay primitives (#20379 rebase)

Rebase of the widget-grid PR onto current main, then grow it into a real
2-axis engine: resolveGridTracks (grid-template tracks — fixed cell counts
and weighted fr shares with mins), layoutWidgetGrid (1D auto-packing flow),
and layoutGridAreas (2D absolute placement with row/col spans and implicit
row growth). Overlay/Dialog primitives give zoned viewport-level modals
with an optional scrim. /grid-test (interactive: areas, nesting, zoom,
gap/padding) and /grid-test streams (4x3 mission-control GridAreas board
with promote-to-main) exercise everything end to end.

* refactor(ui-tui): route production surfaces through the widget-grid engine

Banner (responsive tiers: full logo -> compact rule -> text -> hidden),
SessionPanel (fixed hero track + flexible info track, the desktop pane
shell's fixed-vs-flex contract), floating overlays, prompt zone, and the
pickers all render through WidgetGrid instead of hand-rolled flex math.
Pickers gain maxWidth so grid cells can cap them.

* feat(ui-tui): background-aware theme adaptation + paired palettes + /theme pin

OSC-11 asks the terminal for its actual background at startup (env
heuristics are blind on xterm.js hosts) and the theme re-derives against
the answer: desktop-contract adaptation (contrast floors + fill polarity),
a shared list-row selection primitive instead of per-picker panel fills,
paired light_colors/dark_colors skin blocks with a machine audit, and a
/theme auto|light|dark pin (display.tui_theme) for hosts whose probe lies.
E2E coverage for the OSC reply chain + /theme-info diagnostics.

* feat(ui-tui): theme engine — seeds to derived-tone ladder + flash-free boot

The desktop color-mix system, ported: a theme is a handful of identity
SEEDS (text, primary, accent, border, status hues); every secondary tone
(muted, label, surfaces, chips, selection) is a color-mix derivative
against the real terminal background. lib/color.ts consolidates the
primitives (parse/mix/luminance/contrast/retone + xterm.js's multiplicative
liftForContrast). Knobs are grid-search fitted so the math reproduces the
classic hand-tuned literals (contract-tested). The display shim renders
authored palettes RAW and only rescues near-invisible colors. Boot reads
the last resolved theme from $HERMES_HOME/tui-theme-boot.json so the first
frame paints in the right palette (no default-dark flash), and the
placeholder cursor follows the bubbles textinput pattern.

* perf(tui): skin switches stay hot — MCP gating, pooled reload, swap repaint

Four responsiveness/hardening fixes surfaced by rapid /skin switching:
config.get mtime now carries an mcp_rev hash so the TUI reloads MCP only
when MCP-relevant config changed (cosmetic /skin writes cost seconds of
reconnects before); reload.mcp runs on the RPC pool serialized by a lock
(inline it froze the stdio reader for the duration of a flapping server's
retry loop — config.set/complete.slash sat unread and the TUI appeared
dead); theme swaps schedule one full repaint (incremental diffs after a
recolor tear — stale cells keep the old palette, read as "shadows"); and
OSC-11 pure-black answers are distrusted universally (unset-default
fingerprint on xterm.js hosts and tmux). Parent EIO zombie fixed: a dead
PTY made every render write throw once a second forever; exit after 5
consecutive dead-stream errors.

* fix(ui-tui): light mode renders the vivid palette RAW, not WCAG-darkened

Pixel-sampled against the reference screenshots: the beloved classic
light-mode look is the vivid authored golds rendered essentially raw
(#FFD700 shows as bright #F5C242) — transparent terminal profiles apply no
contrast lift of their own, and pre-darkening every foreground to WCAG 4.5
produced the reported mustard mud. Light-mode display floors become
near-invisible rescues only (1.18 display / 1.6 semantic; dark keeps
1.45/2.2); the default skin ships a fills-only light_colors OVERLAY
(polarity-flip the navy menu/status fills, foregrounds inherit the vivid
colors), and themeForSkin merges polarity overlays instead of replacing.
Palette audit reworked: base colors audited fully, overlays for valid keys
and fill polarity.

* fix(ui-tui): eradicate every transparent-terminal black-slab trigger

On terminal.background #00000000 xterm paints "drawn blank" and
attribute-styled cells against an opaque black RGB the user never sees
elsewhere. Verified by PTY byte capture + stateful SGR replay that we emit
no black backgrounds — then removed every trigger: the banner's opaque
space-fills, the scrollbar's non-scrollable space column and SGR-dim
track, the placeholder's SGR inverse cursor and dim fallback, and the bold
full-width banner rule. Chrome styling is now explicit truecolor only:
scrollbar thumb rides primary (accent on hover/drag) over a blended track,
the placeholder cursor is a theme-colored chip (48;2 bg + luminance-picked
ink), hints always carry an explicit 38;2 foreground.

* fix(ui-tui): session-panel hierarchy + polarity-proof placeholder tone

Tool/skill rows rendered labels in muted and member lists in text — which
inverts per skin (muted is the strong family tone on gold skins but the
weak gray on blue ones; slate/poseidon read backwards). Labels now lead in
the theme's label tone, values recede via an explicit fade toward the
surface; audited across all 9 built-ins x both poles. The composer
placeholder lands on muted — the "(and N more toolsets…)" tone — a
mid-luminance family color that reads receded on both poles even when
polarity detection is wrong.

* feat(ui-tui): OSC-10 foreground polarity tiebreaker for transparent terminals

Transparent profiles make OSC-11 useless (xterm reports the unset default,
pure black, regardless of the composited surface) so polarity detection
lagged editor theme flips. OSC-10 reports the theme's REAL foreground on
those hosts — its luminance reveals the pole. hermes-ink grows a foreground
slot (shared reportedColorSlot factory), App.tsx queries both in the
startup batch (background first so a trusted answer wins without churn),
and the app commits an inferred pole only when the background was
distrusted AND the foreground is decisive (bright=dark theme, dark=light;
mid-grays and #000/#fff defaults commit nothing). User pins still outrank.

* fix(ui-tui): session-panel fade anchors on muted, not the surface — readable on every pole

mix(text, surface) was invisible whenever text was already pale (the
light-rendered default: cream blended toward white = nothing) and inherited
wrong-polarity detection through the surface. mix(muted, text, .5) is
pole-proof: muted is mid-luminance by construction, so the midpoint stays
readable everywhere. Audited 9 skins x both poles: 2.0-2.9:1 on white,
5.6-9.3:1 on dark (worst case 1.92 for a light-authored skin on dark).

* style(skins): default light overlay = goldenrod ladder, not neon or mustard

On white, the vivid #FFD700/#FFBF00 read as glare and the WCAG-darkened
mustard reads as mud. The sweet spot is the statusbar's goldenrod family
(hue kept, saturation tamed, mid luminance): title #C8961E, headers
#D89B04, labels #A97E10, muted #B8860B unchanged, warm bronze ink body
#5C4718, deepened semantics + shell blue. Hierarchy on white: ink 8.9:1 >
fade 5.2 > label 3.7 > muted 3.3 > title 2.7 > headers 2.4. Dark mode
renders the vivid block untouched (explicitly approved as-is).

* refactor(ui-tui): DRY the chrome primitives — shared scrollbarColors + hintRgb

scrollbarColors(t, hover, grabbed) in overlayPrimitives is now THE scheme
for both scrollbars (was duplicated formulas); textInput's hex parsing
collapses into one hintRgb helper feeding colorizeHint and hintCursorCell.
Comment bloat trimmed. No behavior change — 1243 tests byte-green.

* fix(ui-tui): completions popover — aligned name track + neutral descriptions

Two-column grid: the name track auto-sizes to the widest visible command so
descriptions align in their own column instead of running under the names.
Descriptions render in the neutral statusFg gray — label and muted are
near-twins on the gold skins, which made command and description read as
one unparseable run.

* refactor(ui-tui): every selectable list rides the shared selection chip — zero inverse left

/agents, /journey, model picker, skills hub, plugins hub, pet picker, and
the approval/confirm prompts all used SGR inverse for the active row —
terminal-interpreted against unknowable defaults (black slab on transparent
profiles) and visually divergent from completions/session-switcher. New
spreadable chipRowProps(t, active) in overlayPrimitives (chip bg + lifted
ink + bold; spread after `color` so chip ink wins) converts each site to
the one selection treatment. rg confirms zero inverse={} remaining in
components/.

* fix(ui-tui): overlay width caps are absolute — clampOverlayWidth (Copilot review)

Every picker/hub forced width >= 24 AFTER applying the caller's maxWidth,
so a grid cell narrower than 24 (or a FloatBox cell under 28 with its 4
cols of chrome) overflowed and clipped at the terminal edge. One shared
clampOverlayWidth(preferred, maxWidth, min=24): the caller's cap is
ABSOLUTE (a cell knows its budget), the usability floor applies only when
the cap allows it, uncapped keeps the old floor semantics. Five call
sites (model/pet pickers, skills/plugins hubs, session switcher) route
through it; the grid-test FloatBox drops its own 24 floor. Contract-tested
including the sub-floor cap case from the review.

* fix(tui): reload.mcp lock scope + coalesced refresh + macOS polarity flip (Bugbot)

Three real findings from the review of the reload.mcp pooling + OSC-10 work:

- Lock released too early: the leader now holds _mcp_reload_lock across
  shutdown+discover AND its own agent refresh — releasing after discover let
  a second reload tear the registry down while the first was still reading it
  to rebuild the session's tool snapshot.
- Coalesced reload skipped the agent refresh: a follower returned
  "reloaded" without rebuilding ITS OWN session's snapshot, so a coalesced
  session kept stale tools. Followers now wait, then refresh their agent
  against the freshly-built registry (under the lock, skipping the redundant
  shutdown/discover). Shared _finish_reload tail for the `always` opt-out.
- macOS AppleInterfaceStyle fallback never set `resolved`, so a late OSC-10
  foreground reply could re-flip the committed inference (visible churn). It
  now marks resolved; a real OSC-11 background measurement still corrects it
  (that listener intentionally doesn't gate on resolved — measurement beats
  inference).

Bugbot's other four findings were diff-truncation false positives (color.ts,
themeBoot.ts, and the mcp_rev/light_colors/dark_colors types all exist;
typecheck + build green). 384 tui_gateway + TS suites pass.

* fix(tui): mcp_rev includes mcp_servers; reload survives leader failure; /theme persists first (Bugbot r2)

- mcp_rev hash now covers `mcp_servers` (the server DEFINITIONS the classic
  CLI watches) alongside `mcp`/`tools` — editing a server previously bumped
  mtime but not mcp_rev, so the TUI skipped reload.mcp and new servers never
  connected until a manual /reload-mcp.
- reload.mcp coalescing survives a failed leader: a completed-generation
  counter (bumped only after a successful shutdown+discover) gates the
  follower. If the leader threw (flapping server) the follower re-runs the
  full reload itself instead of returning a bogus success over an empty
  registry.
- /theme applies AFTER config.set confirms (mirrors /indicator) with a
  guardedErr catch — a failed persist no longer leaves the session showing a
  theme that reverts on restart.

384 tui_gateway + 1246 TS tests, lint, build green.

* fix(ui-tui): first-swap repaint + config-auto respects shell theme pin (Bugbot r3)

- commitTheme compares the first commit against the SEED theme uiStore
  mounted with (boot cache/default), not null — a cold start that resolves
  to a skin differing from the default previously skipped the anti-tearing
  forceRedraw on that first swap.
- applyConfiguredTuiTheme('auto') now clears only a pin CONFIG set (tracked
  via configPinnedTheme), never a HERMES_TUI_THEME the user exported in their
  shell — that env override outranks auto-detection per detectLightMode's
  documented priority, and a config hydrate was wiping it.

(Bugbot's recurring "GatewaySkin missing paired palette fields" is a
diff-truncation false positive — gatewayTypes.ts declares light_colors/
dark_colors, typecheck green.) 81 handler + build/lint green.

* fix: restore package-lock.json @esbuild platform entries (Bugbot r4)

The branch had stripped every node_modules/@esbuild/* optional-platform
entry from the lockfile (442 deletions, 0 additions) — collateral from an
earlier local @esbuild/darwin-arm64 reinstall that rewrote the lockfile to
this machine's platform only. esbuild still declares them as
optionalDependencies, so `npm ci` on Linux CI would skip the platform
binary and break Vitest / ui-tui builds. No dependency was added on this
branch (the only package.json delta is a dev `visual` script), so the
lockfile is restored to match main exactly.

* fix(ui-tui): seed mcp_rev baseline at startup so first cosmetic write doesn't reload MCP (Bugbot r5)

The startup config.get seeded mtimeRef but not mcpRevRef; after a normal
boot mtime is already non-zero so the poller's baseline branch never runs,
leaving mcpRevRef empty. The first /skin (or other cosmetic) write bumped
mtime with an unchanged mcp_rev, and empty !== hash tripped a full
reload.mcp — exactly the reconnect this optimization removes. Seed the
revision alongside mtime at boot.

* fix(ui-tui): record config theme pin even when env already matches (Bugbot r6)

Regression from the r3 shell-pin fix: applyConfiguredTuiTheme('light'|'dark')
returned early when HERMES_TUI_THEME already matched, leaving
configPinnedTheme false — so a later '/theme auto' refused to clear the pin
and the session stayed forced to the old mode while config said auto. Set
configPinnedTheme before the match short-circuit.

Bugbot's other three r6 findings (GatewaySkin paired-palette fields,
ConfigMtimeResponse.mcp_rev, picker maxWidth props) are diff-truncation
false positives — all declared in gatewayTypes.ts / the picker prop
interfaces; typecheck is green.

* feat(ui-tui): shimmer skeleton for the lazy tools section

The lazy-loaded Available Tools section rendered a BLANK gap that popped
when data landed. It now shows animated shimmer rows shaped like the real
content (label block + value run, diagonal band sweep), and the summary
line prints "… tools · … skills" instead of "0 tools · 0 skills" while
counts load.

components/loaders.tsx ships the primitives (shimmerSegments band math,
Shimmer, useShimmerPhase, ShimmerRows) — colors are caller-owned theme
tones, one interval per composition. Cherry-picked from the SDK-shape
branch so the skeleton lands with this PR; the widget-SDK consumers stay
in the follow-up.

* fmt(js): `npm run fix` on merge (#68938)

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fmt(js): `npm run fix` on merge (#68976)

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fmt(js): `npm run fix` on merge (#68977)

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* test(mcp): stamp breaker-open time on the monotonic clock, not a literal (#69003)

test_session_expired_retry_waits_for_new_session hardcoded
_server_breaker_opened_at["hindsight"] = 123.0 to simulate a circuit breaker
whose cooldown has already elapsed. But the breaker in tools/mcp_tool.py
compares that stamp against time.monotonic() (age = monotonic() - opened_at,
elapsed when age >= _CIRCUIT_BREAKER_COOLDOWN_SEC). time.monotonic()'s origin
is arbitrary and small on a freshly-booted CI container, so age worked out to
only a few seconds there (< the 60s cooldown) — the breaker stayed open, the
half-open probe never fired, and the retry returned the "unreachable" error
instead of "bank ok". It passed on long-uptime dev boxes (large monotonic)
and failed under CI, with the reported "Auto-retry available in ~Ns" drifting
run to run as the container's monotonic clock varied.

Stamp opened_at relative to the same clock the code reads
(time.monotonic() - _CIRCUIT_BREAKER_COOLDOWN_SEC - 1.0) so the cooldown is
provably elapsed regardless of the monotonic origin, exercising the intended
half-open transition deterministically.

* fix(windows): share one bounded, tree-killing git probe across both call sites (#68997)

subprocess.run(["git", ...], timeout=...) deadlocks on Windows: run()'s
post-timeout cleanup calls an unbounded communicate() after killing git.
Killing the PATH-resolved launcher can leave a suspended descendant git.exe
holding duplicates of the captured stdout/stderr handles, so the pipes never
reach EOF and the reader-thread join blocks forever — leaking a process +
two reader threads per fired timeout (the accumulating git.exe load behind
Windows Defender CPU spikes).

Two fail-open probe call sites had this identical flaw:
  - tui_gateway/git_probe.py::run_git — on the Desktop agent-build path
    (_start_agent_build -> _session_info -> branch() -> run_git), where the
    hang turned an optional branch label into "agent initialization timed
    out" (#68609).
  - agent/coding_context.py::_git — hangs the agent turn inside
    build_coding_workspace_block under an ACP host (#66037).

Consolidate both onto one shared bounded_git_probe() in
hermes_cli/_subprocess_compat.py (both files already import from there, so
no new import surface):
  - explicit communicate(timeout), then on ANY failure a tree-kill —
    proc.kill() AND, on Windows, best-effort taskkill /T /F so the suspended
    descendant that holds the pipe writers dies too — plus a bounded 1s
    post-kill drain; if the pipes are still held they're abandoned (the
    orphaned reader threads are daemonic and cost nothing).
  - fail open to "" on every path: spawn error, timeout, kill() raising
    (access denied / already reaped — a raise inside the except handler
    previously escaped the contract), and non-timeout communicate() failures
    now also terminate the child instead of leaving it running.
  - the taskkill spawn can't re-enter the deadlock class: it captures no
    pipes (DEVNULL), so its own timeout cleanup has no reader threads to join.

Normal-path spawn contract is preserved byte-for-byte: PIPE/PIPE/DEVNULL,
text + utf-8 errors="replace", hidden-window creationflags on Windows only,
nonzero returncode -> "". Each call site keeps its own timeout (1.5s / 2.5s).

Supersedes #68622 (Sora-bluesky — git_probe fix + tree-kill) and #66038
(iamwongeeeee — coding_context fix), folding both into one shared helper so
the two sites can't drift and every timeout tree-kills the descendant. Tests
consolidated onto the helper, incl. the previously-missing assertion that a
Windows timeout escalates to taskkill /T /F.

Co-authored-by: Sora-bluesky <sora.bluesky.dev@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: iamwongeeeee <wykim777@naver.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(tui): revision-aware reload.mcp — an ack now means the revision was LOADED

Review on #20379, finding 1 (High). Two ways an MCP config revision could
be silently acknowledged without ever being applied:

Client: the poll advanced its accepted mcp_rev BEFORE calling reload.mcp,
and quietRpc collapses failures to null — a reload that failed against a
temporarily broken server left the revision recorded as applied, and no
subsequent poll retried until an unrelated MCP edit. The handshake is now
syncMcpReload(): send the observed rev with the request, advance `accepted`
only when the server answers status=reloaded (to the server's loaded_rev,
falling back to the requested rev on older gateways), and re-compare on
EVERY poll tick — decoupled from mtime — so a transient failure heals on
the next tick. An in-flight guard stops the 5s poll from stacking requests
behind a slow reload.

Server: generation-only coalescing let a follower triggered by revision B
ack against revision A's registry when the config changed under a slow
leader. The leader now re-hashes the MCP-relevant config after discovery
and repeats until stable (bounded), records _mcp_reload_loaded_rev, and a
follower coalesces only when the revision it was asked to load matches —
otherwise it re-runs the full reload itself. Responses carry loaded_rev.

Deterministic tests for the exact failure sequences: failed reload → no
ack, no generation advance; A-then-B overlap → follower re-runs; matching
rev → coalesces; failed leader → follower re-runs; legacy no-rev callers
keep generation-only coalescing (thread ordering via an instrumented lock,
no sleeps). Client: 6 vitest cases on the ack/retry/in-flight contract.

* fix(ui-tui): boot theme cache gets provenance — a stale hint can't pin the terminal

Review on #20379, finding 2 (High). The boot cache seeded the previous
session's background into HERMES_TUI_BACKGROUND, the same slot a CURRENT
OSC-11 answer occupies — so a cache written on a light terminal pinned a
now-pure-black terminal to light forever: the new OSC-11 #000000 answer is
distrusted by design, the pure-white OSC-10 foreground is distrusted too,
and the macOS appearance fallback refuses to run while the slot is set.

Seeding now records provenance (themeBoot.seedBootEnvironment, extracted
and testable against a passed env). When the current terminal answers the
background probe with the untrusted fingerprint, the gateway handler calls
invalidateBootBackground(): the slot clears ONLY while it still holds the
seeded value (a trusted answer that overwrote it is authoritative), OSC-10
gets first claim in the same startup batch, and a short settle pass re-
derives from the live fallback chain if nothing answered.

The cache is also pin-coherent now: commitTheme persists the config mode
pin (display.tui_theme) alongside the resolved theme + physical background.
Previously "/theme light" on a dark terminal cached a light theme next to a
dark background — the next launch painted light, flipped dark when the skin
resolved against the seeded background, then flipped light again on config
hydration: the exact multi-stage flash the cache exists to eliminate. The
seeded pin counts as config-owned (bootSeededPin), so a later 'auto' can
still clear it instead of mistaking it for a user shell export.

Tests cover the review's sequences: stale-light cache vs current dark
terminal (invalidate → fallback chain), stale-dark vs ambiguous light,
pinned light on a dark physical background across restart (and the
inverse), trusted-overwrite protection, and the explicit-signal guards.

* fix(ui-tui): stacked dialog gets input before the grid under it

Review on #20379, finding 3 (Medium). /grid-test's `d` opens a dialog on
top without clearing the grid, but the grid's input branch ran FIRST — so
Esc/q/Enter mutated the hidden grid (close/unzoom/promote) instead of
closing the visible dialog, contradicting its "Esc/q/Enter close" hint.

Input routing now follows visual stacking: the dialog/grid dispatch is
extracted into handleStackedModalInput() with the dialog branch first, the
hook consumes through it, and tests drive the real dispatch against the
overlay store — each advertised close key closes only the dialog (grid
byte-identical), grid keys don't leak through while the dialog is up, and
the same keys route to the grid again after it closes.

* fix(ui-tui): make `npm run visual` portable off POSIX — zero new deps

Review on #20379, finding 4 (Medium). Three portability defects in the
visual verification harness:

- `FORCE_COLOR=3 COLORTERM=truecolor tsx ...` POSIX env assignment does not
  work under the Windows npm command shell. The script is now a plain Node
  launcher (scripts/visual/run.mjs) that sets the env itself and spawns tsx
  via require.resolve('tsx/cli') — no cross-env, no shell syntax.
- Hardcoded /tmp/tui-visual.{html,png} resolve to a drive-root path like
  C:\tmp on native Windows (and fail when that directory doesn't exist).
  Both scripts now derive the output directory from a shared paths.mjs
  helper: os.tmpdir()/hermes-tui-visual (created recursively;
  HERMES_TUI_VISUAL_DIR overrides for CI or side-by-side runs).
- electron was undeclared by ui-tui and only worked via hoisting luck. The
  launcher now resolves it EXPLICITLY from the install tree the desktop
  workspace already provides (require('electron') in plain Node returns the
  binary path), with an ELECTRON_BIN override and a clear error pointing at
  the repo-root install when it's absent — instead of declaring a second
  ~100MB dependency on a TUI workspace for a dev-only harness.

Also fixes the trailing-whitespace line in render.tsx that `git diff
--check` flags. Verified end-to-end: render writes the HTML scene sheet
and the electron shot step produces the screenshot from the tmpdir path;
the missing-electron error path prints the guidance message.

* perf(ui-tui): shimmer loaders share one clock and stop after a bounded period

Review on #20379, finding 5 (Perf). Every ShimmerRows mounted its own 90 ms
setInterval — the session panel can show lazy skills AND lazy tools at
once, and a lazy watch session stays lazy indefinitely, so an otherwise-
idle TUI ran ~22 React state updates per second forever.

All shimmer compositions now subscribe to a single module-level clock: one
interval regardless of how many skeletons are on screen, updates delivered
in one timer callback so React batches them into a single render pass, and
the interval is torn down with the last subscriber. Each mount's animation
is also bounded (SHIMMER_ANIMATE_MS, 30 s): after the budget the skeleton
freezes in place — it still reads as "loading" — and stops costing renders
entirely.

Tests: fake-timer coverage that N subscribers share one timer in lockstep,
the interval stops with the last unsubscribe, and a late subscriber
restarts the clock cleanly.

* fmt(js): prettier pass on the new review tests

* chore: gitignore node_modules symlinks, not just directories

Worktrees symlink node_modules to the main checkout; the dir-only
node_modules/ pattern doesn't match symlinks, so one slipped into a
commit and broke npm ci on CI (ENOTDIR). Dropping the trailing slash
matches both.

* fix(desktop): stop long-session transcript from drifting to old turns (#69019)

content-visibility:auto on turn groups (perf: off-screen turns skip
style/layout/paint) pairs with contain-intrinsic-size:auto, which only
remembers a turn's size after it renders. A turn that finished streaming
near the bottom had its smaller mid-stream size remembered; once it
scrolled off the top edge and got skipped, it collapsed to that stale
height. With overflow-anchor:none the viewport can't self-correct, so the
stick-to-bottom lock drifts and the view creeps up over older turns — the
'long session eventually shows old responses' visual glitch.

Exempt the newest turns (live tail) from virtualization so a turn is only
ever skipped after its layout has settled at its final size (remembered ==
real -> skipping changes no height). Off-screen older turns still skip, so
the dialog/popover whole-document recalc win on long transcripts is kept
(it scales with the hundreds of old turns, not the small tail).

* ci: retrigger (transient setup-uv manifest fetch flake)

* feat(ui-tui): widget-app SDK — registry, host, dispatch; demos become apps

The SDK the desktop app already has, ported to the TUI: a WidgetApp contract
(id/help/mode/init/reduce/render/usage), a registry, and a host that owns the
active widget, routes input to its reducer, and renders it. The grid-test and
dialog-test debug surfaces are reimplemented as widget apps instead of bespoke
overlay state, and slash commands are generated from the registry. Input for an
open widget is owned by the active app (supersedes the demo-only stacked-modal
routing) — the single active widget enforces topmost-owns-input structurally.

* feat(ui-tui): weather reference app — the async-data contract, themed ASCII art

/weather [location]: wttr.in current conditions behind a Dialog, art bucket
table-driven off WWO weather codes, every tint a theme family tone (sun =
primary, rain = shell blue, thunder = warn). Proves the async story the
demos don't: init returns a loading phase and fires the fetch; results land
through the new host.updateWidget, which patches state ONLY while the app
is still active — a late resolution can never resurrect a closed app or
clobber a different one. `r` refetches; Esc/q/Enter close.

Four async-contract tests (loading→ready via updateWidget, late-resolution
guard, error phase, keymap). 1253 TS tests green.

* feat(ui-tui): ambient widget mode — registry-driven slash catalog + in-flow dock

Widgets can render as ambient (glanceable, non-blocking) instead of modal,
docked in the normal layout flow above/below the status bar rather than taking
over the screen. The slash catalog is generated from the widget registry so new
apps surface automatically, and /ticker lands as the first live-animation
ambient demo.

* feat(ui-tui): self-authored widgets — user-widget loader, hot-load, skill

Hermes can write its own widgets: a loader discovers $HERMES_HOME/tui-widgets/*.mjs,
fs.watch hot-loads them the moment they land (no restart), and a tui-widgets skill
teaches the agent the contract and the openWidget-at-register auto-open recipe.
Load/error/remove events announce themselves in the transcript; a lazy intro
skeleton covers the first paint.

* feat(ui-tui): widget primitives — charts, accordion, shimmer, stable streams

Reusable render primitives the SDK exposes to widget authors: sparkline/gauge/
hbars chart helpers (dimension-stable so live updates never resize the card),
an Accordion for expand/collapse sections, animated shimmer loaders, and a
streams demo that no longer reserves a phantom icon column on unfocused titles.

* docs(skill): tui-widgets — auto-open recipe (openWidget at end of register)

* feat(ui-tui): ambient zone system + widget crash boundary

A full placement grid so the agent can put a widget where it asks — dock-top/
bottom and corner zones, with corners as reserved rails that take real space
instead of floating over content. A per-widget error boundary plus lenient
ShimmerRows means generated widget code can't crash the TUI.

* refactor(ui-tui): host placement router + grid-test width-floor fix

host.tsx collapses to one placement router over a shared render context, and the
grid-test app drops its width floor too (carrying the #20379 review rule). Final
formatting pass folded in.

* feat(themes): cross-surface theme SDK — one skin themes CLI, TUI, and desktop

Make the Python skin engine the single source of truth for a canonical theme
shape consumed by every surface, so a skin authored in $HERMES_HOME/skins/*.yaml
(by a user or by Hermes from a prompt) themes the CLI, TUI, and desktop GUI at
once — the theme analogue of the plugin SDK.

- @hermes/shared: canonical `HermesSkin` token shape + `SKIN_COLOR_TOKENS` enum,
  consumed by both TS surfaces (TUI `GatewaySkin` and desktop dedup onto it).
- Desktop: `skinToDesktopTheme` resolver (skin → CSS-var palette, VS Code-style
  derive-from-seed) + `backend-sync` that registers backend skins into the theme
  registry (Appearance/Cmd-K/`/skin`) and applies on a real change. Seeds on
  gateway.ready (never stomps a persisted pick), applies on skin.changed and the
  post-turn `config.get skin` poll (catch-all for agent-edited config.yaml).
- TUI: `fromSkin` now maps the status bar + `background` keys it was dropping.
- Gateway: `config.get skin` also returns the full resolved palette (additive).
- Skill: `hermes-themes` teaches the agent to author + activate a skin.

Each surface keeps its own normalizing resolver (ansi for the TUI, CSS vars for
the desktop, prompt_toolkit/Rich for the CLI).

* fix(themes): activate skins via `hermes config set`, never a config.yaml hand-edit

The skill told the agent to `patch` display.skin into config.yaml; a stray indent
corrupts the file and breaks the live gateway (the reported "/ menu broke"), and
a raw file edit never live-applies in a running CLI/TUI ("nothing happened").
Route activation through the safe writer (`hermes config set display.skin`), and
state plainly that a tool call can't hot-switch a running CLI/TUI — the user runs
`/skin <name>` (desktop still auto-repaints on the next turn).

* feat(themes): agent-authored skins switch live via a gateway skin watcher

A skin Hermes activates (`hermes config set display.skin X`) or recolors in
place now goes live on every surface (CLI, TUI, desktop) within ~half a
second, on its own — no `/skin`, no tool-hook timing, no user action.

A gateway daemon polls the resolved skin signature `(name, active-file mtime)`
every 0.5s and broadcasts `skin.changed` on any real move — a name switch OR a
live color edit to the active skin. It routes through the SAME path `/skin`
uses, so all surfaces repaint identically. The watcher seeds its baseline at
gateway.ready (stdio + ws) so it only fires on a real change; the `/skin` RPC
seeds the baseline too so it never double-broadcasts.

Subsumes the desktop's post-turn `config.get skin` poll (its skin.changed
handler already applies).

* feat(themes): TUI paints its own background from the skin (OSC 11)

The TUI inherited the terminal's background; now a skin's `background` paints the
whole surface via OSC 11 when a skin is applied, and clears back to the terminal
default (OSC 111) on revert and on exit (ridden in through resetTerminalModes).
Opt-in: a skin with no `background` leaves the terminal untouched, and the
restore only fires if we actually painted. Desktop already themed its own bg;
this closes the loop so Hermes owns its background on every surface.

* feat(themes): element tokens (ui_tool, ui_thinking) + skinnable diffs

Theming was semantic-only: the gold tool `●` was `accent`, shared with
headings/links/chevrons, so "recolor tool calls" was impossible and the agent
had no key to point at. Add `ui_tool` (● + tool spinner) and `ui_thinking`
(reasoning body) tokens that fall back to accent/muted — defaults unchanged,
but now independently settable. Make diffs skinnable too (`diff_*`), which
fromSkin previously hardcoded. Document the full element→key map in the skill so
Hermes knows which knob turns what.

* fix(themes): tweak the ACTIVE skin in place, never fork default

Changing one color ("make the tool ● cyan") forked `default` — which has no
`background` — so applying it reset the terminal to its own (black) default and
dropped the active skin's palette. Teach the skill to edit the active skin's file
in place for a tweak (watcher repaints on the mtime bump), and to fork a built-in
only by carrying its full palette. Hard pitfall: never fork `default` for a tweak.

* feat(themes): `hermes skin set` — deterministic one-color tweak, bg untouched

Changing a single color kept wrecking the rest because the agent hand-authored a
new skin (often from `default`, which has no `background`, resetting the terminal
to black). Add `hermes skin set <key> <hex>`: edits the ACTIVE skin's one key in
place (a built-in is forked into an editable copy carrying its full palette), so
everything else — background included — is preserved. Plus `skin use` / `skin
list`. The skill now points tweaks at this command instead of hand-authoring.

* feat(themes): dedicated code-syntax palette keys

Code highlighting reused brand tokens (accent/text/border/muted), so it couldn't
be themed independently. Add syntax_string/number/keyword/comment skin keys →
syntax* theme tokens (defaulting to those brand tokens, so defaults are
unchanged) and point the highlighter at them. Documented in the element→key map.

* test(themes): E2E live skin switch — config write → skin.changed broadcast

* fix(themes): reconcile element/syntax tokens with main's derive+adapt pipeline

Element tokens (ui_tool/ui_thinking), skinnable diffs, and code-syntax keys
flow through buildPalette → adaptColorsToBackground instead of a hand-mapped
color block, so they inherit #20379's contrast/polarity machinery. thinking
and syntaxComment track the EFFECTIVE muted (banner_dim override included);
the skin's `background` feeds the surface (it also paints the terminal via
OSC 11); statusFg falls back through ui_text/banner_text. Tests assert the
routing/independence contracts rather than pre-adaptation hexes.

* fix(themes): apply a runtime switch back to default on the desktop

ingestBackendSkin returned early for name === 'default' even when
apply=true, so a real runtime switch to the default skin (/skin default
on CLI/TUI, or config.set display.skin=default) emitted skin.changed but
never repainted the desktop. 'default' is no-opinion on the PALETTE (the
desktop keeps its own nous default, so we still never register a converted
theme under it), but it IS a valid apply TARGET: setTheme normalizes
'default' -> nous, so switching back repaints to the desktop default.
Skip only the registry step for 'default' and let it flow through the
apply guard. Addresses Copilot review.

* fix(tui_gateway): serve candidate-inclusive display on warm/live resume

#65919 persists verification candidates (finish_reason=verification_required
/ verify_hook_continue) to state.db but collapses them out of the in-memory
model history via repair_message_sequence. The eager session.resume + REST
paths read the verbatim display lineage (candidate present), but the
warm/live-reuse payload (_live_session_payload) built its user-visible
messages from the collapsed in-memory model history — so switching to a
still-live session dropped the substantive verification answer that a cold
resume of the SAME session showed. That divergence is the cross-session
"substantive text vanishes on switch" class, and the direct sibling of the
resume-duplication regression fixed in #68149.

Reconcile the persisted display lineage (candidate-inclusive, the same
get_messages_as_conversation(..., include_ancestors=True) read the eager
resume + REST paths use) with the fresh in-memory tail in
_live_visible_history, so all three surfaces agree by construction while a
not-yet-flushed live turn is still shown. Extracted
_reconcile_display_with_live as a pure, DI-testable function (anchors on the
last persisted row's (role, text); appends only the uncovered in-memory tail;
trusts the DB display when the tail can't be anchored).

Tests: unit coverage for candidate-inclusion, freshness, empty/raising-DB
fallback, and the combined candidate+fresh-tail case. The existing freshness
guard (test_session_resume_live_payload_uses_current_history_with_ancestors)
stays green.

* fix(tui_gateway): candidate-inclusive display on child-watch resume + E2E

Complete the #65919 warm/live-payload fix across its sibling path and add
real-SessionDB cross-builder coverage.

- Child-watch (lazy) resume: the delegated-subagent watch window served
  _history_to_messages(repaired_history) for its user-visible messages, which
  collapses out persisted verification candidates just like the warm-payload
  path did. Build the visible messages from the verbatim child-only display
  projection (repair_alternation=False) while the repaired history still feeds
  live replay; fall back to the repaired history if the display read fails.

- E2E cross-builder consistency (real SessionDB, not mocks): a persisted
  verification candidate is collapsed out of the model projection but kept in
  the display projection, and _live_visible_history now equals the eager
  session.resume display projection (candidate present). Adds the combined
  candidate + fully-flushed-second-turn case and a lazy child-watch handler
  test that asserts the candidate survives in resp["result"]["messages"].

* fix(cli): add skin to _BUILTIN_SUBCOMMANDS for plugin gating

The new hermes skin subcommand must be declared so startup plugin
discovery can skip when the user targets it.

* fmt(js): `npm run fix` on merge (#69048)

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(desktop): Billing page revamp — current-plan card, in-app plans view, tier art (#68722)

* feat(desktop): revamp Billing page — plan card, in-app plans view, tier art

Reshape the desktop Billing settings per wayfinder ticket 09. New page order:
Plan → Payment → One-time top-up → Automatic refill → Usage, with the at-a-glance
summary strip unchanged at the top.

- CurrentPlanCard replaces the old Subscription row: tier name + price + renewal
  and at most one button — "View plans" (free/no-sub + can_change_plan),
  "Change plan" (subscriber + can_change_plan), or none for teams / non-changers.
  Teams keep the portal "Adjust plan ↗" link so they are not stranded. The button
  navigates in-app to the plans sub-view.
- bview=plans sub-view mirrors the settings pview/kview pattern (useRouteEnumParam,
  default overview). BillingPlansView renders a grid of PlanCard from live tiers[]
  (is_enabled, sorted by tier_order, free tier included).
- PlanCard: tier art + name + $/mo + monthly credits as dollars ("$110 credits/mo").
  Current tier is highlighted + inert; higher/no-current tiers get "Choose ↗"
  (opens portal with plan=<tierId>); lower tiers are a DISABLED "Downgrade" with a
  caption — downgrades move in-app in ticket 11 (gateway pending-change flow), so
  this PR intentionally links them out/disabled rather than wiring the money path.
- buildManageSubscriptionUrl gains an optional third arg (tierId) → appends
  plan=<tierId>. Signature kept identical to draft PR #68666 for a trivial rebase;
  NAS #748 validates the param server-side.
- Tier art: four NAS hero webps rendered as ~40px thumbnails over a Nous-blue well
  with per-tier blend modes (the only place Nous blue appears). Keyed by lowercase
  tier NAME (free/starter→connect, plus→memory, super→automation, ultra→sandbox);
  unknown name → text-only card. Imported via vite static imports for packaged
  file:// + webSecurity.
- Top-up vs auto-refill disambiguated by section label + first sentence: "One-time
  top-up" / "Buy credits now" vs "Automatic refill" / "Refill when low" (configured
  copy reads "Charges $X automatically when your balance falls below $Y.").
- Variant-A auto-refill editing: Manage swaps the row's left side (caption → the two
  $ fields with a pre-allocated error line) and the action column (Manage → Save/
  Cancel) in place, with the row height reserved for the tallest state so the Usage
  section never shifts. Fixes the spurious on-open validation error (errors now show
  only after an edit or a save attempt). Save/disable API calls + confirm-disable
  flow unchanged.
- Remove subscriptionTierChips and the subscription-row chips; reshape (not delete)
  deriveBillingView to expose plan + tiers. Buy-credits row keeps the chips seam.
- Dev fixtures: add free-personal and subscriber-personal (personal orgs, full
  4-tier Free/Plus/Super/Ultra catalog) so the plans view is exercisable.

Tests: update/extend index.test.tsx + use-billing-state.test.ts, add tier-art.test.ts;
delete the old chips tests. Desktop billing suite 70/70 green, typecheck clean.

* fix(desktop): mark the free/lowest tier current (not an upgrade) when there is no subscription

Visual verification caught a spec-fidelity bug: in the plans grid, an account with
no active subscription rendered the Free tier ($0/mo, tier_order 0) as a "Choose ↗"
upgrade — clicking would deep-link the portal to "subscribe to Free".

Ruling: current-card = tier.is_current OR (subscription.current == null AND the tier
is the lowest-order / $0 tier). derivePlanTiers now falls back to the lowest-order
tier as the stand-in current plan when there is no subscription, so the free card
renders exactly like is_current (inert, "Current plan") and — being the lowest order
— no tier can be a downgrade; every paid tier is a "Choose ↗" upgrade.

CurrentPlanCard is unaffected (still "Free" + "View plans"); subscriber-personal is
unchanged (Free stays a disabled Downgrade below the current Plus tier).

Tests: free-personal grid now asserts Free = current/inert, no downgrade state, three
Choose buttons; text-only unknown-tier test gains a free tier so the unknown paid tier
is unambiguously an upgrade. Billing suite 70/70 green, typecheck + lint clean.

* chore(desktop): shrink bundled tier art to 128px thumbnails

The plan-card wells render the art at ~40px; shipping the full landing
images added 2.7 MB to the repo for no visible difference. 128px covers
2x displays; total is now 26 KB.

* fix(desktop): address 6 adversarial-review findings on the Billing revamp

1. Grandfathered current tier (BLOCKER). NAS marks a grandfathered current tier
   is_enabled:false; the enabled-only filter dropped it, leaving currentOrder
   undefined so every lower tier rendered as an actionable "Choose ↗". derivePlanTiers
   now resolves current identity/ordering against the UNFILTERED tiers and keeps the
   grandfathered current tier in the grid as the inert "Current plan" card; downgrades
   classify against its tier_order. (Non-current disabled tiers are still dropped.)

2. Dead plan-card button. derivePlanCard offered "View plans"/"Change plan" purely on
   can_change_plan, but the grid could be empty / current-only and showPlans refused,
   so the button no-oped. It now offers the in-app action ONLY when the grid has ≥1
   actionable (non-current) tier; otherwise it falls back to the portal link.

3. Deep-link bypass. showPlans now gates on the same capability that renders the button
   (view.plan?.action), so a team / non-changer deep-linking bview=plans always falls
   back to overview instead of a grid of live Choose buttons.

4. Lost portal escape hatch. Whenever the card has no in-app action (teams, non-changers,
   refused subscription, empty catalog) it now ALWAYS carries the "Adjust plan ↗" portal
   link built from subscription?.portal_url ?? billing.portal_url — the refusal caption
   no longer promises a portal the UI didn't render.

5. Choose URLs dropping org_id/plan. (a) derivePlanTiers now threads billing.portal_url
   as the fallback base for the Choose URL. (b) buildManageSubscriptionUrl treats the
   hard-coded FALLBACK_PORTAL_BILLING_URL as a last-resort ORIGIN (applying org_id/plan)
   instead of a bare return, so a null portal_url never strips the routing params.

6. Zero-shift on narrow panes. Replaced the magic min-h-28 (under-reserved once the two
   inputs stack below @2xl) with exact reservation: the edit form is always rendered and
   both states share one grid cell ([grid-template-areas:'stack']), invisible+aria-hidden
   when not editing — the row equals the tallest state at every width, no breakpoint math.
   The refusal stays inside the reserved layer.

Tests: +12 (grandfathered current, no-dead-button + empty-catalog portal link, team &
personal deep-link fallback to overview, billing.portal_url-backed Choose URL, fallback
org_id/plan, reserved-form-mounted); updated the two portal-link expectations for §4.
Billing suite 78/78 green; typecheck (app/electron/e2e) + lint clean.

* refactor(desktop): reuse the shared openExternalLink helper in the plans view

* fix(desktop): honor the auto_reload wire contract — null card + disable amounts

A full-stack contract sweep (desktop ↔ shared types ↔ gateway ↔ NAS) surfaced two
real desktop bugs in the auto-refill row:

A. auto_reload.card can be null. The gateway's _parse_auto_reload_card returns None
   for a missing/unknown-kind card and _serialize_billing_state emits `card: null`,
   but the shared BillingAutoReload.card union had no null arm and use-billing-state
   dereferenced `autoReload.card.kind` bare — a crash on the enabled path. Add `| null`
   to the shared union (contract honesty) and guard the read (`card?.kind`); null now
   falls through to the default enabled path, same as a canonical card.

B. Disable was rejected by the gateway. billing.auto_reload unconditionally requires
   threshold + top_up_amount, so `updateAutoReload({ enabled: false })` came back
   invalid_request. (The TUI always sends both; desktop fixture mode stubbed it.)
   disable() now sends the current threshold_usd/reload_to_usd from the autoReload
   prop alongside enabled: false, matching the TUI.

Tests: enabled auto_reload with card:null renders the normal enabled row (derivation
+ render, no crash); disable call carries both current amounts. Billing suite 80/80
green; typecheck (app/electron/e2e) + lint clean.

* fix(tui): guard the nullable auto_reload card in the auto-reload screen

The shared BillingAutoReload.card union gained its honest null arm (the
gateway emits card: null for a missing/unknown card); the TUI's only bare
dereference follows the same default path as a canonical card.

* fix(desktop): align billing inputs to the sm control height

The three billing inputs used an ad-hoc h-8 (32px) next to size=sm
buttons (24px). They now use the control system's size=sm with a
py-[3px] compensation for the input's real 1px border — buttons draw
theirs as an inset shadow, so sm alone still sits 2px taller. All five
controls in the buy row now measure 24px.

* fix(desktop): plan-card actionability + billing view-model hardening

Code-quality review of the Billing revamp (PR #68722).

BLOCKING — a top-tier subscriber (only downgrades/current below them) opened a
plans grid with zero enabled actions AND no portal link. The plan card gated its
in-app button on `tiers.some(state !== 'current')`, which counts the (disabled)
downgrade tiles. It now gates on an actual UPGRADE being present
(`capable && tiers.some(state === 'upgrade')`); with no upgrade the card falls back
to its "Adjust plan ↗" portal link, and the bview=plans deep link (gated on the same
plan.action) falls back to overview.

Reviewer structural items:
- One "plans capability" verdict (personal + can_change_plan + subscription ok) is
  derived once in deriveBillingView and threaded to BOTH derivePlanCard and
  derivePlanTiers; the grid only mints upgrade actions when capable, so the invariant
  lives in one place.
- BillingPlanTierView is now a discriminated union (`current` | `downgrade` w/
  disabledCaption | `upgrade` w/ required action), and BillingPlanCardView is an
  action-XOR-link union — deleting the `tier.action?.url ?? ''` and `plan.link?.url`
  defensive branches in the consumers.
- `findCurrentTier(subscription)` replaces the repeated is_current||id predicate at
  its three sites (plan card price, grid ordering, summary plan line).
- BillingView exposes named `paymentRow` / `topupRow` / `refillRow` instead of an
  `accountRows[]` + three `.find(id)` lookups.
- The auto-refill row that edits in place carries an explicit `manageInApp: true`;
  AutoReloadRow keys off it instead of sniffing the action label/url.
- tier-art header comment no longer cites an internal repo path; dead `?.` removed
  from RowValue (via a destructured const) and the plan-card link handler.

Behavior is identical except the blocking fix. Billing suite 82/82 green; typecheck
(app/electron/e2e) + lint clean.

* refactor(desktop): adopt inline-review nits on the billing plan card

Resolves the inline suggestion threads:
- plan-card gate reads a named `hasActionableTier` = "a tile carries an action"
  (union-safe `'action' in tier`, equivalent to the old upgrade-only check).
- re-narrow link/action inside the click callbacks (`plan.link && …`,
  `tier.action && …`) rather than relying on outer narrowing.

Behavior unchanged; billing suite 82/82 green, typecheck + lint clean.

* fmt(js): `npm run fix` on merge (#69050)

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(cli): plan catalog on Free + plan= deep link + top-up/auto-refill copy split (#68689)

* feat(cli): plan catalog on Free + plan= deep link + top-up/auto-refill copy split

Bring the plain (non-TUI) CLI billing surface to parity with the desktop/TUI
billing changes:

- /subscription on Free (admin/owner, interactive) prints the plan catalog
  (name · $/mo · $credits/mo, from the same tiers[] data the TUI uses; monthly
  credits render as dollars). A numbered pick opens the manage-subscription
  deep-link directly with plan=<tier_id> appended.
- subscription_manage_url(state, tier_id=...) appends plan=<tier_id> (the stable
  tiers[] id) when a tier was picked, org_id first — mirrors the TUI's ?plan=.
  The paid change flow's blocked/unknown-preview portal fallback carries plan=
  for upgrades only; downgrades stay generic/native.
- /topup overview splits one-time top-up from automatic refill, the distinction
  stated in each first sentence ("Add funds now — a single charge…" vs "Refill
  when low — charges … automatically …"), keeping "credits" out of the
  dollars-only surface.
- Downgrades remain native (chargeless scheduled change), unchanged.

Updates the CLI-parity section of docs/billing-lifecycle.md and tests under
tests/hermes_cli + tests/agent.

* refactor(billing): share plan-catalog helpers + harden manage-url builder

- subscription_manage_url now preserves unrelated portal query params (parse_qsl,
  popping only the contract-owned org_id/plan) and restricts to http/https schemes,
  matching the desktop URL builder — the function owns the contract.
- Lift the plan-catalog derivation into agent/subscription_view.py so the CLI Free
  catalog and the paid picker/blocked-preview branch share one implementation:
  selectable_tiers (enabled paid, not current, sorted), format_tier_row (name · $/mo
  · $credits/mo — thousands-grouped like the TUI's toLocaleString, credits suffix
  hidden when absent/zero), and is_upgrade(state, tier_id).

* fix(cli): numbered pick, canonical guarded browser opener, partial auto-refill copy

- Free catalog: accept a bare digit as a pick (the shared normalizer only knows the
  confirm-dialog digit aliases, so `1` used to resolve to None → "Cancelled"). The
  Nth digit maps to the Nth printed row.
- Extract one _open_url_in_browser used by every "open the portal" path, applying the
  device-code flows' console-browser / remote-session guard (webbrowser.open returns
  True even for lynx/w3m over SSH) and returning whether a real browser opened.
- Consume the shared selectable_tiers / format_tier_row / is_upgrade helpers from the
  Free catalog, the paid picker, and the blocked-preview branch.
- /topup auto-refill copy: the concrete "charges $X … below $Y." sentence only when
  both amounts are present and finite; otherwise the generic sentence.

* docs(billing): correct CLI-parity rows (drop cross-repo ref, downgrade invariant)

Remove the other-repo PR reference from the manage-URL row, and state the real
downgrade invariant: a blocked downgrade may print the generic manage URL but never
carries plan=<tier_id> — selected-tier deep-links are reserved for new subscriptions
and upgrades.

* feat(desktop): native in-app downgrade — chargeless preview → schedule → undo (#68761)

* feat(desktop): native in-app downgrade (chargeless preview → schedule → undo)

Ticket 11, stacked on the Billing revamp (ticket 09). Downgrades no longer bounce
to the portal — picking a lower tier runs the gateway pending-change flow in-app;
the scheduled state renders on the plan card with an undo. Upgrades keep the portal
deep link.

- api.ts: add previewSubscriptionChange / scheduleSubscriptionChange /
  resumeSubscription wrappers over subscription.preview|change|resume
  ({subscription_type_id} / {}), typed via SubscriptionPreviewResponse +
  BillingMutationResponse (now re-exported from types.ts).
- use-subscription-change.ts (new): useDowngradeFlow (preview → confirm → schedule,
  refetch + onScheduled on success; typed refusals surface via the shared
  BillingRefusalInline, so insufficient_scope drives the existing step-up exactly
  like the auto-reload save, retried in place) and useResumeFlow (confirm-less undo).
  Both accept a `simulate` switch so DEV fixtures click through with canned success.
- plans-view.tsx: downgrade tiles are now an actionable "Downgrade" that opens an
  in-card preview → confirm panel (mirrors the TUI confirm copy: "…takes effect
  <date>. No charge now; you keep your current plan until then."). The scheduled
  downgrade target renders an inert "Scheduled" marker; other lower tiers stay
  actionable (picking one reschedules).
- CurrentPlanCard: when a downgrade is pending, the caption reads "Changes to
  <tier> on <when>." with an inline Undo → resume → refetch. One line, no jumps.
- use-billing-state.ts: BillingPlanTierView gains a `scheduled` state (and drops the
  ticket-09 disabled-downgrade caption); derivePlanTiers matches the pending target
  by name (NAS sends no id for it) before the downgrade branch; BillingPlanCardView
  gains `pending`, derived from current.pending_downgrade_* .
- inline-feedback.tsx (new): extracted openExternal / BillingRefusalInline /
  StepUpInlineAction / InlineMessage so the plans view reuses the step-up-aware
  refusal renderer without a circular import; openExternal now delegates to the
  canonical @/lib/external-link opener.
- dev-fixtures.ts: add `pending-downgrade` (subscriber-personal on Plus with a Free
  downgrade scheduled for Aug 15) for the plan-card pending state + grid marker.

Tests (+16 → 94 green in the billing suite): api wrappers (preview/change/resume +
insufficient_scope refusal); view derivation (pending plan-card state, scheduled
grid marker); confirm flow (preview shown, change called with the right tier_id,
refetch on success, schedule refusal → step-up affordance); undo flow; the
use-subscription-change hooks (preview-refusal retry, cancel, simulate path).
Updated the ticket-09 downgrade tests for the now-actionable tile. typecheck
(app/electron/e2e) + lint clean.

PR (later): base sid/desktop-billing-revamp; retarget to main after #68722 (09) merges.

* fix(desktop): format downgrade credits delta as signed dollars

The downgrade preview rendered the raw wire string ("Monthly credits change:
-88."), violating the "monthly credits are DOLLARS" ruling. NAS sends
monthly_credits_delta as a bare decimal; format it as signed dollars through the
same money formatter ("−$88/mo", sign preserved, abs value formatted). Zero /
absent still hides the line.

Adds formatMonthlyCreditsDelta (exported) + unit tests (negative/positive/zero/
absent) and asserts the rendered "Monthly credits change: −$88/mo." in the confirm
flow. Billing suite 99/99 green; typecheck + lint clean.

* fix(desktop): downgrade flow hardening — concurrency guard, a11y, DEV-gated sim

Addresses the adversarial review of the native-downgrade diff.

- Concurrency: useDowngradeFlow exposes `mutating` (true only while the schedule
  RPC is in flight). While a change commits, every other Downgrade tile and the
  Back button are disabled; the active panel's Confirm/Cancel already lock. The
  plan-card Undo blocks on its own resume via `busy`. (The server also 409s
  overlapping per-org mutations — this is UI honesty, not the only defense.)
- Accessibility: the confirm panel is role="status" aria-live="polite" and takes
  focus on open (tabIndex=-1 container); closing it returns focus to the tile card,
  so keyboard focus is never stranded and the async preview text is announced.
- DEV-gated simulation: the canned preview/change/resume seam is ignored unless
  import.meta.env.DEV, so a production build never takes the simulated branch even
  if a `simulate` prop leaks through.
- Comments: documented the deliberate manual-retry-after-step-up (no auto-replay,
  matching auto-reload) and that name-matching the scheduled target is safe because
  SubscriptionTypes.name is @unique in NAS.

Tests (+5 → 104 green in the billing suite): mutating exposed only during schedule;
simulate ignored outside DEV; other downgrade tiles + Back disabled mid-schedule;
Undo disabled mid-resume; confirm panel role + focus on open. typecheck
(app/electron/e2e) + lint clean.

* fix(desktop): scheduled cancellations, downgrade-flow concurrency, inline nits

Addresses the native-downgrade review threads.

Scheduled cancellations were invisible (NEW review item). subscription.current
carries cancel_at_period_end + cancellation_effective_* and subscription.resume
clears cancellations exactly like downgrades, but the pending-transition helper only
read pending_downgrade_*, so a portal/TUI-scheduled cancellation rendered as a plain
renewal with no Undo. The pending state is now a union — { kind:'downgrade', tierName,
when } | { kind:'cancellation', when } — computed once in deriveBillingView and
threaded to BOTH the plan card and the grid. The card reads "Cancels on <date>." with
the same Undo (resume); the grid shows a Scheduled marker only for downgrades (a
cancellation has no target tier). Precedence: a downgrade wins if both fields are set
(it names a concrete target — the stronger signal), commented at the helper. Adds a
`pending-cancellation` fixture + tests (card copy, undo wiring, no grid marker,
downgrade-wins precedence).

Concurrency: confirm() takes a synchronous scheduling ref (mirroring useResumeFlow)
so two same-tick clicks — before React commits busy='schedule' — cannot fire two
schedule RPCs; the ref clears on every exit (simulated/stale/refusal/success).
useResumeFlow reorders its unlock: a refusal releases immediately, a success holds
runningRef/busy THROUGH the refetch so Undo never re-enables against the still-pending
card. Test: a synchronous double-activation fires one schedule RPC.

Inline nits: re-narrow link/action inside the click callbacks (`plan.link && …`,
`tier.action && …`) instead of relying on outer narrowing / `?? ''`.

Billing suite green (109); typecheck (app/electron/e2e) + lint clean.

* refactor(desktop): move DEV billing simulation behind the api seam

The fixture simulation lived as `simulate` / `simulateResume` prop drills and
`if (simulated)` branches inside the flow hooks, and it could not actually produce
the state it advertised (a simulated schedule never showed the pending card).

Replaced with `createSimulatedBillingApi(fixture)` — a fully in-memory BillingApi
built once, DEV-gated, in BillingSettingsWithDevFixtures where the fixture is known,
and supplied to the whole subtree via a new `BillingApiProvider` (context override on
`useBillingApi`; `null` = the real gateway api). It serves fetches from a mutable copy
of the fixture and its subscription-change mutations WRITE that copy's pending state:
schedule sets a pending downgrade, resume clears a pending downgrade OR cancellation.
Fixture mode now flows through the SAME react-query path (fetch short-circuit deleted;
queries always enabled; an effect refetches on fixture switch), so the click-through
genuinely progresses — schedule → pending card + Undo + Scheduled marker, undo → cleared.

Deleted `SubscriptionSimulation`, `simulationEnabled`, both prop drills, and every
`if (simulated)` branch — the hooks are now production-pure. Added a test driving the
full simulated loop (schedule → pending appears → resume → cleared), plus cancellation
undo and no-shared-mutation coverage. Removed the now-obsolete simulate hook tests.

Billing suite green (110); typecheck (app/electron/e2e) + lint clean.

* refactor(desktop): extract billing row/card components out of index.tsx

Purely mechanical, no behavior change: split the settings billing route file
(1065 → 593 lines) into focused siblings now that the downgrade feature has settled
their final shape.

- billing-amounts.ts — the dollar parse/format/validate/clamp helpers.
- account-row-value.tsx — RowValue (shared by AccountRow + AutoReloadRow).
- current-plan-card.tsx — CurrentPlanCard.
- auto-reload-row.tsx — AutoReloadRow (the in-place auto-refill editor).

index.tsx keeps the page shell, AccountRow dispatch, BuyCredits flow, and the fixture
wiring. Billing suite green (110); typecheck (app/electron/e2e) + lint clean.

* refactor(desktop): tighten the downgrade flow — phase union, previewMessage, tidy shared modules

Polish that composes with the api-seam rework:

- ActiveDowngrade's four nullables become a `DowngradePhase` discriminated union
  (previewing | previewFailed | ready | scheduling | scheduleFailed). Impossible
  combinations (a preview AND a refusal, "ready" with no quote) can no longer be
  represented; the hook and panel branch on one `kind`, and `mutating` is simply
  `phase.kind === 'scheduling'`.
- The five-way ternary in DowngradeConfirm is replaced by a pure `previewMessage(phase,
  fallbackTierName)` helper; the misnamed `caption` className local is renamed `captionCn`.
- inline-feedback.tsx now holds ONLY the shared refusal/step-up pieces: `openExternal`
  moves to its own `open-external.ts` (a thin wrapper over `@/lib/external-link`'s
  `openExternalLink`), and `InlineMessage` moves back into its sole consumer
  (auto-reload-row.tsx).

No behavior change. Billing suite green (110); typecheck (app/electron/e2e) + lint clean.

* fmt(js): `npm run fix` on merge (#69067)

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(gateway): hard-exit CLI runner after graceful teardown

* test: update gateway run stub for hard-exit helper

* fix(gateway): hard-exit on KeyboardInterrupt path too

The KeyboardInterrupt handler in run_gateway() was the only exit path
that still used bare 'return' instead of _hard_exit_after_gateway_teardown().
While less common than service-managed restarts, a console Ctrl+C still
leaves the process vulnerable to the same Python finalization hang on
non-daemon worker threads (cron ThreadPoolExecutor jobs). Route it through
the same backstop, with a 'return' guard for test stubs that don't raise
on code 0 (production os._exit never returns).

* fix(cli): pass conversation_history on /new /resume /branch flush

Closes #68454

Root cause: cold-resumed transcript rows lack _DB_PERSISTED_MARKER until a
normal turn flush stamps them. Immediate /new,/resume,/branch flushed with
no history boundary, so every restored row was re-appended to the old session.

Fix: pass conversation_history=self.conversation_history at all three sites
(mirrors #68205). Add offline regression coverage for noop + tail-only write.

Verification: pytest tests/agent/test_session_rotation_flush_cold_resume_68454.py (4 passed)

* test: drop source-grep change-detector from #68480

The three behavior tests (control proves dup, boundary is noop, tail-only
write) fully cover the flush semantics. The source-grep test reading
cli.py + cli_commands_mixin.py as text and asserting a string appears is
a change-detector that breaks on benign refactors without adding coverage.

* test: update mock assertions for conversation_history kwarg

The /branch and /resume flush tests asserted the old positional-only
call signature. Update to match the fix from #68480.

* fix(gateway): make adapter fatal-error handoff cancellation-proof; exit if a platform is stranded

The fatal-error notification runs on the failing adapter's own polling
task, and adapter.disconnect() inside the handler can cancel that task
(its current-task guard misses because _safe_adapter_disconnect runs the
close in a wrapper task). The CancelledError killed the handler between
the fatal log and the reconnect queue, leaving the platform permanently
dead inside a live gateway process. #68447 fixed this for telegram at
the adapter layer; this hardens the shared gateway dispatch so every
platform gets the same protection (qqbot #25505/#29005, photon #68693).

- _handle_adapter_fatal_error now runs the real handler in a detached
  task, awaited through asyncio.shield() so caller cancellation cannot
  tunnel into it (Task.cancel() also cancels the task's _fut_waiter).
- If a retryable platform still ends up neither reconnected nor queued,
  the gateway exits with failure so launchd/systemd KeepAlive restarts
  it instead of running indefinitely with a dead platform (#68693).

Fixes #68693

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: map anoop.mehendale@gmail.com -> anoopmehendale-cue

For PR #69007 salvage (#69112).

* fix(update): isolate systemctl timeouts per gateway unit during fleet restart

A TimeoutExpired from one hermes-gateway*.service used to abort the whole
per-scope restart loop, leaving later profile gateways on pre-update
in-memory code after hermes update. Catch timeouts per unit, continue the
fleet, warn with the exact stale units, and exit non-zero when any remain
unrestarted (#68523).

* test(update): cover fleet restart timeout isolation (#68523)

* fix: refresh vulnerable npm lockfile entries

* chore: AUTHOR_MAP for tinetwork

* fix(compression): prevent stale-budget retry loops

* fix(compression): harden startup route scoping

* fix(providers): align custom route scoping

* test(compression): cover overflow after blocked preflight

* test(providers): cover route URL identity boundaries

* test(providers): cover query path slash identity

* test(providers): complete hermetic route coverage

* test(providers): cover URL whitespace route identity

* fix(providers): fail closed on missing active route

* fix(providers): scope route-owned runtime settings

* fix: restore base_url rstrip, extract should_clear_context_pin helper

Salvage follow-up for PR #68899:
- Restore .rstrip('/') on base_url in _swap_credential (both anthropic
  and OpenAI paths) to match every other assignment site. The route
  identity comparison still uses normalize_route_base_url which handles
  trailing slash correctly.
- Extract should_clear_context_pin() into hermes_cli/route_identity.py,
  consolidating 7 copy-pasted call sites across cli.py, gateway/run.py,
  gateway/slash_commands.py, and hermes_cli/model_switch.py into a
  single fail-closed helper.

C1 (anthropic path TLS re-application): pre-existing gap — the Anthropic
adapter (build_anthropic_client) has no TLS customization support at
all, so this is out of scope for this salvage.

* fix(compression): ignore assistant handoff summaries in tail anchor

Assistant-role compaction summaries were treated as the last visible assistant reply after head protection decayed. That pulled the tail boundary back to the summary itself and left zero new turns to summarize.

Exclude internal context summaries from both the visible-reply search and the assistant fallback, mirroring the existing user-role summary exclusion.

* chore: AUTHOR_MAP for McHermes

* fix(telegram): group authz fallback + command sender identity

- authz_mixin: add config.extra fallback for group_allowed_chats
  when observe-unmentioned mode strips user_id from env-var check
- authz_mixin: check adapter allow_from/group_allow_from for
  user authorization from config.yaml without env vars
- telegram/adapter: separate group_allow_from for group chats
  vs allow_from for DMs
- telegram/adapter: preserve sender source for command messages
  so admin-only slash commands work in groups
- telegram/adapter: add _telegram_extra fallback for
  group_allow_from config reading

* fix(telegram): address review findings from PR #67816

- Update test_observed_group_context_preserves_slash_command_text_for_dispatch
  to assert user_id is preserved for COMMAND messages (new correct behavior)
- Add _coerce_allow_set helper to handle both list and comma-separated
  string allowlist inputs (prevents character-by-character iteration bug)
- Include 'channel' in chat_type checks for group-scoped authorization
- Add _telegram_extra fallback for group_allowed_chats (consistent with
  group_allow_from fallback)
- Add AUTHOR_MAP entry for nyaruko@hermes -> tsuk1nose

* fix(telegram): update auth check tests for group_allow_from split

Update test_telegram_auth_check.py to use group_allow_from for group
messages (matching the PR's intentional behavior split: allow_from for
DMs, group_allow_from for groups). Add test_is_user_authorized_from_message_group_allow_from
to cover the new group path.

* fix(openviking): recover pending session commits

* docs: clarify OpenViking local setup

(cherry picked from commit a6807170f1)
(cherry picked from commit 6fb4e9aa8a)

* fix(openviking): serialize orphan session recovery

* fix(openviking): chunk structured session sync

Preserve ordered structured turns across OpenViking's 100-message batch limit and resume retries from the first unconfirmed message.

Based on the OpenViking batching work from commit 1a567f7067 in #58981.

* refactor: cleanup follow-up for salvaged PR #58871

- Remove dead current_sid parameter from _recover_pending_sessions
- Remove dead cleanup parameter from _release_owner_run_claim (always True)
- Set _run_lock_path after flock succeeds, not before
- Collapse redundant BlockingIOError branch (covered by OSError+errno check)
- Track _pending_marked_sids to skip re-writing marker file on every sync_turn

* fix(openviking): inject session-start memory context

(cherry picked from commit 18b474d0bd)

* fix(openviking): align session context with shared profile contract

* fix: discard both session IDs on compression for profile re-injection

The _profile_prefetched_sessions set stores whichever session_id was
passed to prefetch(), which may differ from self._session_id. On
compression, only old_session_id (self._session_id) was discarded,
missing the case where the stored key was the prefetch session_id
parameter. Discard both old and new IDs to cover all cases.

* chore: add kshitij@kshitij.dev to AUTHOR_MAP

* fix(secrets): fall back to stale disk cache when bws live fetch fails

Without this, a single DNS hiccup or BWS outage at gateway startup leaves
the whole fleet running with an empty credential pool — every model call
fails until someone restarts after the network recovers.  When a previous
successful fetch already populated the disk cache, return those secrets
with an explicit warning instead of raising RuntimeError.

`use_cache=False` (explicit opt-out) still raises so manual flows like
the setup wizard surface the original error.  The disk cache is not
re-written on the fallback path so a process restart still triggers a
proper TTL re-check.

Fixes #41925

* fix(secrets): port stale-cache fallback to current DiskCache API + gate by error kind

The stale-fallback branch called _read_disk_cache(), a helper removed in
db495b0fba when disk-cache logic moved to the
shared DiskCache class — every fallback attempt raised NameError instead of
serving cached secrets, silently defeating the PR's whole purpose. Port to
_DISK_CACHE.read().

Also tighten the fallback per DiskCache's TTL contract and the secret-source
error taxonomy:
- Gate on cache_ttl_seconds > 0 so a caller that opted out of caching
  entirely (ttl=0) never gets a secret value that didn't come from a live
  fetch, even on the failure path.
- Gate on _classify_bws_error(str(exc)) being NETWORK or TIMEOUT, reusing
  the existing classifier — an AUTH_FAILED or malformed-output failure must
  still raise, since serving stale secrets there would mask a real
  credential/config problem instead of a transient outage.

Ported the test helpers off the removed _write_disk_cache to a direct JSON
write (matching this file's existing disk-cache test convention) and added
tests for the auth-failure, malformed-output, and zero-TTL gates. Reverting
the fix and re-running confirms 7 of 8 stale-fallback tests fail with the
original NameError.

* fix(secrets): fold OP_CONNECT_HOST/OP_CONNECT_TOKEN into 1Password auth cache-key

_auth_fingerprint() built the 1Password secret cache-key from the
service-account token, OP_ACCOUNT, and OP_SESSION_* vars but omitted
OP_CONNECT_HOST/OP_CONNECT_TOKEN, which are in _OP_ENV_ALLOWLIST and are
forwarded to the op child (the Connect-server auth path). Rotating
OP_CONNECT_TOKEN or re-pointing OP_CONNECT_HOST at a different Connect
identity left the fingerprint unchanged, so both the in-process and disk
caches kept serving secrets resolved under the old Connect credentials for
the full TTL (default 300s, disk-persisted across invocations). This
contradicts the function's own docstring invariant that a value cached
under a previous identity is never served under a new one; it closes the
gap for the Connect path, matching the OP_SESSION_*/service-account paths
that are already protected.

* fix(secrets): pass OP_LOAD_DESKTOP_APP_SETTINGS through to the op child env

The 1Password secret source builds a minimal allowlisted environment for the
`op read` child process. The allowlist omits OP_LOAD_DESKTOP_APP_SETTINGS, so a
user who exports it (shell, .env, or service unit) sees it silently stripped
before it reaches `op`.

That var is `op`'s documented switch to skip the desktop-app integration probe.
When the 1Password desktop app is installed, `op` probes its settings/socket at
startup *before* evaluating service-account auth. If the desktop app's group
container is wedged (e.g. macOS 'Interrupted system call' on the 1Password group
container), that probe blocks with no timeout, so `op read` hangs indefinitely
even with a valid OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN present. Setting
OP_LOAD_DESKTOP_APP_SETTINGS=false is the intended escape hatch — but stripping
it means it has no effect on exactly the headless boxes that need it.

Fix: add OP_LOAD_DESKTOP_APP_SETTINGS to _OP_ENV_ALLOWLIST so the documented
var reaches the child. No behavior change when it's unset. Adds a focused test
alongside the existing allowlist test.

Repro: on a machine with a wedged 1Password desktop container + a valid SA
token, `op read` hangs 600s+ without the var and returns in ~4s with it — but
only if it actually reaches the op process, which this allowlist entry ensures.

Co-authored-by: Minh Nguyen <menhguin@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(mcp): pass secret-source-injected env vars to stdio servers

Surgical reapply of PR #37523 onto current main (the original branch
predates the SecretSource registry refactor).  _build_safe_env() now
forwards env vars tagged in env_loader._SECRET_SOURCES — widened from
Bitwarden-only to any registered secret source (Bitwarden, 1Password,
plugin backends), since the provenance map is source-agnostic.
Explicit server env: config still wins; untagged secrets stay filtered.

Fixes #37499.

* fix(env): stop printing Bitwarden secret names

* fix(secrets): validate bitwarden status token

Keep the env-presence row, but add a real Bitwarden probe so revoked or malformed tokens no longer look healthy in hermes secrets bitwarden status.

Also document the new status behavior and lock it in with a dedicated regression test.

Refs: NousResearch/hermes-agent#40275
Tested: ./scripts/run_tests.sh tests/hermes_cli/test_bitwarden_status.py tests/test_bitwarden_secrets.py
Tested: .venv/bin/python -m ruff check hermes_cli/secrets_cli.py tests/hermes_cli/test_bitwarden_status.py

* fix(secrets): mark _APPLIED_HOMES only after a real fetch attempt (#40597) (#69056)

_apply_external_secret_sources() added the home to _APPLIED_HOMES before
loading config, so a malformed config.yaml, a missing secrets section, or
all-sources-disabled permanently disabled secret loading for the process
— even after the user fixed the config.  Long-lived processes (gateway)
never recovered without a restart.

Now the home is marked only after apply_all() actually ran with at least
one enabled source.  Fetch errors still mark the home (so import-time
load_hermes_dotenv() calls don't re-fetch and re-print the same failure
3-5x per startup); the cheap early-exit paths stay retryable.

Fixes #40597.

* fix(secrets): fall back to os.environ on scope miss when multiplexing is off

fdab380a1 wraps every cron job in a <home>/.env secret scope regardless of
deployment mode. get_secret() treats any installed scope as authoritative,
so in single-profile deployments where provider keys live only in the
process environment (systemd Environment=, pass-cli/op run wrappers, shell
exports) every cron credential read returns empty, the OpenAI client is
built with the no-key-required placeholder, and each scheduled job 401s —
while interactive turns keep working. Scope-miss reads now fall through to
os.environ when multiplexing is off; multiplexed scopes stay authoritative.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(gateway): activate multiplex flag in cross-profile env isolation test

The test installs a secret scope and asserts a scope miss does NOT fall
back to the default profile's env — that isolation guarantee only holds
under multiplexing, which the real gateway activates at startup via
set_multiplex_active().  With the #67827 overlay fallthrough (scope miss
→ os.environ when multiplex is OFF), the test needs to model the
multiplexed runtime it is actually testing.

* feat(secrets): orchestrator-level preserve_existing + profile aliasing (#69058)

Fixes the profile-clobber bug cluster at the apply_all() chokepoint so
every secret source — bundled and plugin — gets both behaviors for free:

- secrets.preserve_existing (#58073): env var names whose existing .env /
  shell value always wins, even against a source with
  override_existing: true.  Escape hatch for per-profile platform
  secrets while everything else rotates centrally.
- Profile aliasing (#51447): under a named profile, an applied
  FOO_<PROFILE> var (credential-shaped suffixes only) also hydrates the
  canonical FOO, so adapters/plugins that read fixed env names see the
  profile's value.  Direct supply beats alias; protected/claimed/
  override guards all apply; secrets.profile_alias: false disables.

Reimplements the intent of PR #58085 (tianma-if, preserve_existing on the
legacy Bitwarden apply shim) and PR #51616 (LeonSGP43, profile aliasing
inside the Bitwarden backend) on the SecretSource orchestrator that
superseded those code paths.

Fixes #58073.  Fixes #51447.

Co-authored-by: tianma-if <5895871+tianma-if@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: LeonSGP43 <154585401+LeonSGP43@users.noreply.github.com>

* test(state): accept FTS5-specific corruption message in read-probe test

With the v23 external-content FTS layout, corrupt shadow segments surface
as 'fts5: corrupt structure record for table ...' instead of the generic
'database disk image is malformed'. Same corruption class, same variance
already documented and handled by _is_fts_write_corruption_error — widen
the test assertion to match.

---------

Co-authored-by: ethernet <arilotter@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: brooklyn! <brooklyn.bb.nicholson@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Gille <4317663+helix4u@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: yoniebans <jonny@nousresearch.com>
Co-authored-by: Rod-fernandez <rodrigo@nxtlevelsaas.com>
Co-authored-by: David Andrews (LexGenius.ai) <david@lexgenius.ai>
Co-authored-by: xxxigm <54813621+xxxigm@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: hermes-seaeye[bot] <307254004+hermes-seaeye[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: SHL0MS <SHL0MS@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: HexLab98 <liruixinch@outlook.com>
Co-authored-by: kshitijk4poor <82637225+kshitijk4poor@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: PRATHAMESH75 <prathamesh290504@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: x7peeps <xtpeeps@qq.com>
Co-authored-by: Imgaojp <6065749+Imgaojp@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Siddharth Balyan <52913345+alt-glitch@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ben Barclay <ben@nousresearch.com>
Co-authored-by: sbe27 <283218367+sbe27@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: TARS <tars@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Austin Pickett <pickett.austin@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Rudimar Ronsoni <rudimar@outlook.com>
Co-authored-by: Austin Pickett <austinpickett@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Joshua <joshua@amokk.net>
Co-authored-by: alelpoan <155192176+alelpoan@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: liuhao1024 <sunsky.lau@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cossackx <121278003+Cossackx@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Jaret Bottoms <jaretbottoms@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Enough1122 <chenjin@hermes.local>
Co-authored-by: Frowtek <frowte3k@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Aniruddha Adak <aniruddhaadak80@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: eazye19 <eazye19@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: frohsinnllc <231045016+frohsinnllc@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: hanyu1212 <28571259+hanyu1212@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: 雨哥 <hanyu1212@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: yungchentang <46495124+yungchentang@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: trevorgordon981 <trevorbgordon@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Börje <borje@dqsverige.se>
Co-authored-by: fazerluga-creator <fazerluga@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: yoma <yingwaizhiying@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Kennedy Umege <kenmege@yahoo.com>
Co-authored-by: pierrenode <298902573+pierrenode@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Sora-bluesky <sora.bluesky.dev@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: iamwongeeeee <wykim777@naver.com>
Co-authored-by: web3blind <264741654+web3blind@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Bartok9 <danielrpike9@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: anoopmehendale-cue <anoop.mehendale@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: tinetwork <martin@tinetwork.com>
Co-authored-by: cucurigoo <241698038+cucurigoo@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: McHermes <mchermes@edu.dreamcatcher.ai>
Co-authored-by: Nyaruko <nyaruko@hermes>
Co-authored-by: Hao Zhe <haozhe4547@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Naveen Fernando <90832919+NPFernando@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Chris Korhonen <ckorhonen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Flownium <157689911+itsflownium@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: kshitij <kshitij@kshitij.dev>
Co-authored-by: JackJin <1037461232@qq.com>
Co-authored-by: briandevans <252620095+briandevans@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: menhguin <17287724+menhguin@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Minh Nguyen <menhguin@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: SeoYeonKim <28585885+westkite1201@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: andrexibiza <84248988+andrexibiza@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: izumi0uu <izumi0uu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Soju06 <qlskssk@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: tianma-if <5895871+tianma-if@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: LeonSGP43 <154585401+LeonSGP43@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-22 04:42:50 -07:00

19710 lines
766 KiB
Python

"""
Hermes Agent — Web UI server.
Provides a FastAPI backend serving the Vite/React frontend and REST API
endpoints for managing configuration, environment variables, and sessions.
Usage:
python -m hermes_cli.main web # Start on http://127.0.0.1:9119
python -m hermes_cli.main web --port 8080
"""
from contextlib import asynccontextmanager, contextmanager
import asyncio
import atexit
import base64
import binascii
import concurrent.futures
import functools
from collections import deque
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timezone
import hashlib
import hmac
import inspect
import importlib.util
import json
import logging
import mimetypes
import os
import re
import secrets
import shlex
import shutil
import stat
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
import threading
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import zipfile
from hermes_cli._subprocess_compat import windows_detach_flags, windows_hide_flags
import urllib.request
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Tuple
import yaml
PROJECT_ROOT = Path(__file__).parent.parent.resolve()
if str(PROJECT_ROOT) not in sys.path:
sys.path.insert(0, str(PROJECT_ROOT))
from hermes_cli import __version__, __release_date__
from hermes_cli.config import (
cfg_get,
DEFAULT_CONFIG,
OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS,
clear_model_endpoint_credentials,
get_config_path,
get_env_path,
get_hermes_home,
get_process_hermes_home,
load_config,
load_env,
read_raw_config,
save_config,
save_env_value,
remove_env_value,
check_config_version,
detect_install_method,
format_docker_update_message,
recommended_update_command_for_method,
redact_key,
write_platform_config_field,
_deep_merge,
)
from plugins.memory.config_schema import (
ProviderConfigSchema,
ProviderField,
STORAGE_HONCHO_HOST_BLOCK,
get_provider_config_schema,
)
from gateway.status import (
derive_gateway_busy,
derive_gateway_drainable,
get_running_pid_cached,
get_running_pid,
get_runtime_status_running_pid,
normalize_updated_at,
parse_active_agents,
read_runtime_status,
)
from utils import env_var_enabled
try:
from fastapi import (
FastAPI, File, Form, HTTPException, Request, UploadFile,
WebSocket, WebSocketDisconnect,
)
from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
from fastapi.responses import FileResponse, HTMLResponse, JSONResponse, Response
from fastapi.staticfiles import StaticFiles
from pydantic import BaseModel, SecretStr
from starlette.concurrency import run_in_threadpool
except ImportError:
# First try lazy-installing the dashboard extras. Only the user actually
# running `hermes dashboard` needs fastapi+uvicorn; lazy install keeps
# them out of every other install path. After install, re-import.
try:
from tools.lazy_deps import ensure as _lazy_ensure
_lazy_ensure("tool.dashboard", prompt=False)
from fastapi import (
FastAPI, File, Form, HTTPException, Request, UploadFile,
WebSocket, WebSocketDisconnect,
)
from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
from fastapi.responses import FileResponse, HTMLResponse, JSONResponse, Response
from fastapi.staticfiles import StaticFiles
from pydantic import BaseModel, SecretStr
from starlette.concurrency import run_in_threadpool
except Exception:
raise SystemExit(
"Web UI requires fastapi and uvicorn.\n"
f"Install with: {sys.executable} -m pip install 'fastapi' 'uvicorn[standard]'"
)
WEB_DIST = Path(os.environ["HERMES_WEB_DIST"]) if "HERMES_WEB_DIST" in os.environ else Path(__file__).parent / "web_dist"
_log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Per-channel subscriber registry used by /api/pub (PTY-side gateway → dashboard)
# and /api/events (dashboard → browser sidebar). Keyed by an opaque channel id
# the chat tab generates on mount; entries auto-evict when the last subscriber
# drops AND the publisher has disconnected.
#
# State lives on app.state (not module-level globals) so that asyncio.Lock is
# created on the running event loop during lifespan startup. A module-level
# asyncio.Lock() binds to whatever loop was active at import time, which breaks
# when the same module is used across TestClient instances or uvicorn reloads.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _start_desktop_cron_ticker(stop_event: "threading.Event", interval: int = 60) -> None:
"""Tick the cron scheduler from inside the desktop dashboard backend.
The scheduler tick loop normally lives in ``hermes gateway run`` — but the
desktop app spawns a ``hermes dashboard`` backend, not a gateway, so a cron
a user creates in the app would never fire. We run the resolved cron
scheduler provider here (no live adapters; delivery falls back to the
per-platform send path).
Cross-process safe: the built-in provider's ``cron.scheduler.tick`` takes
the ``cron/.tick.lock`` file lock, so this never double-fires alongside a
real gateway on the same HERMES_HOME — whichever process grabs the lock
first wins the tick.
"""
from cron.scheduler_provider import resolve_cron_scheduler
provider = resolve_cron_scheduler()
_log.info("Desktop cron scheduler started (provider=%s, interval=%ds)", provider.name, interval)
provider.start(stop_event, interval=interval)
def _warm_gateway_module() -> None:
try:
import hermes_cli.gateway # noqa: F401
except Exception:
pass
def _resolve_restart_drain_timeout() -> float:
try:
from hermes_cli.gateway import _get_restart_drain_timeout
return _get_restart_drain_timeout()
except ImportError:
from gateway.restart import DEFAULT_GATEWAY_RESTART_DRAIN_TIMEOUT
return DEFAULT_GATEWAY_RESTART_DRAIN_TIMEOUT
@asynccontextmanager
async def _lifespan(app: "FastAPI"):
app.state.event_channels = {} # dict[str, set]
app.state.event_lock = asyncio.Lock()
app.state.pty_active_session_files = {} # dict[str, Path]
# Serializes chat-argv resolution so concurrent /api/pty connections
# don't trigger overlapping ``npm install`` / ``npm run build`` work.
# On app.state (not a module global) so the Lock binds to the running
# event loop during lifespan startup — see _get_event_state's docstring.
app.state.chat_argv_lock = asyncio.Lock()
# Fire hermes_cli.gateway import into a background thread so the event
# loop is not blocked and HERMES_DASHBOARD_READY fires without delay.
# On a cold Windows install the module chain triggers .pyc compilation
# and Defender real-time scans that can stall the event loop for 15-30s.
# Running in an executor means the cost is paid in a worker thread while
# the server socket is already open and accepting probes.
asyncio.get_event_loop().run_in_executor(None, _warm_gateway_module)
# Desktop-spawned backends (HERMES_DESKTOP=1) fire cron jobs themselves,
# since the app has no gateway running the scheduler. Server `hermes
# dashboard` is unaffected — it relies on its own gateway.
cron_stop: "threading.Event | None" = None
cron_thread: "threading.Thread | None" = None
if os.getenv("HERMES_DESKTOP") == "1":
cron_stop = threading.Event()
cron_thread = threading.Thread(
target=_start_desktop_cron_ticker,
args=(cron_stop,),
daemon=True,
name="desktop-cron-ticker",
)
cron_thread.start()
# Reap idle/dead keep-alive PTY sessions in the background (30-min TTL).
pty_reaper_task = asyncio.create_task(run_reaper(PTY_REGISTRY))
# Periodic authenticated self-test (feeds the ``dashboard`` component on
# /api/status). The loop exits immediately when httpx is unavailable.
selftest_task = asyncio.create_task(_dashboard_selftest_loop())
try:
yield
finally:
pty_reaper_task.cancel()
selftest_task.cancel()
await PTY_REGISTRY.close_all()
if cron_stop is not None:
cron_stop.set()
def _get_event_state(app: "FastAPI"):
"""Return (event_channels, event_lock) from app.state.
Lazily initialises the state if the lifespan hasn't run (e.g. when
TestClient is constructed without a ``with`` block). The lifespan
path is preferred because it guarantees the Lock is created on the
correct event loop, but the lazy path lets existing non-``with``
TestClient usages keep working.
"""
try:
return app.state.event_channels, app.state.event_lock
except AttributeError:
app.state.event_channels = {}
app.state.event_lock = asyncio.Lock()
return app.state.event_channels, app.state.event_lock
def _get_chat_argv_lock(app: "FastAPI") -> asyncio.Lock:
"""Return the chat-argv resolution lock from app.state.
Mirrors :func:`_get_event_state`: prefers the lifespan-initialised Lock
(created on the correct event loop) but lazily initialises it for
non-``with`` TestClient usages.
"""
try:
return app.state.chat_argv_lock
except AttributeError:
app.state.chat_argv_lock = asyncio.Lock()
return app.state.chat_argv_lock
def _get_pty_active_session_files(app: "FastAPI") -> dict[str, Path]:
"""Return channel -> active-session-file state for dashboard PTYs."""
try:
return app.state.pty_active_session_files
except AttributeError:
app.state.pty_active_session_files = {}
return app.state.pty_active_session_files
app = FastAPI(title="Hermes Agent", version=__version__, lifespan=_lifespan)
# Memory-provider OAuth connect routes live in the memory layer, not here.
from hermes_cli.memory_oauth import router as _memory_oauth_router # noqa: E402
app.include_router(_memory_oauth_router)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Session token for protecting sensitive endpoints (reveal).
# The desktop shell mints the token and injects it via
# HERMES_DASHBOARD_SESSION_TOKEN so its main process can authenticate the
# /api calls it makes on the user's behalf; otherwise we generate one fresh
# on every server start. Either way it dies when the process exits and is
# injected into the SPA HTML so only the legitimate web UI can use it.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_SESSION_TOKEN = os.environ.get("HERMES_DASHBOARD_SESSION_TOKEN") or secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
_SESSION_HEADER_NAME = "X-Hermes-Session-Token"
_SSH_OWNER_NONCE: Optional[str] = None
def _apply_ssh_session_token(token: str) -> None:
global _SESSION_TOKEN
if token:
_SESSION_TOKEN = token
def _apply_ssh_owner_nonce(nonce: Optional[str]) -> None:
global _SSH_OWNER_NONCE
_SSH_OWNER_NONCE = nonce
# In-browser Chat tab (/chat, /api/pty, /api/ws, …). Always enabled: the
# desktop app and the dashboard's own Chat tab both drive the agent over the
# `/api/ws` + `/api/pty` WebSockets, so the embedded-chat surface is an
# unconditional part of the dashboard. Kept as a module-level constant (rather
# than inlining ``True`` at every gate) so the WS endpoints and the SPA token
# injection share a single, testable seam.
_DASHBOARD_EMBEDDED_CHAT_ENABLED = True
# Simple rate limiter for the reveal endpoint
_reveal_timestamps: List[float] = []
_REVEAL_MAX_PER_WINDOW = 5
_REVEAL_WINDOW_SECONDS = 30
# CORS: restrict to localhost origins only. The web UI is intended to run
# locally; binding to 0.0.0.0 with allow_origins=["*"] would let any website
# read/modify config and secrets.
app.add_middleware(
CORSMiddleware,
allow_origin_regex=r"^https?://(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1)(:\d+)?$",
allow_methods=["*"],
allow_headers=["*"],
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Endpoints that do NOT require the session token. Everything else under
# /api/ is gated by the auth middleware below.
#
# This list is defined in ``hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.public_paths`` so the
# OAuth gate middleware can honour the same allowlist — keeping the two
# gates in lockstep avoids drift like the wildcard-subdomain regression
# where ``/api/status`` was public under the legacy gate but 401'd under
# the OAuth gate (breaking the portal's liveness probe).
#
# Keep the upstream list minimal — only truly non-sensitive, read-only
# endpoints belong there.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.public_paths import (
PUBLIC_API_PATHS as _PUBLIC_API_PATHS,
)
def _has_valid_session_token(request: Request) -> bool:
"""True if the request carries a valid dashboard session token.
The dedicated session header avoids collisions with reverse proxies that
already use ``Authorization`` (for example Caddy ``basic_auth``). We still
accept the legacy Bearer path for backward compatibility with older
dashboard bundles.
"""
session_header = request.headers.get(_SESSION_HEADER_NAME, "")
if session_header and hmac.compare_digest(
session_header.encode(),
_SESSION_TOKEN.encode(),
):
return True
auth = request.headers.get("authorization", "")
expected = f"Bearer {_SESSION_TOKEN}"
return hmac.compare_digest(auth.encode(), expected.encode())
# Routes that may also authenticate via a ``?token=`` query param, for download
# links opened by the OS shell or a new browser tab where the session header
# can't be set. Kept narrow — same query-token tradeoff as the /api/pty WS.
_QUERY_TOKEN_API_PATHS: frozenset[str] = frozenset({"/api/files/download"})
def _has_valid_query_token(request: Request, path: str) -> bool:
if path not in _QUERY_TOKEN_API_PATHS:
return False
token = request.query_params.get("token", "")
return bool(token) and hmac.compare_digest(token.encode(), _SESSION_TOKEN.encode())
def _require_token(request: Request) -> None:
"""Authorize a sensitive endpoint, raising 401 if the caller isn't allowed.
Two auth schemes protect the dashboard, exactly one active per bind:
* **Loopback / ``--insecure`` mode** (``auth_required`` False): the
ephemeral ``_SESSION_TOKEN`` is injected into the SPA HTML and echoed
back via ``X-Hermes-Session-Token`` (or the legacy ``Bearer`` header).
Validate it here.
* **Gated / OAuth mode** (``auth_required`` True): ``_SESSION_TOKEN`` is
NOT injected (the SPA authenticates with a session cookie), so there is
no token to check. The ``gated_auth_middleware`` has already verified the
cookie before the request reached this handler — any non-public ``/api/``
route it lets through carries a verified ``request.state.session``. The
legacy ``auth_middleware`` likewise short-circuits in this mode. Requiring
the (absent) token here would 401 every cookie-authenticated request,
making plugin install/enable/disable and the other ``_require_token``
endpoints permanently unreachable behind the gate. Defer to the gate.
"""
if getattr(request.app.state, "auth_required", False):
# Gate is authoritative. It attaches ``request.state.session`` on
# success and 401s otherwise, so a request that reached us is already
# authenticated. Belt-and-braces: confirm the session is present.
if getattr(request.state, "session", None) is not None:
return
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Unauthorized")
if not _has_valid_session_token(request):
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Unauthorized")
# Accepted Host header values for loopback binds. DNS rebinding attacks
# point a victim browser at an attacker-controlled hostname (evil.test)
# which resolves to 127.0.0.1 after a TTL flip — bypassing same-origin
# checks because the browser now considers evil.test and our dashboard
# "same origin". Validating the Host header at the app layer rejects any
# request whose Host isn't one we bound for. See GHSA-ppp5-vxwm-4cf7.
_LOOPBACK_HOST_VALUES: frozenset = frozenset({
"localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1",
})
def should_require_auth(host: str, allow_public: bool = False) -> bool:
"""Return True iff the dashboard auth gate must be active.
Truth table:
host == loopback → False (no auth — local-only, trusted operator)
host != loopback → True (gate engages — OAuth or password required)
"Loopback" is 127.0.0.1, localhost, ::1. RFC1918 / CGNAT / link-local are
deliberately treated as PUBLIC — a hostile device on the same LAN is exactly
the threat model the gate is designed for.
``allow_public`` (the legacy ``--insecure`` escape hatch) NO LONGER disables
the gate. It is accepted for backward-compat with old launch scripts and
desktop shells but is ignored: a non-loopback bind ALWAYS requires an auth
provider (OAuth or the bundled password provider). This closes the
unauthenticated-public-dashboard hole behind the June 2026 ``hermes-0day``
MCP-persistence campaign, where ``--insecure --host 0.0.0.0`` left the
config/MCP/agent surface open to internet scanners.
"""
return host not in _LOOPBACK_HOST_VALUES
def _is_accepted_host(host_header: str, bound_host: str) -> bool:
"""True if the Host header targets the interface we bound to.
Accepts:
- Exact bound host (with or without port suffix)
- Loopback aliases when bound to loopback
- Any host when bound to 0.0.0.0 (explicit opt-in to non-loopback,
no protection possible at this layer)
"""
if not host_header:
return False
# Strip port suffix. IPv6 addresses use bracket notation:
# [::1] — no port
# [::1]:9119 — with port
# Plain hosts/v4:
# localhost:9119
# 127.0.0.1:9119
h = host_header.strip()
if h.startswith("["):
# IPv6 bracketed — port (if any) follows "]:"
close = h.find("]")
if close != -1:
host_only = h[1:close] # strip brackets
else:
host_only = h.strip("[]")
else:
host_only = h.rsplit(":", 1)[0] if ":" in h else h
host_only = host_only.lower()
# 0.0.0.0 bind means operator explicitly opted into all-interfaces
# (requires --insecure per web_server.start_server). No Host-layer
# defence can protect that mode; rely on operator network controls.
if bound_host in {"0.0.0.0", "::"}:
return True
# Loopback bind: accept the loopback names
bound_lc = bound_host.lower()
if bound_lc in _LOOPBACK_HOST_VALUES:
return host_only in _LOOPBACK_HOST_VALUES
# Explicit non-loopback bind: require exact host match
return host_only == bound_lc
@app.middleware("http")
async def host_header_middleware(request: Request, call_next):
"""Reject requests whose Host header doesn't match the bound interface.
Defends against DNS rebinding: a victim browser on a localhost
dashboard is tricked into fetching from an attacker hostname that
TTL-flips to 127.0.0.1. CORS and same-origin checks don't help —
the browser now treats the attacker origin as same-origin with the
dashboard. Host-header validation at the app layer catches it.
See GHSA-ppp5-vxwm-4cf7.
"""
# Store the bound host on app.state so this middleware can read it —
# set by start_server() at listen time.
bound_host = getattr(app.state, "bound_host", None)
if bound_host:
host_header = request.headers.get("host", "")
if not _is_accepted_host(host_header, bound_host):
return JSONResponse(
status_code=400,
content={
"detail": (
"Invalid Host header. Dashboard requests must use "
"the hostname the server was bound to."
),
},
)
return await call_next(request)
@app.middleware("http")
async def _plugin_api_runtime_gate(request: Request, call_next):
"""Block requests to disabled plugin API routes at request time.
:func:`_mount_plugin_api_routes` gates at import time, but if a plugin
is disabled *after* the dashboard is already running, its FastAPI router
remains mounted until restart. This middleware enforces the enabled/
disabled policy on every request to ``/api/plugins/{name}/...`` so that
runtime config changes take effect immediately.
Registered BEFORE the auth middlewares (so it executes AFTER them): a
request that hasn't cleared auth must get auth's 401 first, never this
gate's 404 — otherwise an unauthenticated caller could fingerprint which
plugins are installed/enabled by reading the status code. We only reach
the enabled/disabled check for a request that auth already let through.
"""
path = request.url.path
if path.startswith("/api/plugins/"):
# Only gate authenticated requests. Unauthenticated ones fall
# through so auth_middleware / the OAuth gate return 401 first and
# this route can't be used as a plugin-name oracle.
_authed = (
getattr(request.state, "token_authenticated", False)
or getattr(request.app.state, "auth_required", False)
or _has_valid_session_token(request)
or _has_valid_query_token(request, path)
)
if _authed:
# Extract plugin name from /api/plugins/<name>/...
parts = path.split("/")
# parts: ['', 'api', 'plugins', '<name>', ...]
if len(parts) >= 4:
plugin_name = parts[3]
if plugin_name:
try:
from hermes_cli.plugins_cmd import (
_get_enabled_set,
_get_disabled_set,
)
enabled_set = _get_enabled_set()
disabled_set = _get_disabled_set()
except Exception:
enabled_set = set()
disabled_set = set()
# Determine plugin source. Check the cached plugin list;
# if not found, assume user plugin (safe default — blocks).
plugins = _get_dashboard_plugins()
plugin = next(
(p for p in plugins if p.get("name") == plugin_name),
None,
)
source = plugin.get("source") if plugin else "user"
if source == "user":
if plugin_name in disabled_set or plugin_name not in enabled_set:
return JSONResponse(
status_code=404,
content={"detail": "Plugin not found"},
)
elif source == "bundled":
if plugin_name in disabled_set:
return JSONResponse(
status_code=404,
content={"detail": "Plugin not found"},
)
return await call_next(request)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Dashboard OAuth auth gate — engaged only when start_server flags the
# bind as non-loopback-without-insecure. No-op pass-through in loopback
# mode so the legacy auth_middleware (below) handles those binds via
# the injected ``_SESSION_TOKEN``. Registered between host_header and
# auth_middleware so the order is: host check → cookie auth → token auth.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@app.middleware("http")
async def _dashboard_auth_gate(request: Request, call_next):
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.middleware import gated_auth_middleware
return await gated_auth_middleware(request, call_next)
@app.middleware("http")
async def auth_middleware(request: Request, call_next):
"""Require the session token on all /api/ routes except the public list."""
# A request already authenticated by the token-auth seam (a service caller
# presenting a bearer token on a registered token route) carries
# ``token_authenticated`` — never bounce it through the cookie/session gate.
if getattr(request.state, "token_authenticated", False):
return await call_next(request)
# When the OAuth gate is active, cookie-based auth (gated_auth_middleware
# above) is authoritative. The legacy _SESSION_TOKEN path is loopback-only
# and is skipped here so the gate's session attachment isn't overridden.
if getattr(request.app.state, "auth_required", False):
return await call_next(request)
path = request.url.path
is_mcp_oauth_callback = path.startswith("/api/mcp/oauth/callback/")
if path.startswith("/api/") and path not in _PUBLIC_API_PATHS and not is_mcp_oauth_callback:
if not _has_valid_session_token(request) and not _has_valid_query_token(request, path):
return JSONResponse(
status_code=401,
content={"detail": "Unauthorized"},
)
return await call_next(request)
@app.middleware("http")
async def _token_auth_seam(request: Request, call_next):
"""Outermost auth seam: non-interactive bearer-token auth for opted-in routes.
Registered LAST so it runs FIRST (Starlette middleware is outermost-last).
A registered token route is fully owned here — authenticate by token,
attach the principal + ``token_authenticated`` flag, and let the downstream
cookie/session gates skip enforcement. Non-token routes pass straight
through untouched.
"""
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.token_auth import token_auth_middleware
return await token_auth_middleware(request, call_next)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Dashboard component health — in-process error/self-test counters that feed
# the ``components`` dict on ``/api/status``. That endpoint is in
# ``PUBLIC_API_PATHS``, so everything exported from here must be counts and
# enums only: no exception messages, no request paths, no tokens.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_DASHBOARD_HEALTH_WINDOW_SECONDS = 300.0
class DashboardHealth:
"""Module-level holder for dashboard-process health signals.
Tracks unhandled exceptions / 5xx responses seen by the outermost HTTP
middleware (rolling window) and the result of the periodic authenticated
self-test. ``last_error_path`` and ``last_error_type`` are internal
diagnostics for logs/debuggers — :meth:`snapshot` deliberately exports
neither (public-payload no-secrets contract).
"""
def __init__(self, window_seconds: float = _DASHBOARD_HEALTH_WINDOW_SECONDS) -> None:
self.window_seconds = window_seconds
self._error_times: "deque[float]" = deque(maxlen=256)
self.last_error_type: Optional[str] = None
self.last_error_path: Optional[str] = None # internal-only, never serialized
self.last_error_at: Optional[float] = None
self.selftest_status: str = "unknown" # unknown | ok | failing
self.selftest_http_status: Optional[int] = None
self.selftest_at: Optional[float] = None
def record_error(self, exc_type: str, path: str) -> None:
now = time.time()
self._error_times.append(now)
self.last_error_type = exc_type
self.last_error_path = path
self.last_error_at = now
def record_selftest(self, passed: bool, http_status: Optional[int]) -> None:
self.selftest_status = "ok" if passed else "failing"
self.selftest_http_status = http_status
self.selftest_at = time.time()
def recent_error_count(self) -> int:
cutoff = time.time() - self.window_seconds
while self._error_times and self._error_times[0] < cutoff:
self._error_times.popleft()
return len(self._error_times)
def snapshot(self) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Public component payload: status enum + counts + timestamps only."""
errors = self.recent_error_count()
status = "degraded" if (errors or self.selftest_status == "failing") else "ok"
return {
"status": status,
"recent_unhandled_errors": errors,
"last_error_at": self.last_error_at,
"selftest": self.selftest_status,
}
DASHBOARD_HEALTH = DashboardHealth()
@app.middleware("http")
async def _dashboard_health_middleware(request: Request, call_next):
"""Outermost middleware: count unhandled exceptions and 5xx responses.
Registered after ``_token_auth_seam`` so it is the outermost layer
(Starlette middleware is outermost-last) — nothing below can raise past
it unseen. Records into :data:`DASHBOARD_HEALTH` and re-raises; never
swallows or alters the response.
"""
try:
response = await call_next(request)
except Exception as exc:
DASHBOARD_HEALTH.record_error(type(exc).__name__, request.url.path)
raise
if response.status_code >= 500:
DASHBOARD_HEALTH.record_error(f"http_{response.status_code}", request.url.path)
return response
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Authenticated-route self-test: every minute, make one in-process request
# against a cheap DB-touching authenticated route with the real session
# token. Catches the class of failure where liveness looks fine but every
# authenticated request 500s (e.g. wedged state DB).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_DASHBOARD_SELFTEST_INTERVAL_SECONDS = 60.0
_DASHBOARD_SELFTEST_ROUTE = "/api/sessions?limit=1"
async def _dashboard_selftest_once() -> None:
"""Run one authenticated in-process self-test request and record it."""
try:
import httpx
except ImportError:
return # optional dependency — skip cleanly, leave status "unknown"
try:
transport = httpx.ASGITransport(app=app)
# base_url uses a loopback name so the Host-header middleware accepts
# the request on loopback binds.
async with httpx.AsyncClient(
transport=transport, base_url="http://127.0.0.1"
) as client:
resp = await client.get(
_DASHBOARD_SELFTEST_ROUTE,
headers={_SESSION_HEADER_NAME: _SESSION_TOKEN},
)
DASHBOARD_HEALTH.record_selftest(resp.status_code == 200, resp.status_code)
except Exception:
DASHBOARD_HEALTH.record_selftest(False, None)
async def _dashboard_selftest_loop() -> None:
"""Periodic self-test driver started from the lifespan."""
try:
import httpx # noqa: F401
except ImportError:
_log.debug("httpx unavailable — dashboard self-test disabled")
return
while True:
await asyncio.sleep(_DASHBOARD_SELFTEST_INTERVAL_SECONDS)
# On OAuth-gated binds the legacy session token is not honoured, so
# the probe would false-alarm 401 — skip until the gate is off.
if getattr(app.state, "auth_required", False):
continue
await _dashboard_selftest_once()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Config schema — auto-generated from DEFAULT_CONFIG
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Manual overrides for fields that need select options or custom types
def _memory_provider_options() -> List[str]:
"""Discovered memory providers for the ``memory.provider`` select.
Directory-scan only (no provider imports), so it's safe at module import
time. ``""`` (built-in only) is always first; discovery failures degrade to
the bundled defaults rather than dropping the field. The literal
``builtin`` alias is deliberately NOT offered — built-in memory is not a
provider plugin, and ``_normalize_memory_provider_name`` already maps any
legacy ``builtin``/``built-in``/``none`` value back to ``""`` (#49513).
"""
options = [""]
try:
from plugins.memory import list_memory_provider_names
options.extend(list_memory_provider_names())
except Exception:
options.extend(["honcho"])
# Dedupe, preserve order
return list(dict.fromkeys(options))
_SCHEMA_OVERRIDES: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {
"memory.provider": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Memory provider plugin",
"options": _memory_provider_options(),
},
"model": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Default model (e.g. anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.6)",
"category": "general",
},
"model_context_length": {
"type": "number",
"description": "Context window override (0 = auto-detect from model metadata)",
"category": "general",
},
"terminal.backend": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Terminal execution backend",
"options": ["local", "docker", "ssh", "modal", "daytona", "singularity"],
},
"terminal.modal_mode": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Modal sandbox mode",
"options": ["sandbox", "function"],
},
"tts.provider": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Text-to-speech provider",
"options": ["edge", "elevenlabs", "openai", "xai", "minimax", "mistral", "gemini", "neutts", "kittentts", "piper"],
},
"stt.provider": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Speech-to-text provider",
# "mistral" temporarily removed — mistralai PyPI package quarantined
# (malicious 2.4.6 release on 2026-05-12). Restore once available.
"options": ["local", "groq", "openai", "xai", "elevenlabs"],
},
"stt.elevenlabs.model_id": {
"type": "select",
"description": "ElevenLabs Scribe model",
"options": ["scribe_v2", "scribe_v1"],
},
"display.skin": {
"type": "select",
"description": "CLI visual theme",
"options": ["default", "ares", "mono", "slate"],
},
"dashboard.theme": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Web dashboard visual theme",
"options": ["default", "midnight", "ember", "mono", "cyberpunk", "rose"],
},
"display.resume_display": {
"type": "select",
"description": "How resumed sessions display history",
"options": ["minimal", "full", "off"],
},
"display.busy_input_mode": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Input behavior while agent is running",
"options": ["interrupt", "queue", "steer"],
},
"approvals.mode": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Dangerous command approval mode",
"options": ["manual", "smart", "off"],
},
"context.engine": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Context management engine",
"options": ["default", "custom"],
},
"human_delay.mode": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Simulated typing delay mode",
"options": ["off", "typing", "fixed"],
},
"logging.level": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Log level for agent.log",
"options": ["DEBUG", "INFO", "WARNING", "ERROR"],
},
"agent.service_tier": {
"type": "select",
"description": "API service tier (OpenAI/Anthropic)",
"options": ["", "auto", "default", "flex"],
},
"delegation.reasoning_effort": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Reasoning effort for delegated subagents",
"options": ["", "minimal", "low", "medium", "high", "xhigh", "max", "ultra"],
},
"updates.non_interactive_local_changes": {
"type": "select",
"description": (
"When the chat app / gateway updates Hermes (no terminal prompt), "
"what to do with uncommitted local source edits. 'stash' keeps them "
"and re-applies them after the update; 'discard' throws them away. "
"Terminal updates always ask, regardless of this setting."
),
"options": ["stash", "discard"],
},
"updates.refresh_cua_driver": {
"type": "bool",
"description": (
"Refresh an already-installed cua-driver during hermes update. "
"Disable this on non-admin macOS accounts where /Applications is "
"not writable."
),
},
"browser.headed": {
"type": "boolean",
"description": "Run the local browser in headed mode (visible window). Also keeps the window open between turns; idle sessions are still reaped after browser.inactivity_timeout.",
},
}
# Categories with fewer fields get merged into "general" to avoid tab sprawl.
_CATEGORY_MERGE: Dict[str, str] = {
"privacy": "security",
"context": "agent",
"skills": "agent",
"cron": "agent",
"network": "agent",
"checkpoints": "agent",
"approvals": "security",
"human_delay": "display",
"dashboard": "display",
"code_execution": "agent",
"prompt_caching": "agent",
"goals": "agent",
"updates": "general",
# `onboarding.profile_build` is the only schema-surfaced onboarding field
# (`onboarding.seen` is an internal latch dict, not a user setting), so fold
# it into the agent tab rather than spawning a one-field orphan category.
"onboarding": "agent",
# Only `telegram.reactions` currently lives under telegram — fold it in
# with the other messaging-platform config (discord) so it isn't an
# orphan tab of one field.
"telegram": "discord",
# `mcp.auto_reload_on_config_change` is the only schema-surfaced mcp
# runtime field (server definitions live under mcp_servers, edited via
# the MCP tab) — fold it into the agent tab rather than spawning a
# one-field orphan category.
"mcp": "agent",
# `computer_use.cua_telemetry` is the only schema-surfaced computer_use
# field — fold it into the agent tab rather than spawning a one-field
# orphan category.
"computer_use": "agent",
}
# Display order for tabs — unlisted categories sort alphabetically after these.
_CATEGORY_ORDER = [
"general", "agent", "terminal", "display", "delegation",
"memory", "compression", "security", "browser", "voice",
"tts", "stt", "logging", "discord", "auxiliary",
]
def _infer_type(value: Any) -> str:
"""Infer a UI field type from a Python value."""
if isinstance(value, bool):
return "boolean"
if isinstance(value, int):
return "number"
if isinstance(value, float):
return "number"
if isinstance(value, list):
return "list"
if isinstance(value, dict):
return "object"
return "string"
def _build_schema_from_config(
config: Dict[str, Any],
prefix: str = "",
) -> Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Walk DEFAULT_CONFIG and produce a flat dot-path → field schema dict."""
schema: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
for key, value in config.items():
full_key = f"{prefix}.{key}" if prefix else key
# Skip internal / version keys
if full_key in {"_config_version"}:
continue
# Category is the first path component for nested keys, or "general"
# for top-level scalar fields (model, toolsets, timezone, etc.).
if prefix:
category = prefix.split(".")[0]
elif isinstance(value, dict):
category = key
else:
category = "general"
if isinstance(value, dict):
# Recurse into nested dicts
schema.update(_build_schema_from_config(value, full_key))
else:
entry: Dict[str, Any] = {
"type": _infer_type(value),
"description": full_key.replace(".", "").replace("_", " ").title(),
"category": category,
}
# Apply manual overrides
if full_key in _SCHEMA_OVERRIDES:
entry.update(_SCHEMA_OVERRIDES[full_key])
# Merge small categories
entry["category"] = _CATEGORY_MERGE.get(entry["category"], entry["category"])
schema[full_key] = entry
return schema
CONFIG_SCHEMA = _build_schema_from_config(DEFAULT_CONFIG)
# Inject virtual fields that don't live in DEFAULT_CONFIG but are surfaced
# by the normalize/denormalize cycle. Insert model_context_length right after
# the "model" key so it renders adjacent in the frontend.
_mcl_entry = _SCHEMA_OVERRIDES["model_context_length"]
_ordered_schema: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
for _k, _v in CONFIG_SCHEMA.items():
_ordered_schema[_k] = _v
if _k == "model":
_ordered_schema["model_context_length"] = _mcl_entry
CONFIG_SCHEMA = _ordered_schema
def _is_command_provider_block(value: Any) -> bool:
"""Return True when *value* declares a command-type voice provider.
Mirrors the runtime discriminators
(``tools.tts_tool._is_command_provider_config`` /
``tools.transcription_tools._is_command_stt_provider_config``) and the
desktop's ``isCommandProvider`` in
``apps/desktop/src/app/settings/helpers.ts``: ``type`` is OPTIONAL and
case/space-insensitive (absent or normalizing to ``"command"``), and
``command`` MUST be a non-empty string. Built-in blocks (which carry
``voice``/``model`` and no ``command``) and the ``providers`` container
itself are rejected.
"""
if not isinstance(value, dict):
return False
ptype = str(value.get("type") or "").strip().lower()
if ptype and ptype != "command":
return False
command = value.get("command")
return isinstance(command, str) and bool(command.strip())
def _custom_provider_options(
kind: str,
builtin_names: List[str],
cfg: Dict[str, Any],
) -> List[str]:
"""Return a merged provider option list without hard-coding vendor names.
*kind* is ``"tts"`` or ``"stt"``. The result keeps the built-in display
names first (original order — NOT re-sorted), then appends:
1. Command-type providers declared under the canonical
``<kind>.providers.<name>`` location, plus the legacy top-level
``<kind>.<name>`` fallback — exactly the dual resolution the runtime
performs in ``_get_named_provider_config`` /
``_get_named_stt_provider_config``. Names colliding with a RUNTIME
built-in are excluded case-insensitively (the runtime rejects a
built-in name as a command provider before any config lookup), so a
``providers.EDGE`` command block is not offered.
2. Plugin-registered provider names from ``agent.tts_registry`` /
``agent.transcription_registry`` — opportunistic only: plugins
register at runtime via ``ctx.register_tts_provider()``, and this
process does not necessarily call ``discover_plugins()``, so the
registry may legitimately be empty here. (There is no static
``provides: [tts]`` manifest convention to scan — real manifests only
carry ``provides_tools``/``provides_hooks``.)
3. The current ``<kind>.provider`` value when not already present — a
custom name that only appears as the active provider stays
selectable (matches desktop ``enumOptionsFor``'s current-value
preservation).
Guard semantics deliberately mirror
``apps/desktop/src/app/settings/helpers.ts:commandProviderNames`` so the
backend schema (web dashboard) and the desktop client agree on which
names are offered.
"""
names = [str(n) for n in builtin_names]
seen = {n.strip().lower() for n in names}
# Guard against the RUNTIME built-in sets, not the display shortlist
# above: the display list drifts from the runtime sets (e.g. omits
# ``deepinfra``), and filtering on it would offer names the runtime
# would never honour as command providers.
if kind == "tts":
from tools.tts_tool import BUILTIN_TTS_PROVIDERS as _runtime_builtins
else:
from tools.transcription_tools import BUILTIN_STT_PROVIDERS as _runtime_builtins
def _add(name: Any) -> None:
if not isinstance(name, str):
return
stripped = name.strip()
key = stripped.lower()
if stripped and key not in seen:
names.append(stripped)
seen.add(key)
section = cfg.get(kind)
if not isinstance(section, dict):
section = {}
# Canonical nested location first, then the legacy top-level fallback —
# the same order the runtime resolves them in.
candidate_blocks: List[Any] = []
providers_map = section.get("providers")
if isinstance(providers_map, dict):
candidate_blocks.append(providers_map)
candidate_blocks.append(
{k: v for k, v in section.items() if k != "providers"}
)
for block in candidate_blocks:
for name, value in block.items():
if (
isinstance(name, str)
and name.strip().lower() not in _runtime_builtins
and _is_command_provider_block(value)
):
_add(name)
# Plugin-registered providers (only populated when plugins are loaded in
# this process). Registry names can never collide with built-ins — the
# registries reject such registrations.
try:
if kind == "tts":
from agent.tts_registry import list_providers as _list_voice_providers
else:
from agent.transcription_registry import list_providers as _list_voice_providers
for _p in _list_voice_providers():
_add(getattr(_p, "name", None))
except Exception: # pragma: no cover - registry import should not break schema
pass
# Current-value preservation (``cfg_get`` takes *keys*, not dotted paths).
_add(cfg_get(cfg, kind, "provider"))
return names
def _schema_with_voice_provider_options() -> Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Return CONFIG_SCHEMA with per-request voice provider options merged.
Computed at request time (not import time) so options reflect the
CURRENT config.yaml — including providers added after the server
started, and the profile-scoped config when the request carries a
``profile`` param. The module-level ``CONFIG_SCHEMA`` is never mutated;
entries that change are shallow-copied onto a copied mapping.
"""
try:
cfg = load_config()
except Exception: # pragma: no cover - schema must survive config errors
return CONFIG_SCHEMA
overlay: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
for kind in ("tts", "stt"):
key = f"{kind}.provider"
entry = CONFIG_SCHEMA.get(key)
if not isinstance(entry, dict) or not isinstance(entry.get("options"), list):
continue
merged = _custom_provider_options(kind, list(entry["options"]), cfg)
if merged != entry["options"]:
overlay[key] = {**entry, "options": merged}
if not overlay:
return CONFIG_SCHEMA
fields = dict(CONFIG_SCHEMA)
fields.update(overlay)
return fields
class ConfigUpdate(BaseModel):
config: dict
profile: Optional[str] = None
class EnvVarUpdate(BaseModel):
key: str
value: str
profile: Optional[str] = None
# Optional bearer key for the connectivity probe of a custom/local endpoint
# (``key == "OPENAI_BASE_URL"``). Self-hosted endpoints that gate
# ``/v1/models`` behind auth otherwise look "reachable but empty"; sending
# the key lets the probe enumerate the served models. Ignored for the
# regular PUT /api/env path (which only reads key/value).
api_key: str = ""
class EnvVarDelete(BaseModel):
key: str
profile: Optional[str] = None
class EnvVarReveal(BaseModel):
key: str
profile: Optional[str] = None
class MemoryProviderConfigUpdate(BaseModel):
values: Dict[str, Any] = {}
class MemoryProviderSetupRequest(BaseModel):
values: Dict[str, Any] = {}
class CustomEndpointUpdate(BaseModel):
id: str = ""
name: str
base_url: str
model: str
api_key: Optional[str] = None
context_length: Optional[int] = None
discover_models: bool = True
make_default: bool = False
class MessagingPlatformUpdate(BaseModel):
enabled: Optional[bool] = None
env: Dict[str, str] = {}
clear_env: List[str] = []
# Explicit body profile beats the query param injected by the global
# dashboard profile switcher (same precedence as other scoped writes).
profile: Optional[str] = None
class TelegramOnboardingStart(BaseModel):
bot_name: Optional[str] = None
class TelegramOnboardingApply(BaseModel):
allowed_user_ids: List[str]
profile: Optional[str] = None
class WhatsAppOnboardingStart(BaseModel):
mode: Optional[str] = "bot"
allowed_users: Optional[str] = ""
profile: Optional[str] = None
class WhatsAppOnboardingApply(BaseModel):
mode: Optional[str] = None
allowed_users: Optional[str] = None
profile: Optional[str] = None
class AudioTranscriptionRequest(BaseModel):
data_url: str
mime_type: Optional[str] = None
class ManagedFileUpload(BaseModel):
path: str
data_url: str
overwrite: bool = True
class ChatImageUpload(BaseModel):
data_url: str
filename: Optional[str] = None
class ManagedDirectoryCreate(BaseModel):
path: str
class ManagedFileDelete(BaseModel):
path: str
recursive: bool = False
_AUDIO_MIME_EXTENSIONS: Dict[str, str] = {
"audio/aac": ".aac",
"audio/flac": ".flac",
"audio/m4a": ".m4a",
"audio/mp3": ".mp3",
"audio/mp4": ".mp4",
"audio/mpeg": ".mp3",
"audio/ogg": ".ogg",
"audio/wav": ".wav",
"audio/wave": ".wav",
"audio/webm": ".webm",
"audio/x-m4a": ".m4a",
"audio/x-wav": ".wav",
"video/webm": ".webm",
}
_MAX_TRANSCRIPTION_UPLOAD_BYTES = 25 * 1024 * 1024
def _audio_extension_for_mime(mime_type: str) -> str:
normalized = (mime_type or "").split(";", 1)[0].strip().lower()
return _AUDIO_MIME_EXTENSIONS.get(normalized, ".webm")
class ModelAssignment(BaseModel):
"""Payload for POST /api/model/set — assign a provider/model to a slot.
scope="main" → writes model.provider + model.default
scope="auxiliary" → writes auxiliary.<task>.provider + auxiliary.<task>.model
scope="auxiliary" with task="" → applied to every auxiliary.* slot
scope="auxiliary" with task="__reset__" → resets every slot to provider="auto"
"""
scope: str
provider: str
model: str
task: str = ""
# Optional OpenAI-compatible endpoint URL. Only honored for custom/local
# providers on the main slot — lets the GUI configure a self-hosted endpoint
# (vLLM, llama.cpp, Ollama, …) that needs no API key. The runtime resolver
# reads model.base_url from config (it ignores OPENAI_BASE_URL), so this is
# the path that actually wires a local endpoint into resolution.
base_url: str = ""
# Optional API key for a custom/local endpoint. Persisted to
# ``model.api_key`` (where the runtime resolver reads it) so a self-hosted
# endpoint that requires auth works from the GUI — mirrors the key the
# ``hermes model`` custom flow collects. Honored only on the main slot for
# custom/local providers.
api_key: str = ""
confirm_expensive_model: bool = False
profile: Optional[str] = None
class MoaModelSlot(BaseModel):
provider: str = ""
model: str = ""
# Optional per-slot reasoning effort. Declared so a client round-tripping
# the GET payload doesn't have it stripped at parse time and wiped on save.
reasoning_effort: Optional[str] = None
class MoaPresetPayload(BaseModel):
reference_models: list[MoaModelSlot] = []
aggregator: MoaModelSlot = MoaModelSlot()
# None = temperature omitted from API calls (provider default), matching
# single-model agent behavior.
reference_temperature: Optional[float] = None
aggregator_temperature: Optional[float] = None
max_tokens: int = 4096
# Newer per-preset knobs (see moa_config._normalize_preset). Optional so
# older clients that never send them keep working; declared so clients
# that round-trip the GET payload don't silently erase hand-set values.
reference_max_tokens: Optional[int] = None
fanout: Optional[str] = None
enabled: bool = True
class MoaConfigPayload(BaseModel):
default_preset: str = "default"
active_preset: str = ""
presets: dict[str, MoaPresetPayload] = {}
# Backward-compatible flat payload fields used by older dashboard/desktop
# clients during this PR's transition window.
reference_models: list[MoaModelSlot] = []
aggregator: MoaModelSlot = MoaModelSlot()
reference_temperature: Optional[float] = None
aggregator_temperature: Optional[float] = None
max_tokens: int = 4096
reference_max_tokens: Optional[int] = None
fanout: Optional[str] = None
enabled: bool = True
profile: Optional[str] = None
def _normalize_main_model_assignment(provider: str, model: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""Normalize a main-slot (provider, model) pair before persisting.
The Models page has two assignment paths and only one of them was safe:
- The "Change" picker sends a real Hermes provider slug — fine.
- The per-card "Use as → Main model" menu sends ``entry.provider``
from the analytics rows, falling back to the model's VENDOR prefix
(``modelVendor("anthropic/claude-opus-4.6") == "anthropic"``) when
the session row has no ``billing_provider`` (older sessions, NULL
rows). That wrote ``provider: anthropic`` +
``default: anthropic/claude-opus-4.6`` to config — a vendor-prefixed
OpenRouter slug on the NATIVE Anthropic provider. New sessions then
400 against api.anthropic.com ("model: anthropic/claude-opus-4.6 not
found") and the user reads it as "changing models does nothing".
Two repairs, both at this single chokepoint so every caller inherits:
1. Vendor-name → Hermes-provider mapping: when the provider string is
not a known Hermes provider/alias (e.g. ``moonshotai``, ``x-ai`` is
known but ``poolside`` isn't) but the model is a vendor-prefixed
aggregator slug, keep the user's CURRENT aggregator if they're on
one, else fall back to openrouter.
2. Model-format normalization for the resolved provider via
``normalize_model_for_provider`` (e.g. ``anthropic/claude-opus-4.6``
on native anthropic → ``claude-opus-4-6``).
"""
from hermes_cli.config import get_compatible_custom_providers
from hermes_cli.models import _KNOWN_PROVIDER_NAMES, normalize_provider
from hermes_cli.model_normalize import normalize_model_for_provider
from hermes_cli.providers import resolve_custom_provider, resolve_user_provider
prov_in = (provider or "").strip()
model_in = (model or "").strip()
canonical = normalize_provider(prov_in)
# User-declared providers are real routing targets, not analytics vendor
# labels. Resolve them before the unknown-vendor fallback. ``providers:``
# keeps its declared bare slug; ``custom_providers:`` canonicalizes both a
# bare display name and ``custom:<name>`` to the durable custom slug.
try:
cfg = load_config()
except Exception:
cfg = {}
user_providers = cfg.get("providers") if isinstance(cfg, dict) else None
user_provider = resolve_user_provider(
prov_in, user_providers if isinstance(user_providers, dict) else {}
)
custom_provider = resolve_custom_provider(
prov_in,
get_compatible_custom_providers(cfg) if isinstance(cfg, dict) else [],
)
if user_provider is not None:
return user_provider.id, model_in
if custom_provider is not None:
return custom_provider.id, model_in
if canonical not in _KNOWN_PROVIDER_NAMES and "/" in model_in:
# Vendor prefix posing as a provider (analytics fallback). Resolve
# against the user's current provider when it's an aggregator that
# serves vendor-prefixed slugs; otherwise default to openrouter.
try:
cur_cfg = cfg.get("model", {})
cur_provider = (
str(cur_cfg.get("provider", "") or "").strip().lower()
if isinstance(cur_cfg, dict) else ""
)
except Exception:
cur_provider = ""
from hermes_cli.models import _AGGREGATOR_PROVIDERS
if cur_provider and normalize_provider(cur_provider) in _AGGREGATOR_PROVIDERS:
canonical = normalize_provider(cur_provider)
prov_in = cur_provider
else:
canonical = "openrouter"
prov_in = "openrouter"
# Custom/user-config providers keep the model verbatim — the registry
# normalizer doesn't know their namespaces.
if canonical in _KNOWN_PROVIDER_NAMES and not canonical.startswith("custom"):
try:
normalized_model = normalize_model_for_provider(model_in, canonical)
if normalized_model:
model_in = normalized_model
except Exception:
_log.debug("model normalization failed for %s/%s", prov_in, model_in, exc_info=True)
return prov_in, model_in
def _apply_main_model_assignment(
model_cfg: "Any", provider: str, model: str, base_url: str = "", api_key: str = ""
) -> dict:
"""Apply a main-slot model assignment to a ``model`` config dict in place.
Sets ``provider``/``default``, then reconciles ``base_url``:
- An explicitly supplied ``base_url`` is always persisted (covers
``custom``/local endpoints and any provider whose key is bound to a
non-default host).
- Otherwise, a stale ``base_url`` is cleared ONLY when switching to a
*different* provider — that URL belonged to the old provider. When the
provider is unchanged and no new URL is supplied, the existing
``base_url`` is preserved. This keeps a user's custom endpoint (e.g. a
Xiaomi MiMo Token Plan host, ``https://token-plan-*.xiaomimimo.com/v1``)
alive when they merely re-pick a model under the same provider — picking
a model previously wiped it, forcing the registry default and breaking
Token Plan keys.
The runtime resolver reads ``model.base_url`` from config (it ignores
``OPENAI_BASE_URL``) and only honors it when the configured provider matches
and the pool entry is on the registry default, so preserving it here is what
lets the override actually route. The hardcoded ``context_length`` override
is always dropped since the new model may have a different context window.
Returns the same dict (coerced to a fresh dict if the input wasn't one) so
callers can assign it straight back onto the model config.
"""
if not isinstance(model_cfg, dict):
model_cfg = {}
prev_provider = str(model_cfg.get("provider") or "").strip().lower()
new_provider = provider.strip().lower()
model_cfg["provider"] = provider
model_cfg["default"] = model
if base_url.strip():
model_cfg["base_url"] = base_url.strip()
elif model_cfg.get("base_url") and new_provider != prev_provider:
# Switching providers: the old URL belonged to the old provider, drop
# it so the new provider's default endpoint is used. Same-provider
# re-assignment keeps the user's configured base_url intact.
model_cfg["base_url"] = ""
# The endpoint key follows the same lifecycle as base_url: an explicit key
# is always persisted; an existing key is dropped only when switching to a
# different provider (it belonged to the old endpoint), and preserved on a
# same-provider re-pick so re-selecting a model doesn't wipe the key.
if api_key.strip():
model_cfg["api_key"] = api_key.strip()
model_cfg.pop("api", None)
elif (model_cfg.get("api_key") or model_cfg.get("api")) and new_provider != prev_provider:
# A stale endpoint secret can live under the legacy ``api`` alias with
# no ``api_key`` (the resolver still reads ``model.api`` as a key), so
# the switch-clears-the-key path must trigger on either field — else the
# old endpoint's secret survives in config.yaml and contaminates a later
# custom resolution. clear_model_endpoint_credentials scrubs both.
clear_model_endpoint_credentials(model_cfg, clear_api_mode=False)
if new_provider != prev_provider:
clear_model_endpoint_credentials(model_cfg, clear_api_key=False)
model_cfg.pop("context_length", None)
return model_cfg
_GATEWAY_HEALTH_URL = os.getenv("GATEWAY_HEALTH_URL")
_GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT_MAX = 1.0
_GATEWAY_HEALTH_ROUTE_TIMEOUT = 1.0
try:
_GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT = float(os.getenv("GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT", "1"))
except (ValueError, TypeError):
_log.warning(
"Invalid GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT value %r — using default 1.0s",
os.getenv("GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT"),
)
_GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT = 1.0
if _GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT <= 0:
_log.warning(
"Invalid non-positive GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT value %.3fs — using default 1.0s",
_GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT,
)
_GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT = 1.0
elif _GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT > _GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT_MAX:
_log.warning(
"Capping GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT %.3fs to %.3fs for dashboard liveness probes",
_GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT,
_GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT_MAX,
)
_GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT = _GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT_MAX
_STATUS_ACTIVE_SESSIONS_TIMEOUT = 0.75
# DEPRECATED (scheduled for removal): GATEWAY_HEALTH_URL / GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT.
# Cross-container / cross-host gateway liveness detection will be folded into a
# first-class dashboard config key so it's no longer Docker-adjacent lore buried
# in env vars. The env vars still work for now so existing Compose deployments
# don't break. Do not add new callers — wire new uses through the planned
# config surface.
def _probe_gateway_health() -> tuple[bool, dict | None]:
"""Probe the gateway via its HTTP health endpoint (cross-container).
.. deprecated::
Driven by the deprecated ``GATEWAY_HEALTH_URL`` /
``GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT`` env vars. Scheduled for removal alongside
a move to a first-class dashboard config key. See
:data:`_GATEWAY_HEALTH_URL` for context.
Uses ``/health/detailed`` first (returns full state), falling back to
the simpler ``/health`` endpoint. Returns ``(is_alive, body_dict)``.
Accepts any of these as ``GATEWAY_HEALTH_URL``:
- ``http://gateway:8642`` (base URL — recommended)
- ``http://gateway:8642/health`` (explicit health path)
- ``http://gateway:8642/health/detailed`` (explicit detailed path)
This is a **blocking** call — run via ``run_in_executor`` from async code.
"""
if not _GATEWAY_HEALTH_URL:
return False, None
# Normalise to base URL so we always probe the right paths regardless of
# whether the user included /health or /health/detailed in the env var.
base = _GATEWAY_HEALTH_URL.rstrip("/")
if base.endswith("/health/detailed"):
base = base[: -len("/health/detailed")]
elif base.endswith("/health"):
base = base[: -len("/health")]
for path in (f"{base}/health/detailed", f"{base}/health"):
try:
req = urllib.request.Request(path, method="GET")
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=_GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT) as resp:
if resp.status == 200:
body = json.loads(resp.read())
return True, body
except Exception:
continue
return False, None
def _count_status_active_sessions() -> int:
"""Return the dashboard status active-session count.
This is best-effort status garnish, not a critical path. Use a read-only
connection so /api/status never tries to initialise or migrate state.db
while another Hermes process is writing to it.
"""
from hermes_state import DEFAULT_DB_PATH, SessionDB
# read_only opens require the DB to already exist (see SessionDB.__init__
# read_only contract) — on a fresh install every /api/status poll would
# otherwise pay an OperationalError until the first session is written.
if not DEFAULT_DB_PATH.exists():
return 0
db = SessionDB(read_only=True)
try:
sessions = db.list_sessions_rich(limit=50, compact_rows=True)
now = time.time()
return sum(
1 for s in sessions
if s.get("ended_at") is None
and (now - s.get("last_active", s.get("started_at", 0))) < 300
)
finally:
db.close()
async def _status_active_sessions() -> int:
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
try:
return await asyncio.wait_for(
loop.run_in_executor(None, _count_status_active_sessions),
timeout=_STATUS_ACTIVE_SESSIONS_TIMEOUT,
)
except asyncio.TimeoutError:
_log.debug(
"/api/status active session count exceeded %.2fs; returning 0",
_STATUS_ACTIVE_SESSIONS_TIMEOUT,
)
except Exception as exc:
_log.debug("/api/status active session count unavailable: %s", exc)
return 0
# Image MIME types this endpoint will serve. Extension-allowlisted so an
# authenticated caller can't pull non-image files through it.
_MEDIA_CONTENT_TYPES = {
".png": "image/png",
".jpg": "image/jpeg",
".jpeg": "image/jpeg",
".gif": "image/gif",
".webp": "image/webp",
".svg": "image/svg+xml",
".bmp": "image/bmp",
".ico": "image/x-icon",
}
_MEDIA_MAX_BYTES = 25 * 1024 * 1024
_MANAGED_FILES_ROOT_ENV = "HERMES_DASHBOARD_FILES_ROOT"
_MANAGED_FILE_MAX_BYTES = 100 * 1024 * 1024
_HOSTED_MANAGED_FILES_ROOT = Path("/opt/data")
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ManagedFilesPolicy:
default_path: Path
locked_root: Path | None
can_change_path: bool
_FS_READDIR_HIDDEN = {
".git",
".hg",
".svn",
".cache",
".next",
".turbo",
".venv",
"__pycache__",
"build",
"dist",
"node_modules",
"target",
"venv",
}
# Filenames that must never be listed, read, or downloaded through the
# managed-files API. These typically contain credentials (API keys, tokens)
# and exposing them through the dashboard file browser is a security leak —
# see issue #57505. The set mirrors the credential-file basenames of the two
# canonical credential guards elsewhere in the codebase
# (agent.file_safety.get_read_block_error and
# gateway.platforms.base._ROOT_CREDENTIAL_FILES) so the dashboard Files tab
# doesn't lag behind them — an operator can point the managed root at
# HERMES_HOME itself, at which point every one of these basenames is a live
# secret store sitting in the browsable tree.
_SENSITIVE_MANAGED_FILE_BASENAMES = frozenset({
"auth.json",
"auth.lock",
"credentials",
"config.yaml",
".anthropic_oauth.json",
"google_token.json",
"google_oauth_pending.json",
"google_oauth.json",
"webhook_subscriptions.json",
"bws_cache.json",
"bws_cache.enc.json",
# git's credential-store helper cache (agent.file_safety blocks this too).
".git-credentials",
})
# Directory names whose entire subtree is credential material. Both canonical
# guards deny these as directory trees, not basenames:
# * gateway.platforms.base._ROOT_CREDENTIAL_DIRS = {"pairing", "mcp-tokens"}
# * agent.file_safety.get_read_block_error (mcp-tokens/ prefix match)
# The managed-files API lets the browser descend into subdirs, so a
# basename-only guard would still expose e.g. ``mcp-tokens/<server>.json``
# (live MCP OAuth tokens) and ``pairing/<x>``. We match on ANY path component
# so these trees are blocked wherever they appear under the browsable root,
# without needing to resolve them relative to HERMES_HOME.
_SENSITIVE_MANAGED_DIR_NAMES = frozenset({
"mcp-tokens",
"pairing",
})
def _is_sensitive_filename(name: str) -> bool:
"""Return True for a basename the managed-files API must never expose.
Covers ``.env`` / ``.env.<suffix>`` / ``.envrc`` variants plus the
canonical Hermes credential-store basenames (see
``_SENSITIVE_MANAGED_FILE_BASENAMES`` above).
Case-insensitive so ``.ENV`` / ``.Env.local`` / ``Auth.JSON`` on
case-insensitive filesystems (macOS/Windows mounts) can't slip past
the guard.
Basename-only: for the directory-tree credential stores
(``mcp-tokens/``, ``pairing/``) that the canonical guards also deny,
use :func:`_is_sensitive_path`, which the API call sites route through.
"""
lowered = name.lower()
if lowered == ".env" or lowered.startswith(".env.") or lowered == ".envrc":
return True
return lowered in _SENSITIVE_MANAGED_FILE_BASENAMES
def _is_sensitive_path(path: Path) -> bool:
"""Return True for any path the managed-files API must never expose.
Combines the basename denylist (:func:`_is_sensitive_filename`) with a
credential-directory-tree check: a path is sensitive if its own basename
is sensitive OR any of its path components is a credential directory
(``mcp-tokens`` / ``pairing``). The component match is case-insensitive
and needs no HERMES_HOME resolution, so it blocks these trees wherever
they sit under the operator-configured managed root — closing the gap
the canonical guards cover as directory trees but a basename-only check
would miss.
Read-side only: this guards list/read/download (the #57505 exfil surface).
The write endpoints (upload/mkdir/delete) are a separate threat class
handled by the write-path checks; extending this guard to them is out of
scope for this fix.
"""
if _is_sensitive_filename(path.name):
return True
return any(part.lower() in _SENSITIVE_MANAGED_DIR_NAMES for part in path.parts)
_FS_DATA_URL_MAX_BYTES = 16 * 1024 * 1024
_FS_TEXT_SOURCE_MAX_BYTES = 64 * 1024 * 1024
_FS_TEXT_PREVIEW_MAX_BYTES = 512 * 1024
# Upper bound for the in-app spot editor's save. The editor only opens
# non-truncated text (<= the preview cap), so this is a safety ceiling against
# a pasted-in megablob, not the expected payload size.
_FS_TEXT_WRITE_MAX_BYTES = 8 * 1024 * 1024
_FS_PREVIEW_LANGUAGE_BY_EXT = {
".c": "c",
".conf": "ini",
".cpp": "cpp",
".css": "css",
".csv": "csv",
".go": "go",
".graphql": "graphql",
".h": "c",
".hpp": "cpp",
".html": "html",
".java": "java",
".js": "javascript",
".json": "json",
".jsx": "jsx",
".kt": "kotlin",
".lua": "lua",
".md": "markdown",
".mjs": "javascript",
".py": "python",
".rb": "ruby",
".rs": "rust",
".sh": "shell",
".sql": "sql",
".svg": "xml",
".toml": "toml",
".ts": "typescript",
".tsx": "tsx",
".txt": "text",
".xml": "xml",
".yaml": "yaml",
".yml": "yaml",
".zsh": "shell",
}
_FS_MIME_TYPES = {
".avi": "video/x-msvideo",
".bmp": "image/bmp",
".flac": "audio/flac",
".gif": "image/gif",
".jpeg": "image/jpeg",
".jpg": "image/jpeg",
".m4a": "audio/mp4",
".mkv": "video/x-matroska",
".mov": "video/quicktime",
".mp3": "audio/mpeg",
".mp4": "video/mp4",
".ogg": "audio/ogg",
".opus": "audio/ogg; codecs=opus",
".png": "image/png",
".svg": "image/svg+xml",
".wav": "audio/wav",
".webm": "video/webm",
".webp": "image/webp",
}
def _fs_path(raw_path: str) -> Path:
raw = str(raw_path or "").strip()
if not raw:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Path is required")
if "\0" in raw:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid path")
try:
if raw.lower().startswith("file:"):
parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(raw)
if parsed.netloc and parsed.netloc not in {"", "localhost"}:
raise ValueError
raw = urllib.request.url2pathname(parsed.path)
candidate = Path(raw).expanduser()
if not candidate.is_absolute():
candidate = Path.cwd() / candidate
return candidate.resolve(strict=False)
except (OSError, RuntimeError, ValueError):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid path")
def _fs_mime_type(path: Path) -> str:
suffix = path.suffix.lower()
if suffix in _FS_MIME_TYPES:
return _FS_MIME_TYPES[suffix]
guessed, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(str(path))
return guessed or "application/octet-stream"
def _fs_looks_binary(data: bytes) -> bool:
if not data:
return False
if b"\0" in data:
return True
suspicious = sum(1 for byte in data if byte < 32 and byte not in {9, 10, 13})
return suspicious / len(data) > 0.12
def _fs_regular_file(path: Path) -> tuple[Path, os.stat_result]:
target = _fs_path(str(path))
try:
st = target.stat()
except FileNotFoundError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="File not found")
except NotADirectoryError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="File not found")
except PermissionError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="File is not readable")
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc) or "Invalid path")
if stat.S_ISDIR(st.st_mode):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Path points to a directory")
if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Only regular files can be read")
return target, st
def _fs_find_git_root(start: Path) -> str | None:
directory = start
for _ in range(50):
try:
if (directory / ".git").exists():
return str(directory)
except OSError:
return None
parent = directory.parent
if parent == directory:
return None
directory = parent
return None
def _fs_default_cwd() -> str:
cfg_terminal = load_config().get("terminal") or {}
raw = str(cfg_terminal.get("cwd") or os.environ.get("TERMINAL_CWD") or "").strip()
if raw and raw not in {".", "auto", "cwd"}:
try:
candidate = Path(raw).expanduser().resolve(strict=False)
if candidate.is_dir():
return str(candidate)
except (OSError, RuntimeError):
pass
return str(Path.cwd())
def _fs_git_branch(cwd: str) -> str:
try:
run_kwargs: Dict[str, Any] = {
"capture_output": True,
"text": True,
"timeout": 2,
"check": False,
}
if sys.platform == "win32":
run_kwargs["creationflags"] = windows_hide_flags()
result = subprocess.run(
["git", "-C", cwd, "branch", "--show-current"],
**run_kwargs,
)
return result.stdout.strip() if result.returncode == 0 else ""
except Exception:
return ""
def _media_serve_roots() -> list[Path]:
"""Directories ``GET /api/media`` is allowed to read from.
Confined to where the agent and attach pipeline actually write media on the
gateway host — its images dir and cache subtree. This stops an authenticated
client from reading image-extension files anywhere on disk (e.g. a renamed
key or a screenshot outside the cache) merely because the suffix passes the
allowlist.
"""
home = get_hermes_home()
roots = [home / "images", home / "screenshots", home / "cache"]
out: list[Path] = []
for root in roots:
try:
out.append(root.resolve())
except (OSError, RuntimeError):
continue
return out
@app.get("/api/media")
async def get_media(path: str):
"""Return a gateway-local image file as a base64 data URL.
Lets remote clients (the desktop app over the network, or the web dashboard
in a browser) display images the agent wrote to *this* machine's filesystem
— they can't read the gateway's local disk directly.
Auth-gated by the session token like every other /api route. Restricted to
an image-extension allowlist, a size cap, AND the gateway's own media roots
(resolved, symlink-safe) so it can't be used to read arbitrary files.
"""
try:
target = Path(path).expanduser().resolve()
except (OSError, RuntimeError):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid path")
if target.suffix.lower() not in _MEDIA_CONTENT_TYPES:
raise HTTPException(status_code=415, detail="Unsupported media type")
roots = _media_serve_roots()
if not any(target == root or root in target.parents for root in roots):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Path outside media roots")
if not target.is_file():
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="File not found")
if target.stat().st_size > _MEDIA_MAX_BYTES:
raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="File too large")
encoded = base64.b64encode(target.read_bytes()).decode("ascii")
return {"data_url": f"data:{_MEDIA_CONTENT_TYPES[target.suffix.lower()]};base64,{encoded}"}
def _canonical_path(path: Path, *, require_exists: bool = False) -> Path:
try:
return path.expanduser().resolve(strict=require_exists)
except FileNotFoundError:
if require_exists:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Path not found")
raise
except (OSError, RuntimeError):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid path")
def _ensure_managed_root(raw_path: str | Path) -> Path:
root = Path(raw_path).expanduser()
try:
root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
resolved = root.resolve()
except (OSError, RuntimeError) as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Managed files root is unavailable: {exc}")
if not resolved.is_dir():
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Managed files root is not a directory")
return resolved
def _path_is_under(root: Path, target: Path) -> bool:
return target == root or root in target.parents
def _path_text(raw_path: str | None) -> str:
text = str(raw_path or "").strip()
if "\x00" in text:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid path")
return text
def _local_dashboard_request(request: Request) -> bool:
if getattr(request.app.state, "auth_required", False):
return False
host = (request.url.hostname or "").lower()
client_host = (request.client.host if request.client else "").lower()
local_hosts = {"", "localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1", "testserver", "testclient"}
return host in local_hosts or client_host in local_hosts
def _default_hermes_root_is_opt_data() -> bool:
raw = os.environ.get("HERMES_HOME", "").strip()
if not raw:
return False
try:
from hermes_constants import get_default_hermes_root
root = get_default_hermes_root().expanduser().resolve(strict=False)
except (OSError, RuntimeError):
root = Path(raw).expanduser().resolve(strict=False)
return root == _HOSTED_MANAGED_FILES_ROOT
def _dashboard_local_update_managed_externally() -> bool:
"""Return true when the dashboard should not offer ``hermes update``.
Containerized dashboards are updated by the outer launcher/image, not by an
in-browser local update action. Keep this dashboard capability separate
from install-method detection: manual git/pip installs inside containers can
still behave like their actual install method in the CLI.
However, when the install method is ``git`` (a bind-mounted checkout inside
a container — e.g. the hermes-webui image sharing the Hermes source tree),
the dashboard's ``hermes update`` button is the correct update path and
should not be suppressed. Other containerized install methods remain
externally managed unless their apply path is proven safe inside the
running container filesystem.
"""
if _default_hermes_root_is_opt_data():
return True
try:
from hermes_constants import is_container
if not is_container():
return False
except Exception:
return False
# We are inside a container, but the install may still be self-managed.
# If the install method is git, the dashboard update button works against
# the mounted checkout and should be offered. Keep pip blocked inside
# containers: its apply path mutates the running container filesystem and
# is not the bind-mounted checkout case this gate is meant to recover.
try:
method = detect_install_method(PROJECT_ROOT)
if method == "git":
return False
except Exception:
pass
return True
def _managed_files_policy(request: Request, *, create_root: bool = True) -> ManagedFilesPolicy:
raw_forced_root = os.environ.get(_MANAGED_FILES_ROOT_ENV, "").strip()
if raw_forced_root:
root = _ensure_managed_root(raw_forced_root) if create_root else _canonical_path(Path(raw_forced_root))
return ManagedFilesPolicy(default_path=root, locked_root=root, can_change_path=False)
# Remote/OAuth access does not imply a hosted container. Users can expose a
# local dashboard through the auth gate (for example a macOS launchd install)
# and still expect the Files page to browse their local home directory. Lock
# to /opt/data only when the installation's Hermes root is actually /opt/data
# (the container/hosted layout) or when HERMES_DASHBOARD_FILES_ROOT is set.
if _default_hermes_root_is_opt_data():
root = _ensure_managed_root(_HOSTED_MANAGED_FILES_ROOT) if create_root else _HOSTED_MANAGED_FILES_ROOT
return ManagedFilesPolicy(default_path=root, locked_root=root, can_change_path=False)
home = _canonical_path(Path.home())
return ManagedFilesPolicy(default_path=home, locked_root=None, can_change_path=True)
def _resolve_managed_path(
raw_path: str | None,
request: Request,
*,
for_write: bool = False,
) -> tuple[ManagedFilesPolicy, Path, str]:
policy = _managed_files_policy(request)
text = _path_text(raw_path)
root = policy.locked_root
if root is not None and (not text or text in {".", "/"}):
candidate = root
elif not text:
candidate = policy.default_path
else:
candidate = Path(text).expanduser()
if root is not None and not candidate.is_absolute():
if any(part == ".." for part in candidate.parts):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Path cannot contain '..'")
candidate = root / candidate
elif not candidate.is_absolute():
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Path must be absolute")
if ".." in candidate.parts:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Path cannot contain '..'")
if for_write and not candidate.exists():
parent = _canonical_path(candidate.parent)
resolved = parent / candidate.name
else:
resolved = _canonical_path(candidate, require_exists=not for_write)
if root is not None and not _path_is_under(root, resolved):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Path outside managed files root")
return policy, resolved, str(resolved)
def _managed_response_meta(policy: ManagedFilesPolicy) -> Dict[str, Any]:
locked_root = str(policy.locked_root) if policy.locked_root is not None else None
return {
"root": locked_root,
"locked_root": locked_root,
"can_change_path": policy.can_change_path,
}
def _managed_file_entry(policy: ManagedFilesPolicy, target: Path) -> Dict[str, Any]:
try:
resolved = target.resolve()
except (OSError, RuntimeError):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid path")
if policy.locked_root is not None and not _path_is_under(policy.locked_root, resolved):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Path outside managed files root")
try:
st = resolved.stat()
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not stat path: {exc}")
is_dir = resolved.is_dir()
mime_type = None if is_dir else (mimetypes.guess_type(resolved.name)[0] or "application/octet-stream")
return {
"name": target.name or resolved.name or str(resolved),
"path": str(resolved),
"is_directory": is_dir,
"size": None if is_dir else st.st_size,
"mtime": st.st_mtime,
"mime_type": mime_type,
}
def _decode_data_url(data_url: str) -> tuple[bytes, str]:
text = (data_url or "").strip()
if not text.startswith("data:") or "," not in text:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Upload payload must be a data URL")
header, encoded = text.split(",", 1)
mime_type = header[5:].split(";", 1)[0] or "application/octet-stream"
if ";base64" not in header:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Upload payload must be base64 encoded")
try:
data = base64.b64decode(encoded, validate=True)
except (binascii.Error, ValueError):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Upload payload is not valid base64")
if len(data) > _MANAGED_FILE_MAX_BYTES:
raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="File is too large")
return data, mime_type
_CHAT_IMAGE_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES = 25 * 1024 * 1024
_CHAT_IMAGE_ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS = frozenset({".png", ".jpg", ".jpeg", ".gif", ".webp", ".bmp"})
_CHAT_IMAGE_MAGIC: tuple[tuple[bytes, str], ...] = (
(b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n", ".png"),
(b"\xff\xd8\xff", ".jpg"),
(b"GIF87a", ".gif"),
(b"GIF89a", ".gif"),
(b"BM", ".bmp"),
)
def _sanitize_chat_image_filename(filename: str | None) -> str:
candidate = Path(str(filename or "").strip()).name
candidate = re.sub(r"[\x00-\x1f]+", "_", candidate)
candidate = candidate.strip().strip(".")
return candidate or "pasted-image"
def _chat_image_extension(data: bytes) -> str | None:
head = data[:16]
if head.startswith(b"RIFF") and head[8:12] == b"WEBP":
return ".webp"
for sig, ext in _CHAT_IMAGE_MAGIC:
if head.startswith(sig):
return ext
return None
def _decode_chat_image_upload(payload: ChatImageUpload) -> tuple[bytes, str, str]:
data, mime_type = _decode_data_url(payload.data_url)
if not mime_type.lower().startswith("image/"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Upload payload must be an image")
if len(data) > _CHAT_IMAGE_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES:
mb = _CHAT_IMAGE_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES // (1024 * 1024)
raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail=f"Image is too large; cap is {mb} MB")
ext = _chat_image_extension(data)
if ext not in _CHAT_IMAGE_ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Unsupported image type")
return data, mime_type, ext
@app.post("/api/chat/image-upload")
async def upload_chat_image(payload: ChatImageUpload, profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Persist a browser-provided chat image where the embedded TUI can read it.
The dashboard /chat page runs Hermes inside an xterm.js PTY. Browser
clipboard image bytes are not visible to the server-side clipboard, so the
page uploads them here, then drives the TUI's ``/image <path>`` command
with the returned gateway-visible path. Files land under
``HERMES_HOME/images/`` — the same directory ``clipboard.paste`` /
``image.attach`` already use.
"""
data, mime_type, ext = _decode_chat_image_upload(payload)
with _profile_scope(profile) as scoped_home:
home = scoped_home or get_hermes_home()
img_dir = Path(home) / "images"
try:
img_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
except PermissionError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Image directory is not writable")
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not create image directory: {exc}")
stem = Path(_sanitize_chat_image_filename(payload.filename)).stem or "pasted-image"
stem = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_.-]+", "_", stem).strip("._-") or "pasted-image"
ts = datetime.now().strftime("%Y%m%d_%H%M%S")
target = img_dir / f"dashboard_{ts}_{secrets.token_hex(4)}_{stem}{ext}"
try:
target.write_bytes(data)
except PermissionError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Image directory is not writable")
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not write image: {exc}")
return {
"ok": True,
"path": str(target),
"name": target.name,
"bytes": len(data),
"mime_type": mime_type,
}
@app.get("/api/files")
async def list_managed_files(request: Request, path: Optional[str] = None):
policy, target, display_path = _resolve_managed_path(path, request)
if not target.exists():
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Path not found")
if not target.is_dir():
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Path is not a directory")
try:
entries = [
_managed_file_entry(policy, child)
for child in target.iterdir()
if not _is_sensitive_path(child)
]
except PermissionError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Directory is not readable")
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not read directory: {exc}")
entries.sort(key=lambda item: (not item["is_directory"], str(item["name"]).lower()))
locked_root = policy.locked_root
parent = None
if target.parent != target and (locked_root is None or target != locked_root):
parent = str(target.parent)
return {
"path": display_path,
"parent": parent,
"entries": entries,
**_managed_response_meta(policy),
}
@app.get("/api/files/read")
async def read_managed_file(request: Request, path: str):
policy, target, display_path = _resolve_managed_path(path, request)
if not target.exists():
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="File not found")
if not target.is_file():
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Path is not a file")
if _is_sensitive_path(target):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Access to sensitive files is not allowed")
try:
size = target.stat().st_size
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not stat file: {exc}")
if size > _MANAGED_FILE_MAX_BYTES:
raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="File is too large")
mime_type = mimetypes.guess_type(target.name)[0] or "application/octet-stream"
try:
encoded = base64.b64encode(target.read_bytes()).decode("ascii")
except PermissionError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="File is not readable")
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not read file: {exc}")
return {
"name": target.name,
"path": display_path,
"size": size,
"mime_type": mime_type,
"data_url": f"data:{mime_type};base64,{encoded}",
**_managed_response_meta(policy),
}
@app.get("/api/files/download")
async def download_managed_file(request: Request, path: str):
"""Stream a managed file as an attachment download.
Remote clients (desktop app, browser dashboard) open agent-written files
that live on *this* gateway's disk, not theirs. Auth-gated like every other
managed-files route — ``auth_middleware`` additionally accepts the session
token as a ``?token=`` query param here so a shell/browser-opened download
(which can't set the session header) still authenticates. See ``/api/pty``
for the same query-token precedent.
"""
policy, target, _display_path = _resolve_managed_path(path, request)
if not target.exists():
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="File not found")
if not target.is_file():
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Path is not a file")
if _is_sensitive_path(target):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Access to sensitive files is not allowed")
try:
size = target.stat().st_size
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not stat file: {exc}")
if size > _MANAGED_FILE_MAX_BYTES:
raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="File is too large")
mime_type = mimetypes.guess_type(target.name)[0] or "application/octet-stream"
return FileResponse(
path=str(target),
media_type=mime_type,
filename=target.name,
content_disposition_type="attachment",
)
@app.post("/api/files/upload")
async def upload_managed_file(payload: ManagedFileUpload, request: Request):
policy, target, display_path = _resolve_managed_path(payload.path, request, for_write=True)
if target.exists() and target.is_dir():
raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail="A directory already exists at that path")
if target.exists() and not payload.overwrite:
raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail="File already exists")
data, _mime_type = _decode_data_url(payload.data_url)
try:
target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
target.write_bytes(data)
except PermissionError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="File is not writable")
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not write file: {exc}")
return {
"ok": True,
"entry": _managed_file_entry(policy, target),
"path": display_path,
**_managed_response_meta(policy),
}
# Stream uploads to disk in fixed-size chunks. The legacy JSON endpoint above
# buffers the whole file as a base64 data URL in a JSON body, which (a) inflates
# the payload ~33%, (b) holds the entire file (plus its decoded copy) in memory,
# and (c) reliably trips upstream proxy body-size/timeout limits with a 502 on
# large backup archives (NS-501). This multipart endpoint reads the request body
# in 1 MiB chunks straight to a temp file, enforces the size cap as it goes, and
# atomically renames into place — constant memory, no base64 inflation.
_UPLOAD_CHUNK_BYTES = 1024 * 1024
@app.post("/api/files/upload-stream")
async def upload_managed_file_stream(
request: Request,
file: UploadFile = File(...),
path: str = Form(...),
overwrite: bool = Form(True),
):
policy, target, display_path = _resolve_managed_path(path, request, for_write=True)
if target.exists() and target.is_dir():
raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail="A directory already exists at that path")
if target.exists() and not overwrite:
raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail="File already exists")
try:
target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
except PermissionError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="File is not writable")
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not create parent directory: {exc}")
# Write to a sibling temp file first so a partial/aborted upload never
# clobbers an existing file, then atomically rename into place.
tmp_fd, tmp_name = tempfile.mkstemp(
prefix=f".{target.name}.", suffix=".upload", dir=str(target.parent)
)
tmp_path = Path(tmp_name)
total = 0
renamed = False
try:
with os.fdopen(tmp_fd, "wb") as out:
while True:
chunk = await file.read(_UPLOAD_CHUNK_BYTES)
if not chunk:
break
total += len(chunk)
if total > _MANAGED_FILE_MAX_BYTES:
raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="File is too large")
out.write(chunk)
os.replace(tmp_path, target)
renamed = True
except HTTPException:
raise
except PermissionError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="File is not writable")
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not write file: {exc}")
finally:
# Clean up the temp file on every non-success exit, including
# BaseException paths the `except` clauses above don't catch — most
# importantly asyncio.CancelledError when a browser aborts a large
# upload mid-stream (the exact NS-501 scenario). os.replace clears
# tmp_path on success, so only unlink when the rename didn't happen.
if not renamed:
tmp_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
await file.close()
return {
"ok": True,
"entry": _managed_file_entry(policy, target),
"path": display_path,
**_managed_response_meta(policy),
}
@app.post("/api/files/mkdir")
async def create_managed_directory(payload: ManagedDirectoryCreate, request: Request):
policy, target, display_path = _resolve_managed_path(payload.path, request, for_write=True)
if target.exists() and not target.is_dir():
raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail="A file already exists at that path")
try:
target.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
except PermissionError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Directory is not writable")
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not create directory: {exc}")
return {
"ok": True,
"entry": _managed_file_entry(policy, target),
"path": display_path,
**_managed_response_meta(policy),
}
@app.delete("/api/files")
async def delete_managed_file(payload: ManagedFileDelete, request: Request):
policy, target, display_path = _resolve_managed_path(payload.path, request)
if policy.locked_root is not None and target == policy.locked_root:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Cannot delete the managed files root")
if target.parent == target:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Cannot delete the filesystem root")
if not target.exists():
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Path not found")
try:
if target.is_dir():
if payload.recursive:
shutil.rmtree(target)
else:
target.rmdir()
else:
target.unlink()
except OSError as exc:
status_code = 409 if target.is_dir() and not payload.recursive else 500
raise HTTPException(status_code=status_code, detail=f"Could not delete path: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "path": display_path, **_managed_response_meta(policy)}
@app.get("/api/fs/list")
async def fs_list(path: str):
target = _fs_path(path)
try:
entries = []
with os.scandir(target) as scan:
for entry in scan:
if entry.name in _FS_READDIR_HIDDEN:
continue
entries.append({
"name": entry.name,
"path": str(target / entry.name),
"isDirectory": entry.is_dir(follow_symlinks=False),
})
entries.sort(key=lambda item: (not item["isDirectory"], item["name"].lower(), item["name"]))
return {"entries": entries}
except FileNotFoundError:
return {"entries": [], "error": "ENOENT"}
except NotADirectoryError:
return {"entries": [], "error": "ENOTDIR"}
except PermissionError:
return {"entries": [], "error": "EACCES"}
except OSError as exc:
return {"entries": [], "error": getattr(exc, "strerror", None) or "read-error"}
@app.get("/api/fs/read-text")
async def fs_read_text(path: str):
target, st = _fs_regular_file(_fs_path(path))
if st.st_size > _FS_TEXT_SOURCE_MAX_BYTES:
raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="File too large")
bytes_to_read = min(st.st_size, _FS_TEXT_PREVIEW_MAX_BYTES)
try:
with target.open("rb") as handle:
data = handle.read(bytes_to_read)
except PermissionError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="File is not readable")
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc) or "File read failed")
return {
"binary": _fs_looks_binary(data[:4096]),
"byteSize": st.st_size,
"language": _FS_PREVIEW_LANGUAGE_BY_EXT.get(target.suffix.lower(), "text"),
"mimeType": _fs_mime_type(target),
"path": str(target),
"text": data.decode("utf-8", errors="replace"),
"truncated": st.st_size > _FS_TEXT_PREVIEW_MAX_BYTES,
}
class FsWriteText(BaseModel):
path: str
content: str
@app.post("/api/fs/write-text")
async def fs_write_text(payload: FsWriteText):
"""Overwrite (or create) a UTF-8 text file for the in-app spot editor.
Mirrors the local Electron ``hermes:fs:writeText`` hardening: the path is
resolved + validated by ``_fs_path``, the parent directory must already
exist (we never build directory trees), only regular files may be replaced,
and the payload is size-capped. The write is staged to a sibling temp file
and ``os.replace``-d into place so a crash mid-write can't truncate the
original. Stale-on-disk detection is the client's job (re-read before save),
so both transports behave identically.
"""
target = _fs_path(payload.path)
text = payload.content or ""
if len(text.encode("utf-8")) > _FS_TEXT_WRITE_MAX_BYTES:
raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="Content too large")
try:
st: Optional[os.stat_result] = target.stat()
except FileNotFoundError:
st = None
except PermissionError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="File is not writable")
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc) or "Invalid path")
if st is not None and stat.S_ISDIR(st.st_mode):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Path points to a directory")
if st is not None and not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Only regular files can be written")
if not target.parent.is_dir():
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Parent directory does not exist")
tmp = target.with_name(f".{target.name}.hermes-tmp-{os.getpid()}")
try:
tmp.write_text(text, encoding="utf-8")
os.replace(tmp, target)
except PermissionError:
tmp.unlink(missing_ok=True)
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="File is not writable")
except OSError as exc:
tmp.unlink(missing_ok=True)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not write file: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "path": str(target), "byteSize": len(text.encode("utf-8"))}
@app.get("/api/fs/read-data-url")
async def fs_read_data_url(path: str):
target, st = _fs_regular_file(_fs_path(path))
if st.st_size > _FS_DATA_URL_MAX_BYTES:
raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="File too large")
try:
encoded = base64.b64encode(target.read_bytes()).decode("ascii")
except PermissionError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="File is not readable")
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc) or "File read failed")
return {"dataUrl": f"data:{_fs_mime_type(target)};base64,{encoded}"}
@app.get("/api/fs/git-root")
async def fs_git_root(path: str):
target = _fs_path(path)
try:
st = target.stat()
start = target if stat.S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) else target.parent
except OSError:
start = target
return {"root": _fs_find_git_root(start)}
@app.get("/api/fs/default-cwd")
async def fs_default_cwd():
cwd = _fs_default_cwd()
return {"cwd": cwd, "branch": _fs_git_branch(cwd)}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Git ops — the remote half of the desktop coding rail + review pane.
#
# The desktop runs these as Electron-local git on the user's machine; over a
# remote gateway that's the wrong filesystem, so we mirror them here (same auth
# gate + path hardening as /api/fs). Logic lives in ``hermes_cli.web_git``;
# these are thin, executor-offloaded wrappers (git/gh can block).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
from hermes_cli import web_git as _web_git # noqa: E402
async def _git_op(fn, *args):
"""Run a (blocking) git op off the event loop; map a failed mutation to 400."""
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
try:
return await loop.run_in_executor(None, fn, *args)
except RuntimeError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc) or "git operation failed")
def _git_path(path: str) -> str:
return str(_fs_path(path))
class GitPathBody(BaseModel):
path: str
class GitFileBody(BaseModel):
path: str
file: Optional[str] = None
class GitCommitBody(BaseModel):
path: str
message: str
push: bool = False
class GitWorktreeAddBody(BaseModel):
path: str
name: Optional[str] = None
branch: Optional[str] = None
base: Optional[str] = None
existingBranch: Optional[str] = None
class GitWorktreeRemoveBody(BaseModel):
path: str
worktreePath: str
force: bool = False
class GitBranchSwitchBody(BaseModel):
path: str
branch: str
@app.get("/api/git/status")
async def git_status_route(path: str):
return await _git_op(_web_git.repo_status, _git_path(path))
@app.get("/api/git/worktrees")
async def git_worktrees_route(path: str):
return {"worktrees": await _git_op(_web_git.worktree_list, _git_path(path))}
@app.get("/api/git/branches")
async def git_branches_route(path: str):
return {"branches": await _git_op(_web_git.branch_list, _git_path(path))}
@app.get("/api/git/base-branches")
async def git_base_branches_route(path: str):
return {"branches": await _git_op(_web_git.base_branch_list, _git_path(path))}
@app.get("/api/git/review/list")
async def git_review_list_route(path: str, scope: str = "uncommitted", base: Optional[str] = None):
return await _git_op(_web_git.review_list, _git_path(path), scope, base)
@app.get("/api/git/review/diff")
async def git_review_diff_route(
path: str, file: str, scope: str = "uncommitted", base: Optional[str] = None, staged: bool = False
):
return {"diff": await _git_op(_web_git.review_diff, _git_path(path), file, scope, base, staged)}
@app.get("/api/git/file-diff")
async def git_file_diff_route(path: str, file: str):
return {"diff": await _git_op(_web_git.file_diff_vs_head, _git_path(path), file)}
@app.get("/api/git/review/commit-context")
async def git_commit_context_route(path: str):
return await _git_op(_web_git.review_commit_context, _git_path(path))
@app.get("/api/git/review/rev-parse")
async def git_rev_parse_route(path: str, ref: Optional[str] = None):
return {"sha": await _git_op(_web_git.review_rev_parse, _git_path(path), ref)}
@app.get("/api/git/review/ship-info")
async def git_ship_info_route(path: str):
return await _git_op(_web_git.review_ship_info, _git_path(path))
@app.post("/api/git/review/stage")
async def git_stage_route(body: GitFileBody):
return await _git_op(_web_git.review_stage, _git_path(body.path), body.file)
@app.post("/api/git/review/unstage")
async def git_unstage_route(body: GitFileBody):
return await _git_op(_web_git.review_unstage, _git_path(body.path), body.file)
@app.post("/api/git/review/revert")
async def git_revert_route(body: GitFileBody):
return await _git_op(_web_git.review_revert, _git_path(body.path), body.file)
@app.post("/api/git/review/commit")
async def git_commit_route(body: GitCommitBody):
return await _git_op(_web_git.review_commit, _git_path(body.path), body.message, body.push)
@app.post("/api/git/review/push")
async def git_push_route(body: GitPathBody):
return await _git_op(_web_git.review_push, _git_path(body.path))
@app.post("/api/git/review/create-pr")
async def git_create_pr_route(body: GitPathBody):
return await _git_op(_web_git.review_create_pr, _git_path(body.path))
@app.post("/api/git/worktree/add")
async def git_worktree_add_route(body: GitWorktreeAddBody):
options = {
key: value
for key, value in {
"name": body.name,
"branch": body.branch,
"base": body.base,
"existingBranch": body.existingBranch,
}.items()
if value
}
return await _git_op(_web_git.worktree_add, _git_path(body.path), options)
@app.post("/api/git/worktree/remove")
async def git_worktree_remove_route(body: GitWorktreeRemoveBody):
return await _git_op(
_web_git.worktree_remove, _git_path(body.path), _git_path(body.worktreePath), body.force
)
@app.post("/api/git/branch/switch")
async def git_branch_switch_route(body: GitBranchSwitchBody):
return await _git_op(_web_git.branch_switch, _git_path(body.path), body.branch)
# Host TCP ports each port-binding gateway platform listens on, as
# ``platform-name -> (config port key, adapter default)``. Mirrors
# ``PORT_BINDING_PLATFORM_VALUES`` in gateway/config.py and each adapter's
# DEFAULT_PORT / DEFAULT_WEBHOOK_PORT constant. Used only for the dashboard's
# gateway-topology readout — best-effort display data, not a bind source.
_PORT_BINDING_PLATFORM_PORTS: Dict[str, Tuple[str, int]] = {
"webhook": ("port", 8644),
"api_server": ("port", 8642),
"msgraph_webhook": ("port", 8646),
"feishu": ("webhook_port", 8765),
"wecom_callback": ("port", 8645),
"bluebubbles": ("webhook_port", 8645),
"sms": ("webhook_port", 8080),
"whatsapp_cloud": ("webhook_port", 8090),
"line": ("port", 8646),
}
# Platform states that mean the adapter is NOT serving its port right now.
_PLATFORM_DEAD_STATES = frozenset({"fatal", "disconnected", "stopped"})
def _profile_platform_ports(profile_home: Path, runtime: Optional[dict]) -> Dict[str, int]:
"""Best-effort map of ``platform -> host TCP port`` for one profile's gateway.
Reads the platforms the running gateway reported in its
``gateway_state.json`` and resolves each port-binding platform's port from
the profile's ``config.yaml`` (top-level ``platforms:`` wins over
``gateway.platforms:``, matching ``load_gateway_config`` precedence),
falling back to the adapter default. Display-only: env-var port overrides
(e.g. ``WEBHOOK_PORT`` in that profile's .env) are not resolved here.
"""
platforms = (runtime or {}).get("platforms") or {}
active = [
name for name, state in platforms.items()
if name in _PORT_BINDING_PLATFORM_PORTS
and isinstance(state, dict)
and state.get("state") not in _PLATFORM_DEAD_STATES
]
if not active:
return {}
blocks: Dict[str, dict] = {}
try:
with open(profile_home / "config.yaml", encoding="utf-8") as f:
cfg = yaml.safe_load(f) or {}
gateway_cfg = cfg.get("gateway") if isinstance(cfg.get("gateway"), dict) else {}
# gateway.platforms first, top-level platforms second — later wins,
# matching the precedence in gateway.config.load_gateway_config().
for src in ((gateway_cfg or {}).get("platforms"), cfg.get("platforms")):
if not isinstance(src, dict):
continue
for plat_name, plat_block in src.items():
if isinstance(plat_block, dict):
blocks.setdefault(plat_name, {}).update(plat_block)
except Exception:
blocks = {}
ports: Dict[str, int] = {}
for name in active:
port_key, default_port = _PORT_BINDING_PLATFORM_PORTS[name]
block = blocks.get(name) or {}
extra = block.get("extra") if isinstance(block.get("extra"), dict) else {}
raw = block.get(port_key, (extra or {}).get(port_key, default_port))
try:
ports[name] = int(raw)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
ports[name] = default_port
return ports
def _collect_profile_gateway_topology() -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Enumerate profiles and the gateways serving them for ``/api/status``.
Returns ``{"profiles": [...], "gateway_mode": ..., "gateways": [...]}``:
* ``profiles`` — every profile on the host (default + named), from
``profiles_to_serve(True)`` (the cheap enumeration chokepoint — no
per-profile config reads or skill counts).
* ``gateways`` — one entry per profile with a LIVE gateway process:
``{"profile", "ports", "served_profiles"?}``. Liveness reuses
``_check_gateway_running`` so this agrees with the profiles sidebar.
* ``gateway_mode`` — ``"multiplex"`` when the default gateway serves
multiple profiles (gateway.multiplex_profiles), ``"single"`` for one
live gateway, ``"multiple"`` for independent per-profile gateways,
``"none"`` when nothing is running.
"""
try:
from hermes_cli.profiles import _check_gateway_running, profiles_to_serve
from gateway.status import read_runtime_status
homes = profiles_to_serve(True)
except Exception:
_log.debug("profile/gateway topology enumeration failed", exc_info=True)
return {"profiles": [], "gateway_mode": "unknown", "gateways": []}
profile_names = [name for name, _home in homes]
gateways: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
multiplex = False
for name, home in homes:
try:
if not _check_gateway_running(home):
continue
except Exception:
continue
try:
runtime = read_runtime_status(home / "gateway_state.json")
except Exception:
runtime = None
served = [str(p) for p in ((runtime or {}).get("served_profiles") or [])]
if name == "default" and len(served) > 1:
multiplex = True
entry: Dict[str, Any] = {
"profile": name,
"ports": _profile_platform_ports(home, runtime),
}
if served:
entry["served_profiles"] = served
gateways.append(entry)
if multiplex:
mode = "multiplex"
elif len(gateways) > 1:
mode = "multiple"
elif len(gateways) == 1:
mode = "single"
else:
mode = "none"
return {"profiles": profile_names, "gateway_mode": mode, "gateways": gateways}
@app.get("/api/ssh/ownership")
async def get_ssh_ownership(request: Request):
_require_token(request)
if not _SSH_OWNER_NONCE:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="SSH ownership is not active")
return {"ok": True, "sshOwnerNonce": _SSH_OWNER_NONCE, "protocolVersion": 1}
@app.get("/api/status")
async def get_status(profile: Optional[str] = None):
status_scope = None
requested_profile = (profile or "").strip()
# Plain /api/status stays the machine-level public liveness probe. The
# dashboard adds ?profile= when its management switcher targets another
# profile, so its gateway badge reflects the selected profile.
#
# Use the config-only (contextvar) scope, NOT _profile_scope: this handler
# awaits the remote-health probe, and _profile_scope swaps process-global
# skills-module attributes that a concurrent request would cross-restore
# across that await. Status only resolves get_hermes_home() at call time
# (config/env/gateway state), which the task-local contextvar covers.
if requested_profile and requested_profile.lower() != "current":
status_scope = _config_profile_scope(requested_profile)
status_scope.__enter__()
try:
current_ver, latest_ver = check_config_version()
# --- Gateway liveness detection ---
# Try local PID check first (same-host). If that fails and a remote
# GATEWAY_HEALTH_URL is configured, probe the gateway over HTTP so the
# dashboard works when the gateway runs in a separate container.
gateway_pid = get_running_pid_cached()
gateway_running = gateway_pid is not None
remote_health_body: dict | None = None
if not gateway_running and _GATEWAY_HEALTH_URL:
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
try:
alive, remote_health_body = await asyncio.wait_for(
loop.run_in_executor(None, _probe_gateway_health),
timeout=_GATEWAY_HEALTH_ROUTE_TIMEOUT,
)
except TimeoutError:
_log.warning(
"/api/status gateway health probe exceeded %.2fs; using local status",
_GATEWAY_HEALTH_ROUTE_TIMEOUT,
)
alive, remote_health_body = False, None
if alive:
gateway_running = True
# PID from the remote container (display only — not locally valid)
if remote_health_body:
gateway_pid = remote_health_body.get("pid")
gateway_state = None
gateway_platforms: dict = {}
gateway_exit_reason = None
gateway_updated_at = None
configured_gateway_platforms: set[str] | None = None
try:
from gateway.config import load_gateway_config
gateway_config = load_gateway_config()
configured_gateway_platforms = {
platform.value for platform in gateway_config.get_connected_platforms()
}
except Exception:
configured_gateway_platforms = None
# Prefer the detailed health endpoint response (has full state) when the
# local runtime status file is absent or stale (cross-container).
local_runtime = read_runtime_status()
runtime = local_runtime
if runtime is None and remote_health_body and remote_health_body.get("gateway_state"):
runtime = remote_health_body
# The runtime-status PID fallback validates liveness with a local
# os.kill() probe, so it must only run against the LOCAL status file —
# never the remote health body, whose PID belongs to another host and
# is display-only. (Running os.kill on a remote PID is both wrong and
# trips the test live-system guard.)
if not gateway_running and local_runtime is not None:
runtime_pid = get_runtime_status_running_pid(local_runtime)
if runtime_pid is not None:
gateway_running = True
gateway_pid = runtime_pid
if runtime:
gateway_state = runtime.get("gateway_state")
gateway_platforms = runtime.get("platforms") or {}
if configured_gateway_platforms is not None:
gateway_platforms = {
key: value
for key, value in gateway_platforms.items()
if key in configured_gateway_platforms
}
gateway_exit_reason = runtime.get("exit_reason")
# Contract: gateway_updated_at is RFC3339 string | null, never a
# number. ``runtime`` here may be the local gateway_state.json
# (legacy gateways wrote epoch floats; hand edits can inject
# anything) or a remote /health/detailed body — normalize both.
gateway_updated_at = normalize_updated_at(runtime.get("updated_at"))
if not gateway_running:
gateway_state = gateway_state if gateway_state in {"stopped", "startup_failed"} else "stopped"
gateway_platforms = {}
elif gateway_running and remote_health_body is not None:
# The health probe confirmed the gateway is alive, but the local
# runtime status file may be stale (cross-container). Override
# stopped/None state so the dashboard shows the correct badge.
if gateway_state in {None, "stopped"}:
gateway_state = "running"
# If there was no runtime info at all but the health probe confirmed alive,
# ensure we still report the gateway as running (no shared volume scenario).
if gateway_running and gateway_state is None and remote_health_body is not None:
gateway_state = "running"
active_sessions = await _status_active_sessions()
# Busy/drainable readout (NAS lifecycle-safety gate). active_agents is
# the in-flight gateway-turn count the gateway now persists at every
# turn boundary; gateway_busy/gateway_drainable are derived from it +
# liveness via the single shared contract in gateway.status. Liveness
# keys off gateway_running (a live PID/health probe), NEVER
# gateway_updated_at — a healthy idle gateway never advances that.
active_agents = parse_active_agents((runtime or {}).get("active_agents", 0))
gateway_busy = derive_gateway_busy(
gateway_running=gateway_running,
gateway_state=gateway_state,
active_agents=active_agents,
)
gateway_drainable = derive_gateway_drainable(
gateway_running=gateway_running,
gateway_state=gateway_state,
)
# Resolved drain timeout (seconds) so NAS can size its poll deadline
# without out-of-band knowledge. Offload to a thread: on a cold
# Windows install the first import of hermes_cli.gateway blocks the
# asyncio event loop for 15-30s (.pyc compilation + Defender scans),
# exceeding the desktop handshake's 15s socket timeout. After the
# first call the module is in sys.modules and run_in_executor returns
# in microseconds.
restart_drain_timeout = await asyncio.get_running_loop().run_in_executor(
None, _resolve_restart_drain_timeout
)
# Dashboard auth gate (Phase 7): surface whether the gate is engaged
# and which providers are registered so ``hermes status`` and the
# SPA's StatusPage can show "OAuth gate ON via Nous Research" or
# "loopback only — no auth gate" with no extra round trips.
auth_required = bool(getattr(app.state, "auth_required", False))
auth_providers: list[str] = []
try:
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth import list_providers as _list_providers
auth_providers = [p.name for p in _list_providers()]
except Exception:
# Module not importable yet (early startup) — leave as [].
pass
# Nous bootstrap-session validity for the NAS health sweep. A hosted
# agent whose Nous auth dies terminally (invalid_grant / quarantine)
# looks HEALTHY to every liveness/connectivity probe — the machine,
# relay, and this dashboard all stay up — yet every inference turn
# fails. This is the ONLY signal that surfaces that condition, and it
# is determinable with no working token (local auth-store state). NAS
# re-mints the bootstrap session when it reads "terminal". Best-effort:
# never let auth classification break the public liveness probe.
nous_session_valid = "unknown"
try:
from hermes_cli.auth import get_nous_session_validity
nous_session_valid = get_nous_session_validity()
except Exception:
nous_session_valid = "unknown"
# Always-public liveness + auth-gate shape. Safe for external uptime
# probes (NAS's wildcard-subdomain liveness probe), the SPA's pre-login
# bootstrap, and anyone who can curl the host — i.e. exactly the audience
# ``PUBLIC_API_PATHS`` documents this endpoint as serving.
status = {
"version": __version__,
"release_date": __release_date__,
"config_version": current_ver,
"latest_config_version": latest_ver,
"can_update_hermes": not _dashboard_local_update_managed_externally(),
"gateway_running": gateway_running,
"gateway_state": gateway_state,
"gateway_platforms": gateway_platforms,
"gateway_exit_reason": gateway_exit_reason,
"gateway_updated_at": gateway_updated_at,
"active_agents": active_agents,
"gateway_busy": gateway_busy,
"gateway_drainable": gateway_drainable,
"restart_drain_timeout": restart_drain_timeout,
"active_sessions": active_sessions,
"auth_required": auth_required,
"auth_providers": auth_providers,
"nous_session_valid": nous_session_valid,
}
# Component-level health rollup. Counts and status enums only — this
# payload is public (PUBLIC_API_PATHS), so no messages, paths, or
# other detail that could carry secrets. The storage probe reuses the
# gateway readiness state_db check (read-only, 1s-bounded) in an
# executor so a wedged DB can't stall the event loop.
components: Dict[str, Any] = {
"gateway": {
"status": "ok" if gateway_running and gateway_state in {"running", "draining"} else "degraded",
"state": gateway_state or ("running" if gateway_running else "stopped"),
},
"dashboard": DASHBOARD_HEALTH.snapshot(),
}
try:
from gateway.readiness import _probe_state_db
storage_check = await asyncio.get_running_loop().run_in_executor(
None, functools.partial(_probe_state_db, get_hermes_home())
)
components["storage"] = {"status": storage_check.get("status", "degraded")}
except Exception:
components["storage"] = {"status": "degraded"}
platform_states = [
str(value.get("state") or value.get("status") or "").lower()
for value in gateway_platforms.values()
if isinstance(value, dict)
]
platforms_ok = all(
state in {"connected", "running", "ok"} for state in platform_states
)
components["platforms"] = {
"status": "ok" if platforms_ok else "degraded",
"configured": len(gateway_platforms),
"connected": sum(
1 for state in platform_states if state in {"connected", "running", "ok"}
),
}
status["components"] = components
status["overall"] = (
"ok"
if all(item.get("status") == "ok" for item in components.values())
else "degraded"
)
# Deferred FTS rebuild progress (schema v23): lets the desktop /
# dashboard render a "search index rebuilding: N%" indicator instead
# of users wondering why old-message search is slower after an
# update. None/absent when no rebuild is pending (the common case).
# Read-only probe, never blocks startup, never raises.
try:
from hermes_state import SessionDB as _SDB
from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home as _ghh
_db_path = _ghh() / "state.db"
if _db_path.exists():
_sdb = _SDB(db_path=_db_path, read_only=True)
try:
_rebuild = _sdb.fts_rebuild_status()
finally:
_sdb.close()
if _rebuild is not None:
status["fts_rebuild"] = _rebuild
except Exception:
pass
# Profile + gateway topology: which profiles exist, whether one
# multiplexed gateway or several per-profile gateways serve them, and
# (gated) which host ports the live gateways' port-binding platforms
# listen on. Enumerating profiles walks the filesystem and probes the
# process table, so keep it off the event loop.
#
# Split by sensitivity: profile NAMES (``profiles``) and the gateway
# ``gateway_mode`` are low-sensitivity PRODUCT surface — Hermes Cloud
# renders the profile list in the Portal, which reads this endpoint over
# the network (a gated bind), so they must survive the auth gate. The
# per-gateway ``gateways[]`` detail carries host ports (deployment
# recon), so it stays gated with the host paths / PID below.
topology = await asyncio.get_running_loop().run_in_executor(
None, _collect_profile_gateway_topology
)
status["profiles"] = topology["profiles"]
status["gateway_mode"] = topology["gateway_mode"]
# Absolute host paths, the gateway PID, the internal gateway health
# URL, and per-gateway ports are deployment recon a liveness probe never
# needs. ``/api/status`` is in ``PUBLIC_API_PATHS`` so it bypasses
# dashboard auth; on a network-exposed (gated) bind that means *any*
# unauthenticated caller reaches it, and leaking host metadata there
# contradicts the allowlist's own contract ("version, gateway state,
# active session count, and the dashboard auth-gate shape. No bodies, no
# session content, no secrets"). Surface this detail only on a loopback
# / ``--insecure`` bind, where the dashboard is local-only and the
# caller is already inside the trust envelope — the same loopback/gated
# split ``should_require_auth`` draws.
if not auth_required:
status.update({
"hermes_home": str(get_hermes_home()),
"config_path": str(get_config_path()),
"env_path": str(get_env_path()),
"gateway_pid": gateway_pid,
"gateway_health_url": _GATEWAY_HEALTH_URL,
"gateways": topology["gateways"],
})
return status
finally:
if status_scope is not None:
status_scope.__exit__(*sys.exc_info())
_WINDOWS_11_MIN_BUILD = 22000
def _windows_build_number(version: str, platform_label: str) -> Optional[int]:
"""Extract the Windows NT build number from stdlib platform strings."""
for value in (version or "", platform_label or ""):
match = re.search(r"(?:^|[^\d])10\.0\.(\d{5,})(?:[^\d]|$)", value)
if not match:
continue
try:
return int(match.group(1))
except ValueError:
continue
return None
def _display_system_platform(
*,
system: str,
release: str,
version: str,
platform_label: str,
) -> Dict[str, str]:
"""Return host OS fields for display while preserving stdlib detail."""
if system == "Windows" and release == "10":
build = _windows_build_number(version, platform_label)
if build is not None and build >= _WINDOWS_11_MIN_BUILD:
platform_label = re.sub(
r"^Windows-10(?=-)",
"Windows-11",
platform_label,
count=1,
)
release = "11"
return {
"os": system,
"os_release": release,
"os_version": version,
"platform": platform_label,
}
@app.get("/api/system/stats")
async def get_system_stats():
"""Host + process system stats for the System page.
OS / Python / host identity from stdlib; CPU / memory / disk / uptime from
psutil when available, with graceful degradation when it isn't. Read-only
and non-sensitive (no env values, no paths beyond the hermes home root).
"""
import platform as _platform
info: Dict[str, Any] = {
**_display_system_platform(
system=_platform.system(),
release=_platform.release(),
version=_platform.version(),
platform_label=_platform.platform(),
),
"arch": _platform.machine(),
"hostname": _platform.node(),
"python_version": _platform.python_version(),
"python_impl": _platform.python_implementation(),
"hermes_version": __version__,
"cpu_count": os.cpu_count(),
}
# psutil enriches the picture when present; everything below is optional.
try:
import psutil # type: ignore
vm = psutil.virtual_memory()
info["memory"] = {
"total": vm.total,
"available": vm.available,
"used": vm.used,
"percent": vm.percent,
}
try:
du = psutil.disk_usage(str(get_hermes_home()))
info["disk"] = {
"total": du.total,
"used": du.used,
"free": du.free,
"percent": du.percent,
}
except Exception:
pass
try:
info["cpu_percent"] = psutil.cpu_percent(interval=0.1)
la = getattr(psutil, "getloadavg", None)
if la:
info["load_avg"] = list(la())
except Exception:
pass
try:
boot = psutil.boot_time()
info["uptime_seconds"] = int(time.time() - boot)
except Exception:
pass
try:
proc = psutil.Process()
info["process"] = {
"pid": proc.pid,
"rss": proc.memory_info().rss,
"create_time": int(proc.create_time()),
"num_threads": proc.num_threads(),
}
except Exception:
pass
info["psutil"] = True
except Exception:
info["psutil"] = False
# stdlib-only fallbacks for load average + uptime where the kernel
# exposes them.
try:
info["load_avg"] = list(os.getloadavg())
except (OSError, AttributeError):
pass
return info
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Curator endpoints — background skill-maintenance status + controls.
#
# The curator periodically reviews skills (archive stale, prune, pin). The
# dashboard surfaces its state and the pause/resume/run-now controls that
# `hermes curator` exposes.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@app.get("/api/curator")
async def get_curator_status():
try:
from agent import curator
except Exception as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Curator unavailable: {exc}")
try:
state = curator.load_state()
except Exception:
state = {}
return {
"enabled": _safe_call(curator, "is_enabled", True),
"paused": _safe_call(curator, "is_paused", False),
"interval_hours": _safe_call(curator, "get_interval_hours", None),
"last_run_at": state.get("last_run_at"),
"min_idle_hours": _safe_call(curator, "get_min_idle_hours", None),
"stale_after_days": _safe_call(curator, "get_stale_after_days", None),
"archive_after_days": _safe_call(curator, "get_archive_after_days", None),
}
class CuratorPause(BaseModel):
paused: bool
@app.put("/api/curator/paused")
async def set_curator_paused(body: CuratorPause):
from agent import curator
curator.set_paused(bool(body.paused))
return {"ok": True, "paused": bool(body.paused)}
@app.post("/api/curator/run")
async def run_curator():
"""Trigger a curator review now (backgrounded; tail via action status)."""
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(["curator", "run"], "curator-run")
except Exception as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to run curator: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "pid": proc.pid, "name": "curator-run"}
@app.get("/api/learning/graph")
async def get_learning_graph(profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Learning graph payload for the desktop panel.
Profile-scoped view of learned, non-base skills plus memory chunks, with
graph links derived from skill relations and memory-skill overlap.
"""
try:
from agent.learning_graph import build_learning_graph
with _profile_scope(profile):
return build_learning_graph()
except Exception:
_log.exception("GET /api/learning/graph failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to build learning graph")
class LearningNodeRef(BaseModel):
id: str
profile: Optional[str] = None
class LearningNodeEdit(BaseModel):
id: str
content: str
profile: Optional[str] = None
@app.get("/api/learning/node")
async def get_learning_node(id: str, profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Current content of a journey node (skill SKILL.md or memory chunk), for an edit prefill."""
from agent.learning_mutations import node_detail
with _profile_scope(profile):
res = node_detail(id)
if not res.get("ok"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=res.get("message", "not found"))
return res
@app.delete("/api/learning/node")
async def delete_learning_node(body: LearningNodeRef):
"""Delete a journey node — skills are archived (restorable), memories removed."""
from agent.learning_mutations import delete_node
with _profile_scope(body.profile):
res = delete_node(body.id)
if not res.get("ok"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=res.get("message", "delete failed"))
return res
@app.put("/api/learning/node")
async def update_learning_node(body: LearningNodeEdit):
"""Rewrite a journey node's content (SKILL.md or memory chunk)."""
from agent.learning_mutations import edit_node
with _profile_scope(body.profile):
res = edit_node(body.id, body.content)
if not res.get("ok"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=res.get("message", "edit failed"))
return res
def _safe_call(mod, fn_name: str, default):
try:
fn = getattr(mod, fn_name, None)
return fn() if callable(fn) else default
except Exception:
return default
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Portal endpoint — Nous Portal auth + Tool Gateway routing status (read-only).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@app.get("/api/portal")
async def get_portal_status():
cfg = load_config() or {}
auth: Dict[str, Any] = {}
try:
from hermes_cli.auth import get_nous_auth_status
auth = get_nous_auth_status() or {}
except Exception:
auth = {}
features = []
try:
from hermes_cli.nous_subscription import get_nous_subscription_features
feats = get_nous_subscription_features(cfg)
if feats is not None:
for feat in feats.items():
if getattr(feat, "managed_by_nous", False):
state = "via Nous Portal"
elif getattr(feat, "active", False) and getattr(feat, "current_provider", None):
state = feat.current_provider
elif getattr(feat, "active", False):
state = "active"
else:
state = "not configured"
features.append({"label": getattr(feat, "label", ""), "state": state})
except Exception:
_log.exception("portal features failed")
model_cfg = cfg.get("model") if isinstance(cfg.get("model"), dict) else {}
return {
"logged_in": bool(auth.get("logged_in")),
"portal_url": auth.get("portal_base_url"),
"inference_url": auth.get("inference_base_url"),
"provider": str((model_cfg or {}).get("provider") or ""),
"subscription_url": "https://portal.nousresearch.com/manage-subscription",
"features": features,
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Diagnostics: prompt-size, support dump, debug upload, config migrate.
# All produce text output, so they spawn background actions tailed via
# /api/actions/<name>/status.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@app.post("/api/ops/prompt-size")
async def run_prompt_size():
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(["prompt-size"], "prompt-size")
except Exception as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "pid": proc.pid, "name": "prompt-size"}
@app.post("/api/ops/dump")
async def run_dump():
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(["dump"], "dump")
except Exception as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "pid": proc.pid, "name": "dump"}
@app.post("/api/ops/config-migrate")
async def run_config_migrate():
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(["config", "migrate"], "config-migrate")
except Exception as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "pid": proc.pid, "name": "config-migrate"}
class DebugShareRequest(BaseModel):
# Redaction is ON by default — force-mode scrubs credential-shaped tokens
# out of log content before it leaves the machine. The toggle exists so an
# operator who knows the logs are clean can opt out for fuller fidelity.
redact: bool = True
# Recent log lines included in the summary tail (full logs are separate).
lines: int = 200
@app.post("/api/ops/debug-share")
async def run_debug_share_endpoint(body: DebugShareRequest | None = None):
"""Upload a redacted debug report + full logs and return the paste URLs.
Unlike the other diagnostics actions (doctor, dump, prompt-size) this is
*synchronous*: the whole point of ``debug share`` is the set of shareable
URLs it produces, so we run the upload in a worker thread and return the
structured ``{urls, failures, redacted, ...}`` payload directly. The
dashboard renders those as real, copyable links instead of scraping a log
tail. Pastes auto-delete after 6 hours (handled inside the share core).
"""
from hermes_cli.debug import build_debug_share
req = body or DebugShareRequest()
try:
result = await asyncio.to_thread(
build_debug_share,
log_lines=max(1, min(int(req.lines), 5000)),
redact=bool(req.redact),
)
except RuntimeError as exc:
# Required summary-report upload failed (offline / paste service down).
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail=f"Upload failed: {exc}")
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("debug share failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed: {exc}")
return {
"ok": True,
"urls": result.urls,
"failures": result.failures,
"redacted": result.redacted,
"auto_delete_seconds": result.auto_delete_seconds,
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Gateway + update actions (invoked from the Status page).
#
# Both commands are spawned as detached subprocesses so the HTTP request
# returns immediately. stdin is closed (``DEVNULL``) so any stray ``input()``
# calls fail fast with EOF rather than hanging forever. stdout/stderr are
# streamed to a per-action log file under ``~/.hermes/logs/<action>.log`` so
# the dashboard can tail them back to the user.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_ACTION_LOG_DIR: Path = get_hermes_home() / "logs"
_ACTION_LOG_TAIL_MAX_BYTES = 256 * 1024
_ACTION_LOG_TAIL_INITIAL_CHUNK_BYTES = 8 * 1024
_ACTION_LOG_TAIL_MAX_CHUNK_BYTES = 64 * 1024
# Short ``name`` (from the URL) → absolute log file path.
_ACTION_LOG_FILES: Dict[str, str] = {
"gateway-restart": "gateway-restart.log",
"gateway-start": "gateway-start.log",
"gateway-stop": "gateway-stop.log",
"hermes-update": "hermes-update.log",
"doctor": "action-doctor.log",
"security-audit": "action-security-audit.log",
"backup": "action-backup.log",
"import": "action-import.log",
"checkpoints-prune": "action-checkpoints-prune.log",
"skills-install": "action-skills-install.log",
"skills-uninstall": "action-skills-uninstall.log",
"skills-update": "action-skills-update.log",
"curator-run": "action-curator-run.log",
"prompt-size": "action-prompt-size.log",
"dump": "action-dump.log",
"config-migrate": "action-config-migrate.log",
"tools-post-setup": "action-tools-post-setup.log",
}
# ``name`` → most recently spawned Popen handle. Used so ``status`` can
# report liveness and exit code without shelling out to ``ps``.
_ACTION_PROCS: Dict[str, subprocess.Popen] = {}
_ACTION_COMMANDS: Dict[str, Tuple[str, ...]] = {}
# ``name`` → completed synthetic action result for actions the server handled
# without spawning a subprocess (for example, unsupported Docker updates).
_ACTION_RESULTS: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
def _record_completed_action(name: str, message: str, exit_code: int = 1) -> None:
"""Record a non-spawned action result and write it to the action log."""
log_file_name = _ACTION_LOG_FILES[name]
_ACTION_LOG_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
log_path = _ACTION_LOG_DIR / log_file_name
with open(log_path, "ab", buffering=0) as log_file:
log_file.write(
f"\n=== {name} completed {time.strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')} ===\n".encode()
)
log_file.write(message.encode("utf-8", errors="replace"))
if not message.endswith("\n"):
log_file.write(b"\n")
_ACTION_PROCS.pop(name, None)
_ACTION_COMMANDS.pop(name, None)
_ACTION_RESULTS[name] = {"exit_code": exit_code, "pid": None}
def _dashboard_spawn_executable() -> str:
"""Prefer pythonw.exe for detached dashboard actions on Windows."""
if sys.platform != "win32":
return sys.executable
exe = sys.executable
if exe.lower().endswith("python.exe"):
pythonw = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(exe), "pythonw.exe")
if os.path.isfile(pythonw):
return pythonw
return exe
def _spawn_hermes_action(subcommand: List[str], name: str) -> subprocess.Popen:
"""Spawn ``hermes <subcommand>`` detached and record the Popen handle.
Uses the running interpreter's ``hermes_cli.main`` module so the action
inherits the same venv/PYTHONPATH the web server is using.
"""
log_file_name = _ACTION_LOG_FILES[name]
_ACTION_LOG_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
log_path = _ACTION_LOG_DIR / log_file_name
log_file = open(log_path, "ab", buffering=0)
log_file.write(
f"\n=== {name} started {time.strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')} ===\n".encode()
)
cmd = [_dashboard_spawn_executable(), "-m", "hermes_cli.main", *subcommand]
# The dashboard runs *inside* the gateway process, so os.environ carries
# _HERMES_GATEWAY=1. Inheriting it makes a spawned `hermes gateway restart`
# trip the in-process restart-loop guard and exit 1 — silently failing the
# dashboard's auto-restart paths. The gateway's own restart watcher already
# drops it (gateway/run.py); mirror that here (#52470).
action_env = {**os.environ, "HERMES_NONINTERACTIVE": "1"}
action_env.pop("_HERMES_GATEWAY", None)
popen_kwargs: Dict[str, Any] = {
"cwd": str(PROJECT_ROOT),
"stdin": subprocess.DEVNULL,
"stdout": log_file,
"stderr": subprocess.STDOUT,
"env": action_env,
}
if sys.platform == "win32":
popen_kwargs["creationflags"] = windows_detach_flags()
else:
popen_kwargs["start_new_session"] = True
proc = subprocess.Popen(cmd, **popen_kwargs)
# The child inherits its own duplicated fd for stdout/stderr, so the
# parent's handle can be released immediately — otherwise we leak one
# fd per spawned action.
log_file.close()
_ACTION_RESULTS.pop(name, None)
_ACTION_COMMANDS[name] = tuple(subcommand)
_ACTION_PROCS[name] = proc
return proc
def _tail_lines(path: Path, n: int) -> List[str]:
"""Return the last ``n`` lines of ``path`` without loading huge logs."""
if n <= 0 or not path.exists():
return []
try:
size = path.stat().st_size
except OSError:
return []
if size <= 0:
return []
min_offset = max(0, size - _ACTION_LOG_TAIL_MAX_BYTES)
offset = size
chunk_size = _ACTION_LOG_TAIL_INITIAL_CHUNK_BYTES
newline_count = 0
chunks: List[bytes] = []
drop_partial_first_line = False
try:
with path.open("rb") as handle:
while offset > min_offset and newline_count <= n:
read_size = min(chunk_size, offset - min_offset)
offset -= read_size
handle.seek(offset)
chunk = handle.read(read_size)
chunks.append(chunk)
newline_count += chunk.count(b"\n")
chunk_size = min(
chunk_size * 2,
_ACTION_LOG_TAIL_MAX_CHUNK_BYTES,
)
if offset > 0:
handle.seek(offset - 1)
drop_partial_first_line = handle.read(1) != b"\n"
except OSError:
return []
lines = (
b"".join(reversed(chunks))
.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
.splitlines()
)
if drop_partial_first_line and lines:
lines = lines[1:]
return lines[-n:]
def _gateway_subcommand(profile: Optional[str], verb: str) -> List[str]:
return _profile_cli_args(profile) + ["gateway", verb]
def _gateway_display_command(profile: Optional[str], verb: str) -> str:
return " ".join(["hermes", *_gateway_subcommand(profile, verb)])
# Kept in sync with the corresponding frontend validation in ChannelsPage.tsx.
_TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN_RE = re.compile(r"\d+:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{30,}")
_TELEGRAM_USER_ID_RE = re.compile(r"\d+")
_SLACK_MEMBER_ID_RE = re.compile(r"[UW][A-Z0-9]{2,}")
def _validate_messaging_env_value(platform_id: str, key: str, value: str) -> None:
"""Reject platform credentials that are clearly in the wrong field."""
if not value:
return
if platform_id == "telegram":
if key == "TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN" and not _TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN_RE.fullmatch(value):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="Telegram bot token must be the complete token from @BotFather, such as 123456789:ABC…",
)
if key == "TELEGRAM_ALLOWED_USERS":
user_ids = [part.strip() for part in value.split(",") if part.strip()]
if any(not _TELEGRAM_USER_ID_RE.fullmatch(user_id) for user_id in user_ids):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="Telegram allowed users must be comma-separated numeric user IDs.",
)
return
if platform_id != "slack":
return
if key == "SLACK_BOT_TOKEN" and not value.startswith("xoxb-"):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="Slack Bot Token must start with xoxb-. Paste the bot token from OAuth & Permissions.",
)
if key == "SLACK_APP_TOKEN" and not value.startswith("xapp-"):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="Slack App Token must start with xapp-. Paste the app-level token from Basic Information > App-Level Tokens.",
)
if key == "SLACK_ALLOWED_USERS":
# Mirror the gateway's parse (gateway/platforms/slack.py): split on comma,
# strip, and drop empty entries so a trailing/interior comma isn't rejected
# here when the runtime would accept it. "*" is the allow-all wildcard.
user_ids = [part.strip() for part in value.split(",") if part.strip()]
invalid = [
user_id
for user_id in user_ids
if user_id != "*" and not _SLACK_MEMBER_ID_RE.fullmatch(user_id)
]
if invalid:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="Slack allowed user IDs must be comma-separated member IDs like U01ABC2DEF3.",
)
def _spawn_gateway_restart(profile: Optional[str] = None) -> Tuple[subprocess.Popen, bool]:
"""Spawn ``hermes gateway restart``, reusing an in-flight restart.
Multiple dashboard paths can request a restart in quick succession
(restart button double-click, or a stale cached frontend firing its own
restart after the server already auto-restarted post-onboarding). Two
concurrent ``hermes gateway restart`` children race each other on the
manual kill-and-start path, so reuse the live one instead.
Returns ``(proc, reused)``.
"""
subcommand = _gateway_subcommand(profile, "restart")
existing = _ACTION_PROCS.get("gateway-restart")
if existing is not None and existing.poll() is None:
existing_command = _ACTION_COMMANDS.get("gateway-restart")
if existing_command is None or existing_command == tuple(subcommand):
return existing, True
raise RuntimeError("gateway restart already in progress for another profile")
return _spawn_hermes_action(subcommand, "gateway-restart"), False
def _restart_gateway_after_webhook_enable(profile: Optional[str] = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Best-effort gateway restart after enabling the webhook platform."""
try:
proc, reused = _spawn_gateway_restart(profile)
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to auto-restart gateway after enabling webhooks")
return {
"restart_started": False,
"restart_error": str(exc),
}
if reused:
_log.info(
"Webhook enable: reusing in-flight gateway restart (pid %s)",
proc.pid,
)
return {
"restart_started": True,
"restart_action": "gateway-restart",
"restart_pid": proc.pid,
}
@app.post("/api/gateway/restart")
async def restart_gateway(profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Kick off a ``hermes gateway restart`` in the background."""
try:
proc, _reused = _spawn_gateway_restart(profile)
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to spawn gateway restart")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to restart gateway: {exc}")
return {
"ok": True,
"pid": proc.pid,
"name": "gateway-restart",
}
@app.post("/api/gateway/drain")
async def gateway_drain(request: Request):
"""Begin or cancel an external (NAS-driven) gateway drain.
Authenticated by the non-interactive token-auth seam: the
``dashboard_auth/drain`` plugin registers this exact path as a token route
and verifies the ``Authorization`` bearer secret. If that plugin isn't
active (no ``HERMES_DASHBOARD_DRAIN_SECRET``), the route is NOT a token
route, so on a gated bind the cookie gate handles it (a browser session can
still drive it from the dashboard) and on a loopback bind the legacy
session-token gate applies — either way it is never unauthenticated on a
network-exposed bind.
Body: ``{"action": "drain"}`` (begin) or ``{"action": "cancel"}`` (cancel).
Begin writes the ``.drain_request.json`` marker the gateway's
``_drain_control_watcher`` observes (flip to ``draining`` + refuse new
turns); cancel removes it (revert to ``running`` + re-accept). Idempotent
on both sides. This endpoint only writes/removes the marker — the gateway
process owns the actual state transition (there is no HTTP control channel
into the running gateway; the marker IS the channel, decisions.md Q-B).
The force-override (D6: "unless a user commands it") is NOT here — an
immediate, drain-skipping action maps onto the existing
``POST /api/gateway/restart`` force path, which supersedes a drain.
"""
from gateway.drain_control import (
clear_drain_request,
drain_requested,
write_drain_request,
)
try:
body = await request.json()
except Exception:
body = {}
action = str((body or {}).get("action", "drain")).strip().lower()
# Attribute the request to the verified token principal when present
# (token-auth seam attaches it); fall back to a generic label otherwise.
principal_obj = getattr(request.state, "token_principal", None)
principal = getattr(principal_obj, "principal", None) or "dashboard"
if action == "cancel":
existed = clear_drain_request()
_log.info("Gateway drain CANCEL requested by %s (existed=%s)", principal, existed)
return {"ok": True, "action": "cancel", "was_draining": existed}
if action != "drain":
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"Unknown drain action {action!r}; expected 'drain' or 'cancel'",
)
payload = write_drain_request(
principal=str(principal),
suppress_notification=bool((body or {}).get("suppress_notification", False)),
)
_log.info(
"Gateway drain BEGIN requested by %s (suppress_notification=%s)",
principal,
payload["suppress_notification"],
)
return {
"ok": True,
"action": "drain",
"requested_at": payload["requested_at"],
# Echo so a caller polling /api/status knows the marker is now set;
# the gateway watcher flips gateway_state -> draining within ~1s.
"draining": drain_requested(),
"suppress_notification": payload["suppress_notification"],
}
@app.post("/api/hermes/update")
async def update_hermes():
"""Kick off ``hermes update`` in the background."""
if _dashboard_local_update_managed_externally():
message = (
"Hermes updates are managed outside this dashboard in "
"containerized environments. The built-in local updater is "
"disabled here."
)
_record_completed_action("hermes-update", message, exit_code=1)
return {
"ok": False,
"pid": None,
"name": "hermes-update",
"error": "dashboard_update_managed_externally",
"message": message,
"update_command": "managed outside dashboard",
}
install_method = detect_install_method(PROJECT_ROOT)
if install_method == "docker":
message = format_docker_update_message()
_record_completed_action("hermes-update", message, exit_code=1)
return {
"ok": False,
"pid": None,
"name": "hermes-update",
"error": "docker_update_unsupported",
"message": message,
"update_command": recommended_update_command_for_method(install_method),
}
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(["update"], "hermes-update")
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to spawn hermes update")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to start update: {exc}")
return {
"ok": True,
"pid": proc.pid,
"name": "hermes-update",
}
def _recent_upstream_commits(n: int = 20) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Commits the local checkout is behind ``origin/main`` by, newest first.
Logs the SAME range the behind-count uses (``HEAD..origin/main`` — see
``banner._check_via_local_git``), NOT the branch's ``@{upstream}``. On a
feature-branch checkout ``@{upstream}`` is the branch's own tip (zero
commits), which would leave the changelog empty even though the count is
non-zero. Pinning to ``origin/main`` keeps count and changelog consistent.
Best-effort: returns [] if not a git checkout, origin/main is unreachable,
or git is unavailable. Never raises into the request path.
"""
try:
out = subprocess.run(
[
"git",
"-C",
str(PROJECT_ROOT),
"log",
"--format=%H%x1f%s%x1f%an%x1f%ct",
"HEAD..origin/main",
f"-n{int(n)}",
],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=5,
)
if out.returncode != 0:
return []
rows: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for line in out.stdout.splitlines():
if not line.strip():
continue
parts = (line.split("\x1f") + ["", "", "", "0"])[:4]
sha, summary, author, at = parts
rows.append(
{
"sha": sha[:7],
"summary": summary,
"author": author,
"at": int(at or 0),
}
)
return rows
except Exception:
return []
@app.get("/api/hermes/update/check")
async def check_hermes_update(force: bool = False):
"""Report whether a Hermes update is available, without applying it.
Powers the dashboard's "check before you update" flow: the System page
shows the commit-behind count and asks the user to confirm before
``POST /api/hermes/update`` actually runs ``hermes update``.
Returns:
install_method: 'git' | 'pip' | 'docker' | 'nixos' | 'homebrew' | ...
current_version: installed Hermes version string
behind: commits behind upstream (>=1), 0 if up to date,
-1 if behind by an unknown count (nix/pypi), or null if the
check could not run (offline, no remote, etc.)
update_available: convenience bool (behind is non-zero and not null)
can_apply: True when the dashboard's update button can apply it
in place (git/pip); False for docker/nix/homebrew where the
user must update out-of-band
update_command: the recommended command for this install method
message: human-readable guidance for non-applyable methods
commits: for git/pip installs that are behind, a list of the commits
the local checkout is behind upstream by — each
{sha, summary, author, at}. Absent/empty otherwise. The
desktop's remote update overlay renders this as "what's
changed". Additive: existing consumers ignore it.
"""
if _dashboard_local_update_managed_externally():
return {
"install_method": "managed-runtime",
"current_version": __version__,
"behind": None,
"update_available": False,
"can_apply": False,
"update_command": "managed outside dashboard",
"message": (
"Hermes updates are managed outside this dashboard in "
"containerized environments."
),
}
install_method = detect_install_method(PROJECT_ROOT)
update_command = recommended_update_command_for_method(install_method)
payload: Dict[str, Any] = {
"install_method": install_method,
"current_version": __version__,
"behind": None,
"update_available": False,
"can_apply": install_method in ("git", "pip"),
"update_command": update_command,
"message": None,
}
if install_method == "docker":
payload["message"] = format_docker_update_message()
return payload
# banner.check_for_updates() handles git / pypi / nix-revision paths and
# caches the result for 6h. ``force`` busts the cache so the "Check now"
# button reflects reality immediately.
try:
from hermes_cli.banner import check_for_updates
if force:
try:
(get_hermes_home() / ".update_check").unlink()
except OSError:
pass
behind = await asyncio.to_thread(check_for_updates)
except Exception:
_log.exception("Update check failed")
behind = None
payload["behind"] = behind
if behind is None:
payload["message"] = "Couldn't reach the update source — try again later."
elif behind == 0:
payload["message"] = "You're on the latest version."
else:
payload["update_available"] = True
# Enrich with the actual commits we're behind by, so the desktop's
# remote update overlay can show "what's changed". git/pip only;
# best-effort (empty list on any failure).
if install_method in ("git", "pip"):
payload["commits"] = await asyncio.to_thread(_recent_upstream_commits)
return payload
@app.post("/api/audio/transcribe")
async def transcribe_audio_upload(payload: AudioTranscriptionRequest):
data_url = (payload.data_url or "").strip()
if not data_url.startswith("data:") or "," not in data_url:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid audio payload")
header, encoded = data_url.split(",", 1)
if ";base64" not in header:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400, detail="Audio payload must be base64 encoded"
)
mime_type = (
payload.mime_type or header[5:].split(";", 1)[0] or "audio/webm"
).strip()
normalized_mime_type = mime_type.split(";", 1)[0].lower()
if not (
normalized_mime_type.startswith("audio/")
or normalized_mime_type == "video/webm"
):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400, detail="Payload must be an audio recording"
)
try:
audio_bytes = base64.b64decode(encoded, validate=True)
except (binascii.Error, ValueError):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Audio payload is not valid base64")
if not audio_bytes:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Audio recording is empty")
if len(audio_bytes) > _MAX_TRANSCRIPTION_UPLOAD_BYTES:
raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="Audio recording is too large")
temp_path = ""
try:
suffix = _audio_extension_for_mime(mime_type)
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(
prefix="hermes-desktop-voice-",
suffix=suffix,
delete=False,
) as tmp:
tmp.write(audio_bytes)
temp_path = tmp.name
from tools.transcription_tools import transcribe_audio
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
result = await loop.run_in_executor(None, transcribe_audio, temp_path)
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Desktop voice transcription failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Transcription failed: {exc}")
finally:
if temp_path:
try:
os.unlink(temp_path)
except OSError:
pass
if not result.get("success"):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=result.get("error") or "Transcription failed",
)
return {
"ok": True,
"transcript": str(result.get("transcript") or "").strip(),
"provider": result.get("provider"),
}
class TTSSpeakRequest(BaseModel):
text: str
def _elevenlabs_voice_label(voice: Dict[str, Any]) -> str:
name = str(voice.get("name") or voice.get("voice_id") or "Voice").strip()
category = str(voice.get("category") or "").strip()
return f"{name} ({category})" if category else name
# Collapses repeated identical ElevenLabs voice-list failures (the desktop
# re-polls on every settings open/focus) to a single log line. Re-arms on
# success or when the error signature changes, so a real new failure is seen.
_voice_list_last_error: Optional[str] = None
def _voice_list_error_logged_once(signature: Optional[str]) -> bool:
"""Return True if ``signature`` is new and should be logged now.
Passing ``None`` clears the latch (call on success). Idempotent per
signature: the same error logs once until it changes.
"""
global _voice_list_last_error
if signature is None:
_voice_list_last_error = None
return False
if signature == _voice_list_last_error:
return False
_voice_list_last_error = signature
return True
@app.get("/api/audio/elevenlabs/voices")
async def get_elevenlabs_voices():
"""Return ElevenLabs voices when an API key is configured.
The desktop UI uses this for the ``tts.elevenlabs.voice_id`` dropdown.
Only non-secret voice metadata is returned; the API key stays server-side.
"""
api_key = (load_env().get("ELEVENLABS_API_KEY") or os.environ.get("ELEVENLABS_API_KEY") or "").strip()
if not api_key:
return {"available": False, "voices": []}
request = urllib.request.Request(
"https://api.elevenlabs.io/v1/voices",
headers={
"Accept": "application/json",
"xi-api-key": api_key,
},
)
try:
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
def _fetch() -> Dict[str, Any]:
with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=10) as response:
return json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
payload = await loop.run_in_executor(None, _fetch)
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
# An auth failure (bad/expired/scoped key) is a persistent,
# user-fixable state, not a transient blip — the desktop polls this on
# every settings open/focus, so a per-poll WARNING floods the log
# (#voice-list-401-spam). Treat 401/403 as "integration unavailable":
# report it to the UI with a 200 and log at most once until the error
# signature changes (see _voice_list_error_logged_once).
if exc.code in (401, 403):
if _voice_list_error_logged_once(f"http-{exc.code}"):
_log.info(
"ElevenLabs voices unavailable: %s — check ELEVENLABS_API_KEY", exc
)
return {"available": False, "voices": [], "error": "unauthorized"}
if _voice_list_error_logged_once(f"http-{exc.code}"):
_log.warning("ElevenLabs voice list failed: %s", exc)
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="Could not load ElevenLabs voices")
except Exception as exc:
if _voice_list_error_logged_once(str(exc)):
_log.warning("ElevenLabs voice list failed: %s", exc)
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="Could not load ElevenLabs voices")
_voice_list_error_logged_once(None) # success — re-arm logging for next failure
voices = []
for voice in payload.get("voices") or []:
if not isinstance(voice, dict):
continue
voice_id = str(voice.get("voice_id") or "").strip()
if not voice_id:
continue
voices.append({
"voice_id": voice_id,
"name": str(voice.get("name") or voice_id),
"label": _elevenlabs_voice_label(voice),
})
voices.sort(key=lambda item: str(item.get("label") or "").lower())
return {"available": True, "voices": voices}
@app.post("/api/audio/speak")
async def speak_text(payload: TTSSpeakRequest):
"""Synthesize speech and return audio as base64 data URL.
Used by the desktop voice-conversation mode to play back assistant
responses without exposing the on-disk file path. Reuses the
existing TTS provider chain (Edge / OpenAI / ElevenLabs / etc.)
configured in ``~/.hermes/config.yaml`` under ``tts.``.
"""
text = (payload.text or "").strip()
if not text:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Text is required")
try:
from tools.tts_tool import text_to_speech_tool
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
result_json = await loop.run_in_executor(None, text_to_speech_tool, text)
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Desktop voice TTS failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Speech synthesis failed: {exc}")
try:
result = json.loads(result_json) if isinstance(result_json, str) else result_json
except Exception:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Invalid TTS response")
if not result.get("success"):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=result.get("error") or "Speech synthesis failed",
)
file_path = result.get("file_path")
if not file_path or not os.path.isfile(file_path):
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Audio file missing")
ext = os.path.splitext(file_path)[1].lower()
mime_type = {
".mp3": "audio/mpeg",
".ogg": "audio/ogg",
".opus": "audio/ogg",
".wav": "audio/wav",
".flac": "audio/flac",
}.get(ext, "audio/mpeg")
try:
with open(file_path, "rb") as fh:
audio_bytes = fh.read()
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not read audio: {exc}")
finally:
try:
os.unlink(file_path)
except OSError:
pass
encoded = base64.b64encode(audio_bytes).decode("ascii")
return {
"ok": True,
"data_url": f"data:{mime_type};base64,{encoded}",
"mime_type": mime_type,
"provider": result.get("provider"),
}
@app.get("/api/actions/{name}/status")
async def get_action_status(name: str, lines: int = 200):
"""Tail an action log and report whether the process is still running."""
log_file_name = _ACTION_LOG_FILES.get(name)
if log_file_name is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Unknown action: {name}")
log_path = _ACTION_LOG_DIR / log_file_name
tail = _tail_lines(log_path, min(max(lines, 1), 2000))
proc = _ACTION_PROCS.get(name)
if proc is None:
result = _ACTION_RESULTS.get(name)
running = False
exit_code = result.get("exit_code") if result else None
pid = result.get("pid") if result else None
else:
exit_code = proc.poll()
running = exit_code is None
pid = proc.pid
if exit_code is not None:
try:
proc.wait(timeout=1)
except Exception:
pass
_ACTION_RESULTS[name] = {"exit_code": exit_code, "pid": pid}
_ACTION_PROCS.pop(name, None)
_ACTION_COMMANDS.pop(name, None)
return {
"name": name,
"running": running,
"exit_code": exit_code,
"pid": pid,
"lines": tail,
}
# Per-row fields that no session LIST consumer reads but that dominate the
# payload. ``system_prompt`` is the fully rendered prompt — tens of KB per
# row — and made a 21-row /api/sessions response 528KB (96% dead weight),
# re-fetched by the desktop sidebar on every refresh. The desktop's
# SessionInfo type doesn't declare either field and the web UI never touches
# them; ``GET /api/sessions/{id}`` detail reads stay complete. List callers
# that genuinely need the full rows can pass ``?full=1``.
_SESSION_LIST_HEAVY_FIELDS = ("system_prompt", "model_config")
def _strip_session_list_rows(sessions: List[Dict[str, Any]]) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
for s in sessions:
for key in _SESSION_LIST_HEAVY_FIELDS:
s.pop(key, None)
return sessions
@app.get("/api/sessions")
def get_sessions(
limit: int = 20,
offset: int = 0,
min_messages: int = 0,
archived: str = "exclude",
order: str = "created",
source: str = None,
exclude_sources: str = None,
cwd_prefix: str = None,
full: bool = False,
profile: Optional[str] = None,
):
"""List sessions.
``archived`` controls how soft-archived sessions are treated:
``exclude`` (default) hides them, ``only`` returns just the archived ones
(used by the desktop "Archived sessions" settings panel), and ``include``
returns both.
``order`` controls pagination order: ``created`` (default, by original
start time) or ``recent`` (by latest activity across the compression
chain). ``recent`` keeps a long-running conversation on the first page
after it auto-compresses into a fresh continuation id.
Rows omit ``system_prompt``/``model_config`` (the payload-dominating
fields no list UI reads) unless ``full=1`` is passed.
"""
if archived not in ("exclude", "only", "include"):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="archived must be one of: exclude, only, include",
)
if order not in ("created", "recent"):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="order must be one of: created, recent",
)
profile_name: Optional[str] = None
if profile:
profile_name, _ = _cron_profile_home(profile)
try:
db = _open_session_db_for_profile(profile)
try:
min_message_count = max(0, min_messages)
archived_only = archived == "only"
include_archived = archived == "include"
# Optional source scoping: ``source`` includes a single class,
# ``exclude_sources`` (comma-separated) drops classes. The desktop
# uses these to split recents (exclude=cron) from the cron-jobs
# section (source=cron) into two independent lists.
exclude_list = [s for s in (exclude_sources or "").split(",") if s.strip()]
sessions = db.list_sessions_rich(
source=source or None,
exclude_sources=exclude_list or None,
cwd_prefix=(cwd_prefix or None),
limit=limit,
offset=offset,
min_message_count=min_message_count,
include_archived=include_archived,
archived_only=archived_only,
order_by_last_active=order == "recent",
# SQL-level projection: when the caller didn't ask for full
# rows, skip the system_prompt blob inside SQLite too (pairs
# with the API-level _strip_session_list_rows below).
compact_rows=not full,
)
total = db.session_count(
source=source or None,
cwd_prefix=(cwd_prefix or None),
exclude_sources=exclude_list or None,
min_message_count=min_message_count,
include_archived=include_archived,
archived_only=archived_only,
exclude_children=True,
)
now = time.time()
for s in sessions:
s["is_active"] = (
s.get("ended_at") is None
and (now - s.get("last_active", s.get("started_at", 0))) < 300
)
if profile_name:
s["profile"] = profile_name
s["is_default_profile"] = profile_name == "default"
# SQLite stores the flag as 0/1; expose a real JSON boolean.
s["archived"] = bool(s.get("archived"))
if not full:
_strip_session_list_rows(sessions)
return {"sessions": sessions, "total": total, "limit": limit, "offset": offset}
finally:
db.close()
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception:
_log.exception("GET /api/sessions failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Internal server error")
@app.get("/api/profiles/sessions")
def get_profiles_sessions(
limit: int = 20,
offset: int = 0,
min_messages: int = 0,
archived: str = "exclude",
order: str = "recent",
profile: str = "all",
source: str = None,
exclude_sources: str = None,
full: bool = False,
):
"""Unified, read-only session list aggregated across ALL profiles.
Intentionally process-light: this opens each profile's ``state.db`` directly
from disk — it does NOT spawn a dashboard backend per profile. Each returned
session is tagged with its owning ``profile`` so the desktop renders one
browsable list and only spins up a profile's backend when the user actually
interacts (sends a message). A user with a single (default) profile gets the
same rows as ``/api/sessions``, just tagged ``profile="default"``.
Rows omit ``system_prompt``/``model_config`` unless ``full=1`` — same
list projection as ``/api/sessions``.
"""
if archived not in ("exclude", "only", "include"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="archived must be one of: exclude, only, include")
if order not in ("created", "recent"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="order must be one of: created, recent")
from hermes_state import SessionDB
from hermes_cli import profiles as profiles_mod
targets: List[Tuple[str, Path]] = []
if profile and profile != "all":
name, home = _cron_profile_home(profile)
targets.append((name, home))
else:
try:
infos = profiles_mod.list_profiles()
targets = [(info.name, info.path) for info in infos]
except Exception:
_log.exception("GET /api/profiles/sessions: list_profiles failed")
targets = []
if not targets:
targets.append(("default", profiles_mod.get_profile_dir("default")))
min_message_count = max(0, min_messages)
archived_only = archived == "only"
include_archived = archived == "include"
# Source scoping (see /api/sessions): recents pass exclude_sources=cron,
# the cron-jobs section passes source=cron — two independent lists so
# newest cron sessions can't starve the recents page.
source_filter = source or None
exclude_list = [s for s in (exclude_sources or "").split(",") if s.strip()]
# Over-fetch per profile so the merged+sorted window is correct for the
# requested page. Capped so a huge profile can't blow up the response.
per_profile = min(max(limit + offset, limit), 500)
merged: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
total = 0
profile_totals: Dict[str, int] = {}
errors: List[Dict[str, str]] = []
now = time.time()
for name, home in targets:
db_path = Path(home) / "state.db"
if not db_path.exists():
continue
try:
# Read-only: this loop runs on every sidebar refresh, so it must
# never DDL/write-lock another profile's live DB (see SessionDB
# read_only docstring).
db = SessionDB(db_path=db_path, read_only=True)
except Exception as exc:
errors.append({"profile": name, "error": str(exc)})
continue
try:
rows = db.list_sessions_rich(
source=source_filter,
exclude_sources=exclude_list or None,
limit=per_profile,
offset=0,
min_message_count=min_message_count,
include_archived=include_archived,
archived_only=archived_only,
order_by_last_active=order == "recent",
# Same SQL-level blob skip as /api/sessions (see above).
compact_rows=not full,
)
profile_total = db.session_count(
source=source_filter,
exclude_sources=exclude_list or None,
min_message_count=min_message_count,
include_archived=include_archived,
archived_only=archived_only,
exclude_children=True,
)
total += profile_total
profile_totals[name] = profile_total
for s in rows:
s["profile"] = name
s["is_default_profile"] = name == "default"
s["is_active"] = (
s.get("ended_at") is None
and (now - s.get("last_active", s.get("started_at", 0))) < 300
)
s["archived"] = bool(s.get("archived"))
merged.append(s)
except Exception as exc:
errors.append({"profile": name, "error": str(exc)})
finally:
db.close()
sort_key = "last_active" if order == "recent" else "started_at"
merged.sort(key=lambda s: s.get(sort_key) or s.get("started_at") or 0, reverse=True)
window = merged[offset:offset + limit]
if not full:
_strip_session_list_rows(window)
return {
"sessions": window,
"total": total,
"profile_totals": profile_totals,
"limit": limit,
"offset": offset,
"errors": errors,
}
@app.get("/api/profiles/sessions/sidebar")
def get_profiles_sessions_sidebar(
recents_profile: str = "all",
recents_limit: int = 20,
recents_exclude: str = None,
cron_limit: int = 50,
messaging_limit: int = 100,
messaging_exclude: str = None,
):
"""Batched sidebar session slices — one profile-DB open per refresh.
The desktop sidebar needs three source-scoped windows per refresh: recents
(local chats, scoped to the active profile), cron sessions (all profiles),
and messaging-platform sessions (all profiles). Served as three separate
``/api/profiles/sessions`` calls they reopened every profile's ``state.db``
three times and re-counted each refresh. This opens each DB once and runs
the three filtered queries together, returning the three windows in one
payload. Read-only and process-light, same row projection and 300s active
heuristic as ``/api/profiles/sessions``.
The caller passes the source taxonomy (``recents_exclude`` /
``messaging_exclude`` CSV, ``source=cron`` is implicit) so this stays
taxonomy-agnostic like the per-slice endpoint. All three slices use
``min_messages=1`` / ``archived=exclude`` / recency order, matching the
desktop's per-slice calls.
"""
from hermes_state import SessionDB
from hermes_cli import profiles as profiles_mod
# cron + messaging are cross-profile; recents is scoped to recents_profile.
# Scan every profile once regardless (each DB opened a single time).
try:
infos = profiles_mod.list_profiles()
targets: List[Tuple[str, Path]] = [(info.name, info.path) for info in infos]
except Exception:
_log.exception("GET /api/profiles/sessions/sidebar: list_profiles failed")
targets = []
if not targets:
targets.append(("default", profiles_mod.get_profile_dir("default")))
recents_scope = (recents_profile or "all").strip() or "all"
recents_exclude_list = [s for s in (recents_exclude or "").split(",") if s.strip()]
messaging_exclude_list = [s for s in (messaging_exclude or "").split(",") if s.strip()]
recents_cap = min(max(recents_limit, 1), 500)
cron_cap = min(max(cron_limit, 1), 500)
messaging_cap = min(max(messaging_limit, 1), 500)
recents_rows: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
cron_rows: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
messaging_rows: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
recents_total = 0
recents_profile_totals: Dict[str, int] = {}
errors: List[Dict[str, str]] = []
now = time.time()
def _tag(rows: List[Dict[str, Any]], name: str) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
for s in rows:
s["profile"] = name
s["is_default_profile"] = name == "default"
s["is_active"] = (
s.get("ended_at") is None
and (now - s.get("last_active", s.get("started_at", 0))) < 300
)
s["archived"] = bool(s.get("archived"))
return rows
def _slice(db, *, source=None, exclude=None, cap):
return db.list_sessions_rich(
source=source,
exclude_sources=exclude or None,
limit=cap,
offset=0,
min_message_count=1,
include_archived=False,
archived_only=False,
order_by_last_active=True,
compact_rows=True,
)
for name, home in targets:
db_path = Path(home) / "state.db"
if not db_path.exists():
continue
try:
db = SessionDB(db_path=db_path, read_only=True)
except Exception as exc:
errors.append({"profile": name, "error": str(exc)})
continue
try:
if recents_scope == "all" or name == recents_scope:
recents_rows.extend(
_tag(_slice(db, exclude=recents_exclude_list, cap=recents_cap), name)
)
rtotal = db.session_count(
exclude_sources=recents_exclude_list or None,
min_message_count=1,
include_archived=False,
archived_only=False,
exclude_children=True,
)
recents_total += rtotal
recents_profile_totals[name] = rtotal
cron_rows.extend(_tag(_slice(db, source="cron", cap=cron_cap), name))
messaging_rows.extend(
_tag(_slice(db, exclude=messaging_exclude_list, cap=messaging_cap), name)
)
except Exception as exc:
errors.append({"profile": name, "error": str(exc)})
finally:
db.close()
def _window(rows: List[Dict[str, Any]], cap: int) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
rows.sort(key=lambda s: s.get("last_active") or s.get("started_at") or 0, reverse=True)
win = rows[:cap]
_strip_session_list_rows(win)
return win
return {
"recents": {
"sessions": _window(recents_rows, recents_cap),
"total": recents_total,
"profile_totals": recents_profile_totals,
},
"cron": {"sessions": _window(cron_rows, cron_cap)},
"messaging": {
"sessions": _window(messaging_rows, messaging_cap),
"total": len(messaging_rows),
},
"errors": errors,
}
@app.get("/api/sessions/search")
async def search_sessions(q: str = "", limit: int = 20, profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Search sessions by ID plus full-text message content using FTS5.
Direct session-id matches are surfaced first, then FTS message-content
matches. Results are deduped by compression lineage, not by raw
``session_id``. Auto-compression rotates a conversation onto a fresh
session id (and leaves the old segment's messages in the FTS index), so one
logical chat can own many ``sessions`` rows that all match the same query.
Branches also use ``parent_session_id``, but they are real alternate
conversations; don't collapse branch-specific hits back into the parent.
"""
if not q or not q.strip():
return {"results": []}
try:
db = _open_session_db_for_profile(profile)
try:
safe_limit = max(1, min(int(limit or 20), 100))
# Walk parent_session_id to the compression root, memoized so a
# chain of compression segments only costs one walk. We deliberately
# stop at branch/delegate edges: those sessions may diverge from the
# parent and should remain searchable on their own.
root_cache: dict = {}
def compression_root(session_id: str) -> str:
if not session_id:
return session_id
if session_id in root_cache:
return root_cache[session_id]
chain = []
cur = session_id
visited = set()
root = session_id
while cur and cur not in visited:
visited.add(cur)
chain.append(cur)
if cur in root_cache:
root = root_cache[cur]
break
try:
s = db.get_session(cur)
except Exception:
s = None
if not s:
root = cur
break
parent = s.get("parent_session_id") if isinstance(s, dict) else None
if not parent:
root = cur
break
try:
parent_session = db.get_session(parent)
except Exception:
parent_session = None
if not parent_session:
root = cur
break
parent_ended_at = parent_session.get("ended_at")
started_at = s.get("started_at")
is_compression_edge = (
parent_session.get("end_reason") == "compression"
and parent_ended_at is not None
and started_at is not None
and started_at >= parent_ended_at
)
if not is_compression_edge:
root = cur
break
cur = parent
for node in chain:
root_cache[node] = root
return root
tip_cache: dict = {}
def lineage_tip(root_id: str) -> str:
if root_id in tip_cache:
return tip_cache[root_id]
tip = root_id
try:
resolved = db.get_compression_tip(root_id)
if resolved:
tip = resolved
except Exception:
pass
tip_cache[root_id] = tip
return tip
# Both ID matches and content matches share one keyspace, keyed by
# compression lineage root, so an id-hit and a content-hit on the
# same logical conversation collapse to a single result. The first
# hit for a lineage wins; ID matches run first and take priority.
seen: dict = {}
def add_lineage_result(raw_sid: str, payload: dict) -> None:
if not raw_sid:
return
root = compression_root(raw_sid)
if root in seen or len(seen) >= safe_limit:
return
payload = dict(payload)
payload["session_id"] = lineage_tip(root)
payload["lineage_root"] = root
seen[root] = payload
# Direct ID matches first: users often paste a session id from CLI,
# logs, or another Hermes surface. FTS can't find those unless the
# id happens to appear in message text. search_sessions_by_id is
# SQL-bounded, so this stays cheap even with thousands of sessions.
for row in db.search_sessions_by_id(q, limit=safe_limit, include_archived=True):
sid = row.get("id")
preview = (row.get("preview") or "").strip()
snippet = preview or f"Session ID: {sid}"
add_lineage_result(
sid,
{
"snippet": snippet,
"role": None,
"source": row.get("source"),
"model": row.get("model"),
"session_started": row.get("started_at"),
},
)
# Auto-add prefix wildcards so partial words match
# e.g. "nimb" → "nimb*" matches "nimby"
# Preserve quoted phrases and existing wildcards as-is
import re
terms = []
for token in re.findall(r'"[^"]*"|\S+', q.strip()):
if token.startswith('"') or token.endswith("*"):
terms.append(token)
else:
terms.append(token + "*")
prefix_query = " ".join(terms)
# Over-fetch so lineage dedup can still surface `limit` distinct
# conversations even when several hits collapse onto one root.
fetch_limit = max(safe_limit * 5, 50)
matches = db.search_messages(query=prefix_query, limit=fetch_limit)
for m in matches:
if len(seen) >= safe_limit:
break
add_lineage_result(
m["session_id"],
{
"snippet": m.get("snippet", ""),
"role": m.get("role"),
"source": m.get("source"),
"model": m.get("model"),
"session_started": m.get("session_started"),
},
)
return {"results": list(seen.values())}
finally:
db.close()
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception:
_log.exception("GET /api/sessions/search failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Search failed")
def _normalize_config_for_web(config: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Normalize config for the web UI.
Hermes supports ``model`` as either a bare string (``"anthropic/claude-sonnet-4"``)
or a dict (``{default: ..., provider: ..., base_url: ...}``). The schema is built
from DEFAULT_CONFIG where ``model`` is a string, but user configs often have the
dict form. Normalize to the string form so the frontend schema matches.
Also surfaces ``model_context_length`` as a top-level field so the web UI can
display and edit it. A value of 0 means "auto-detect".
"""
config = dict(config) # shallow copy
model_val = config.get("model")
if isinstance(model_val, dict):
# Extract context_length before flattening the dict
ctx_len = model_val.get("context_length", 0)
config["model"] = model_val.get("default", model_val.get("name", ""))
config["model_context_length"] = ctx_len if isinstance(ctx_len, int) else 0
else:
config["model_context_length"] = 0
return config
# ── Memory provider config: one generic GET/PUT pair, dispatching on storage ──
def _provider_field_entry(field: ProviderField) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Static, storage-independent shape of one field for the UI payload."""
return {
"key": field.key,
"label": field.label,
"kind": field.kind,
"description": field.description,
"info": field.info,
"placeholder": field.placeholder,
"inline": field.inline,
"group": field.group,
"options": [
{"value": opt.value, "label": opt.label, "description": opt.description}
for opt in field.options
],
}
# Sentinel: remove this key so it falls back to the host or built-in default.
_UNSET: Any = object()
def _coerce_field_value(field: ProviderField, raw: str) -> Any:
"""Coerce a submitted non-secret value to its native JSON type.
Values arrive as strings over the API; this converts them to the type the
Honcho resolver expects (bool/number/list/dict), so e.g. a boolean is stored
as a JSON ``false`` rather than the string ``"false"`` (which would read as
truthy). Returns ``_UNSET`` when the field should be removed. Raises
``ValueError`` on malformed input.
"""
value = (raw or "").strip()
kind = field.kind
if kind == "select":
if not value:
value = field.default
if value not in field.allowed_values():
raise ValueError(f"Invalid value for '{field.key}'")
return value
if kind == "bool":
from utils import is_truthy_value
return is_truthy_value(value)
if kind == "number":
if not value:
return _UNSET
try:
number = float(value)
except ValueError as exc:
raise ValueError(f"Invalid number for '{field.key}'") from exc
return int(number) if number.is_integer() else number
if kind == "json":
if not value:
return _UNSET
try:
parsed = json.loads(value)
except (ValueError, TypeError) as exc:
raise ValueError(f"Invalid JSON for '{field.key}'") from exc
if not isinstance(parsed, (dict, list)):
raise ValueError(f"'{field.key}' must be a JSON object or array")
return parsed
# text / secret — blank clears the key so it falls back to host/default.
return value if value else _UNSET
def _serialize_field_value(field: ProviderField, value: Any) -> str:
"""Render a stored native value as the string the generic UI edits.
``None`` (key absent) yields the field's declared default. Bools become
``"true"``/``"false"``, JSON objects/arrays are re-encoded, numbers are
stringified — so the renderer's per-kind controls always get the shape they
expect regardless of how the value sits on disk.
"""
if value is None:
return field.default
if field.kind == "bool":
from utils import is_truthy_value
return "true" if is_truthy_value(value) else "false"
if field.kind == "json":
if isinstance(value, (dict, list)):
return json.dumps(value)
return str(value)
return str(value)
# — flat-json backend (default; reusable for simple providers) —
def _flat_json_path(provider: ProviderConfigSchema) -> Path:
return get_hermes_home() / provider.name / "config.json"
def _read_flat_json(provider: ProviderConfigSchema) -> Dict[str, Any]:
path = _flat_json_path(provider)
if not path.exists():
return {}
try:
data = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
except Exception:
_log.warning("Failed to read memory provider config from %s", path, exc_info=True)
return {}
return data if isinstance(data, dict) else {}
def _read_field(field: ProviderField, sources: tuple, env: Dict[str, str]) -> Any:
"""Return the stored native value from the first source holding it, or ``None``.
Presence (``key in source``) decides, not truthiness, so a stored ``False``
or ``0`` survives instead of being mistaken for "unset".
"""
for source in sources:
for source_key in (field.key, *field.aliases):
if source_key in source and source[source_key] is not None:
return source[source_key]
for env_key in field.env_fallbacks:
value = env.get(env_key)
if value:
return value
return None
def _declared_field_is_set(field: ProviderField, sources: tuple, env: Dict[str, str]) -> bool:
for env_key in (field.env_key, *field.env_fallbacks):
if env_key and env.get(env_key):
return True
return any(source.get(k) for source in sources for k in (field.key, *field.aliases))
# — honcho host-block backend —
def _honcho_resolvers():
"""Lazily import the Honcho plugin's resolvers (optional plugin)."""
from plugins.memory.honcho.client import _host_block, resolve_active_host, resolve_config_path
return resolve_active_host, resolve_config_path, _host_block
def _honcho_read_sources() -> tuple[Dict[str, Any], str, Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Return (root config, active host key, host block) for the current profile."""
resolve_active_host, resolve_config_path, host_block_of = _honcho_resolvers()
host = resolve_active_host()
path = resolve_config_path()
raw: Dict[str, Any] = {}
if path.exists():
try:
loaded = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
raw = loaded if isinstance(loaded, dict) else {}
except Exception:
_log.warning("Failed to read Honcho config from %s", path, exc_info=True)
return raw, host, host_block_of(raw, host)
def _declared_provider_payload(provider: ProviderConfigSchema) -> Dict[str, Any]:
fields: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
env = load_env()
is_honcho = provider.storage == STORAGE_HONCHO_HOST_BLOCK
if is_honcho:
raw, host, host_block = _honcho_read_sources()
def sources_for(field: ProviderField) -> tuple:
return (host_block, raw) if field.scope == "host" else (raw,)
else:
host = ""
data = _read_flat_json(provider)
def sources_for(field: ProviderField) -> tuple:
return (data,)
for field in provider.fields:
entry = _provider_field_entry(field)
sources = sources_for(field)
if field.is_secret:
entry["value"] = "" # secrets are write-only over the API
entry["is_set"] = _declared_field_is_set(field, sources, env)
fields.append(entry)
continue
native = _read_field(field, sources, env)
if is_honcho and not field.placeholder and field.key in {"workspace", "aiPeer"}:
# Blank fields surface the resolved host Honcho will actually use.
entry["placeholder"] = host
value = _serialize_field_value(field, native)
if field.kind == "select" and value not in field.allowed_values():
value = field.default
entry["value"] = value
# Presence, not truthiness — a stored False/0 is still "set".
entry["is_set"] = native is not None if is_honcho else bool(value)
fields.append(entry)
return {"name": provider.name, "label": provider.label, "docs_url": provider.docs_url, "fields": fields}
def _apply_field_values(provider: ProviderConfigSchema, values: Dict[str, str], target_for) -> None:
"""Apply submitted non-secret fields to their backend dict, in place.
Only keys present in ``values`` are touched, so a partial save never
clobbers fields owned by another surface. ``_UNSET`` clears the key (and
its aliases) so it falls back to the host/default mapping.
"""
for field in provider.fields:
if field.is_secret or field.key not in values:
continue
target = target_for(field)
coerced = _coerce_field_value(field, values[field.key])
if coerced is _UNSET:
target.pop(field.key, None)
for alias in field.aliases:
target.pop(alias, None)
else:
target[field.key] = coerced
def _write_provider_flat(provider: ProviderConfigSchema, values: Dict[str, str]) -> None:
from utils import atomic_json_write
existing = _read_flat_json(provider)
for field in provider.fields:
if field.is_secret:
submitted = (values.get(field.key) or "").strip()
if submitted and field.env_key:
save_env_value(field.env_key, submitted)
_apply_field_values(provider, values, lambda field: existing)
path = _flat_json_path(provider)
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
atomic_json_write(path, existing, mode=0o600)
def _write_provider_honcho(provider: ProviderConfigSchema, values: Dict[str, str]) -> None:
"""Persist submitted fields to Honcho's real config for the active host.
Only keys present in ``values`` are touched, so a partial save (e.g. the
inline panel) never clobbers fields owned by the full-config editor. Blank
text clears a key so it falls back to the host/default mapping.
"""
from plugins.memory.honcho.oauth import ACCESS_TOKEN_PREFIX, _config_refresh_lock
from utils import atomic_json_write
resolve_active_host, resolve_config_path, host_block_of = _honcho_resolvers()
host = resolve_active_host()
# Write the file reads resolve, or a save shadows it with a sparse copy.
path = resolve_config_path()
# OAuth rotation is single-use; an unlocked RMW here can revoke the grant.
with _config_refresh_lock(path):
cfg: Dict[str, Any] = {}
if path.exists():
try:
loaded = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
cfg = loaded if isinstance(loaded, dict) else {}
except Exception:
_log.warning("Failed to read Honcho config from %s", path, exc_info=True)
hosts = cfg.get("hosts")
cfg["hosts"] = hosts = hosts if isinstance(hosts, dict) else {}
# Update the block reads resolve (legacy dot-form included), never shadow it.
existing = host_block_of(cfg, host)
host_key = next((k for k, v in hosts.items() if v is existing), host) if existing else host
host_block = hosts.setdefault(host_key, existing)
for field in provider.fields:
if not field.is_secret:
continue
submitted = (values.get(field.key) or "").strip()
if not submitted:
continue
if field.env_key:
save_env_value(field.env_key, submitted)
# Persist where the client reads first; an OAuth token owns that slot.
stored = host_block.get(field.key)
if not (isinstance(stored, str) and stored.startswith(ACCESS_TOKEN_PREFIX)):
host_block[field.key] = submitted
_apply_field_values(provider, values, lambda field: host_block if field.scope == "host" else cfg)
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
atomic_json_write(path, cfg, mode=0o600)
def _stringify_submitted_values(values: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, str]:
"""The declared-schema path edits strings; the dashboard may send natives."""
out: Dict[str, str] = {}
for key, value in values.items():
if value is None:
out[key] = ""
elif isinstance(value, str):
out[key] = value
elif isinstance(value, bool):
out[key] = "true" if value else "false"
elif isinstance(value, (dict, list)):
out[key] = json.dumps(value)
else:
out[key] = str(value)
return out
def _update_memory_provider_config(provider: ProviderConfigSchema, values: Dict[str, str]) -> None:
if provider.storage == STORAGE_HONCHO_HOST_BLOCK:
_write_provider_honcho(provider, values)
else:
_write_provider_flat(provider, values)
config = load_config()
memory_config = config.get("memory")
if not isinstance(memory_config, dict):
memory_config = {}
config["memory"] = memory_config
if memory_config.get("provider") != provider.name:
memory_config["provider"] = provider.name
save_config(config)
def _memory_provider_label(name: str) -> str:
return name.replace("_", " ").replace("-", " ").title()
def _normalize_memory_provider_name(name: Any) -> str:
provider = str(name or "").strip()
if provider.lower() in {"built-in", "builtin", "none"}:
return ""
return provider
def _load_memory_provider(name: str):
try:
from plugins.memory import load_memory_provider
return load_memory_provider(name)
except Exception:
_log.debug("Failed to load memory provider %s", name, exc_info=True)
return None
def _memory_provider_manifest(name: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
try:
from plugins.memory import find_provider_dir
provider_dir = find_provider_dir(name)
if provider_dir is None:
return {}
manifest_path = provider_dir / "plugin.yaml"
if not manifest_path.exists():
return {}
with manifest_path.open(encoding="utf-8-sig") as handle:
manifest = yaml.safe_load(handle) or {}
return manifest if isinstance(manifest, dict) else {}
except Exception:
_log.debug("Failed to read memory provider manifest for %s", name, exc_info=True)
return {}
def _string_list(value: Any) -> List[str]:
if not isinstance(value, list):
return []
return [str(item).strip() for item in value if str(item).strip()]
def _memory_provider_setup_manifest(name: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
manifest = _memory_provider_manifest(name)
external_dependencies: List[Dict[str, str]] = []
for raw in manifest.get("external_dependencies") or []:
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
continue
dep = {
"name": str(raw.get("name") or "").strip(),
"install": str(raw.get("install") or "").strip(),
"check": str(raw.get("check") or "").strip(),
}
if dep["name"] or dep["install"] or dep["check"]:
external_dependencies.append(dep)
return {
"pip_dependencies": _string_list(manifest.get("pip_dependencies")),
"external_dependencies": external_dependencies,
"required_env": _string_list(manifest.get("requires_env")),
}
def _memory_provider_setup_info(name: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
setup = _memory_provider_setup_manifest(name)
setup["dependencies_installed"] = _memory_provider_dependencies_installed(setup)
return setup
_MEMORY_PROVIDER_IMPORT_NAMES = {
"honcho-ai": "honcho",
"mem0ai": "mem0",
"hindsight-client": "hindsight_client",
"hindsight-all": "hindsight",
}
def _memory_provider_dependency_package(dep: str) -> str:
return re.split(r"[\[<>=!~;]", dep, maxsplit=1)[0].strip()
def _memory_provider_import_name(dep: str) -> str:
package = _memory_provider_dependency_package(dep)
return _MEMORY_PROVIDER_IMPORT_NAMES.get(package, package.replace("-", "_"))
def _dependency_importable(dep: str) -> bool:
import_name = _memory_provider_import_name(dep)
if not import_name:
return False
try:
__import__(import_name)
return True
except ImportError:
return False
def _trim_setup_output(value: Optional[str], limit: int = 4000) -> str:
text = str(value or "")
if len(text) <= limit:
return text
return f"{text[:limit]}\n... truncated ..."
def _memory_provider_setup_env() -> Dict[str, str]:
env = os.environ.copy()
home = Path.home()
extra_bins = [
home / ".brv-cli" / "bin",
home / ".local" / "bin",
home / ".npm-global" / "bin",
Path("/usr/local/bin"),
]
existing_path = env.get("PATH", "")
prefix = os.pathsep.join(str(path) for path in extra_bins if path.exists())
if prefix:
env["PATH"] = prefix + os.pathsep + existing_path
return env
def _command_result(
*,
kind: str,
name: str,
status: str,
command: str = "",
completed: Optional[subprocess.CompletedProcess] = None,
error: Optional[str] = None,
) -> Dict[str, Any]:
return {
"kind": kind,
"name": name,
"status": status,
"command": command,
"returncode": None if completed is None else completed.returncode,
"stdout": "" if completed is None else _trim_setup_output(completed.stdout),
"stderr": _trim_setup_output(error or ("" if completed is None else completed.stderr)),
}
def _run_setup_command(
command: Any,
*,
display: str,
shell: bool = False,
timeout: int = 180,
) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
return subprocess.run(
command,
shell=shell,
executable="/bin/bash" if shell else None,
env=_memory_provider_setup_env(),
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=timeout,
check=False,
)
def _memory_provider_dependencies_installed(setup: Dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
pip_dependencies = _string_list(setup.get("pip_dependencies"))
external_dependencies = setup.get("external_dependencies") or []
pip_ok = all(_dependency_importable(dep) for dep in pip_dependencies)
external_ok = True
for dep in external_dependencies:
if not isinstance(dep, dict):
continue
check_cmd = str(dep.get("check") or "").strip()
install_cmd = str(dep.get("install") or "").strip()
if not check_cmd:
if install_cmd:
external_ok = False
continue
try:
completed = _run_setup_command(
shlex.split(check_cmd),
display=check_cmd,
timeout=20,
)
except Exception:
external_ok = False
continue
if completed.returncode != 0:
external_ok = False
return pip_ok and external_ok
def _install_memory_provider_pip_dependencies(dependencies: List[str]) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
missing = [dep for dep in dependencies if not _dependency_importable(dep)]
if not dependencies:
return []
if not missing:
return [
_command_result(kind="pip", name=", ".join(dependencies), status="already_installed")
]
uv_path = shutil.which("uv")
if uv_path:
command: Any = [uv_path, "pip", "install", "--python", sys.executable, "--quiet", *missing]
display = f"uv pip install --python {sys.executable} {' '.join(missing)}"
else:
command = [sys.executable, "-m", "pip", "install", "--quiet", *missing]
display = f"{sys.executable} -m pip install {' '.join(missing)}"
try:
completed = _run_setup_command(command, display=display, timeout=240)
except Exception as exc:
return [
_command_result(
kind="pip",
name=", ".join(missing),
status="failed",
command=display,
error=str(exc),
)
]
return [
_command_result(
kind="pip",
name=", ".join(missing),
status="installed" if completed.returncode == 0 else "failed",
command=display,
completed=completed,
)
]
def _install_memory_provider_external_dependencies(
dependencies: List[Dict[str, str]],
) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
results: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for dep in dependencies:
name = dep.get("name") or "dependency"
check_cmd = dep.get("check") or ""
install_cmd = dep.get("install") or ""
if check_cmd:
try:
check = _run_setup_command(
shlex.split(check_cmd),
display=check_cmd,
timeout=20,
)
except Exception as exc:
results.append(
_command_result(
kind="external_check",
name=name,
status="missing" if install_cmd else "failed",
command=check_cmd,
error=str(exc),
)
)
else:
if check.returncode == 0:
results.append(
_command_result(
kind="external_check",
name=name,
status="already_installed",
command=check_cmd,
completed=check,
)
)
continue
results.append(
_command_result(
kind="external_check",
name=name,
status="missing" if install_cmd else "failed",
command=check_cmd,
completed=check,
)
)
if not install_cmd:
continue
if install_cmd:
try:
install = _run_setup_command(
install_cmd,
display=install_cmd,
shell=True,
timeout=300,
)
except Exception as exc:
results.append(
_command_result(
kind="external_install",
name=name,
status="failed",
command=install_cmd,
error=str(exc),
)
)
continue
results.append(
_command_result(
kind="external_install",
name=name,
status="installed" if install.returncode == 0 else "failed",
command=install_cmd,
completed=install,
)
)
if check_cmd and install.returncode == 0:
try:
post_check = _run_setup_command(
shlex.split(check_cmd),
display=check_cmd,
timeout=20,
)
results.append(
_command_result(
kind="external_check",
name=name,
status="verified" if post_check.returncode == 0 else "failed",
command=check_cmd,
completed=post_check,
)
)
except Exception as exc:
results.append(
_command_result(
kind="external_check",
name=name,
status="failed",
command=check_cmd,
error=str(exc),
)
)
return results
def _install_memory_provider_setup(name: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
provider = _load_memory_provider(name)
manifest = _memory_provider_manifest(name)
if provider is None and not manifest:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Unknown memory provider: {name}")
setup = _memory_provider_setup_manifest(name)
results = []
results.extend(_install_memory_provider_pip_dependencies(setup["pip_dependencies"]))
results.extend(
_install_memory_provider_external_dependencies(setup["external_dependencies"])
)
if not results:
results.append(
_command_result(
kind="setup",
name=name,
status="no_declared_steps",
)
)
ok = all(result["status"] not in {"failed"} for result in results)
statuses = {row["name"]: row for row in _discover_memory_provider_statuses()}
return {
"ok": ok,
"provider": name,
"results": results,
"status": statuses.get(name),
}
def _normalize_memory_provider_schema(name: str, provider: Any) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
raw_schema: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
if provider is not None and hasattr(provider, "get_config_schema"):
try:
raw = provider.get_config_schema()
if isinstance(raw, list):
raw_schema = [field for field in raw if isinstance(field, dict)]
except Exception:
_log.warning("Failed to read memory provider schema for %s", name, exc_info=True)
fields: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for raw in raw_schema:
key = str(raw.get("key") or "").strip()
if not key:
continue
choices = raw.get("choices") or raw.get("options") or []
if not isinstance(choices, list):
choices = []
explicit_kind = str(raw.get("kind") or raw.get("type") or "").strip().lower()
if raw.get("secret"):
kind = "secret"
elif choices:
kind = "select"
elif explicit_kind in {"bool", "boolean"} or isinstance(raw.get("default"), bool):
kind = "boolean"
else:
kind = "text"
options = []
for choice in choices:
value = str(choice)
options.append({"value": value, "label": value, "description": ""})
description = str(raw.get("description") or "")
fields.append({
"key": key,
"label": str(raw.get("label") or key.replace("_", " ").title()),
"kind": kind,
"description": description,
"placeholder": str(raw.get("placeholder") or ""),
"required": bool(raw.get("required", False)),
"default": raw.get("default", ""),
"options": options,
"url": str(raw.get("url") or ""),
"when": raw.get("when") if isinstance(raw.get("when"), dict) else None,
"_env_key": str(raw.get("env_var") or "") or None,
})
return fields
def _read_json_file(path: Path) -> Dict[str, Any]:
if not path.exists():
return {}
try:
data = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
except Exception:
_log.debug("Failed to read JSON config from %s", path, exc_info=True)
return {}
return data if isinstance(data, dict) else {}
def _read_memory_provider_existing_values(name: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Best-effort read of existing provider config across legacy/native stores."""
hermes_home = get_hermes_home()
values: Dict[str, Any] = {}
# Common native provider stores.
for path in (
hermes_home / f"{name}.json",
hermes_home / name / "config.json",
):
values.update(_read_json_file(path))
try:
cfg = load_config()
except Exception:
cfg = {}
memory_cfg = cfg.get("memory") if isinstance(cfg, dict) else {}
if isinstance(memory_cfg, dict):
provider_cfg = memory_cfg.get(name)
if isinstance(provider_cfg, dict):
values.update(provider_cfg)
legacy_cfg = memory_cfg.get("provider_config")
if isinstance(legacy_cfg, dict):
values = {**legacy_cfg, **values}
# Holographic stores under plugins.hermes-memory-store.
plugins_cfg = cfg.get("plugins") if isinstance(cfg, dict) else {}
if name == "holographic" and isinstance(plugins_cfg, dict):
holographic_cfg = plugins_cfg.get("hermes-memory-store")
if isinstance(holographic_cfg, dict):
values.update(holographic_cfg)
return values
def _env_lookup(env_key: Optional[str]) -> str:
if not env_key:
return ""
env_on_disk = load_env()
return str(env_on_disk.get(env_key) or os.environ.get(env_key) or "")
def _coerce_bool(value: Any, *, default: bool = False) -> bool:
if isinstance(value, bool):
return value
if value is None or value == "":
return default
if isinstance(value, (int, float)):
return bool(value)
text = str(value).strip().lower()
if text in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}:
return True
if text in {"0", "false", "no", "off"}:
return False
raise ValueError(f"Invalid boolean value: {value}")
def _field_default(field: Dict[str, Any]) -> Any:
default = field.get("default", "")
if field["kind"] == "boolean":
return _coerce_bool(default, default=False)
return default
def _field_value(field: Dict[str, Any], data: Dict[str, Any]) -> Any:
if field["kind"] == "secret":
return ""
value = data.get(field["key"])
if value in (None, ""):
value = _env_lookup(field.get("_env_key"))
if value in (None, ""):
value = _field_default(field)
if field["kind"] == "select":
allowed = {opt["value"] for opt in field.get("options", [])}
value = str(value)
return value if value in allowed else str(_field_default(field))
if field["kind"] == "boolean":
return _coerce_bool(value, default=_coerce_bool(_field_default(field), default=False))
return str(value)
def _field_is_set(field: Dict[str, Any], data: Dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
if field["kind"] == "secret":
return bool(_env_lookup(field.get("_env_key")) or data.get(field["key"]))
value = _field_value(field, data)
return value not in (None, "")
def _field_visible(
field: Dict[str, Any],
data: Dict[str, Any],
fields_by_key: Optional[Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]]] = None,
) -> bool:
when = field.get("when")
if not isinstance(when, dict) or not when:
return True
for dep_key, expected in when.items():
dep_field = (fields_by_key or {}).get(str(dep_key)) or {
"key": str(dep_key),
"kind": "text",
"default": "",
"_env_key": None,
}
actual = _field_value(dep_field, data)
if str(actual) != str(expected):
return False
return True
def _public_memory_provider_field(field: Dict[str, Any], data: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
entry = {
"key": field["key"],
"label": field["label"],
"kind": field["kind"],
"description": field["description"],
"placeholder": field["placeholder"],
"required": field["required"],
"value": "" if field["kind"] == "secret" else _field_value(field, data),
"is_set": _field_is_set(field, data),
"options": field.get("options", []),
"url": field.get("url", ""),
"when": field.get("when"),
}
return entry
def _memory_provider_payload(name: str, provider: Any) -> Dict[str, Any]:
data = _read_memory_provider_existing_values(name)
fields = [
_public_memory_provider_field(field, data)
for field in _normalize_memory_provider_schema(name, provider)
]
return {
"name": name,
"label": _memory_provider_label(name),
"fields": fields,
"setup": _memory_provider_setup_info(name),
}
def _coerce_schema_field(field: Dict[str, Any], raw: Any) -> Any:
if field["kind"] == "boolean":
return _coerce_bool(raw, default=_coerce_bool(_field_default(field), default=False))
value = str(raw if raw is not None else "").strip()
if field["kind"] == "select":
if not value:
value = str(_field_default(field))
allowed = {opt["value"] for opt in field.get("options", [])}
if value not in allowed:
raise ValueError(f"Invalid value for '{field['key']}'")
return value
return value or _field_default(field)
def _save_memory_provider_native_config(name: str, provider: Any, values: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
if provider is not None and hasattr(provider, "save_config"):
try:
from agent.memory_provider import MemoryProvider as _BaseMemoryProvider
except Exception:
provider.save_config(values, str(get_hermes_home()))
return
if type(provider).save_config is not _BaseMemoryProvider.save_config:
provider.save_config(values, str(get_hermes_home()))
return
cfg = load_config()
memory_cfg = cfg.get("memory")
if not isinstance(memory_cfg, dict):
memory_cfg = {}
cfg["memory"] = memory_cfg
current = memory_cfg.get(name)
if not isinstance(current, dict):
current = {}
current.update(values)
memory_cfg[name] = current
save_config(cfg)
def _memory_provider_is_configured(name: str, provider: Any) -> bool:
data = _read_memory_provider_existing_values(name)
fields = _normalize_memory_provider_schema(name, provider)
fields_by_key = {field["key"]: field for field in fields}
visible_fields = [
field for field in fields if _field_visible(field, data, fields_by_key)
]
required_fields = [field for field in visible_fields if field.get("required")]
if not required_fields:
return True
return all(_field_is_set(field, data) for field in required_fields)
def _discover_memory_provider_statuses() -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
discovered: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
try:
from plugins.memory import discover_memory_providers
for name, description, available in discover_memory_providers():
discovered[str(name)] = {
"name": str(name),
"description": str(description or ""),
"available": bool(available),
"missing": False,
}
except Exception:
_log.exception("discover_memory_providers failed")
cfg = load_config()
active = ""
mem = cfg.get("memory")
if isinstance(mem, dict):
active = _normalize_memory_provider_name(mem.get("provider"))
if active and active not in discovered:
discovered[active] = {
"name": active,
"description": "Configured provider was not found.",
"available": False,
"missing": True,
}
providers: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for name in sorted(discovered):
row = discovered[name]
provider = None if row["missing"] else _load_memory_provider(name)
setup = _memory_provider_setup_info(name)
configured = False if row["missing"] else _memory_provider_is_configured(name, provider)
schema_fields = [] if row["missing"] else _normalize_memory_provider_schema(name, provider)
if row["missing"]:
status = "missing"
elif not row["available"] and not setup.get("dependencies_installed", True):
status = "unavailable"
elif not configured:
status = "needs_config"
elif not row["available"] and schema_fields:
status = "needs_config"
elif not row["available"]:
status = "unavailable"
else:
status = "ready"
providers.append({
"name": name,
"description": row["description"],
"available": row["available"],
"configured": configured,
"status": status,
"setup": setup,
})
return providers
def _require_memory_provider_ready(name: str) -> None:
if not name:
return
statuses = {row["name"]: row for row in _discover_memory_provider_statuses()}
row = statuses.get(name)
if row is None:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"Unknown memory provider '{name}'.",
)
if row["status"] != "ready":
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=(
f"Memory provider '{name}' is not ready "
f"({row['status'].replace('_', ' ')}). Configure it in the dashboard first."
),
)
def _write_memory_provider_config_values(
name: str,
provider: Any,
values: Dict[str, Any],
) -> None:
existing = _read_memory_provider_existing_values(name)
fields = _normalize_memory_provider_schema(name, provider)
fields_by_key = {field["key"]: field for field in fields}
config_values: Dict[str, Any] = {}
secrets: Dict[str, str] = {}
for field in fields:
if not _field_visible(field, {**existing, **config_values}, fields_by_key):
continue
if field["kind"] == "secret":
submitted = str(values.get(field["key"]) or "").strip()
if submitted and field.get("_env_key"):
secrets[str(field["_env_key"])] = submitted
continue
raw = (
values[field["key"]]
if field["key"] in values
else existing.get(field["key"], _field_default(field))
)
config_values[field["key"]] = _coerce_schema_field(field, raw)
_save_memory_provider_native_config(name, provider, config_values)
for env_key, secret in secrets.items():
save_env_value(env_key, secret)
_MEMORY_PROVIDER_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,63}$")
def _require_valid_memory_provider_name(name: str) -> None:
"""Reject provider names that could traverse outside the plugin dirs.
``name`` is interpolated into filesystem paths by ``find_provider_dir()``
and gates which plugin manifest's setup commands run. A strict charset
allowlist (no path separators, no dots) makes traversal impossible
regardless of how the downstream lookup evolves.
"""
if not _MEMORY_PROVIDER_NAME_RE.fullmatch(name or ""):
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Unknown memory provider: {name}")
@app.get("/api/memory/providers/{name}/config")
async def get_memory_provider_config(name: str, surface: Optional[str] = None, profile: Optional[str] = None):
_require_valid_memory_provider_name(name)
def _run():
with _profile_scope(profile):
if surface == "declared":
declared = get_provider_config_schema(name)
if declared is None:
# Undeclared providers (e.g. builtin) have no desktop
# config surface; the generic panel renders nothing.
return {"name": name, "label": name, "docs_url": "", "fields": []}
return _declared_provider_payload(declared)
provider = _load_memory_provider(name)
if provider is None:
# Undeclared providers (e.g. builtin) have no config surface. Return an
# empty schema so the generic panel simply renders nothing.
return {"name": name, "label": name, "fields": [], "setup": _memory_provider_setup_info(name)}
return _memory_provider_payload(name, provider)
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
@app.post("/api/memory/providers/{name}/setup")
async def setup_memory_provider(name: str, body: MemoryProviderSetupRequest):
_require_valid_memory_provider_name(name)
provider = _load_memory_provider(name)
if provider is None and not _memory_provider_manifest(name):
# No discoverable plugin directory → nothing whose manifest could
# legitimately declare setup commands. Refuse before the
# command-running path. (provider may be None with a manifest present
# when its pip deps aren't installed yet — that's the setup use case.)
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Unknown memory provider: {name}")
if provider is not None and body.values:
try:
_write_memory_provider_config_values(name, provider, body.values)
except ValueError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc)) from exc
except Exception:
_log.exception("Failed to persist memory provider setup values for %s", name)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Internal server error")
return _install_memory_provider_setup(name)
@app.put("/api/memory/providers/{name}/config")
async def update_memory_provider_config(
name: str, body: MemoryProviderConfigUpdate, surface: Optional[str] = None, profile: Optional[str] = None
):
_require_valid_memory_provider_name(name)
values = body.values or {}
def _run():
with _profile_scope(profile):
if surface == "declared":
declared = get_provider_config_schema(name)
if declared is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Unknown memory provider: {name}")
_update_memory_provider_config(declared, _stringify_submitted_values(values))
return {"ok": True}
provider = _load_memory_provider(name)
if provider is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Unknown memory provider: {name}")
_write_memory_provider_config_values(name, provider, values)
_require_memory_provider_ready(name)
config = load_config()
memory_config = config.get("memory")
if not isinstance(memory_config, dict):
memory_config = {}
config["memory"] = memory_config
memory_config["provider"] = name
save_config(config)
return {"ok": True, "active": name}
try:
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
except HTTPException:
raise
except ValueError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc)) from exc
except Exception:
_log.exception("PUT /api/memory/providers/%s/config failed", name)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Internal server error")
@app.get("/api/config")
async def get_config(profile: Optional[str] = None):
with _profile_scope(profile):
config = _normalize_config_for_web(load_config())
# Strip internal keys that the frontend shouldn't see or send back
return {k: v for k, v in config.items() if not k.startswith("_")}
@app.get("/api/config/defaults")
async def get_defaults():
return DEFAULT_CONFIG
@app.get("/api/config/schema")
async def get_schema(profile: Optional[str] = None):
# Voice provider options are merged per-request so user-declared
# command providers (tts.providers.* / stt.providers.*) added after
# server start still show up, scoped to the requested profile's config.
with _config_profile_scope(profile):
fields = _schema_with_voice_provider_options()
return {"fields": fields, "category_order": _CATEGORY_ORDER}
_EMPTY_MODEL_INFO: dict = {
"model": "",
"provider": "",
"auto_context_length": 0,
"config_context_length": 0,
"effective_context_length": 0,
"capabilities": {},
}
@app.get("/api/model/info")
def get_model_info(profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Return resolved model metadata for the currently configured model.
Calls the same context-length resolution chain the agent uses, so the
frontend can display "Auto-detected: 200K" alongside the override field.
Also returns model capabilities (vision, reasoning, tools) when available.
"""
try:
with _profile_scope(profile):
cfg = load_config()
model_cfg = cfg.get("model", "")
# Extract model name and provider from the config
if isinstance(model_cfg, dict):
model_name = model_cfg.get("default", model_cfg.get("name", ""))
provider = model_cfg.get("provider", "")
base_url = model_cfg.get("base_url", "")
config_ctx = model_cfg.get("context_length")
else:
model_name = str(model_cfg) if model_cfg else ""
provider = ""
base_url = ""
config_ctx = None
if not model_name:
return dict(_EMPTY_MODEL_INFO, provider=provider)
# Resolve auto-detected context length (pass config_ctx=None to get
# purely auto-detected value, then separately report the override)
try:
from agent.model_metadata import get_model_context_length
auto_ctx = get_model_context_length(
model=model_name,
base_url=base_url,
provider=provider,
config_context_length=None, # ignore override — we want auto value
)
except Exception:
auto_ctx = 0
config_ctx_int = 0
if isinstance(config_ctx, int) and config_ctx > 0:
config_ctx_int = config_ctx
# Effective is what the agent actually uses
effective_ctx = config_ctx_int if config_ctx_int > 0 else auto_ctx
# Try to get model capabilities from models.dev
caps = {}
try:
from agent.models_dev import get_model_capabilities
mc = get_model_capabilities(provider=provider, model=model_name)
if mc is not None:
caps = {
"supports_tools": mc.supports_tools,
"supports_vision": mc.supports_vision,
"supports_reasoning": mc.supports_reasoning,
"context_window": mc.context_window,
"max_output_tokens": mc.max_output_tokens,
"model_family": mc.model_family,
}
except Exception:
pass
return {
"model": model_name,
"provider": provider,
"auto_context_length": auto_ctx,
"config_context_length": config_ctx_int,
"effective_context_length": effective_ctx,
"capabilities": caps,
}
except HTTPException:
# Unknown/invalid profile must surface as 404, not degrade into a
# 200 with empty model info (which would render as "no model set").
raise
except Exception:
_log.exception("GET /api/model/info failed")
return dict(_EMPTY_MODEL_INFO)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Model assignment — pick provider+model for main slot or auxiliary slots.
# Mirrors the model.options JSON-RPC from tui_gateway but uses REST so the
# Models page (which has no chat PTY open) can drive it.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Canonical auxiliary task slots. Keep in sync with DEFAULT_CONFIG["auxiliary"]
# in hermes_cli/config.py — listed here for deterministic ordering in the UI.
_AUX_TASK_SLOTS: Tuple[str, ...] = (
"vision",
"web_extract",
"compression",
"skills_hub",
"approval",
"mcp",
"title_generation",
"triage_specifier",
"kanban_decomposer",
"profile_describer",
"curator",
)
@app.get("/api/model/options")
def get_model_options(
profile: Optional[str] = None,
refresh: bool = False,
include_unconfigured: bool = False,
explicit_only: bool = False,
):
"""Return authenticated providers + their curated model lists.
REST equivalent of the ``model.options`` JSON-RPC on tui_gateway, so the
dashboard Models page can render the picker without a live chat session.
The response shape matches ``model.options`` 1:1 so ``ModelPickerDialog``
can share the same types.
``profile`` scopes the picker context (current model/provider, custom
providers from config, per-profile .env auth state) so the Models page
reads the SAME profile /api/model/set writes.
``refresh`` busts the per-provider model-id disk cache so every row
re-fetches its live catalog — used by the picker's explicit "Refresh
Models" control. Normal opens leave it false to stay on the 1h cache.
"""
try:
from hermes_cli.inventory import build_models_payload, load_picker_context
# Most desktop surfaces should only list providers the user has already
# configured. Onboarding opts into the full provider universe via
# include_unconfigured=1 so it can still render setup affordances for
# providers that are not yet authenticated.
with _profile_scope(profile):
return build_models_payload(
load_picker_context(),
explicit_only=bool(explicit_only),
include_unconfigured=bool(include_unconfigured),
picker_hints=True,
canonical_order=True,
pricing=True,
capabilities=True,
refresh=bool(refresh),
probe_custom_providers=bool(refresh),
probe_current_custom_provider=not bool(refresh),
)
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception:
_log.exception("GET /api/model/options failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to list model options")
@app.get("/api/model/recommended-default")
def get_recommended_default_model(provider: str = ""):
"""Return the recommended default model for a freshly-authenticated provider.
Mirrors the model-curation `hermes model` does so GUI onboarding lands on a
sensible default instead of blindly taking the first curated entry. For
Nous this honors the user's free/paid tier: free users get a free model,
paid users get the full curated default. For any other provider it falls
back to the first curated model (same as before).
Response: {"provider": str, "model": str, "free_tier": bool | None}
where free_tier is True/False for Nous and None otherwise. `model` may be
empty if nothing could be resolved (caller degrades gracefully).
"""
slug = (provider or "").strip().lower()
if slug == "nous":
try:
from hermes_cli.models import (
get_curated_nous_model_ids,
get_pricing_for_provider,
check_nous_free_tier,
partition_nous_models_by_tier,
pick_silent_default_model,
union_with_portal_free_recommendations,
union_with_portal_paid_recommendations,
)
from hermes_cli.auth import get_provider_auth_state
model_ids = get_curated_nous_model_ids()
pricing = get_pricing_for_provider("nous") or {}
free_tier = check_nous_free_tier(force_fresh=True)
portal_url = ""
try:
state = get_provider_auth_state("nous") or {}
portal_url = state.get("portal_base_url", "") or ""
except Exception:
portal_url = ""
if free_tier:
model_ids, pricing = union_with_portal_free_recommendations(
model_ids, pricing, portal_url
)
model_ids, _unavailable = partition_nous_models_by_tier(
model_ids, pricing, free_tier=True
)
else:
model_ids, pricing = union_with_portal_paid_recommendations(
model_ids, pricing, portal_url
)
model = pick_silent_default_model(model_ids, provider="nous")
return {"provider": "nous", "model": model, "free_tier": bool(free_tier)}
except Exception:
_log.exception("GET /api/model/recommended-default (nous) failed")
return {"provider": "nous", "model": "", "free_tier": None}
# Non-Nous: preferred silent default when the provider's curated list
# carries it, else the first curated model. Aggregator lists lead with the
# priciest Anthropic flagship (claude-fable-5), which must never be the
# model a user lands on without explicitly picking it.
try:
from hermes_cli.inventory import build_models_payload, load_picker_context
from hermes_cli.models import pick_silent_default_model
payload = build_models_payload(load_picker_context())
for row in payload.get("providers", []):
if str(row.get("slug", "")).lower() == slug:
models = [str(m) for m in (row.get("models") or [])]
return {"provider": slug, "model": pick_silent_default_model(models, provider=slug), "free_tier": None}
return {"provider": slug, "model": "", "free_tier": None}
except Exception:
_log.exception("GET /api/model/recommended-default failed")
return {"provider": slug, "model": "", "free_tier": None}
@app.get("/api/model/auxiliary")
def get_auxiliary_models(profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Return current auxiliary task assignments.
Shape:
{
"tasks": [
{"task": "vision", "provider": "auto", "model": "", "base_url": ""},
...
],
"main": {"provider": "openrouter", "model": "anthropic/claude-opus-4.7"},
}
``profile`` scopes the read — without it, the Models page would show
the dashboard profile's auxiliary pins while /api/model/set wrote the
selected profile's (read/write asymmetry).
"""
try:
with _profile_scope(profile):
cfg = load_config()
aux_cfg = cfg.get("auxiliary", {})
if not isinstance(aux_cfg, dict):
aux_cfg = {}
tasks = []
for slot in _AUX_TASK_SLOTS:
slot_cfg = aux_cfg.get(slot, {}) if isinstance(aux_cfg.get(slot), dict) else {}
tasks.append({
"task": slot,
"provider": str(slot_cfg.get("provider", "auto") or "auto"),
"model": str(slot_cfg.get("model", "") or ""),
"base_url": str(slot_cfg.get("base_url", "") or ""),
})
model_cfg = cfg.get("model", {})
if isinstance(model_cfg, dict):
main = {
"provider": str(model_cfg.get("provider", "") or ""),
"model": str(model_cfg.get("default", model_cfg.get("name", "")) or ""),
}
else:
main = {"provider": "", "model": str(model_cfg) if model_cfg else ""}
return {"tasks": tasks, "main": main}
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception:
_log.exception("GET /api/model/auxiliary failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to read auxiliary config")
@app.get("/api/model/moa")
def get_moa_models(profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Return the configured Mixture-of-Agents provider/model slots."""
try:
from hermes_cli.moa_config import normalize_moa_config
with _profile_scope(profile):
cfg = load_config()
return normalize_moa_config(cfg.get("moa") if isinstance(cfg, dict) else {})
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception:
_log.exception("GET /api/model/moa failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to read MoA config")
@app.put("/api/model/moa")
def set_moa_models(body: MoaConfigPayload, profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Persist the Mixture-of-Agents provider/model slots."""
try:
from hermes_cli.moa_config import normalize_moa_config, validate_moa_payload
def _slot_dict(slot: MoaModelSlot) -> dict:
# Drop unset optionals so saved slots stay minimal ({provider, model}).
return {k: v for k, v in slot.dict().items() if v is not None}
def _preset_dict(preset: MoaPresetPayload) -> dict:
return {
"reference_models": [_slot_dict(slot) for slot in preset.reference_models],
"aggregator": _slot_dict(preset.aggregator),
"reference_temperature": preset.reference_temperature,
"aggregator_temperature": preset.aggregator_temperature,
"max_tokens": preset.max_tokens,
"reference_max_tokens": preset.reference_max_tokens,
"fanout": preset.fanout,
"enabled": preset.enabled,
}
with _profile_scope(body.profile or profile):
cfg = load_config()
if body.presets:
raw = {
"default_preset": body.default_preset,
"active_preset": body.active_preset,
"presets": {name: _preset_dict(preset) for name, preset in body.presets.items()},
}
else:
raw = _preset_dict(
MoaPresetPayload(
reference_models=body.reference_models,
aggregator=body.aggregator,
reference_temperature=body.reference_temperature,
aggregator_temperature=body.aggregator_temperature,
max_tokens=body.max_tokens,
reference_max_tokens=body.reference_max_tokens,
fanout=body.fanout,
enabled=body.enabled,
)
)
# Reject-don't-repair: normalize_moa_config() silently swaps any
# preset containing incomplete slots for the hardcoded defaults —
# correct tolerance for hand-edited configs at READ time, silent
# data loss at WRITE time (#64156: desktop autosave of a
# half-filled slot replaced the user's whole preset). Refuse the
# save loudly so no client can corrupt config through this route.
problems = validate_moa_payload(raw)
if problems:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=422,
detail="Invalid MoA config: " + "; ".join(problems),
)
normalized = normalize_moa_config(raw)
cfg["moa"] = normalized
save_config(cfg)
return {"ok": True, **normalized}
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception:
_log.exception("PUT /api/model/moa failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to save MoA config")
@app.post("/api/model/set")
async def set_model_assignment(body: ModelAssignment, profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Assign a model to the main slot or an auxiliary task slot.
Writes to ``~/.hermes/config.yaml`` — applies to **new** sessions only.
The currently running chat PTY (if any) is not affected; use the
``/model`` slash command inside a chat to hot-swap that specific session.
"""
scope = (body.scope or "").strip().lower()
provider = (body.provider or "").strip()
model = (body.model or "").strip()
task = (body.task or "").strip().lower()
base_url = (body.base_url or "").strip()
api_key = (body.api_key or "").strip()
if scope not in {"main", "auxiliary"}:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="scope must be 'main' or 'auxiliary'")
try:
# Expensive-model warning runs BEFORE the profile scope is entered:
# _profile_scope must never be held across an await (the RLock is
# reentrant per-thread, so a second coroutine interleaving on the
# event-loop thread could cross-restore the module globals).
if model and not body.confirm_expensive_model:
try:
from hermes_cli.model_cost_guard import expensive_model_warning
# Pricing lookup can hit models.dev / a /models endpoint on a
# cache miss — keep it off the event loop.
warning = await asyncio.to_thread(
expensive_model_warning,
model,
provider=provider,
base_url=base_url,
)
except Exception:
warning = None
if warning is not None:
return {
"ok": False,
"scope": scope,
"provider": provider,
"model": model,
"confirm_required": True,
"confirm_message": warning.message,
}
def _apply_assignment():
with _profile_scope(body.profile or profile):
return _apply_model_assignment_sync(
scope, provider, model, task, base_url, api_key
)
return await asyncio.to_thread(_apply_assignment)
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception:
_log.exception("POST /api/model/set failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to save model assignment")
def _apply_model_assignment_sync(
scope: str, provider: str, model: str, task: str, base_url: str, api_key: str = ""
):
"""Synchronous body of POST /api/model/set.
Runs inside ``_profile_scope`` (in a worker thread) so every
load_config/save_config lands in the requested profile. Raises
HTTPException for validation errors — the async wrapper re-raises them.
"""
cfg = load_config()
if scope == "main":
if not provider or not model:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="provider and model required for main")
provider, model = _normalize_main_model_assignment(provider, model)
providers_cfg = cfg.get("providers")
provider_entry = providers_cfg.get(provider) if isinstance(providers_cfg, dict) else None
if not base_url and isinstance(provider_entry, dict) and provider_entry.get("base_url"):
base_url = str(provider_entry.get("base_url") or "").strip()
model_cfg = _apply_main_model_assignment(
cfg.get("model", {}), provider, model, base_url, api_key
)
# Fall back to the provider entry's stored key only when the request
# didn't carry one — same precedence as the base_url fill above. An
# unconditional overwrite silently discards a key the caller is
# rotating in, and model.api_key outranks the environment at client
# construction (#62269), so the stale key keeps authenticating.
if (
not api_key
and isinstance(provider_entry, dict)
and provider_entry.get("api_key")
):
model_cfg["api_key"] = provider_entry["api_key"]
cfg["model"] = model_cfg
# When switching the main provider to Nous, mirror the CLI's
# post-model-selection behaviour (hermes_cli/main.py
# prompt_enable_tool_gateway / tools_config apply_nous_managed_defaults):
# auto-route any *unconfigured* tools through the Nous Tool Gateway.
# This is purely additive — apply_nous_managed_defaults skips every
# tool where the user already has a direct key (FIRECRAWL_API_KEY,
# FAL_KEY, etc.) or an explicit backend/provider in config, so it
# never overwrites a user's own setup. GUI users thus land on the
# gateway the same way CLI users do, without a separate prompt.
gateway_tools: list[str] = []
if provider.strip().lower() == "nous":
try:
from hermes_cli.nous_subscription import apply_nous_managed_defaults
from hermes_cli.tools_config import _get_platform_tools
enabled = _get_platform_tools(
cfg, "cli", include_default_mcp_servers=False
)
changed = apply_nous_managed_defaults(
cfg,
enabled_toolsets=enabled,
force_fresh=True,
)
gateway_tools = sorted(changed)
except Exception:
# Portal lookup hiccups / non-subscriber / non-nous gating
# must never block saving the model assignment.
_log.debug("apply_nous_managed_defaults skipped", exc_info=True)
save_config(cfg)
# Register a named ``custom_providers`` entry for a custom/local
# endpoint, mirroring the ``hermes model`` custom flow
# (_save_custom_provider). Without this the endpoint only lives in
# ``model.*`` and the picker has no proper ready row for it — the
# GUI then surfaces a "needs setup" dead-end on the bare ``custom``
# provider. Dedups by base_url, so re-saving is idempotent.
if provider.strip().lower() in {"custom", "local"} and base_url:
try:
from hermes_cli.main import _auto_provider_name, _save_custom_provider
_save_custom_provider(
base_url,
api_key,
model,
name=_auto_provider_name(base_url),
)
except Exception:
# Never block the assignment on the bookkeeping write —
# model.* is already persisted and routable.
_log.debug("custom_providers registration skipped", exc_info=True)
# Surface auxiliary slots still pinned to a *different* provider than
# the new main one. Switching the main model does NOT touch aux pins
# (they're independent, sticky per-task overrides — see
# auxiliary_client._resolve_auto). A user who switches main away from
# a now-unpaid provider (e.g. nous with $0 balance) keeps paying 402s
# on every background aux call until they reset those pins. We never
# auto-clear them — pinning aux to a cheaper/different model is a
# legitimate config — but we tell the caller so the UI can offer a
# "reset to main" nudge instead of silently burning credits.
new_provider = provider.strip().lower()
stale_aux: list[dict] = []
aux_cfg = cfg.get("auxiliary", {})
if isinstance(aux_cfg, dict):
for slot in _AUX_TASK_SLOTS:
slot_cfg = aux_cfg.get(slot)
if not isinstance(slot_cfg, dict):
continue
slot_provider = str(slot_cfg.get("provider", "") or "").strip()
if (
slot_provider
and slot_provider.lower() not in {"auto", ""}
and slot_provider.lower() != new_provider
):
stale_aux.append({
"task": slot,
"provider": slot_provider,
"model": str(slot_cfg.get("model", "") or ""),
})
return {
"ok": True,
"scope": "main",
"provider": provider,
"model": model,
"base_url": model_cfg.get("base_url", ""),
"gateway_tools": gateway_tools,
"stale_aux": stale_aux,
}
# scope == "auxiliary"
aux = cfg.get("auxiliary")
if not isinstance(aux, dict):
aux = {}
if task == "__reset__":
# Reset every slot to provider="auto", model="" — keeps other fields intact.
for slot in _AUX_TASK_SLOTS:
slot_cfg = aux.get(slot)
if not isinstance(slot_cfg, dict):
slot_cfg = {}
slot_cfg["provider"] = "auto"
slot_cfg["model"] = ""
slot_cfg.pop("base_url", None)
clear_model_endpoint_credentials(slot_cfg)
aux[slot] = slot_cfg
cfg["auxiliary"] = aux
save_config(cfg)
return {"ok": True, "scope": "auxiliary", "reset": True}
if not provider:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="provider required for auxiliary")
targets = [task] if task else list(_AUX_TASK_SLOTS)
for slot in targets:
if slot not in _AUX_TASK_SLOTS:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"unknown auxiliary task: {slot}")
slot_cfg = aux.get(slot)
if not isinstance(slot_cfg, dict):
slot_cfg = {}
prev_provider = str(slot_cfg.get("provider") or "").strip().lower()
new_provider = provider.strip().lower()
slot_cfg["provider"] = provider
slot_cfg["model"] = model
if new_provider != prev_provider and new_provider != "custom":
slot_cfg.pop("base_url", None)
clear_model_endpoint_credentials(slot_cfg)
aux[slot] = slot_cfg
cfg["auxiliary"] = aux
save_config(cfg)
return {
"ok": True,
"scope": "auxiliary",
"tasks": targets,
"provider": provider,
"model": model,
}
def _infer_provider_on_model_change(model_val: str, prev_provider: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""Infer which provider serves ``model_val`` when the flat Config-page Model
field changes, given the previously-saved ``prev_provider``.
Returns ``(provider, model)``; ``provider`` is empty when no switch is
warranted (leave the existing provider untouched). Two signals, in order:
1. Curated-catalog detection (``detect_provider_for_model``) — handles the
~28 OpenRouter-curated models and direct provider-static catalogs.
2. Vendor-slug heuristic — a ``vendor/model`` slug cannot belong to a
single-model / non-aggregator provider (e.g. ``ollama-local``). When the
current provider is not an aggregator that serves vendor-prefixed slugs,
route to an aggregator. ``_normalize_main_model_assignment`` (called by
the caller) keeps the user's current aggregator when they're already on
one, else falls back to openrouter — the same chokepoint logic as
``POST /api/model/set``.
"""
name = (model_val or "").strip()
if not name:
return "", name
try:
from hermes_cli.models import (
_AGGREGATOR_PROVIDERS,
detect_provider_for_model,
normalize_provider,
)
except Exception:
return "", name
try:
detected = detect_provider_for_model(name, prev_provider)
except Exception:
detected = None
if detected:
return detected[0], detected[1]
# Vendor-prefixed slug under a non-aggregator provider → reassign. Use a
# sentinel "openrouter" here; _normalize_main_model_assignment resolves the
# real aggregator (keeps a current aggregator, else openrouter).
if "/" in name:
try:
cur_is_aggregator = normalize_provider(prev_provider) in _AGGREGATOR_PROVIDERS
except Exception:
cur_is_aggregator = False
if not cur_is_aggregator:
return "openrouter", name
return "", name
def _denormalize_config_from_web(config: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Reverse _normalize_config_for_web before saving.
Reconstructs ``model`` as a dict by reading the current on-disk config
to recover model subkeys (provider, base_url, api_mode, etc.) that were
stripped from the GET response. The frontend only sees model as a flat
string; the rest is preserved transparently.
Also handles ``model_context_length`` — writes it back into the model dict
as ``context_length``. A value of 0 or absent means "auto-detect" (omitted
from the dict so get_model_context_length() uses its normal resolution).
"""
config = dict(config)
# Remove any _model_meta that might have leaked in (shouldn't happen
# with the stripped GET response, but be defensive)
config.pop("_model_meta", None)
# Extract and remove model_context_length before processing model
ctx_override = config.pop("model_context_length", 0)
if not isinstance(ctx_override, int):
try:
ctx_override = int(ctx_override)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
ctx_override = 0
model_val = config.get("model")
if isinstance(model_val, str) and model_val:
# Read the current disk config to recover model subkeys
try:
disk_config = load_config()
disk_model = disk_config.get("model")
if isinstance(disk_model, dict):
prev_default = str(disk_model.get("default") or "").strip()
prev_provider = str(disk_model.get("provider") or "").strip()
# When the model name actually changed, re-detect which
# provider serves it. The Config-page Model field is a flat
# string with no provider info, so without this a user who
# picks an OpenRouter model while their default provider is
# ollama-local keeps the stale provider and 404s. Only fires
# on a real model change so saving unrelated config fields
# never overwrites an explicit provider.
if model_val != prev_default and prev_provider:
new_provider, resolved_model = _infer_provider_on_model_change(
model_val, prev_provider
)
if new_provider and new_provider.strip().lower() != prev_provider.lower():
# Route through the canonical assignment chokepoints so
# the model is normalized for the new provider and stale
# base_url/api_mode/api_key are cleared on the switch
# (and preserved on a same-provider re-pick).
norm_provider, norm_model = _normalize_main_model_assignment(
new_provider, resolved_model
)
disk_model = _apply_main_model_assignment(
disk_model, norm_provider, norm_model
)
model_val = norm_model
# Preserve all subkeys, update default with the new value
disk_model["default"] = model_val
# Write context_length into the model dict (0 = remove/auto)
if ctx_override > 0:
disk_model["context_length"] = ctx_override
else:
disk_model.pop("context_length", None)
config["model"] = disk_model
# Model was previously a bare string — upgrade to dict if
# user is setting a context_length override
elif ctx_override > 0:
config["model"] = {
"default": model_val,
"context_length": ctx_override,
}
except Exception:
pass # can't read disk config — just use the string form
return config
@app.put("/api/config")
async def update_config(body: ConfigUpdate, profile: Optional[str] = None):
try:
with _profile_scope(body.profile or profile):
# The dashboard form is schema-driven (see CONFIG_SCHEMA). Any root
# key absent from the schema — most visibly ``custom_providers``, but
# also ``agent.personalities``, ``terminal.lifetime_seconds``, etc. —
# is not sent in the PUT body. A full-replace save would silently
# drop those keys. Deep-merge incoming over what's on disk so the
# frontend can only overwrite what it explicitly sends.
existing = read_raw_config()
incoming = _denormalize_config_from_web(body.config)
save_config(_deep_merge(existing, incoming))
return {"ok": True}
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception:
_log.exception("PUT /api/config failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Internal server error")
def _catalog_provider_env_metadata() -> dict:
"""Map provider env vars → desktop card metadata, derived from the catalog.
Returns ``{env_var: {provider, provider_label, description, url, is_password,
advanced}}`` for every API-key provider in the unified ``provider_catalog()``
(i.e. the ``hermes model`` universe). This is what lets the desktop Keys tab
render a card for a provider even when its env var was never hand-added to
``OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS`` — closing the drift where CLI-configurable providers
(openai-api, kilocode, novita, tencent-tokenhub, copilot, …) were missing
from the GUI.
Hand ``OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS`` prose is layered ON TOP of this in the endpoint;
this only supplies membership + grouping + sensible fallbacks.
"""
try:
from hermes_cli.provider_catalog import provider_catalog
except Exception:
return {}
# Env vars already declared with a NON-provider category (e.g. the shared
# GITHUB_TOKEN, which is a Skills-Hub "tool" credential) must not be
# promoted into a provider card. Copilot lists GITHUB_TOKEN among its auth
# aliases, but its provider card uses the provider-owned COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN.
try:
from hermes_cli.config import OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS as _OPT
except Exception:
_OPT = {}
_non_provider_keys = {
k for k, v in _OPT.items()
if (v or {}).get("category") and (v or {}).get("category") != "provider"
}
meta: dict = {}
for d in provider_catalog():
if d.tab != "keys":
continue
# API-key vars: the first is the primary (password) field; any aliases
# are kept as additional password fields so users can clear them too.
for env_var in d.api_key_env_vars:
if env_var in _non_provider_keys:
continue # don't hijack a shared tool/messaging credential
meta.setdefault(
env_var,
{
"provider": d.slug,
"provider_label": d.label,
"description": d.description,
"url": d.signup_url or None,
"is_password": True,
"advanced": False,
"category": "provider",
},
)
# Base-URL override is an advanced, non-secret field for the same card.
if d.base_url_env_var:
meta.setdefault(
d.base_url_env_var,
{
"provider": d.slug,
"provider_label": d.label,
"description": f"{d.label} base URL override",
"url": None,
"is_password": False,
"advanced": True,
"category": "provider",
},
)
# AWS-SDK providers (Bedrock) authenticate via the AWS credential chain
# rather than a pasted API key, so they have no api_key_env_vars. Tag
# their AWS_* settings to the provider card so they still appear on the
# Keys tab (otherwise Bedrock — a `hermes model` provider — would be
# invisible in the desktop app).
if d.auth_type == "aws_sdk":
for aws_var in ("AWS_REGION", "AWS_PROFILE"):
existing = meta.get(aws_var, {})
meta[aws_var] = {
"provider": d.slug,
"provider_label": d.label,
"description": existing.get("description") or f"{d.label} ({aws_var})",
"url": existing.get("url"),
"is_password": False,
"advanced": existing.get("advanced", True),
"category": "provider",
}
# Vertex AI authenticates via OAuth2 (service-account JSON or ADC), not a
# pasted API key, so it also has no api_key_env_vars. Tag its credential
# env var to the provider card so it appears on the Keys tab (otherwise
# Vertex — a `hermes model` provider — would be invisible in the desktop
# app). The value is a filesystem path, not a secret string, so it is
# not a password field.
if d.auth_type == "vertex":
existing = meta.get("VERTEX_CREDENTIALS_PATH", {})
meta["VERTEX_CREDENTIALS_PATH"] = {
"provider": d.slug,
"provider_label": d.label,
"description": existing.get("description")
or f"{d.label} — service account JSON path (or use ADC)",
"url": existing.get("url"),
"is_password": False,
"advanced": existing.get("advanced", True),
"category": "provider",
}
return meta
@app.get("/api/env")
async def get_env_vars(profile: Optional[str] = None):
with _profile_scope(profile):
env_on_disk = load_env()
channel_keys = _channel_managed_env_keys()
catalog_meta = _catalog_provider_env_metadata()
def _row(var_name: str, info: dict, *, custom: bool = False) -> dict:
value = env_on_disk.get(var_name)
cat_meta = catalog_meta.get(var_name) or {}
# Hand OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS prose wins where present; the catalog fills any
# gaps (description/url) and always supplies provider grouping hints.
return {
"is_set": bool(value),
"redacted_value": redact_key(value) if value else None,
"description": info.get("description") or cat_meta.get("description", ""),
"url": info.get("url") if info.get("url") is not None else cat_meta.get("url"),
"category": info.get("category") or cat_meta.get("category", ""),
"is_password": info.get("password", cat_meta.get("is_password", False)),
"tools": info.get("tools", []),
"advanced": info.get("advanced", cat_meta.get("advanced", False)),
# True when this var is a messaging-platform credential owned by a
# Channels page card. The Keys/Env page uses this to hide it and
# avoid duplicating the (richer) Channels configuration UI.
"channel_managed": var_name in channel_keys,
# Provider grouping hints derived from the unified provider catalog
# so the desktop Keys tab groups by the SAME provider identity the
# CLI `hermes model` picker uses (not desktop-only prefix guesses).
"provider": cat_meta.get("provider", ""),
"provider_label": cat_meta.get("provider_label", ""),
# True when this key exists in the user's .env but is NOT in any
# catalog (OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS or the provider catalog) — an
# arbitrary/custom env var the user added directly. Surfaced so the
# Keys page can list (and let the user manage) them instead of
# hiding everything it doesn't recognise.
"custom": custom,
}
result = {}
for var_name, info in OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS.items():
result[var_name] = _row(var_name, info)
# Synthesize rows for catalog provider env vars that have no hand entry in
# OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS — these are the providers that were CLI-configurable but
# invisible in the desktop app until now.
for var_name in catalog_meta:
if var_name not in result:
result[var_name] = _row(var_name, {})
# Surface arbitrary/custom keys the user set in .env that aren't in any
# catalog. These are always "set" (they're on disk). Treated as secrets by
# default (is_password=True → redacted, reveal-gated) since an unrecognised
# key could hold anything. Channel-managed credentials are excluded — those
# belong to the Channels page. This makes the "add a custom key" surface
# round-trip: a key added there reappears here under its own section.
for var_name in env_on_disk:
if var_name in result or var_name in channel_keys:
continue
row = _row(var_name, {}, custom=True)
row["category"] = "custom"
row["is_password"] = True
result[var_name] = row
return result
@app.put("/api/env")
async def set_env_var(body: EnvVarUpdate, profile: Optional[str] = None):
try:
with _profile_scope(body.profile or profile):
# Unified credential lifecycle: writes .env AND reconciles any
# config.yaml mirror still holding the previous value of this var
# (model.api_key / auxiliary.*.api_key / custom_providers[*]),
# so a rotation can't leave a stale higher-precedence copy that
# keeps authenticating with the old key (#62269).
from hermes_cli.credential_lifecycle import save_provider_env_credential
result = save_provider_env_credential(body.key, body.value)
return result
except ValueError as exc:
# save_env_value raises ValueError for invalid names and for keys
# on the denylist (LD_PRELOAD, PATH, PYTHONPATH, …). Surface the
# message to the SPA so the user understands why the write was
# refused instead of seeing an opaque 500.
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc)) from exc
except Exception:
_log.exception("PUT /api/env failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Internal server error")
# Live credential probes keyed by env var. Each entry is (method, url, auth)
# where auth is "bearer" (Authorization header) or "query" (?key=). A cheap
# read-only models/key call that 401s on a bad token — enough to catch a
# mistyped key before it's persisted. Providers absent from this map (or local
# endpoints) are not network-validated; the client treats those as "unknown".
_CREDENTIAL_PROBES: dict[str, tuple[str, str]] = {
"OPENROUTER_API_KEY": ("https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/key", "bearer"),
"OPENAI_API_KEY": ("https://api.openai.com/v1/models", "bearer"),
"XAI_API_KEY": ("https://api.x.ai/v1/models", "bearer"),
"GEMINI_API_KEY": ("https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/models", "query"),
}
def _parse_model_ids(resp: "Any") -> List[str]:
"""Extract model ids from an OpenAI-compatible ``/v1/models`` response.
Tolerant of the common shapes: ``{"data": [{"id": ...}]}`` (OpenAI / vLLM /
llama.cpp) and a bare ``{"data": ["id", ...]}``. Returns ``[]`` on any
parse/HTTP error so a slightly non-standard endpoint never hard-blocks.
"""
try:
if not resp.is_success:
return []
payload = resp.json()
except Exception:
return []
data = payload.get("data") if isinstance(payload, dict) else payload
if not isinstance(data, list):
return []
ids: List[str] = []
for item in data:
if isinstance(item, dict):
mid = str(item.get("id") or "").strip()
else:
mid = str(item or "").strip()
if mid:
ids.append(mid)
return ids
def _custom_endpoint_id(raw: str, fallback: str = "custom") -> str:
slug = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_-]+", "-", (raw or "").strip()).strip("-_").lower()
return slug or fallback
def _models_from_custom_endpoint_entry(entry: Dict[str, Any]) -> List[str]:
models: List[str] = []
raw_models = entry.get("models")
if isinstance(raw_models, dict):
models.extend(str(model).strip() for model in raw_models.keys())
elif isinstance(raw_models, list):
models.extend(str(model).strip() for model in raw_models)
default_model = str(entry.get("model") or entry.get("default_model") or "").strip()
if default_model:
models.insert(0, default_model)
seen: set[str] = set()
return [model for model in models if model and not (model in seen or seen.add(model))]
def _custom_endpoint_response(cfg: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
model_cfg = cfg.get("model", {}) if isinstance(cfg.get("model"), dict) else {}
current_provider = str(model_cfg.get("provider", "") or "")
current_model = str(model_cfg.get("default", model_cfg.get("name", "")) or "")
current_base_url = str(model_cfg.get("base_url", "") or "")
endpoints: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
providers = cfg.get("providers")
if isinstance(providers, dict):
for provider_id, raw_entry in providers.items():
if not isinstance(raw_entry, dict):
continue
base_url = str(raw_entry.get("base_url") or raw_entry.get("url") or raw_entry.get("api") or "").strip()
if not base_url:
continue
endpoint_id = str(provider_id)
models = _models_from_custom_endpoint_entry(raw_entry)
endpoint_model = str(raw_entry.get("model") or raw_entry.get("default_model") or (models[0] if models else ""))
endpoints.append({
"id": endpoint_id,
"name": str(raw_entry.get("name") or endpoint_id),
"base_url": base_url,
"model": endpoint_model,
"models": models,
"context_length": raw_entry.get("context_length"),
"discover_models": bool(raw_entry.get("discover_models", True)),
"has_api_key": bool(str(raw_entry.get("api_key", "") or "").strip()),
"api_key_preview": redact_key(str(raw_entry.get("api_key", "") or "")) if raw_entry.get("api_key") else None,
"is_current": endpoint_id == current_provider,
"source": "providers",
})
if current_provider.lower() == "custom" and current_base_url and not any(e["id"] == "custom" for e in endpoints):
endpoints.insert(0, {
"id": "custom",
"name": "Custom",
"base_url": current_base_url,
"model": current_model,
"models": [current_model] if current_model else [],
"context_length": model_cfg.get("context_length"),
"discover_models": True,
"has_api_key": bool(str(model_cfg.get("api_key", "") or "").strip()),
"api_key_preview": redact_key(str(model_cfg.get("api_key", "") or "")) if model_cfg.get("api_key") else None,
"is_current": True,
"source": "direct-config",
})
return {
"endpoints": endpoints,
"current": {
"provider": current_provider,
"model": current_model,
"base_url": current_base_url,
},
}
def _detach_main_model_from_provider(cfg: Dict[str, Any], provider_key: str) -> None:
"""Drop the main-slot mirror of a provider that no longer exists.
``activate_custom_endpoint`` copies the endpoint's ``base_url`` and
``api_key`` onto ``model``. That mirror outranks the environment at client
construction (#62269), so deleting the endpoint without clearing it leaves
the agent still authenticating to the deleted host with the deleted key —
and leaves that key sitting in config.yaml after the operator believes the
dashboard removed it.
Only touches ``model`` when it actually names the deleted provider, so an
endpoint deleted while a *different* provider is active is left alone.
"""
model_cfg = cfg.get("model")
if not isinstance(model_cfg, dict):
return
if str(model_cfg.get("provider") or "").strip().lower() != provider_key:
return
for field in ("provider", "base_url", "api_key"):
model_cfg.pop(field, None)
cfg["model"] = model_cfg
def _write_custom_endpoint(cfg: Dict[str, Any], body: CustomEndpointUpdate) -> Tuple[str, Dict[str, Any]]:
endpoint_id = _custom_endpoint_id(body.id or body.name)
name = (body.name or "").strip()
base_url = (body.base_url or "").strip().rstrip("/")
model = (body.model or "").strip()
if not name:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="name required")
if not base_url:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="base_url required")
parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(base_url)
if not parsed.scheme or not parsed.netloc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="base_url must include scheme and host")
if not model:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="model required")
providers = cfg.get("providers")
if not isinstance(providers, dict):
providers = {}
existing = providers.get(endpoint_id)
if not isinstance(existing, dict):
existing = {}
# Merge onto the existing entry rather than replacing it. A providers.<name>
# block is not owned by this panel: it can carry hand-written keys the
# dashboard has no field for — ``api_mode``, ``key_env``/``api_key_env``,
# ``extra_headers`` (which may themselves carry credentials),
# ``request_overrides`` — and rebuilding from scratch silently dropped every
# one of them on an unrelated edit, leaving a provider that no longer
# authenticates or speaks the right protocol.
entry: Dict[str, Any] = dict(existing)
entry.update({
"name": name,
"base_url": base_url,
"model": model,
"discover_models": bool(body.discover_models),
})
# Same for the model map: the panel names one default model, it does not
# enumerate the provider's catalogue. Keep the other models (and their
# context lengths) and just ensure this one is present.
existing_models = entry.get("models")
models_map: Dict[str, Any] = dict(existing_models) if isinstance(existing_models, dict) else {}
current_model_entry = models_map.get(model)
models_map[model] = dict(current_model_entry) if isinstance(current_model_entry, dict) else {}
entry["models"] = models_map
if body.context_length and body.context_length > 0:
entry["context_length"] = int(body.context_length)
entry["models"][model]["context_length"] = int(body.context_length)
if body.api_key is not None and body.api_key.strip():
entry["api_key"] = body.api_key.strip()
providers[endpoint_id] = entry
cfg["providers"] = providers
if body.make_default:
cfg["model"] = _apply_main_model_assignment(
cfg.get("model", {}), endpoint_id, model, base_url
)
if entry.get("api_key") and isinstance(cfg["model"], dict):
cfg["model"]["api_key"] = entry["api_key"]
return endpoint_id, entry
@app.get("/api/providers/custom-endpoints")
def list_custom_endpoints():
"""Return configured OpenAI-compatible custom endpoints for Desktop."""
try:
return _custom_endpoint_response(load_config())
except Exception:
_log.exception("GET /api/providers/custom-endpoints failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to list custom endpoints")
@app.post("/api/providers/custom-endpoints")
def upsert_custom_endpoint(body: CustomEndpointUpdate):
"""Create or update a v12+ ``providers`` custom endpoint entry."""
try:
cfg = load_config()
endpoint_id, _entry = _write_custom_endpoint(cfg, body)
save_config(cfg)
response = _custom_endpoint_response(cfg)
response["ok"] = True
response["id"] = endpoint_id
return response
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception:
_log.exception("POST /api/providers/custom-endpoints failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to save custom endpoint")
@app.post("/api/providers/custom-endpoints/{endpoint_id}/activate")
def activate_custom_endpoint(endpoint_id: str):
"""Set a configured custom endpoint as the default model provider."""
try:
cfg = load_config()
provider_key = _custom_endpoint_id(endpoint_id)
providers = cfg.get("providers")
entry = providers.get(provider_key) if isinstance(providers, dict) else None
if not isinstance(entry, dict):
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="custom endpoint not found")
models = _models_from_custom_endpoint_entry(entry)
model = str(entry.get("model") or (models[0] if models else "")).strip()
base_url = str(entry.get("base_url") or "").strip()
if not model or not base_url:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="custom endpoint is incomplete")
model_cfg = _apply_main_model_assignment(cfg.get("model", {}), provider_key, model, base_url)
if entry.get("api_key"):
model_cfg["api_key"] = entry["api_key"]
cfg["model"] = model_cfg
save_config(cfg)
return {"ok": True, "provider": provider_key, "model": model}
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception:
_log.exception("POST /api/providers/custom-endpoints/%s/activate failed", endpoint_id)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to activate custom endpoint")
@app.delete("/api/providers/custom-endpoints/{endpoint_id}")
def delete_custom_endpoint(endpoint_id: str):
"""Remove a configured custom endpoint from ``providers``."""
try:
cfg = load_config()
provider_key = _custom_endpoint_id(endpoint_id)
providers = cfg.get("providers")
if not isinstance(providers, dict) or provider_key not in providers:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="custom endpoint not found")
providers.pop(provider_key, None)
cfg["providers"] = providers
_detach_main_model_from_provider(cfg, provider_key)
save_config(cfg)
response = _custom_endpoint_response(cfg)
response["ok"] = True
return response
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception:
_log.exception("DELETE /api/providers/custom-endpoints/%s failed", endpoint_id)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to delete custom endpoint")
@app.post("/api/providers/custom-endpoints/validate")
async def validate_custom_endpoint(body: CustomEndpointUpdate):
"""Probe a custom endpoint by calling its OpenAI-compatible /models URL."""
import httpx
base_url = (body.base_url or "").strip().rstrip("/")
if not base_url:
return {"ok": False, "reachable": True, "message": "Enter an endpoint URL first.", "models": []}
url = base_url + "/models"
headers = {"Accept": "application/json"}
if body.api_key and body.api_key.strip():
headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {body.api_key.strip()}"
try:
with httpx.Client(timeout=httpx.Timeout(8.0)) as client:
resp = client.get(url, headers=headers)
except Exception:
return {"ok": False, "reachable": False, "message": f"Could not reach {url}.", "models": []}
if resp.status_code in (401, 403):
return {"ok": False, "reachable": True, "message": "The endpoint rejected the API key.", "models": []}
if not resp.is_success:
return {"ok": False, "reachable": True, "message": f"Endpoint returned HTTP {resp.status_code}.", "models": []}
return {"ok": True, "reachable": True, "message": "", "models": _parse_model_ids(resp)}
@app.post("/api/providers/validate")
async def validate_provider_credential(body: EnvVarUpdate, request: Request):
"""Live-probe a provider credential before it's saved.
Returns {ok, reachable, message}. ok=True means the provider accepted the
key; ok=False + reachable=True means the key is bad (caller should block);
reachable=False means the network probe couldn't run (caller may save with
a warning rather than hard-blocking offline users).
"""
_require_token(request)
import httpx
key = (body.key or "").strip()
value = (body.value or "").strip()
if not value:
return {"ok": False, "reachable": True, "message": "Enter a value first."}
# Local / custom endpoint: validate connectivity, not auth — any HTTP
# response (even 401) proves the endpoint is up. Also surface the model
# ids the endpoint advertises (OpenAI ``/v1/models`` shape) so the GUI can
# auto-pick a default without asking the user to type a model name.
if key == "OPENAI_BASE_URL":
url = value.rstrip("/") + "/models"
# Send the optional API key so endpoints that require auth on
# ``/v1/models`` (many hosted OpenAI-compatible servers) still enumerate
# their models instead of returning an empty list behind a 401.
api_key = (body.api_key or "").strip()
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {api_key}"} if api_key else None
try:
with httpx.Client(timeout=httpx.Timeout(8.0)) as client:
resp = client.get(url, headers=headers)
return {"ok": True, "reachable": True, "message": "", "models": _parse_model_ids(resp)}
except Exception:
return {"ok": False, "reachable": False, "message": f"Could not reach {url}."}
probe = _CREDENTIAL_PROBES.get(key)
if not probe:
# No probe for this provider — can't validate, don't block.
return {"ok": True, "reachable": False, "message": ""}
url, auth = probe
headers = {"Accept": "application/json"}
params = {}
if auth == "bearer":
headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {value}"
else:
params["key"] = value
try:
with httpx.Client(timeout=httpx.Timeout(10.0)) as client:
resp = client.get(url, headers=headers, params=params)
except Exception:
return {"ok": False, "reachable": False, "message": "Could not reach the provider to verify the key."}
if resp.status_code in (401, 403):
return {"ok": False, "reachable": True, "message": "That API key was rejected. Double-check it and try again."}
if resp.status_code == 429 or resp.is_success:
# 429 = key is valid but rate-limited; success = valid.
return {"ok": True, "reachable": True, "message": ""}
return {"ok": False, "reachable": True, "message": f"Provider returned HTTP {resp.status_code} for this key."}
@app.delete("/api/env")
async def remove_env_var(body: EnvVarDelete, profile: Optional[str] = None):
try:
with _profile_scope(body.profile or profile):
# Unified credential lifecycle: clears the .env entry AND every
# mirror of the credential — env-seeded credential_pool entries in
# auth.json (stale ones kept providers alive in the model picker,
# #51071/#59761), the affected providers' model-cache rows, and
# value-matched config.yaml api_key mirrors. OAuth/device-code/
# manual pool entries for the same provider are preserved.
from hermes_cli.credential_lifecycle import remove_provider_env_credential
result = remove_provider_env_credential(body.key)
if not result.get("found"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"{body.key} not found in .env")
return result
except HTTPException:
raise
except ValueError as exc:
# remove_env_value raises ValueError for invalid key names. Surface
# the message to the SPA so the user understands why the delete was
# refused instead of seeing an opaque 500. Mirrors PUT /api/env.
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc)) from exc
except Exception:
_log.exception("DELETE /api/env failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Internal server error")
@app.post("/api/env/reveal")
async def reveal_env_var(
body: EnvVarReveal, request: Request, profile: Optional[str] = None
):
"""Return the real (unredacted) value of a single env var.
Protected by:
- Ephemeral session token (generated per server start, injected into SPA)
- Rate limiting (max 5 reveals per 30s window)
- Audit logging
"""
# --- Token check ---
_require_token(request)
# --- Rate limit ---
now = time.time()
cutoff = now - _REVEAL_WINDOW_SECONDS
_reveal_timestamps[:] = [t for t in _reveal_timestamps if t > cutoff]
if len(_reveal_timestamps) >= _REVEAL_MAX_PER_WINDOW:
raise HTTPException(status_code=429, detail="Too many reveal requests. Try again shortly.")
_reveal_timestamps.append(now)
# --- Reveal ---
with _profile_scope(body.profile or profile):
env_on_disk = load_env()
value = env_on_disk.get(body.key)
if value is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"{body.key} not found in .env")
_log.info("env/reveal: %s", body.key)
return {"key": body.key, "value": value}
# Entries omit fields they don't need to override; the catalog builder fills
# in env_vars from OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS via prefix matching when not specified,
# and pulls required_env from a plugin's PlatformEntry when available.
_PLATFORM_OVERRIDES: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {
"telegram": {
"name": "Telegram",
"description": "Run Hermes from Telegram DMs, groups, and topics.",
"docs_url": "https://core.telegram.org/bots/features#botfather",
"env_vars": ("TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN", "TELEGRAM_ALLOWED_USERS", "TELEGRAM_PROXY"),
"required_env": ("TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN",),
},
"discord": {
"name": "Discord",
"description": "Connect Hermes to Discord DMs, channels, and threads.",
"docs_url": "https://discord.com/developers/applications",
"env_vars": (
"DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN",
"DISCORD_ALLOWED_USERS",
"DISCORD_REPLY_TO_MODE",
),
"required_env": ("DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN",),
},
"slack": {
"name": "Slack",
"description": "Use Hermes from Slack via Socket Mode. Add allowed Slack member IDs so connected bots can respond.",
"docs_url": "https://api.slack.com/apps",
"env_vars": ("SLACK_BOT_TOKEN", "SLACK_APP_TOKEN", "SLACK_ALLOWED_USERS"),
"required_env": ("SLACK_BOT_TOKEN", "SLACK_APP_TOKEN"),
},
"mattermost": {
"name": "Mattermost",
"description": "Connect Hermes to Mattermost channels and direct messages.",
"docs_url": "https://mattermost.com/deploy/",
"env_vars": ("MATTERMOST_URL", "MATTERMOST_TOKEN", "MATTERMOST_ALLOWED_USERS"),
"required_env": ("MATTERMOST_URL", "MATTERMOST_TOKEN"),
},
"matrix": {
"name": "Matrix",
"description": "Use Hermes in Matrix rooms and direct messages.",
"docs_url": "https://matrix.org/ecosystem/servers/",
"env_vars": (
"MATRIX_HOMESERVER",
"MATRIX_ACCESS_TOKEN",
"MATRIX_USER_ID",
"MATRIX_ALLOWED_USERS",
),
"required_env": ("MATRIX_HOMESERVER", "MATRIX_ACCESS_TOKEN", "MATRIX_USER_ID"),
},
"signal": {
"name": "Signal",
"description": "Connect through a signal-cli REST bridge.",
"docs_url": "https://github.com/bbernhard/signal-cli-rest-api",
"env_vars": ("SIGNAL_HTTP_URL", "SIGNAL_ACCOUNT", "SIGNAL_ALLOWED_USERS"),
"required_env": ("SIGNAL_HTTP_URL", "SIGNAL_ACCOUNT"),
},
"whatsapp": {
"name": "WhatsApp",
"description": "Use Hermes through the bundled WhatsApp bridge with QR-based auth.",
"docs_url": "https://github.com/tulir/whatsmeow",
"env_vars": (
"WHATSAPP_ENABLED",
"WHATSAPP_MODE",
"WHATSAPP_DM_POLICY",
"WHATSAPP_ALLOWED_USERS",
),
"required_env": (),
},
"homeassistant": {
"name": "Home Assistant",
"description": "Control your smart home from Hermes via Home Assistant.",
"docs_url": "https://www.home-assistant.io/docs/authentication/",
"env_vars": ("HASS_URL", "HASS_TOKEN"),
"required_env": ("HASS_URL", "HASS_TOKEN"),
},
"email": {
"name": "Email",
"description": "Talk to Hermes through an IMAP/SMTP mailbox.",
"docs_url": "https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/messaging/",
"env_vars": (
"EMAIL_ADDRESS",
"EMAIL_PASSWORD",
"EMAIL_IMAP_HOST",
"EMAIL_SMTP_HOST",
),
"required_env": (
"EMAIL_ADDRESS",
"EMAIL_PASSWORD",
"EMAIL_IMAP_HOST",
"EMAIL_SMTP_HOST",
),
},
"sms": {
"name": "SMS (Twilio)",
"description": "Send and receive text messages via Twilio.",
"docs_url": "https://www.twilio.com/console",
"env_vars": ("TWILIO_ACCOUNT_SID", "TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN"),
"required_env": ("TWILIO_ACCOUNT_SID", "TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN"),
},
"dingtalk": {
"name": "DingTalk",
"description": "Connect Hermes to DingTalk groups (钉钉).",
"docs_url": "https://open.dingtalk.com/document/orgapp/the-robot-development-process",
"env_vars": ("DINGTALK_CLIENT_ID", "DINGTALK_CLIENT_SECRET"),
"required_env": ("DINGTALK_CLIENT_ID", "DINGTALK_CLIENT_SECRET"),
},
"feishu": {
"name": "Feishu / Lark",
"description": "Use Hermes inside Feishu / Lark.",
"docs_url": "https://open.feishu.cn/document/uAjLw4CM/ukTMukTMukTM/reference/im-v1/intro",
"env_vars": (
"FEISHU_APP_ID",
"FEISHU_APP_SECRET",
"FEISHU_ENCRYPT_KEY",
"FEISHU_VERIFICATION_TOKEN",
),
"required_env": ("FEISHU_APP_ID", "FEISHU_APP_SECRET"),
},
"google_chat": {
"name": "Google Chat",
"description": "Connect Hermes to Google Chat via Cloud Pub/Sub.",
"docs_url": "https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/messaging/google_chat",
},
"wecom": {
"name": "WeCom (group bot)",
"description": "Send-only WeCom group bot via webhook.",
"docs_url": "https://developer.work.weixin.qq.com/document/path/91770",
"env_vars": ("WECOM_BOT_ID", "WECOM_SECRET"),
"required_env": ("WECOM_BOT_ID",),
},
"wecom_callback": {
"name": "WeCom (app)",
"description": "Two-way WeCom integration via callback app.",
"docs_url": "https://developer.work.weixin.qq.com/document/path/90930",
"env_vars": (
"WECOM_CALLBACK_CORP_ID",
"WECOM_CALLBACK_CORP_SECRET",
"WECOM_CALLBACK_AGENT_ID",
"WECOM_CALLBACK_TOKEN",
"WECOM_CALLBACK_ENCODING_AES_KEY",
),
"required_env": (
"WECOM_CALLBACK_CORP_ID",
"WECOM_CALLBACK_CORP_SECRET",
"WECOM_CALLBACK_AGENT_ID",
),
},
"weixin": {
"name": "Weixin / WeChat (Personal)",
"description": "Connect a personal WeChat account through Tencent's iLink Bot API.",
"docs_url": "https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/messaging/weixin/",
"env_vars": ("WEIXIN_ACCOUNT_ID", "WEIXIN_TOKEN", "WEIXIN_BASE_URL"),
"required_env": ("WEIXIN_ACCOUNT_ID", "WEIXIN_TOKEN"),
},
"bluebubbles": {
"name": "BlueBubbles (iMessage)",
"description": "Use Hermes through iMessage via a BlueBubbles server.",
"docs_url": "https://bluebubbles.app/",
"env_vars": (
"BLUEBUBBLES_SERVER_URL",
"BLUEBUBBLES_PASSWORD",
"BLUEBUBBLES_ALLOWED_USERS",
),
"required_env": ("BLUEBUBBLES_SERVER_URL", "BLUEBUBBLES_PASSWORD"),
},
"qqbot": {
"name": "QQ Bot",
"description": "Connect Hermes to a QQ Bot from the QQ Open Platform.",
"docs_url": "https://q.qq.com",
"env_vars": ("QQ_APP_ID", "QQ_CLIENT_SECRET", "QQ_ALLOWED_USERS"),
"required_env": ("QQ_APP_ID", "QQ_CLIENT_SECRET"),
},
# Teams ships as a platform plugin, so its name/env vars come from the
# plugin registry. Only the docs link needs an override here so the
# Channels page can point at the Microsoft Teams setup guide.
"teams": {
"docs_url": "https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/messaging/teams",
},
"yuanbao": {
"name": "Yuanbao (元宝)",
"description": "Connect Hermes to Tencent Yuanbao.",
"docs_url": "",
"required_env": (),
},
"api_server": {
"name": "API server",
"description": "Expose Hermes as an OpenAI-compatible HTTP API for tools like Open WebUI.",
"docs_url": "https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/messaging/",
"env_vars": (
"API_SERVER_ENABLED",
"API_SERVER_KEY",
"API_SERVER_PORT",
"API_SERVER_HOST",
"API_SERVER_MODEL_NAME",
),
"required_env": (),
},
"webhook": {
"name": "Webhooks",
"description": "Receive events from GitHub, GitLab, and other webhook sources.",
"docs_url": "https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/messaging/webhooks/",
"env_vars": ("WEBHOOK_ENABLED", "WEBHOOK_PORT", "WEBHOOK_SECRET"),
"required_env": (),
},
}
# Display order: well-known platforms surface first; unknown plugins fall to
# the end alphabetically.
_PLATFORM_ORDER: tuple[str, ...] = (
"telegram",
"discord",
"slack",
"mattermost",
"matrix",
"whatsapp",
"signal",
"bluebubbles",
"homeassistant",
"email",
"sms",
"dingtalk",
"feishu",
"google_chat",
"wecom",
"wecom_callback",
"weixin",
"qqbot",
"yuanbao",
"api_server",
"webhook",
)
# Display labels for env vars not in OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS (HOME_CHANNEL_*, bridge
# toggles, Twilio, HASS, Email, etc.). Anything missing from OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS
# falls back here so the UI can still render a friendly label.
_MESSAGING_ENV_FALLBACKS: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {
"SIGNAL_HTTP_URL": {
"description": "signal-cli REST API base URL, e.g. http://127.0.0.1:8080",
"prompt": "Signal bridge URL",
"url": "https://github.com/bbernhard/signal-cli-rest-api",
},
"SIGNAL_ACCOUNT": {
"description": "Signal account phone number registered with the bridge",
"prompt": "Signal account",
},
"SIGNAL_ALLOWED_USERS": {
"description": "Comma-separated Signal users allowed to use the bot",
"prompt": "Allowed Signal users",
},
"WHATSAPP_ENABLED": {
"description": "Enable the WhatsApp gateway adapter",
"prompt": "Enable WhatsApp",
"advanced": True,
},
"WHATSAPP_MODE": {
"description": "WhatsApp bridge mode",
"prompt": "WhatsApp mode",
"advanced": True,
},
"WHATSAPP_DM_POLICY": {
"description": "How WhatsApp direct messages are authorized",
"prompt": "WhatsApp DM policy",
"advanced": True,
},
"WHATSAPP_ALLOWED_USERS": {
"description": "Comma-separated WhatsApp users allowed to use the bot",
"prompt": "Allowed WhatsApp users",
},
"HASS_URL": {
"description": "Home Assistant base URL, e.g. https://homeassistant.local:8123",
"prompt": "Home Assistant URL",
},
"HASS_TOKEN": {
"description": "Long-lived access token from Home Assistant (Profile → Security)",
"prompt": "Home Assistant access token",
"password": True,
},
"EMAIL_ADDRESS": {
"description": "Email address to send and receive from",
"prompt": "Email address",
},
"EMAIL_PASSWORD": {
"description": "Email account password or app password",
"prompt": "Email password",
"password": True,
},
"EMAIL_IMAP_HOST": {
"description": "IMAP server host (e.g. imap.gmail.com)",
"prompt": "IMAP host",
},
"EMAIL_SMTP_HOST": {
"description": "SMTP server host (e.g. smtp.gmail.com)",
"prompt": "SMTP host",
},
"TWILIO_ACCOUNT_SID": {
"description": "Twilio Account SID",
"prompt": "Twilio Account SID",
"url": "https://www.twilio.com/console",
},
"TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN": {
"description": "Twilio Auth Token",
"prompt": "Twilio Auth Token",
"password": True,
},
"WECOM_BOT_ID": {"description": "WeCom group bot ID", "prompt": "WeCom Bot ID"},
"WECOM_SECRET": {
"description": "WeCom group bot secret",
"prompt": "WeCom Secret",
"password": True,
},
"WECOM_CALLBACK_CORP_ID": {
"description": "WeCom corp ID",
"prompt": "WeCom Corp ID",
},
"WECOM_CALLBACK_CORP_SECRET": {
"description": "WeCom app corp secret",
"prompt": "WeCom Corp Secret",
"password": True,
},
"WECOM_CALLBACK_AGENT_ID": {
"description": "WeCom app agent ID",
"prompt": "WeCom Agent ID",
},
"WECOM_CALLBACK_TOKEN": {
"description": "WeCom callback verification token",
"prompt": "WeCom Token",
},
"WECOM_CALLBACK_ENCODING_AES_KEY": {
"description": "WeCom callback AES encoding key",
"prompt": "WeCom AES Key",
"password": True,
},
"WEIXIN_ACCOUNT_ID": {
"description": "iLink Bot account ID obtained through QR login in hermes gateway setup",
"prompt": "iLink Bot account ID",
},
"WEIXIN_TOKEN": {
"description": "iLink Bot token obtained through QR login in hermes gateway setup",
"prompt": "iLink Bot token",
"password": True,
},
"WEIXIN_BASE_URL": {
"description": "iLink API base URL saved by QR login (default: https://ilinkai.weixin.qq.com)",
"prompt": "iLink API base URL",
},
"FEISHU_APP_ID": {"description": "Feishu / Lark app ID", "prompt": "App ID"},
"FEISHU_APP_SECRET": {
"description": "Feishu / Lark app secret",
"prompt": "App secret",
"password": True,
},
"FEISHU_ENCRYPT_KEY": {
"description": "Feishu / Lark encrypt key",
"prompt": "Encrypt key",
"password": True,
},
"FEISHU_VERIFICATION_TOKEN": {
"description": "Feishu / Lark verification token",
"prompt": "Verification token",
"password": True,
},
"DINGTALK_CLIENT_ID": {
"description": "DingTalk client ID (App key)",
"prompt": "Client ID",
},
"DINGTALK_CLIENT_SECRET": {
"description": "DingTalk client secret (App secret)",
"prompt": "Client secret",
"password": True,
},
}
def _messaging_platform_catalog() -> tuple[dict[str, Any], ...]:
"""Build the messaging catalog from the gateway's Platform enum + plugin registry.
Built-in platforms come from ``gateway.config.Platform`` (LOCAL is excluded).
Plugin platforms come from ``gateway.platform_registry.plugin_entries()``,
which lets newly installed adapters (e.g. IRC) appear without a code change
here. Per-platform UI metadata (description, docs URL, env-var picks) lives
in :data:`_PLATFORM_OVERRIDES`; anything not overridden gets reasonable
defaults derived from the platform id and required_env.
"""
from gateway.config import Platform
seen: set[str] = set()
entries: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
for member in Platform.__members__.values():
if member.value == "local":
continue
if member.value in seen:
continue
seen.add(member.value)
entries.append(_build_catalog_entry(member.value))
try:
from gateway.platform_registry import platform_registry
for plugin_entry in platform_registry.plugin_entries():
if plugin_entry.name in seen:
continue
seen.add(plugin_entry.name)
entries.append(_build_catalog_entry(plugin_entry.name, plugin_entry))
except Exception:
_log.debug("plugin platform registry unavailable", exc_info=True)
order = {pid: idx for idx, pid in enumerate(_PLATFORM_ORDER)}
entries.sort(
key=lambda e: (order.get(e["id"], len(_PLATFORM_ORDER)), e["name"].lower())
)
return tuple(entries)
def _channel_managed_env_keys() -> frozenset[str]:
"""Env-var keys owned by a Channels page platform card.
The Channels page is the canonical surface for configuring messaging
platform credentials (with connection status, test, enable toggle and
gateway restart). The Keys/Env page consults this set to hide those vars
so the same fields aren't duplicated in a plainer UI. Best-effort: if the
gateway catalog can't be built, nothing is flagged and Keys shows it all.
"""
try:
keys: set[str] = set()
for entry in _messaging_platform_catalog():
keys.update(entry.get("env_vars", ()))
return frozenset(keys)
except Exception:
_log.debug("could not build channel-managed env key set", exc_info=True)
return frozenset()
# Cross-cutting gateway / relay knobs stay on the Keys → Settings tab even though
# they use the ``messaging`` category in OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS. Platform-scoped vars
# (``DISCORD_*``, ``MATRIX_*``, …) are owned by the Messaging UI instead.
_MESSAGING_KEYS_PAGE_KEYS = frozenset({
"GATEWAY_ALLOW_ALL_USERS",
"GATEWAY_PROXY_KEY",
"GATEWAY_PROXY_URL",
})
def _platform_env_prefixes(platform_id: str) -> tuple[str, ...]:
"""Env-var prefixes owned by a messaging platform card."""
aliases: dict[str, tuple[str, ...]] = {
"email": ("EMAIL_",),
"homeassistant": ("HASS_",),
"qqbot": ("QQ_", "QQBOT_"),
"sms": ("TWILIO_",),
"wecom": ("WECOM_BOT_", "WECOM_SECRET"),
"wecom_callback": ("WECOM_CALLBACK_",),
}
if platform_id in aliases:
return aliases[platform_id]
return (platform_id.upper().replace("-", "_") + "_",)
def _discover_platform_env_vars(platform_id: str) -> tuple[str, ...]:
"""All messaging-category env vars for a platform (override + plugin + prefix)."""
prefixes = _platform_env_prefixes(platform_id)
keys: list[str] = []
for name, info in OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS.items():
if info.get("category") != "messaging":
continue
if name in _MESSAGING_KEYS_PAGE_KEYS:
continue
if not any(name.startswith(prefix) for prefix in prefixes):
continue
keys.append(name)
return tuple(sorted(set(keys)))
def _merge_platform_env_vars(
platform_id: str,
override: dict[str, Any],
plugin_entry: Any | None,
) -> tuple[str, ...]:
"""Canonical env-var list for a messaging platform card."""
discovered = _discover_platform_env_vars(platform_id)
if "env_vars" in override:
return tuple(dict.fromkeys((*override["env_vars"], *discovered)))
if plugin_entry is not None and plugin_entry.required_env:
return tuple(dict.fromkeys((*tuple(plugin_entry.required_env), *discovered)))
return discovered
def _build_catalog_entry(
platform_id: str, plugin_entry: Any | None = None
) -> dict[str, Any]:
override = _PLATFORM_OVERRIDES.get(platform_id, {})
env_vars = _merge_platform_env_vars(platform_id, override, plugin_entry)
if "required_env" in override:
required_env = tuple(override["required_env"])
elif plugin_entry is not None:
required_env = tuple(plugin_entry.required_env or ())
else:
required_env = ()
if override.get("name"):
name = override["name"]
elif plugin_entry is not None and plugin_entry.label:
name = plugin_entry.label
else:
name = platform_id.replace("_", " ").title()
description = override.get("description")
if not description and plugin_entry is not None:
description = plugin_entry.install_hint or ""
return {
"id": platform_id,
"name": name,
"description": description or "",
"docs_url": override.get("docs_url", ""),
"env_vars": env_vars,
"required_env": required_env,
}
def _catalog_lookup(platform_id: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
for entry in _messaging_platform_catalog():
if entry["id"] == platform_id:
return entry
return None
def _messaging_env_info(key: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
info = OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS.get(key) or _MESSAGING_ENV_FALLBACKS.get(key) or {}
return {
"description": info.get("description", ""),
"prompt": info.get("prompt", key),
"help": info.get("help", ""),
"url": info.get("url"),
"is_password": info.get("password", False),
"advanced": info.get("advanced", False),
}
def _gateway_platform_config(platform_id: str):
from gateway.config import Platform, load_gateway_config
config = load_gateway_config()
platform = Platform(platform_id)
platform_config = config.platforms.get(platform)
return config, platform, platform_config
def _messaging_platform_payload(
entry: dict[str, Any],
env_on_disk: dict[str, str],
runtime: dict | None,
scoped: bool = False,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
platform_id = entry["id"]
runtime_platforms = runtime.get("platforms") if runtime else {}
runtime_platform = (
runtime_platforms.get(platform_id, {})
if isinstance(runtime_platforms, dict)
else {}
)
gateway_running = (
get_running_pid() is not None
or get_runtime_status_running_pid(runtime) is not None
)
env_vars = []
for key in entry["env_vars"]:
# When profile-scoped, judge only the profile's own .env — the
# dashboard process's os.environ carries the ROOT install's .env
# (loaded at startup) and would falsely report the root credentials
# as the profile's.
value = env_on_disk.get(key) or ("" if scoped else os.getenv(key, ""))
env_vars.append(
{
"key": key,
"required": key in entry["required_env"],
"is_set": bool(value),
"redacted_value": redact_key(value) if value else None,
**_messaging_env_info(key),
}
)
if scoped:
# Profile-scoped view: derive enablement/configuration from the
# profile's config.yaml + .env only. load_gateway_config()'s
# env-override layer reads os.environ and would leak the root
# install's tokens into the profile's reported state.
try:
cfg = load_config()
platforms_cfg = cfg.get("platforms") or {}
plat_cfg = platforms_cfg.get(platform_id)
if not isinstance(plat_cfg, dict):
plat_cfg = {}
enabled = bool(plat_cfg.get("enabled"))
hc = plat_cfg.get("home_channel")
home_channel = hc if isinstance(hc, dict) else None
except Exception:
enabled = False
home_channel = None
configured = all(env_on_disk.get(key) for key in entry["required_env"])
else:
try:
gateway_config, platform, platform_config = _gateway_platform_config(
platform_id
)
enabled = bool(platform_config and platform_config.enabled)
configured = bool(
platform_config
and gateway_config._is_platform_connected(platform, platform_config)
)
home_channel = (
platform_config.home_channel.to_dict()
if platform_config and platform_config.home_channel
else None
)
except Exception:
enabled = False
configured = all(
env_on_disk.get(key) or os.getenv(key, "")
for key in entry["required_env"]
)
home_channel = None
state = (
runtime_platform.get("state") if isinstance(runtime_platform, dict) else None
)
runtime_gateway_state = runtime.get("gateway_state") if isinstance(runtime, dict) else None
runtime_gateway_error = runtime.get("exit_reason") if isinstance(runtime, dict) else None
if not enabled:
state = "disabled"
elif not configured:
state = "not_configured"
elif gateway_running and not state:
state = "pending_restart"
elif (
not gateway_running
and not state
and runtime_gateway_state == "startup_failed"
):
state = "startup_failed"
elif not gateway_running and not state:
state = "gateway_stopped"
error_code = (
runtime_platform.get("error_code")
if isinstance(runtime_platform, dict)
else None
)
error_message = (
runtime_platform.get("error_message")
if isinstance(runtime_platform, dict)
else None
)
if state == "startup_failed":
error_code = error_code or "startup_failed"
error_message = error_message or runtime_gateway_error
whatsapp_setup = None
if platform_id == "whatsapp":
whatsapp_mode = (
env_on_disk.get("WHATSAPP_MODE")
or ("" if scoped else os.getenv("WHATSAPP_MODE", ""))
).strip()
allowed_users_value = (
env_on_disk.get("WHATSAPP_ALLOWED_USERS")
or ("" if scoped else os.getenv("WHATSAPP_ALLOWED_USERS", ""))
).strip()
whatsapp_setup = {
"mode": whatsapp_mode if whatsapp_mode in {"bot", "self-chat"} else "",
"allowed_users_set": bool(allowed_users_value),
"home_channel_set": bool(home_channel),
}
payload = {
"id": platform_id,
"name": entry["name"],
"description": entry["description"],
"docs_url": entry["docs_url"],
"enabled": enabled,
"configured": configured,
"gateway_running": gateway_running,
"state": state,
"error_code": error_code,
"error_message": error_message,
"updated_at": (
runtime_platform.get("updated_at")
if isinstance(runtime_platform, dict)
else None
),
"home_channel": home_channel,
"env_vars": env_vars,
}
if whatsapp_setup is not None:
payload["whatsapp_setup"] = whatsapp_setup
return payload
def _write_platform_enabled(platform_id: str, enabled: bool) -> None:
write_platform_config_field(platform_id, "enabled", enabled)
_WHATSAPP_ONBOARDING_TTL_SECONDS = 600
_WHATSAPP_ONBOARDING_TERMINAL_STATUSES = {"connected", "error", "expired", "cancelled"}
@dataclass
class _WhatsAppOnboardingSession:
proc: subprocess.Popen | None
mode: str
allowed_users: str
session_path: str
expires_at: str
expires_at_ts: float
profile: str | None = None
status: str = "starting"
qr_payload: str | None = None
account_id: str | None = None
account_name: str | None = None
account_phone: str | None = None
error: str | None = None
_whatsapp_onboarding_sessions: dict[str, _WhatsAppOnboardingSession] = {}
_whatsapp_onboarding_lock = threading.RLock()
def _utc_iso_from_ts(ts: float) -> str:
return datetime.fromtimestamp(ts, timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
def _normalize_whatsapp_onboarding_mode(value: Any) -> str:
mode = str(value or "bot").strip().lower()
if mode not in {"bot", "self-chat"}:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="WhatsApp mode must be 'bot' or 'self-chat'.")
return mode
def _normalize_whatsapp_allowed_users(value: Any) -> str:
raw = str(value or "").strip()
if not raw:
return ""
return ",".join(part.replace(" ", "") for part in raw.split(",") if part.strip())
def _whatsapp_session_path() -> Path:
from hermes_constants import get_hermes_dir
return get_hermes_dir("platforms/whatsapp/session", "whatsapp/session")
def _whatsapp_phone_from_identifier(value: Any) -> str | None:
raw = str(value or "").strip()
if not raw:
return None
candidate = raw.split("@", 1)[0].split(":", 1)[0]
digits = re.sub(r"\D+", "", candidate)
return digits or None
def _whatsapp_linked_account_from_session(session_path: Path) -> tuple[str | None, str | None, str | None]:
creds_path = session_path / "creds.json"
try:
payload = json.loads(creds_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
except Exception:
return None, None, None
account_id: str | None = None
account_name: str | None = None
def collect(candidate: Any) -> None:
nonlocal account_id, account_name
if not isinstance(candidate, dict):
return
if account_id is None:
for key in ("id", "jid", "lid"):
value = str(candidate.get(key) or "").strip()
if value:
account_id = value
break
if account_name is None:
for key in ("name", "verifiedName", "notify", "pushName"):
value = str(candidate.get(key) or "").strip()
if value:
account_name = value
break
collect(payload.get("me"))
collect(payload.get("account"))
collect(payload)
return account_id, account_name, _whatsapp_phone_from_identifier(account_id)
def _ensure_whatsapp_bridge_dependencies(bridge_dir: Path) -> None:
"""Install bridge dependencies when the dashboard is the setup surface."""
if (bridge_dir / "node_modules").exists():
return
from hermes_constants import find_node_executable, with_hermes_node_path
from utils import env_int
npm = find_node_executable("npm")
if not npm:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500,
detail="npm was not found. WhatsApp setup needs Node.js and npm.",
)
timeout = env_int("WHATSAPP_NPM_INSTALL_TIMEOUT", 300)
try:
result = subprocess.run(
[npm, "install", "--silent"],
cwd=str(bridge_dir),
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=timeout,
env=with_hermes_node_path(),
creationflags=windows_hide_flags(),
)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired as exc:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500,
detail="Installing WhatsApp bridge dependencies timed out.",
) from exc
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500,
detail=f"Failed to install WhatsApp bridge dependencies: {exc}",
) from exc
if result.returncode != 0:
detail = (result.stderr or result.stdout or "").strip()
if detail:
detail = "\n".join(detail.splitlines()[-10:])
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500,
detail=f"npm install failed for WhatsApp bridge: {detail or 'no output'}",
)
def _spawn_whatsapp_pairing_process(session_path: Path, mode: str) -> subprocess.Popen:
from gateway.platforms.whatsapp_common import resolve_whatsapp_bridge_dir
from hermes_constants import find_node_executable, with_hermes_node_path
bridge_dir = resolve_whatsapp_bridge_dir()
bridge_script = bridge_dir / "bridge.js"
if not bridge_script.exists():
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500,
detail=f"WhatsApp bridge script was not found at {bridge_script}.",
)
node = find_node_executable("node")
if not node:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500,
detail="Node.js was not found. WhatsApp setup needs Node.js.",
)
_ensure_whatsapp_bridge_dependencies(bridge_dir)
session_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
env = with_hermes_node_path()
env["WHATSAPP_MODE"] = mode
env["WHATSAPP_DM_POLICY"] = "pairing"
return subprocess.Popen(
[
node,
str(bridge_script),
"--pair-only",
"--pair-json",
"--session",
str(session_path),
],
cwd=str(bridge_dir),
stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,
text=True,
encoding="utf-8",
errors="replace",
start_new_session=True,
env=env,
creationflags=windows_hide_flags(),
)
def _terminate_whatsapp_pairing(proc: subprocess.Popen | None) -> None:
if proc is None:
return
if proc.poll() is not None:
return
try:
proc.terminate()
proc.wait(timeout=3)
except Exception:
try:
proc.kill()
except Exception:
pass
def _watch_whatsapp_pairing(pairing_id: str, proc: subprocess.Popen) -> None:
try:
stream = proc.stdout
if stream is not None:
for line in stream:
raw = line.strip()
if not raw:
continue
try:
payload = json.loads(raw)
except json.JSONDecodeError:
continue
event = str(payload.get("event") or "").strip()
with _whatsapp_onboarding_lock:
record = _whatsapp_onboarding_sessions.get(pairing_id)
if not record or record.proc is not proc:
return
if event == "qr":
qr = str(payload.get("qr") or "").strip()
if qr:
record.qr_payload = qr
record.status = "waiting"
record.error = None
elif event == "connected":
user = payload.get("user")
if isinstance(user, dict):
account_id = str(user.get("id") or "").strip()
account_name = str(user.get("name") or "").strip()
record.account_id = account_id or None
record.account_name = account_name or None
record.account_phone = _whatsapp_phone_from_identifier(account_id)
record.status = "connected"
record.error = None
elif event == "error":
record.status = "error"
record.error = str(payload.get("error") or "WhatsApp pairing failed.")
elif event == "disconnected" and record.status == "starting":
record.status = "waiting"
returncode = proc.wait()
except Exception as exc:
with _whatsapp_onboarding_lock:
record = _whatsapp_onboarding_sessions.get(pairing_id)
if record and record.proc is proc and record.status not in _WHATSAPP_ONBOARDING_TERMINAL_STATUSES:
record.status = "error"
record.error = str(exc)
return
with _whatsapp_onboarding_lock:
record = _whatsapp_onboarding_sessions.get(pairing_id)
if not record or record.proc is not proc:
return
if record.status in {"connected", "cancelled", "expired"}:
return
record.status = "error"
record.error = (
"WhatsApp pairing process exited before pairing completed."
if returncode == 0
else f"WhatsApp pairing process exited with code {returncode}."
)
def _run_whatsapp_pairing(pairing_id: str, session_path: Path, mode: str) -> None:
with _whatsapp_onboarding_lock:
record = _whatsapp_onboarding_sessions.get(pairing_id)
if not record or record.status in _WHATSAPP_ONBOARDING_TERMINAL_STATUSES:
return
record.status = "installing"
try:
proc = _spawn_whatsapp_pairing_process(session_path, mode)
except Exception as exc:
with _whatsapp_onboarding_lock:
record = _whatsapp_onboarding_sessions.get(pairing_id)
if record and record.status not in _WHATSAPP_ONBOARDING_TERMINAL_STATUSES:
record.status = "error"
record.error = str(exc)
return
with _whatsapp_onboarding_lock:
record = _whatsapp_onboarding_sessions.get(pairing_id)
if not record or record.status in _WHATSAPP_ONBOARDING_TERMINAL_STATUSES:
_terminate_whatsapp_pairing(proc)
return
record.proc = proc
record.status = "starting"
_watch_whatsapp_pairing(pairing_id, proc)
def _prune_whatsapp_onboarding_sessions() -> None:
now = time.time()
remove_ids: list[str] = []
for pairing_id, record in _whatsapp_onboarding_sessions.items():
if (
record.proc is not None
and record.status not in _WHATSAPP_ONBOARDING_TERMINAL_STATUSES
and record.proc.poll() is not None
):
record.status = "error"
record.error = "WhatsApp pairing process exited before pairing completed."
if record.expires_at_ts <= now and record.status not in _WHATSAPP_ONBOARDING_TERMINAL_STATUSES:
_terminate_whatsapp_pairing(record.proc)
record.status = "expired"
record.error = "WhatsApp QR setup expired. Start a new setup."
if record.status in _WHATSAPP_ONBOARDING_TERMINAL_STATUSES and record.expires_at_ts + 300 <= now:
remove_ids.append(pairing_id)
for pairing_id in remove_ids:
_whatsapp_onboarding_sessions.pop(pairing_id, None)
def _supersede_whatsapp_onboarding_sessions(session_path: Path) -> None:
for existing in _whatsapp_onboarding_sessions.values():
if existing.session_path == str(session_path) and existing.status not in _WHATSAPP_ONBOARDING_TERMINAL_STATUSES:
existing.status = "cancelled"
existing.error = "Superseded by a newer WhatsApp setup session."
_terminate_whatsapp_pairing(existing.proc)
def _whatsapp_onboarding_payload(pairing_id: str, record: _WhatsAppOnboardingSession) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"pairing_id": pairing_id,
"status": record.status,
"qr_payload": record.qr_payload,
"expires_at": record.expires_at,
"mode": record.mode,
"allowed_users": record.allowed_users,
"account_id": record.account_id,
"account_name": record.account_name,
"account_phone": record.account_phone,
"error": record.error,
}
def _restart_gateway_after_whatsapp_onboarding(profile: Optional[str] = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
try:
proc, reused = _spawn_gateway_restart(profile)
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to auto-restart gateway after WhatsApp onboarding")
return {
"restart_started": False,
"restart_error": str(exc),
}
if reused:
_log.info(
"WhatsApp onboarding: reusing in-flight gateway restart (pid %s)",
proc.pid,
)
return {
"restart_started": True,
"restart_action": "gateway-restart",
"restart_pid": proc.pid,
}
@app.post("/api/messaging/whatsapp/onboarding/start")
async def start_whatsapp_onboarding(body: WhatsAppOnboardingStart):
mode = _normalize_whatsapp_onboarding_mode(body.mode)
allowed_users = _normalize_whatsapp_allowed_users(body.allowed_users)
effective_profile = body.profile
with _config_profile_scope(effective_profile):
session_path = _whatsapp_session_path()
expires_at_ts = time.time() + _WHATSAPP_ONBOARDING_TTL_SECONDS
expires_at = _utc_iso_from_ts(expires_at_ts)
if (session_path / "creds.json").exists():
pairing_id = secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
account_id, account_name, account_phone = _whatsapp_linked_account_from_session(session_path)
record = _WhatsAppOnboardingSession(
proc=None,
mode=mode,
allowed_users=allowed_users,
session_path=str(session_path),
expires_at=expires_at,
expires_at_ts=expires_at_ts,
profile=effective_profile,
status="connected",
account_id=account_id,
account_name=account_name,
account_phone=account_phone,
)
with _whatsapp_onboarding_lock:
_prune_whatsapp_onboarding_sessions()
_supersede_whatsapp_onboarding_sessions(session_path)
_whatsapp_onboarding_sessions[pairing_id] = record
return _whatsapp_onboarding_payload(pairing_id, record)
pairing_id = secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
record = _WhatsAppOnboardingSession(
proc=None,
mode=mode,
allowed_users=allowed_users,
session_path=str(session_path),
expires_at=expires_at,
expires_at_ts=expires_at_ts,
profile=effective_profile,
)
with _whatsapp_onboarding_lock:
_prune_whatsapp_onboarding_sessions()
_supersede_whatsapp_onboarding_sessions(session_path)
_whatsapp_onboarding_sessions[pairing_id] = record
threading.Thread(
target=_run_whatsapp_pairing,
args=(pairing_id, session_path, mode),
daemon=True,
).start()
return _whatsapp_onboarding_payload(pairing_id, record)
@app.get("/api/messaging/whatsapp/onboarding/{pairing_id}")
async def get_whatsapp_onboarding_status(pairing_id: str):
with _whatsapp_onboarding_lock:
_prune_whatsapp_onboarding_sessions()
record = _whatsapp_onboarding_sessions.get(pairing_id)
if not record:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404,
detail="WhatsApp setup session was not found. Start a new setup.",
)
if record.status == "expired":
raise HTTPException(status_code=410, detail=record.error or "WhatsApp setup expired.")
return _whatsapp_onboarding_payload(pairing_id, record)
@app.post("/api/messaging/whatsapp/onboarding/{pairing_id}/apply")
async def apply_whatsapp_onboarding(
pairing_id: str, body: WhatsAppOnboardingApply, profile: Optional[str] = None
):
with _whatsapp_onboarding_lock:
_prune_whatsapp_onboarding_sessions()
record = _whatsapp_onboarding_sessions.get(pairing_id)
if not record:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404,
detail="WhatsApp setup session was not found. Start a new setup.",
)
if record.status != "connected":
raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail="WhatsApp setup is not connected yet.")
mode = _normalize_whatsapp_onboarding_mode(body.mode or record.mode)
allowed_users = _normalize_whatsapp_allowed_users(
record.allowed_users if body.allowed_users is None else body.allowed_users
)
if mode == "self-chat" and not allowed_users:
allowed_users = record.account_phone or record.account_id or ""
record_profile = record.profile
effective_profile = body.profile or profile or record_profile
try:
with _config_profile_scope(effective_profile):
save_env_value("WHATSAPP_MODE", mode)
save_env_value("WHATSAPP_DM_POLICY", "pairing")
if allowed_users:
save_env_value("WHATSAPP_ALLOWED_USERS", allowed_users)
# Blank means "keep the existing allowlist"; explicit clearing
# still lives in the normal config editor where the field is visible.
save_env_value("WHATSAPP_ENABLED", "true")
_write_platform_enabled("whatsapp", True)
except HTTPException:
raise
except ValueError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc)) from exc
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("WhatsApp onboarding apply failed")
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500,
detail="Failed to save WhatsApp setup.",
) from exc
with _whatsapp_onboarding_lock:
_whatsapp_onboarding_sessions.pop(pairing_id, None)
restart_result = _restart_gateway_after_whatsapp_onboarding(effective_profile)
return {
"ok": True,
"platform": "whatsapp",
"needs_restart": not restart_result["restart_started"],
**restart_result,
}
@app.delete("/api/messaging/whatsapp/onboarding/{pairing_id}")
async def cancel_whatsapp_onboarding(pairing_id: str):
with _whatsapp_onboarding_lock:
record = _whatsapp_onboarding_sessions.pop(pairing_id, None)
if record:
record.status = "cancelled"
_terminate_whatsapp_pairing(record.proc)
return {"ok": True}
_TELEGRAM_ONBOARDING_DEFAULT_URL = "https://setup.hermes-agent.nousresearch.com"
_TELEGRAM_ONBOARDING_USER_AGENT = f"HermesDashboard/{__version__}"
@dataclass
class _TelegramOnboardingPairing:
poll_token: str
expires_at: str
expires_at_ts: float
bot_token: str | None = None
bot_username: str | None = None
owner_user_id: str | None = None
_telegram_onboarding_pairings: dict[str, _TelegramOnboardingPairing] = {}
_telegram_onboarding_lock = threading.RLock()
def _telegram_onboarding_base_url() -> str:
return (
os.getenv("TELEGRAM_ONBOARDING_URL", _TELEGRAM_ONBOARDING_DEFAULT_URL)
.strip()
.rstrip("/")
)
def _parse_expiry_ts(value: str) -> float:
try:
normalized = value.replace("Z", "+00:00")
parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(normalized)
if parsed.tzinfo is None:
parsed = parsed.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
return parsed.timestamp()
except Exception:
return time.time() + 600
def _prune_telegram_onboarding_pairings() -> None:
now = time.time()
expired = [
pairing_id
for pairing_id, record in _telegram_onboarding_pairings.items()
if record.expires_at_ts <= now
]
for pairing_id in expired:
_telegram_onboarding_pairings.pop(pairing_id, None)
def _normalize_telegram_user_id(value: Any) -> str | None:
normalized = str(value or "").strip()
if _TELEGRAM_USER_ID_RE.fullmatch(normalized):
return normalized
return None
def _telegram_onboarding_error_message(error: str, fallback: str) -> str:
return {
"not_found": "Telegram pairing was not found. Start a new setup.",
"expired": "Telegram setup expired. Start a new setup.",
"claimed": "Telegram setup was already claimed. Start a new setup.",
"unauthorized": "Telegram setup service rejected this request.",
"telegram_manager_bot_token_not_configured": "Telegram setup service is not configured.",
"telegram_token_fetch_failed": "Telegram could not finish bot setup. Try again.",
}.get(error, fallback)
def _telegram_onboarding_request_sync(
method: str,
path: str,
*,
body: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
bearer_token: str | None = None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
import httpx
headers = {
"Accept": "application/json",
"User-Agent": _TELEGRAM_ONBOARDING_USER_AGENT,
}
request_kwargs: dict[str, Any] = {}
if body is not None:
headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
request_kwargs["json"] = body
if bearer_token:
headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {bearer_token}"
url = f"{_telegram_onboarding_base_url()}{path}"
try:
with httpx.Client(timeout=httpx.Timeout(10.0)) as client:
response = client.request(
method,
url,
headers=headers,
**request_kwargs,
)
response.raise_for_status()
except httpx.HTTPStatusError as exc:
try:
parsed = exc.response.json()
except Exception:
parsed = {}
error = str(parsed.get("error") or parsed.get("status") or "")
detail = _telegram_onboarding_error_message(
error,
"Telegram setup service returned an error.",
)
status_code = 404 if exc.response.status_code == 404 else 502
if error in {"expired", "claimed"}:
status_code = 410
raise HTTPException(status_code=status_code, detail=detail) from exc
except httpx.RequestError as exc:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=502,
detail="Telegram setup service is unavailable. Try again shortly.",
) from exc
except Exception as exc:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=502,
detail="Telegram setup service is unavailable. Try again shortly.",
) from exc
try:
parsed = response.json()
except Exception as exc:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=502,
detail="Telegram setup service returned an invalid response.",
) from exc
if not isinstance(parsed, dict):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=502,
detail="Telegram setup service returned an invalid response.",
)
return parsed
async def _telegram_onboarding_request(
method: str,
path: str,
*,
body: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
bearer_token: str | None = None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
return await asyncio.to_thread(
_telegram_onboarding_request_sync,
method,
path,
body=body,
bearer_token=bearer_token,
)
@app.post("/api/messaging/telegram/onboarding/start")
async def start_telegram_onboarding(body: TelegramOnboardingStart):
bot_name = (body.bot_name or "Hermes Agent").strip() or "Hermes Agent"
payload = await _telegram_onboarding_request(
"POST",
"/v1/telegram/pairings",
body={"bot_name": bot_name},
)
pairing_id = str(payload.get("pairing_id") or "").strip()
poll_token = str(payload.get("poll_token") or "").strip()
expires_at = str(payload.get("expires_at") or "").strip()
deep_link = str(payload.get("deep_link") or "").strip()
qr_payload = str(payload.get("qr_payload") or deep_link).strip()
suggested_username = str(payload.get("suggested_username") or "").strip()
if not pairing_id or not poll_token or not expires_at or not deep_link:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=502,
detail="Telegram setup service returned an incomplete response.",
)
with _telegram_onboarding_lock:
_prune_telegram_onboarding_pairings()
_telegram_onboarding_pairings[pairing_id] = _TelegramOnboardingPairing(
poll_token=poll_token,
expires_at=expires_at,
expires_at_ts=_parse_expiry_ts(expires_at),
)
return {
"pairing_id": pairing_id,
"suggested_username": suggested_username,
"deep_link": deep_link,
"qr_payload": qr_payload,
"expires_at": expires_at,
}
@app.get("/api/messaging/telegram/onboarding/{pairing_id}")
async def get_telegram_onboarding_status(pairing_id: str):
with _telegram_onboarding_lock:
_prune_telegram_onboarding_pairings()
record = _telegram_onboarding_pairings.get(pairing_id)
if not record:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404,
detail="Telegram setup session was not found. Start a new setup.",
)
if record.bot_token:
return {
"status": "ready",
"bot_username": record.bot_username,
"owner_user_id": record.owner_user_id,
"expires_at": record.expires_at,
}
poll_token = record.poll_token
payload = await _telegram_onboarding_request(
"GET",
f"/v1/telegram/pairings/{urllib.parse.quote(pairing_id, safe='')}",
bearer_token=poll_token,
)
status = str(payload.get("status") or "").strip()
if status == "waiting":
with _telegram_onboarding_lock:
current = _telegram_onboarding_pairings.get(pairing_id)
expires_at = current.expires_at if current else ""
return {"status": "waiting", "expires_at": expires_at}
if status == "ready":
bot_token = str(payload.get("token") or "").strip()
bot_username = str(payload.get("bot_username") or "").strip()
if not bot_token:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=502,
detail="Telegram setup service returned an incomplete response.",
)
owner_user_id = _normalize_telegram_user_id(payload.get("owner_user_id"))
with _telegram_onboarding_lock:
record = _telegram_onboarding_pairings.get(pairing_id)
if not record:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404,
detail="Telegram setup session was not found. Start a new setup.",
)
record.bot_token = bot_token
record.bot_username = bot_username or None
record.owner_user_id = owner_user_id
return {
"status": "ready",
"bot_username": record.bot_username,
"owner_user_id": record.owner_user_id,
"expires_at": record.expires_at,
}
if status in {"expired", "claimed"}:
with _telegram_onboarding_lock:
_telegram_onboarding_pairings.pop(pairing_id, None)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=410,
detail=_telegram_onboarding_error_message(
status,
"Telegram setup is no longer available. Start a new setup.",
),
)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=502,
detail="Telegram setup service returned an unknown status.",
)
def _restart_gateway_after_telegram_onboarding(profile: Optional[str] = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Best-effort gateway restart after saving Telegram QR onboarding.
The QR flow naturally pulls users into Telegram on another device. If the
saved token waits on a separate dashboard restart click, Hermes appears
broken from the chat side. Keep the config save authoritative, but report
restart failures so the UI can fall back to the existing manual banner.
"""
try:
proc, reused = _spawn_gateway_restart(profile)
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to auto-restart gateway after Telegram onboarding")
return {
"restart_started": False,
"restart_error": str(exc),
}
if reused:
_log.info(
"Telegram onboarding: reusing in-flight gateway restart (pid %s)",
proc.pid,
)
return {
"restart_started": True,
"restart_action": "gateway-restart",
"restart_pid": proc.pid,
}
@app.post("/api/messaging/telegram/onboarding/{pairing_id}/apply")
async def apply_telegram_onboarding(
pairing_id: str, body: TelegramOnboardingApply, profile: Optional[str] = None
):
allowed_user_ids = []
seen = set()
for raw_id in body.allowed_user_ids:
normalized = _normalize_telegram_user_id(raw_id)
if not normalized:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="Allowed Telegram user IDs must be numeric.",
)
if normalized not in seen:
seen.add(normalized)
allowed_user_ids.append(normalized)
if not allowed_user_ids:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="Add at least one allowed Telegram user ID.",
)
with _telegram_onboarding_lock:
_prune_telegram_onboarding_pairings()
record = _telegram_onboarding_pairings.get(pairing_id)
if not record:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404,
detail="Telegram setup session was not found. Start a new setup.",
)
bot_token = record.bot_token
bot_username = record.bot_username
if not bot_token:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=409,
detail="Telegram setup is not ready yet.",
)
effective_profile = body.profile or profile
try:
with _profile_scope(effective_profile):
save_env_value("TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN", bot_token)
save_env_value("TELEGRAM_ALLOWED_USERS", ",".join(allowed_user_ids))
_write_platform_enabled("telegram", True)
except HTTPException:
raise
except ValueError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc)) from exc
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Telegram onboarding apply failed")
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500,
detail="Failed to save Telegram setup.",
) from exc
with _telegram_onboarding_lock:
_telegram_onboarding_pairings.pop(pairing_id, None)
restart_result = _restart_gateway_after_telegram_onboarding(effective_profile)
return {
"ok": True,
"platform": "telegram",
"bot_username": bot_username,
"needs_restart": not restart_result["restart_started"],
**restart_result,
}
@app.delete("/api/messaging/telegram/onboarding/{pairing_id}")
async def cancel_telegram_onboarding(pairing_id: str):
with _telegram_onboarding_lock:
_telegram_onboarding_pairings.pop(pairing_id, None)
return {"ok": True}
@app.get("/api/messaging/platforms")
async def get_messaging_platforms(profile: Optional[str] = None):
# Profile-scoped so the dashboard's global profile switcher shows the
# TARGET profile's channel credentials/state, not the root install's.
# Inside _profile_scope, load_env()/read_runtime_status()/get_running_pid()
# all resolve against the requested profile's HERMES_HOME.
with _profile_scope(profile) as scoped_dir:
env_on_disk = load_env()
runtime = read_runtime_status()
return {
"env_path": str(get_env_path()),
"gateway_start_command": _gateway_display_command(profile, "start"),
"platforms": [
_messaging_platform_payload(
entry, env_on_disk, runtime, scoped=scoped_dir is not None
)
for entry in _messaging_platform_catalog()
]
}
def _multiplex_port_binding_conflict(
platform_id: str, requested_profile: Optional[str]
) -> Optional[str]:
"""Reason enabling ``platform_id`` on the target profile would break a
multiplexed gateway, or ``None`` when the change is allowed.
Mirrors the gateway's startup rule (``_start_one_profile_adapters`` in
gateway/run.py): with ``gateway.multiplex_profiles`` on, the default
profile owns the single shared HTTP listener and serves every profile via
the ``/p/<profile>/`` prefix, so a SECONDARY profile must never enable a
port-binding platform. Without this pre-write check the dashboard happily
persisted the invalid config and the shared gateway died with
``MultiplexConfigError`` on its next start — for ALL profiles. Only
*enabling* is blocked; disabling/clearing stays allowed so users can
repair an already-invalid profile.
"""
from gateway.config import PORT_BINDING_PLATFORM_VALUES, load_gateway_config
if platform_id not in PORT_BINDING_PLATFORM_VALUES:
return None
requested = (requested_profile or "").strip()
if not requested or requested.lower() == "current":
from hermes_cli.profiles import get_active_profile_name
# The dashboard's own profile. "custom" (an unrecognized HERMES_HOME)
# is outside the profiles tree, so a multiplexed gateway never serves
# it — nothing to guard.
target = get_active_profile_name()
else:
_resolve_profile_dir(requested) # same 400/404 as _profile_scope
target = requested
if target in ("default", "custom"):
return None
# The multiplex flag that matters is the one the shared gateway reads at
# startup: the DEFAULT profile's gateway config (plus the process-wide
# GATEWAY_MULTIPLEX_PROFILES override, which load_gateway_config applies).
with _config_profile_scope("default"):
if not load_gateway_config().multiplex_profiles:
return None
return (
f"Cannot enable '{platform_id}' on profile '{target}': it binds its "
"own listener port, and gateway.multiplex_profiles is on, so the "
"default profile owns the single shared HTTP listener for every "
"profile. Configure this channel on the default profile instead "
"(disabling or clearing it here is still allowed)."
)
@app.put("/api/messaging/platforms/{platform_id}")
async def update_messaging_platform(
platform_id: str, body: MessagingPlatformUpdate, profile: Optional[str] = None
):
entry = _catalog_lookup(platform_id)
if not entry:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404, detail=f"Unknown messaging platform: {platform_id}"
)
target_profile = body.profile or profile
if body.enabled:
conflict = _multiplex_port_binding_conflict(platform_id, target_profile)
if conflict:
# Reject BEFORE any .env/config.yaml write so the profile stays
# loadable by the multiplexed gateway.
_log.info(
"Rejected messaging platform update: platform=%s profile=%s "
"(multiplex port-binding conflict)",
platform_id,
target_profile or "current",
)
raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail=conflict)
allowed_env = set(entry["env_vars"])
try:
with _profile_scope(body.profile or profile):
for key in body.clear_env:
if key not in allowed_env:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"{key} is not configurable for {entry['name']}",
)
remove_env_value(key)
for key, value in body.env.items():
if key not in allowed_env:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"{key} is not configurable for {entry['name']}",
)
trimmed = value.strip()
if trimmed:
_validate_messaging_env_value(platform_id, key, trimmed)
save_env_value(key, trimmed)
if body.enabled is not None:
_write_platform_enabled(platform_id, body.enabled)
# Audit trail for channel config mutations: names only, never values.
_log.info(
"Messaging platform updated: platform=%s profile=%s enabled=%s "
"env_keys=%s cleared_keys=%s",
platform_id,
target_profile or "current",
body.enabled,
sorted(body.env),
sorted(body.clear_env),
)
return {"ok": True, "platform": platform_id}
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception:
_log.exception("PUT /api/messaging/platforms/%s failed", platform_id)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Internal server error")
@app.post("/api/messaging/platforms/{platform_id}/test")
async def test_messaging_platform(platform_id: str, profile: Optional[str] = None):
entry = _catalog_lookup(platform_id)
if not entry:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404, detail=f"Unknown messaging platform: {platform_id}"
)
with _profile_scope(profile) as scoped_dir:
env_on_disk = load_env()
payload = _messaging_platform_payload(
entry, env_on_disk, read_runtime_status(), scoped=scoped_dir is not None
)
if not payload["enabled"]:
message = f"{entry['name']} is disabled. Enable it, then restart the gateway."
return {"ok": False, "state": payload["state"], "message": message}
if not payload["configured"]:
missing = [
field["key"]
for field in payload["env_vars"]
if field["required"] and not field["is_set"]
]
message = (
f"Missing required setup: {', '.join(missing)}"
if missing
else "Platform setup is incomplete."
)
return {"ok": False, "state": payload["state"], "message": message}
if not payload["gateway_running"]:
return {
"ok": False,
"state": payload["state"],
"message": "Gateway is not running. Restart the gateway to connect this platform.",
}
if payload["state"] == "connected":
return {
"ok": True,
"state": payload["state"],
"message": f"{entry['name']} is connected.",
}
if payload.get("error_message"):
return {
"ok": False,
"state": payload["state"],
"message": payload["error_message"],
}
return {
"ok": False,
"state": payload["state"],
"message": "Setup looks complete, but the gateway has not reported a connection yet. Restart the gateway.",
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OAuth provider endpoints — status + disconnect (Phase 1)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# Phase 1 surfaces *which OAuth providers exist* and whether each is
# connected, plus a disconnect button. The actual login flow (PKCE for
# Anthropic, device-code for Nous/Codex) still runs in the CLI for now;
# Phase 2 will add in-browser flows. For unconnected providers we return
# the canonical ``hermes auth add <provider>`` command so the dashboard
# can surface a one-click copy.
def _truncate_token(value: Optional[str], visible: int = 6) -> str:
"""Return ``...XXXXXX`` (last N chars) for safe display in the UI.
We never expose more than the trailing ``visible`` characters of an
OAuth access token. JWT prefixes (the part before the first dot) are
stripped first when present so the visible suffix is always part of
the signing region rather than a meaningless header chunk.
Returns the Entra-ID placeholder when handed a callable (Azure Foundry
bearer provider) — the callable is NEVER invoked here.
"""
if not value:
return ""
if callable(value) and not isinstance(value, str):
# Entra ID bearer provider — never reveal a minted token in the UI.
return "<entra-id-bearer>"
s = str(value)
if "." in s and s.count(".") >= 2:
# Looks like a JWT — show the trailing piece of the signature only.
s = s.rsplit(".", 1)[-1]
if len(s) <= visible:
return s
return f"{s[-visible:]}"
def _anthropic_oauth_status() -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Status for the "Anthropic API Key" catalog entry.
Two sources, in priority order:
1. ``~/.hermes/.anthropic_oauth.json`` — Hermes-managed PKCE flow (what
this entry's Connect button writes)
2. ``ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`` → ``ANTHROPIC_TOKEN`` → ``CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN``
env vars (registry order) — from ``.env``, the shell, or an external
secret source like Bitwarden (whose keys are injected into the process
env during ``load_hermes_dotenv()``, so the same check covers them)
Claude Code's ``~/.claude/.credentials.json`` is deliberately NOT read
here — it has its own dedicated catalog entry (``claude-code`` →
``_claude_code_only_status``). Reporting it under the API-key entry
double-counts the token and shadows a real ANTHROPIC_API_KEY.
"""
try:
from agent.anthropic_adapter import (
read_hermes_oauth_credentials,
_get_hermes_oauth_file,
)
except ImportError:
read_hermes_oauth_credentials = None # type: ignore
_get_hermes_oauth_file = None # type: ignore
hermes_creds = None
if read_hermes_oauth_credentials:
try:
hermes_creds = read_hermes_oauth_credentials()
except Exception:
hermes_creds = None
if hermes_creds and hermes_creds.get("accessToken"):
return {
"logged_in": True,
"source": "hermes_pkce",
"source_label": f"Hermes PKCE ({_get_hermes_oauth_file() if _get_hermes_oauth_file else None})",
"token_preview": _truncate_token(hermes_creds.get("accessToken")),
"expires_at": hermes_creds.get("expiresAt"),
"has_refresh_token": bool(hermes_creds.get("refreshToken")),
}
# Env-var / secret-source path. ``get_env_value`` checks the process
# environment first (where Bitwarden-sourced secrets land) then .env.
env_var_order: tuple = ("ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", "ANTHROPIC_TOKEN", "CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN")
try:
from hermes_cli.auth import PROVIDER_REGISTRY
env_var_order = PROVIDER_REGISTRY["anthropic"].api_key_env_vars
except (ImportError, KeyError):
pass
try:
from hermes_cli.config import get_env_value
except ImportError:
get_env_value = None # type: ignore
try:
from hermes_cli.env_loader import format_secret_source_suffix
except ImportError:
format_secret_source_suffix = None # type: ignore
for var in env_var_order:
value = (get_env_value(var) if get_env_value else None) or os.getenv(var)
if not value:
continue
suffix = format_secret_source_suffix(var) if format_secret_source_suffix else ""
return {
"logged_in": True,
"source": "env_var",
"source_label": f"{var}{suffix}",
"token_preview": _truncate_token(value),
"expires_at": None,
"has_refresh_token": False,
}
return {"logged_in": False, "source": None}
def _claude_code_only_status() -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Surface Claude Code CLI credentials as their own provider entry.
Independent of the Anthropic entry above so users can see whether their
Claude Code subscription tokens are actively flowing into Hermes even
when they also have a separate Hermes-managed PKCE login.
"""
try:
from agent.anthropic_adapter import read_claude_code_credentials
creds = read_claude_code_credentials()
except Exception:
creds = None
if creds and creds.get("accessToken"):
return {
"logged_in": True,
"source": "claude_code_cli",
"source_label": "~/.claude/.credentials.json",
"token_preview": _truncate_token(creds.get("accessToken")),
"expires_at": creds.get("expiresAt"),
"has_refresh_token": bool(creds.get("refreshToken")),
}
return {"logged_in": False, "source": None}
def _copilot_acp_status() -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Status for copilot-acp — credentials are owned by the Copilot CLI.
There is no cheap programmatic credential probe for the ACP subprocess, so
this is a read-only "managed by the Copilot CLI" card (like claude-code):
Hermes never claims a login state it can't verify.
"""
return {
"logged_in": False,
"source": "copilot_cli",
"source_label": "Managed by the GitHub Copilot CLI",
"token_preview": None,
"expires_at": None,
"has_refresh_token": False,
}
# Explicit, hand-tuned OAuth/account provider cards. These carry the bits that
# can't be derived from the unified provider catalog: the OAuth ``flow`` shape,
# the per-provider ``status_fn``, the ``cli_command`` fallback, and curated
# display order. They are the OVERRIDE BASE for ``_build_oauth_catalog()``,
# which unions them with every accounts-tab provider in ``provider_catalog()``
# so newly-added OAuth/external providers appear automatically (no hand edit).
# This tuple also still includes two entries that are NOT catalog providers but
# must show on the Accounts tab: the api-key Anthropic PKCE card and the
# synthetic ``claude-code`` subscription row.
# ``flow`` describes the OAuth shape so the modal can pick the right UI:
# ``pkce`` = open URL + paste callback code, ``device_code`` = show code +
# verification URL + poll, ``external`` = read-only (delegated to a third-party
# CLI like Claude Code or Qwen).
_OAUTH_PROVIDER_CATALOG: tuple[Dict[str, Any], ...] = (
{
"id": "nous",
"name": "Nous Portal",
"flow": "device_code",
"cli_command": "hermes auth add nous",
"docs_url": "https://portal.nousresearch.com",
"status_fn": None, # dispatched via auth.get_nous_auth_status
},
{
"id": "openai-codex",
"name": "OpenAI OAuth (ChatGPT)",
"flow": "device_code",
"cli_command": "hermes auth add openai-codex",
"docs_url": "https://platform.openai.com/docs",
"status_fn": None, # dispatched via auth.get_codex_auth_status
},
{
"id": "qwen-oauth",
"name": "Qwen (via Qwen CLI)",
"flow": "external",
"cli_command": "hermes auth add qwen-oauth",
"docs_url": "https://github.com/QwenLM/qwen-code",
"status_fn": None, # dispatched via auth.get_qwen_auth_status
},
{
"id": "minimax-oauth",
"name": "MiniMax (OAuth)",
# MiniMax's flow is structurally device-code (verification URI +
# user code, backend polls the token endpoint) with a PKCE
# extension for code-binding. The dashboard renders the same UX
# as Nous's device-code flow; the PKCE bit is a security
# extension that doesn't change the operator experience.
"flow": "device_code",
"cli_command": "hermes auth add minimax-oauth",
"docs_url": "https://www.minimax.io",
"status_fn": None, # dispatched via auth.get_minimax_oauth_auth_status
},
{
"id": "xai-oauth",
"name": "xAI Grok OAuth (SuperGrok / Premium+)",
# Device code is the default because it works in remote shells,
# containers, and desktop installs without requiring a reachable
# 127.0.0.1 callback.
"flow": "device_code",
"cli_command": "hermes auth add xai-oauth",
"docs_url": "https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/guides/xai-grok-oauth",
"status_fn": None, # dispatched via auth.get_xai_oauth_auth_status
},
{
"id": "copilot-acp",
"name": "GitHub Copilot (ACP)",
"flow": "external",
"cli_command": "copilot /login",
"docs_url": "https://docs.github.com/en/copilot",
"status_fn": _copilot_acp_status,
},
# ── Anthropic / Claude entries sit at the bottom: the API-key path
# first, then the subscription OAuth path (which only works with extra
# usage credits on top of a Claude Max plan — see disclaimer in name).
{
"id": "anthropic",
"name": "Anthropic API Key",
"flow": "pkce",
"cli_command": "hermes auth add anthropic",
"docs_url": "https://docs.claude.com/en/api/getting-started",
"status_fn": _anthropic_oauth_status,
},
{
"id": "claude-code",
"name": "Anthropic OAuth: Required Extra Usage Credits to Use Subscription",
"flow": "external",
"cli_command": "claude setup-token",
"docs_url": "https://docs.claude.com/en/docs/claude-code",
"status_fn": _claude_code_only_status,
},
)
def _resolve_provider_status(provider_id: str, status_fn) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Dispatch to the right status helper for an OAuth provider entry."""
if status_fn is not None:
try:
return status_fn()
except Exception as e:
return {"logged_in": False, "error": str(e)}
try:
from hermes_cli import auth as hauth
if provider_id == "nous":
raw = hauth.get_nous_auth_status()
return {
"logged_in": bool(raw.get("logged_in")),
"source": "nous_portal",
"source_label": raw.get("portal_base_url") or "Nous Portal",
"token_preview": _truncate_token(raw.get("access_token")),
"expires_at": raw.get("access_expires_at"),
"has_refresh_token": bool(raw.get("has_refresh_token")),
}
if provider_id == "openai-codex":
raw = hauth.get_codex_auth_status()
return {
"logged_in": bool(raw.get("logged_in")),
"source": raw.get("source") or "openai_codex",
"source_label": raw.get("auth_mode") or "OpenAI Codex",
"token_preview": _truncate_token(raw.get("api_key")),
"expires_at": None,
"has_refresh_token": False,
"last_refresh": raw.get("last_refresh"),
}
if provider_id == "qwen-oauth":
raw = hauth.get_qwen_auth_status()
return {
"logged_in": bool(raw.get("logged_in")),
"source": "qwen_cli",
"source_label": raw.get("auth_store_path") or "Qwen CLI",
"token_preview": _truncate_token(raw.get("access_token")),
"expires_at": raw.get("expires_at"),
"has_refresh_token": bool(raw.get("has_refresh_token")),
}
if provider_id == "minimax-oauth":
raw = hauth.get_minimax_oauth_auth_status()
return {
"logged_in": bool(raw.get("logged_in")),
"source": "minimax_oauth",
"source_label": f"MiniMax ({raw.get('region', 'global')})",
"token_preview": None,
"expires_at": raw.get("expires_at"),
"has_refresh_token": True,
}
if provider_id == "xai-oauth":
raw = hauth.get_xai_oauth_auth_status()
# source_label is meant to be a human-readable origin (auth-store
# path / credential source), not the internal auth_mode string
# ("oauth_pkce"). Prefer the store path, then the source slug.
return {
"logged_in": bool(raw.get("logged_in")),
"source": raw.get("source") or "xai_oauth",
"source_label": raw.get("auth_store") or raw.get("source") or "xAI Grok OAuth",
"token_preview": _truncate_token(raw.get("api_key")),
"expires_at": None,
"has_refresh_token": True,
"last_refresh": raw.get("last_refresh"),
}
# No hand-written branch for this provider id: fall through to the
# canonical slug-driven dispatcher so accounts-tab providers derived
# from the unified catalog (which carry status_fn=None) still reflect
# real login state instead of rendering permanently logged-out. This
# closes the membership-auto-extends-but-status-doesn't gap: add an
# OAuth/account provider plugin and its card shows the right state.
raw = hauth.get_auth_status(provider_id)
if isinstance(raw, dict) and "logged_in" in raw:
return {
"logged_in": bool(raw.get("logged_in")),
"source": raw.get("source") or raw.get("provider") or provider_id,
"source_label": (
raw.get("source_label")
or raw.get("auth_store")
or raw.get("auth_store_path")
or raw.get("base_url")
or raw.get("name")
or ""
),
"token_preview": _truncate_token(
raw.get("access_token") or raw.get("api_key")
),
"expires_at": raw.get("expires_at") or raw.get("access_expires_at"),
"has_refresh_token": bool(raw.get("has_refresh_token")),
}
except Exception as e:
return {"logged_in": False, "error": str(e)}
return {"logged_in": False}
def _oauth_provider_disconnect_command(provider: Dict[str, Any]) -> Optional[str]:
"""Shell command that clears an external provider's credentials.
External providers store their credentials outside Hermes, so the disconnect
API deliberately refuses them (we never delete files another CLI owns on the
user's behalf via a silent API call). For the ones we know how to clear we
instead hand the GUI a command it can *run in the embedded terminal* — the
user sees exactly what executes, and Hermes then stops resolving the token.
Claude Code has no scriptable logout (only the interactive ``/logout``), so
we remove the credential the same way logout does: the macOS Keychain entry
(``Claude Code-credentials``) and/or the ``~/.claude/.credentials.json``
file — the two sources ``read_claude_code_credentials()`` consults. Returns
None for providers we can't safely clear (the GUI shows a manual hint).
"""
if provider.get("flow") != "external":
return None
if provider.get("id") == "claude-code":
rm_file = "rm -f ~/.claude/.credentials.json"
if sys.platform == "darwin":
return f'security delete-generic-password -s "Claude Code-credentials" 2>/dev/null; {rm_file}'
return rm_file
return None
def _oauth_provider_disconnect_hint(provider: Dict[str, Any], status: Dict[str, Any]) -> Optional[str]:
"""Return the manual disconnect path when the API cannot clear this provider."""
if provider.get("flow") == "external":
if _oauth_provider_disconnect_command(provider):
# The GUI offers a one-click "run in terminal" path; this hint is the
# fallback wording for surfaces that only show text.
return "Managed outside Hermes — run the disconnect command to remove it."
return "Managed by that provider's CLI; remove it there."
if status.get("source") == "env_var":
return "Remove the API key from Settings → Keys instead."
return None
def _build_oauth_catalog() -> list[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Build the Accounts-tab provider list.
MEMBERSHIP is the union of:
1. ``_OAUTH_PROVIDER_CATALOG`` — the explicit, hand-tuned cards that carry
bespoke flow / status_fn / cli_command (including the api-key Anthropic
PKCE card and the synthetic claude-code subscription row, which are not
catalog providers), and
2. every accounts-tab provider in the unified ``provider_catalog()`` (the
``hermes model`` universe) — so any OAuth/external provider added as a
plugin appears automatically, with sensible defaults, even if no
explicit card was written for it.
The explicit catalog wins on metadata; the unified catalog guarantees we
never silently drop a provider the CLI picker offers. Order: explicit cards
first (their curated order), then any catalog-only providers appended in
``hermes model`` order.
"""
rows: list[Dict[str, Any]] = []
seen: set[str] = set()
# 1. Explicit hand-tuned cards (authoritative metadata + curated order).
for entry in _OAUTH_PROVIDER_CATALOG:
if entry["id"] in seen:
continue
seen.add(entry["id"])
rows.append(dict(entry))
# 2. Catalog accounts-providers not already covered — keeps the Accounts tab
# in lockstep with the `hermes model` universe (zero-edit for new plugins).
try:
from hermes_cli.provider_catalog import provider_catalog
for d in provider_catalog():
if d.tab != "accounts" or d.slug in seen:
continue
seen.add(d.slug)
rows.append({
"id": d.slug,
"name": d.label,
"flow": "external",
"cli_command": f"hermes auth add {d.slug}",
"docs_url": d.signup_url or "",
"status_fn": None,
})
except Exception:
pass
return rows
@app.get("/api/providers/oauth")
async def list_oauth_providers(profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Enumerate every OAuth-capable LLM provider with current status.
Response shape (per provider):
id stable identifier (used in DELETE path)
name human label
flow "pkce" | "device_code" | "external"
cli_command fallback CLI command for users to run manually
disconnect_command shell command that clears an external provider's
creds (run in the embedded terminal), else null
docs_url external docs/portal link for the "Learn more" link
status:
logged_in bool — currently has usable creds
source short slug ("hermes_pkce", "claude_code", ...)
source_label human-readable origin (file path, env var name)
token_preview last N chars of the token, never the full token
expires_at ISO timestamp string or null
has_refresh_token bool
Membership is derived from the unified provider_catalog() so this stays in
sync with the `hermes model` picker; _OAUTH_OVERRIDES supplies per-provider
flow/status/cli metadata.
"""
with _profile_scope(profile):
providers = []
for p in _build_oauth_catalog():
status = _resolve_provider_status(p["id"], p.get("status_fn"))
disconnect_hint = _oauth_provider_disconnect_hint(p, status)
providers.append({
"id": p["id"],
"name": p["name"],
"flow": p["flow"],
"cli_command": p["cli_command"],
"docs_url": p["docs_url"],
"disconnect_hint": disconnect_hint,
"disconnect_command": _oauth_provider_disconnect_command(p),
"disconnectable": disconnect_hint is None,
"status": status,
})
return {"providers": providers}
@app.delete("/api/providers/oauth/{provider_id}")
async def disconnect_oauth_provider(
provider_id: str,
request: Request,
profile: Optional[str] = None,
):
"""Disconnect an OAuth provider. Token-protected (matches /env/reveal)."""
_require_token(request)
with _profile_scope(profile):
catalog_by_id = {p["id"]: p for p in _build_oauth_catalog()}
provider = catalog_by_id.get(provider_id)
if provider is None:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"Unknown provider: {provider_id}. "
f"Available: {', '.join(sorted(catalog_by_id))}",
)
disconnect_hint = _oauth_provider_disconnect_hint(provider, {})
if disconnect_hint:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"{provider['name']} cannot be disconnected automatically. {disconnect_hint}",
)
status = _resolve_provider_status(provider_id, provider.get("status_fn"))
disconnect_hint = _oauth_provider_disconnect_hint(provider, status)
if disconnect_hint:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"{provider['name']} cannot be disconnected automatically. {disconnect_hint}",
)
# Anthropic clears only the Hermes-managed PKCE file and auth-store entry.
# The separate claude-code catalog row is external/read-only and rejected
# above so we never pretend to remove ~/.claude/* credentials owned by the CLI.
if provider_id == "anthropic":
cleared = False
try:
from agent.anthropic_adapter import _get_hermes_oauth_file
oauth_file = _get_hermes_oauth_file()
if oauth_file.exists():
oauth_file.unlink()
cleared = True
except Exception:
pass
# Also clear the credential pool entry if present.
try:
from hermes_cli.auth import clear_provider_auth
cleared = clear_provider_auth("anthropic") or cleared
except Exception:
pass
_log.info("oauth/disconnect: %s", provider_id)
return {"ok": bool(cleared), "provider": provider_id}
try:
from hermes_cli.auth import clear_provider_auth, invalidate_nous_auth_status_cache
cleared = clear_provider_auth(provider_id)
if provider_id == "nous":
invalidate_nous_auth_status_cache()
_log.info("oauth/disconnect: %s (cleared=%s)", provider_id, cleared)
return {"ok": bool(cleared), "provider": provider_id}
except Exception as e:
_log.exception("disconnect %s failed", provider_id)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=str(e))
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OAuth Phase 2 — in-browser PKCE & device-code flows
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# Two flow shapes are supported:
#
# PKCE (Anthropic):
# 1. POST /api/providers/oauth/anthropic/start
# → server generates code_verifier + challenge, builds claude.ai
# authorize URL, stashes verifier in _oauth_sessions[session_id]
# → returns { session_id, flow: "pkce", auth_url }
# 2. UI opens auth_url in a new tab. User authorizes, copies code.
# 3. POST /api/providers/oauth/anthropic/submit { session_id, code }
# → server exchanges (code + verifier) → tokens at console.anthropic.com
# → persists to ~/.hermes/.anthropic_oauth.json AND credential pool
# → returns { ok: true, status: "approved" }
#
# Device code (Nous, OpenAI Codex):
# 1. POST /api/providers/oauth/{nous|openai-codex}/start
# → server hits provider's device-auth endpoint
# → gets { user_code, verification_url, device_code, interval, expires_in }
# → spawns background poller thread that polls the token endpoint
# every `interval` seconds until approved/expired
# → stores poll status in _oauth_sessions[session_id]
# → returns { session_id, flow: "device_code", user_code,
# verification_url, expires_in, poll_interval }
# 2. UI opens verification_url in a new tab and shows user_code.
# 3. UI polls GET /api/providers/oauth/{provider}/poll/{session_id}
# every 2s until status != "pending".
# 4. On "approved" the background thread has already saved creds; UI
# refreshes the providers list.
#
# Sessions are kept in-memory only (single-process FastAPI) and time out
# after 15 minutes. A periodic cleanup runs on each /start call to GC
# expired sessions so the dict doesn't grow without bound.
_OAUTH_SESSION_TTL_SECONDS = 15 * 60
_oauth_sessions: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
_oauth_sessions_lock = threading.Lock()
# Import OAuth constants from canonical source instead of duplicating.
# Guarded so hermes web still starts if anthropic_adapter is unavailable;
# Phase 2 endpoints will return 501 in that case.
try:
from agent.anthropic_adapter import (
_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID as _ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID,
_OAUTH_TOKEN_URL as _ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_TOKEN_URL,
_OAUTH_TOKEN_URLS as _ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_TOKEN_URLS,
_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI as _ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI,
_OAUTH_SCOPES as _ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_SCOPES,
_generate_pkce as _generate_pkce_pair,
)
_ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_AVAILABLE = True
except ImportError:
_ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_AVAILABLE = False
_ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_AUTHORIZE_URL = "https://claude.ai/oauth/authorize"
def _gc_oauth_sessions() -> None:
"""Drop expired sessions. Called opportunistically on /start."""
cutoff = time.time() - _OAUTH_SESSION_TTL_SECONDS
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
stale = [sid for sid, sess in _oauth_sessions.items() if sess["created_at"] < cutoff]
for sid in stale:
_oauth_sessions.pop(sid, None)
def _oauth_profile_name(profile: Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]:
requested = (profile or "").strip()
if not requested or requested.lower() == "current":
return None
return requested
def _validate_oauth_profile(profile: Optional[str]) -> None:
profile_name = _oauth_profile_name(profile)
if profile_name:
_resolve_profile_dir(profile_name)
def _new_oauth_session(
provider_id: str,
flow: str,
profile: Optional[str] = None,
) -> tuple[str, Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Create + register a new OAuth session, return (session_id, session_dict)."""
sid = secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
profile_name = _oauth_profile_name(profile)
sess = {
"session_id": sid,
"provider": provider_id,
"flow": flow,
"profile": profile_name,
"created_at": time.time(),
"status": "pending", # pending | approved | denied | expired | error
"error_message": None,
}
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
_oauth_sessions[sid] = sess
return sid, sess
def _oauth_session_profile(
session_id: str,
fallback: Optional[str] = None,
) -> Optional[str]:
"""Return the profile that owns an OAuth session, if one was provided."""
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess = _oauth_sessions.get(session_id)
profile = sess.get("profile") if sess else None
return profile or _oauth_profile_name(fallback)
def _save_anthropic_oauth_creds(access_token: str, refresh_token: str, expires_at_ms: int) -> None:
"""Persist Anthropic PKCE creds to both Hermes file AND credential pool.
Mirrors what auth_commands.add_command does so the dashboard flow leaves
the system in the same state as ``hermes auth add anthropic``.
"""
from agent.anthropic_adapter import _get_hermes_oauth_file
oauth_file = _get_hermes_oauth_file()
payload = {
"accessToken": access_token,
"refreshToken": refresh_token,
"expiresAt": expires_at_ms,
}
# atomic_json_write creates the temp with mode 0o600 (via mkstemp) *before*
# any content is written, then fsyncs and atomically replaces the target.
# The previous os.replace + post-hoc chmod left a TOCTOU window in which the
# OAuth token file was world-readable at the default umask (0o644 on most
# hosts) between the rename and the chmod. atomic_json_write also preserves
# the existing file's owner and cleans up its temp on failure.
from utils import atomic_json_write
atomic_json_write(oauth_file, payload, indent=2, mode=0o600)
# Best-effort credential-pool insert. Failure here doesn't invalidate
# the file write — pool registration only matters for the rotation
# strategy, not for runtime credential resolution.
try:
from agent.credential_pool import (
PooledCredential,
load_pool,
AUTH_TYPE_OAUTH,
SOURCE_MANUAL,
)
import uuid
pool = load_pool("anthropic")
# Avoid duplicate entries: delete any prior dashboard-issued OAuth entry
existing = [e for e in pool.entries() if getattr(e, "source", "").startswith(f"{SOURCE_MANUAL}:dashboard_pkce")]
for e in existing:
try:
pool.remove_entry(getattr(e, "id", ""))
except Exception:
pass
entry = PooledCredential(
provider="anthropic",
id=uuid.uuid4().hex[:6],
label="dashboard PKCE",
auth_type=AUTH_TYPE_OAUTH,
priority=0,
source=f"{SOURCE_MANUAL}:dashboard_pkce",
access_token=access_token,
refresh_token=refresh_token,
expires_at_ms=expires_at_ms,
)
pool.add_entry(entry)
except Exception as e:
_log.warning("anthropic pool add (dashboard) failed: %s", e)
def _start_anthropic_pkce(profile: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Begin PKCE flow. Returns the auth URL the UI should open."""
if not _ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_AVAILABLE:
raise HTTPException(status_code=501, detail="Anthropic OAuth not available (missing adapter)")
verifier, challenge = _generate_pkce_pair()
sid, sess = _new_oauth_session("anthropic", "pkce", profile=profile)
sess["verifier"] = verifier
sess["state"] = verifier # Anthropic round-trips verifier as state
params = {
"code": "true",
"client_id": _ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID,
"response_type": "code",
"redirect_uri": _ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI,
"scope": _ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_SCOPES,
"code_challenge": challenge,
"code_challenge_method": "S256",
"state": verifier,
}
auth_url = f"{_ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_AUTHORIZE_URL}?{urllib.parse.urlencode(params)}"
return {
"session_id": sid,
"flow": "pkce",
"auth_url": auth_url,
"expires_in": _OAUTH_SESSION_TTL_SECONDS,
}
def _submit_anthropic_pkce(
session_id: str,
code_input: str,
profile: Optional[str] = None,
) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Exchange authorization code for tokens. Persists on success."""
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess = _oauth_sessions.get(session_id)
if not sess or sess["provider"] != "anthropic" or sess["flow"] != "pkce":
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Unknown or expired session")
if sess["status"] != "pending":
return {"ok": False, "status": sess["status"], "message": sess.get("error_message")}
# Anthropic's redirect callback page formats the code as `<code>#<state>`.
# Strip the state suffix if present (we already have the verifier server-side).
parts = code_input.strip().split("#", 1)
code = parts[0].strip()
if not code:
return {"ok": False, "status": "error", "message": "No code provided"}
state_from_callback = parts[1] if len(parts) > 1 else ""
exchange_data = json.dumps({
"grant_type": "authorization_code",
"client_id": _ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID,
"code": code,
"state": state_from_callback or sess["state"],
"redirect_uri": _ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI,
"code_verifier": sess["verifier"],
}).encode()
# Anthropic migrated the OAuth token endpoint to platform.claude.com;
# console.anthropic.com now 404s. Try the new host first, then fall back.
result = None
last_exc = None
for _endpoint in _ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_TOKEN_URLS:
req = urllib.request.Request(
_endpoint,
data=exchange_data,
headers={
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"User-Agent": "hermes-dashboard/1.0",
},
method="POST",
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=20) as resp:
result = json.loads(resp.read().decode())
break
except Exception as e:
last_exc = e
continue
if result is None:
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess["status"] = "error"
sess["error_message"] = f"Token exchange failed: {last_exc}"
return {"ok": False, "status": "error", "message": sess["error_message"]}
access_token = result.get("access_token", "")
refresh_token = result.get("refresh_token", "")
expires_in = int(result.get("expires_in") or 3600)
if not access_token:
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess["status"] = "error"
sess["error_message"] = "No access token returned"
return {"ok": False, "status": "error", "message": sess["error_message"]}
expires_at_ms = int(time.time() * 1000) + (expires_in * 1000)
try:
with _profile_scope(_oauth_session_profile(session_id, profile)):
_save_anthropic_oauth_creds(access_token, refresh_token, expires_at_ms)
except Exception as e:
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess["status"] = "error"
sess["error_message"] = f"Save failed: {e}"
return {"ok": False, "status": "error", "message": sess["error_message"]}
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess["status"] = "approved"
_log.info("oauth/pkce: anthropic login completed (session=%s)", session_id)
return {"ok": True, "status": "approved"}
async def _start_device_code_flow(
provider_id: str,
profile: Optional[str] = None,
) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Initiate a device-code flow (Nous, OpenAI Codex, MiniMax, or xAI).
Calls the provider's device-auth endpoint via the existing CLI helpers,
then spawns a background poller. Returns the user-facing display fields
so the UI can render the verification page link + user code.
"""
if provider_id == "nous":
from hermes_cli.auth import (
_request_device_code,
PROVIDER_REGISTRY,
)
import httpx
pconfig = PROVIDER_REGISTRY["nous"]
portal_base_url = (
os.getenv("HERMES_PORTAL_BASE_URL")
or os.getenv("NOUS_PORTAL_BASE_URL")
or pconfig.portal_base_url
).rstrip("/")
client_id = pconfig.client_id
scope = pconfig.scope
def _do_nous_device_request():
with httpx.Client(
timeout=httpx.Timeout(15.0),
headers={"Accept": "application/json"},
) as client:
return (
_request_device_code(
client=client,
portal_base_url=portal_base_url,
client_id=client_id,
scope=scope,
),
scope,
)
device_data, effective_scope = await asyncio.get_running_loop().run_in_executor(
None, _do_nous_device_request
)
sid, sess = _new_oauth_session("nous", "device_code", profile=profile)
sess["device_code"] = str(device_data["device_code"])
sess["interval"] = int(device_data["interval"])
sess["expires_at"] = time.time() + int(device_data["expires_in"])
sess["portal_base_url"] = portal_base_url
sess["client_id"] = client_id
sess["scope"] = effective_scope
threading.Thread(
target=_nous_poller, args=(sid,), daemon=True, name=f"oauth-poll-{sid[:6]}"
).start()
return {
"session_id": sid,
"flow": "device_code",
"user_code": str(device_data["user_code"]),
"verification_url": str(device_data["verification_uri_complete"]),
"expires_in": int(device_data["expires_in"]),
"poll_interval": int(device_data["interval"]),
}
if provider_id == "openai-codex":
# Codex uses fixed OpenAI device-auth endpoints; reuse the helper.
sid, _ = _new_oauth_session("openai-codex", "device_code", profile=profile)
# Use the helper but in a thread because it polls inline.
# We can't extract just the start step without refactoring auth.py,
# so we run the full helper in a worker and proxy the user_code +
# verification_url back via the session dict. The helper prints
# to stdout — we capture nothing here, just status.
threading.Thread(
target=_codex_full_login_worker, args=(sid,), daemon=True,
name=f"oauth-codex-{sid[:6]}",
).start()
# Block briefly until the worker has populated the user_code, OR error.
deadline = time.monotonic() + 10
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
s = _oauth_sessions.get(sid)
if s and (s.get("user_code") or s["status"] != "pending"):
break
await asyncio.sleep(0.1)
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
s = _oauth_sessions.get(sid, {})
if s.get("status") == "error":
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=s.get("error_message") or "device-auth failed")
if not s.get("user_code"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=504, detail="device-auth timed out before returning a user code")
return {
"session_id": sid,
"flow": "device_code",
"user_code": s["user_code"],
"verification_url": s["verification_url"],
"expires_in": int(s.get("expires_in") or 900),
"poll_interval": int(s.get("interval") or 5),
}
if provider_id == "minimax-oauth":
# MiniMax uses a device-code-style flow (verification URI + user
# code + background poll) with a PKCE extension on top. From the
# operator's perspective it's identical to Nous's device-code
# flow; the PKCE bit (verifier + challenge from
# _minimax_pkce_pair) is a security extension that binds the
# token exchange to the original session.
from hermes_cli.auth import (
_minimax_pkce_pair,
_minimax_request_user_code,
MINIMAX_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID,
MINIMAX_OAUTH_GLOBAL_BASE,
)
import httpx
verifier, challenge, state = _minimax_pkce_pair()
portal_base_url = (
os.getenv("MINIMAX_PORTAL_BASE_URL") or MINIMAX_OAUTH_GLOBAL_BASE
).rstrip("/")
def _do_minimax_request():
with httpx.Client(
timeout=httpx.Timeout(15.0),
headers={"Accept": "application/json"},
follow_redirects=True,
) as client:
return _minimax_request_user_code(
client=client,
portal_base_url=portal_base_url,
client_id=MINIMAX_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID,
code_challenge=challenge,
state=state,
)
device_data = await asyncio.get_event_loop().run_in_executor(
None, _do_minimax_request
)
sid, sess = _new_oauth_session("minimax-oauth", "device_code", profile=profile)
# The CLI flow names this `interval_ms` because MiniMax's
# `interval` field is in milliseconds (defensive default 2000ms
# in _minimax_poll_token).
interval_raw = device_data.get("interval")
sess["interval_ms"] = (
int(interval_raw) if interval_raw is not None else None
)
sess["user_code"] = str(device_data["user_code"])
sess["code_verifier"] = verifier
sess["state"] = state
sess["portal_base_url"] = portal_base_url
sess["client_id"] = MINIMAX_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID
sess["region"] = "global"
# `expired_in` from MiniMax is overloaded — could be a unix-ms
# timestamp OR a seconds-from-now duration. Mirror the heuristic
# in _minimax_poll_token. Stash the raw value for the poller;
# compute a derived expires_at + UI-friendly expires_in seconds.
expired_in_raw = int(device_data["expired_in"])
sess["expired_in_raw"] = expired_in_raw
if expired_in_raw > 1_000_000_000_000: # likely unix-ms
expires_at_ts = expired_in_raw / 1000.0
expires_in_seconds = max(0, int(expires_at_ts - time.time()))
else:
expires_at_ts = time.time() + expired_in_raw
expires_in_seconds = expired_in_raw
sess["expires_at"] = expires_at_ts
threading.Thread(
target=_minimax_poller,
args=(sid,),
daemon=True,
name=f"oauth-poll-{sid[:6]}",
).start()
return {
"session_id": sid,
"flow": "device_code",
"user_code": str(device_data["user_code"]),
"verification_url": str(device_data["verification_uri"]),
"expires_in": expires_in_seconds,
"poll_interval": max(2, (sess["interval_ms"] or 2000) // 1000),
}
if provider_id == "xai-oauth":
from hermes_cli.auth import _xai_oauth_request_device_code
import httpx
def _do_xai_device_request():
with httpx.Client(
timeout=httpx.Timeout(20.0),
headers={"Accept": "application/json"},
) as client:
return _xai_oauth_request_device_code(client)
device_data = await asyncio.get_running_loop().run_in_executor(
None, _do_xai_device_request
)
sid, sess = _new_oauth_session("xai-oauth", "device_code", profile=profile)
sess["device_code"] = str(device_data["device_code"])
sess["interval"] = int(device_data["interval"])
sess["expires_at"] = time.time() + int(device_data["expires_in"])
threading.Thread(
target=_xai_device_poller,
args=(sid,),
daemon=True,
name=f"oauth-poll-{sid[:6]}",
).start()
return {
"session_id": sid,
"flow": "device_code",
"user_code": str(device_data["user_code"]),
"verification_url": str(
device_data.get("verification_uri_complete")
or device_data["verification_uri"]
),
"expires_in": int(device_data["expires_in"]),
"poll_interval": int(device_data["interval"]),
}
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Provider {provider_id} does not support device-code flow")
def _nous_poller(session_id: str) -> None:
"""Background poller that drives a Nous device-code flow to completion."""
from hermes_cli.auth import (
_poll_for_token,
refresh_nous_oauth_from_state,
)
from datetime import datetime, timezone
import httpx
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess = _oauth_sessions.get(session_id)
if not sess:
return
portal_base_url = sess["portal_base_url"]
client_id = sess["client_id"]
device_code = sess["device_code"]
interval = sess["interval"]
scope = sess.get("scope")
expires_in = max(60, int(sess["expires_at"] - time.time()))
try:
with httpx.Client(timeout=httpx.Timeout(15.0), headers={"Accept": "application/json"}) as client:
token_data = _poll_for_token(
client=client,
portal_base_url=portal_base_url,
client_id=client_id,
device_code=device_code,
expires_in=expires_in,
poll_interval=interval,
)
# Same post-processing as _nous_device_code_login (validate/refresh JWT)
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
token_ttl = int(token_data.get("expires_in") or 0)
auth_state = {
"portal_base_url": portal_base_url,
"inference_base_url": token_data.get("inference_base_url"),
"client_id": client_id,
"scope": token_data.get("scope") or scope,
"token_type": token_data.get("token_type", "Bearer"),
"access_token": token_data["access_token"],
"refresh_token": token_data.get("refresh_token"),
"obtained_at": now.isoformat(),
"expires_at": (
datetime.fromtimestamp(now.timestamp() + token_ttl, tz=timezone.utc).isoformat()
if token_ttl else None
),
"expires_in": token_ttl,
}
with _profile_scope(_oauth_session_profile(session_id)):
full_state = refresh_nous_oauth_from_state(
auth_state,
timeout_seconds=15.0,
force_refresh=False,
)
from hermes_cli.auth import persist_nous_credentials
persist_nous_credentials(full_state)
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess["status"] = "approved"
_log.info("oauth/device: nous login completed (session=%s)", session_id)
except Exception as e:
_log.warning("nous device-code poll failed (session=%s): %s", session_id, e)
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess["status"] = "error"
sess["error_message"] = str(e)
def _minimax_poller(session_id: str) -> None:
"""Background poller that drives a MiniMax OAuth flow to completion.
Mirrors `_nous_poller` but calls the MiniMax-specific token endpoint,
which uses a PKCE-style ``code_verifier`` + ``user_code`` rather than
the ``device_code`` field used by Nous. On success, builds the same
auth_state dict that ``_minimax_oauth_login`` (the CLI flow) builds
and persists via ``_minimax_save_auth_state`` — so the dashboard
path leaves the system in the same state as
``hermes auth add minimax-oauth``.
"""
from hermes_cli.auth import (
_minimax_poll_token,
_minimax_resolve_token_expiry_unix,
_minimax_save_auth_state,
MINIMAX_OAUTH_GLOBAL_INFERENCE,
MINIMAX_OAUTH_SCOPE,
)
from datetime import datetime, timezone
import httpx
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess = _oauth_sessions.get(session_id)
if not sess:
return
portal_base_url = sess["portal_base_url"]
client_id = sess["client_id"]
user_code = sess["user_code"]
code_verifier = sess["code_verifier"]
interval_ms = sess.get("interval_ms")
expired_in_raw = sess["expired_in_raw"]
try:
with httpx.Client(
timeout=httpx.Timeout(15.0),
headers={"Accept": "application/json"},
follow_redirects=True,
) as client:
token_data = _minimax_poll_token(
client=client,
portal_base_url=portal_base_url,
client_id=client_id,
user_code=user_code,
code_verifier=code_verifier,
expired_in=expired_in_raw,
interval_ms=interval_ms,
)
# Build the auth_state dict in the same shape as the CLI flow's
# `_minimax_oauth_login` so `_minimax_save_auth_state` writes
# the canonical record. Region is fixed to "global" for the
# dashboard path; cn-region operators can still use the CLI
# flow which supports `--region cn`.
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
expires_at_ts = _minimax_resolve_token_expiry_unix(
int(token_data["expired_in"]), now=now,
)
expires_in_s = max(0, int(expires_at_ts - now.timestamp()))
auth_state = {
"provider": "minimax-oauth",
"region": sess.get("region", "global"),
"portal_base_url": portal_base_url,
"inference_base_url": MINIMAX_OAUTH_GLOBAL_INFERENCE,
"client_id": client_id,
"scope": MINIMAX_OAUTH_SCOPE,
"token_type": token_data.get("token_type", "Bearer"),
"access_token": token_data["access_token"],
"refresh_token": token_data["refresh_token"],
"resource_url": token_data.get("resource_url"),
"obtained_at": now.isoformat(),
"expires_at": datetime.fromtimestamp(
expires_at_ts, tz=timezone.utc
).isoformat(),
"expires_in": expires_in_s,
}
with _profile_scope(_oauth_session_profile(session_id)):
_minimax_save_auth_state(auth_state)
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess["status"] = "approved"
_log.info("oauth/device: minimax login completed (session=%s)", session_id)
except Exception as e:
_log.warning("minimax device-code poll failed (session=%s): %s", session_id, e)
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess["status"] = "error"
sess["error_message"] = str(e)
def _xai_device_poller(session_id: str) -> None:
"""Background poller for xAI's OAuth device-code flow."""
import httpx
from hermes_cli.auth import (
_save_xai_oauth_tokens,
_xai_oauth_discovery,
_xai_oauth_poll_device_token,
unsuppress_credential_source,
)
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess = _oauth_sessions.get(session_id)
if not sess:
return
device_code = sess["device_code"]
interval = int(sess["interval"])
expires_in = max(60, int(sess["expires_at"] - time.time()))
try:
discovery = _xai_oauth_discovery(20.0)
with httpx.Client(
timeout=httpx.Timeout(20.0),
headers={"Accept": "application/json"},
) as client:
token_data = _xai_oauth_poll_device_token(
client,
token_endpoint=discovery["token_endpoint"],
device_code=device_code,
expires_in=expires_in,
poll_interval=interval,
)
tokens = {
"access_token": str(token_data.get("access_token", "") or "").strip(),
"refresh_token": str(token_data.get("refresh_token", "") or "").strip(),
"id_token": str(token_data.get("id_token", "") or "").strip(),
"expires_in": token_data.get("expires_in"),
"token_type": str(token_data.get("token_type") or "Bearer").strip() or "Bearer",
}
with _profile_scope(_oauth_session_profile(session_id)):
_save_xai_oauth_tokens(
tokens,
discovery=discovery,
last_refresh=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
auth_mode="oauth_device_code",
)
# The singleton write above is the single source of truth: the
# credential-pool load seeds it as the canonical ``device_code``
# entry. Do NOT also insert a parallel ``manual:dashboard_*`` pool
# entry — that duplicates the single-use refresh token across two
# entries and triggers rotation churn / ``refresh_token_reused``.
# An interactive dashboard login is also an explicit re-enable
# signal, so clear any ``device_code`` suppression left by a
# prior ``hermes auth remove xai-oauth`` (mirrors auth_add_command
# and the ``hermes model`` re-login path in _login_xai_oauth).
unsuppress_credential_source("xai-oauth", "device_code")
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess["status"] = "approved"
_log.info("oauth/device: xai login completed (session=%s)", session_id)
except Exception as e:
_log.warning("xai device-code poll failed (session=%s): %s", session_id, e)
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess["status"] = "error"
sess["error_message"] = str(e)
def _http_response_error_detail(resp: Any) -> str:
"""Best-effort extraction of a short provider error detail."""
try:
payload = resp.json()
except Exception:
payload = None
if isinstance(payload, dict):
error = payload.get("error")
if isinstance(error, dict):
parts = [
str(error.get(key, "")).strip()
for key in ("message", "error_description", "code", "type")
if str(error.get(key, "")).strip()
]
if parts:
return ": ".join(parts)
if isinstance(error, str) and error.strip():
return error.strip()
for key in ("detail", "message", "error_description"):
value = payload.get(key)
if isinstance(value, str) and value.strip():
return value.strip()
text = str(getattr(resp, "text", "") or "").strip()
return text[:500]
def _codex_device_code_start_error(resp: Any) -> str:
"""Dashboard-facing OpenAI Codex device-code start failure."""
status = getattr(resp, "status_code", "unknown")
detail = _http_response_error_detail(resp)
lower = detail.lower()
if "device" in lower and ("authori" in lower or "enable" in lower):
message = (
"OpenAI rejected the device-code login request. Your OpenAI "
"account may need device-code authorization enabled before Hermes "
"can start this dashboard login. Enable device-code authorization "
"in OpenAI, then return here and click Login again."
)
else:
message = (
"OpenAI rejected the device-code login request. Please try Login "
"again from the dashboard after checking your OpenAI account settings."
)
if detail:
return f"{message} (HTTP {status}: {detail})"
return f"{message} (HTTP {status})"
def _codex_full_login_worker(session_id: str) -> None:
"""Run the complete OpenAI Codex device-code flow.
Codex doesn't use the standard OAuth device-code endpoints; it has its
own ``/api/accounts/deviceauth/usercode`` (JSON body, returns
``device_auth_id``) and ``/api/accounts/deviceauth/token`` (JSON body
polled until 200). On success the response carries an
``authorization_code`` + ``code_verifier`` that get exchanged at
CODEX_OAUTH_TOKEN_URL with grant_type=authorization_code.
The flow is replicated inline (rather than calling
_codex_device_code_login) because that helper prints/blocks/polls in a
single function — we need to surface the user_code to the dashboard the
moment we receive it, well before polling completes.
"""
try:
import httpx
from hermes_cli.auth import (
CODEX_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID,
CODEX_OAUTH_TOKEN_URL,
DEFAULT_CODEX_BASE_URL,
)
issuer = "https://auth.openai.com"
# Step 1: request device code
with httpx.Client(timeout=httpx.Timeout(15.0)) as client:
resp = client.post(
f"{issuer}/api/accounts/deviceauth/usercode",
json={"client_id": CODEX_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID},
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
)
if resp.status_code != 200:
raise RuntimeError(_codex_device_code_start_error(resp))
device_data = resp.json()
user_code = device_data.get("user_code", "")
device_auth_id = device_data.get("device_auth_id", "")
poll_interval = max(3, int(device_data.get("interval", "5")))
if not user_code or not device_auth_id:
raise RuntimeError("device-code response missing user_code or device_auth_id")
verification_url = f"{issuer}/codex/device"
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess = _oauth_sessions.get(session_id)
if not sess:
return
sess["user_code"] = user_code
sess["verification_url"] = verification_url
sess["device_auth_id"] = device_auth_id
sess["interval"] = poll_interval
sess["expires_in"] = 15 * 60 # OpenAI's effective limit
sess["expires_at"] = time.time() + sess["expires_in"]
# Step 2: poll until authorized
deadline = time.monotonic() + sess["expires_in"]
code_resp = None
with httpx.Client(timeout=httpx.Timeout(15.0)) as client:
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
time.sleep(poll_interval)
poll = client.post(
f"{issuer}/api/accounts/deviceauth/token",
json={"device_auth_id": device_auth_id, "user_code": user_code},
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
)
if poll.status_code == 200:
code_resp = poll.json()
break
if poll.status_code in {403, 404}:
continue # user hasn't authorized yet
raise RuntimeError(f"deviceauth/token poll returned {poll.status_code}")
if code_resp is None:
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess["status"] = "expired"
sess["error_message"] = "Device code expired before approval"
return
# Step 3: exchange authorization_code for tokens
authorization_code = code_resp.get("authorization_code", "")
code_verifier = code_resp.get("code_verifier", "")
if not authorization_code or not code_verifier:
raise RuntimeError("device-auth response missing authorization_code/code_verifier")
with httpx.Client(timeout=httpx.Timeout(15.0)) as client:
token_resp = client.post(
CODEX_OAUTH_TOKEN_URL,
data={
"grant_type": "authorization_code",
"code": authorization_code,
"redirect_uri": f"{issuer}/deviceauth/callback",
"client_id": CODEX_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID,
"code_verifier": code_verifier,
},
headers={"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"},
)
if token_resp.status_code != 200:
raise RuntimeError(f"token exchange returned {token_resp.status_code}")
tokens = token_resp.json()
access_token = tokens.get("access_token", "")
refresh_token = tokens.get("refresh_token", "")
if not access_token:
raise RuntimeError("token exchange did not return access_token")
from hermes_cli.auth import _save_codex_tokens
with _profile_scope(_oauth_session_profile(session_id)):
_save_codex_tokens({
"access_token": access_token,
"refresh_token": refresh_token,
})
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess["status"] = "approved"
_log.info("oauth/device: openai-codex login completed (session=%s)", session_id)
except Exception as e:
_log.warning("codex device-code worker failed (session=%s): %s", session_id, e)
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
s = _oauth_sessions.get(session_id)
if s:
s["status"] = "error"
s["error_message"] = str(e)
@app.post("/api/providers/oauth/{provider_id}/start")
async def start_oauth_login(
provider_id: str,
request: Request,
profile: Optional[str] = None,
):
"""Initiate an OAuth login flow. Token-protected."""
_require_token(request)
_gc_oauth_sessions()
_validate_oauth_profile(profile)
valid = {p["id"] for p in _OAUTH_PROVIDER_CATALOG}
if provider_id not in valid:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Unknown provider {provider_id}")
catalog_entry = next(p for p in _OAUTH_PROVIDER_CATALOG if p["id"] == provider_id)
if catalog_entry["flow"] == "external":
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"{provider_id} uses an external CLI; run `{catalog_entry['cli_command']}` manually",
)
try:
# The pkce branch is gated on provider_id == "anthropic" because
# `_start_anthropic_pkce()` is hardcoded to the Anthropic flow.
# Routing any other future pkce-flagged provider through it would
# silently launch the Anthropic OAuth flow (the bug fixed in this
# change for MiniMax). New PKCE providers must add their own
# start function and an explicit branch here.
if catalog_entry["flow"] == "pkce" and provider_id == "anthropic":
return _start_anthropic_pkce(profile=profile)
if catalog_entry["flow"] == "device_code":
return await _start_device_code_flow(provider_id, profile=profile)
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as e:
_log.exception("oauth/start %s failed", provider_id)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=str(e))
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Unsupported flow")
class OAuthSubmitBody(BaseModel):
session_id: str
code: str
@app.post("/api/providers/oauth/{provider_id}/submit")
async def submit_oauth_code(
provider_id: str,
body: OAuthSubmitBody,
request: Request,
profile: Optional[str] = None,
):
"""Submit the auth code for PKCE flows. Token-protected."""
_require_token(request)
if provider_id == "anthropic":
return await asyncio.get_running_loop().run_in_executor(
None, _submit_anthropic_pkce, body.session_id, body.code, profile,
)
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"submit not supported for {provider_id}")
@app.get("/api/providers/oauth/{provider_id}/poll/{session_id}")
async def poll_oauth_session(
provider_id: str,
session_id: str,
profile: Optional[str] = None,
):
"""Poll a session's status (no auth — read-only state).
Shared by the device-code flows (Nous, OpenAI Codex, MiniMax, xAI).
Each surfaces progress through the same background-worker-updated
``status`` field, so a single poll endpoint serves them all.
"""
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess = _oauth_sessions.get(session_id)
if not sess:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Session not found or expired")
if sess["provider"] != provider_id:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Provider mismatch for session")
return {
"session_id": session_id,
"status": sess["status"],
"error_message": sess.get("error_message"),
"expires_at": sess.get("expires_at"),
}
@app.delete("/api/providers/oauth/sessions/{session_id}")
async def cancel_oauth_session(
session_id: str,
request: Request,
profile: Optional[str] = None,
):
"""Cancel a pending OAuth session. Token-protected."""
_require_token(request)
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess = _oauth_sessions.pop(session_id, None)
if sess is None:
return {"ok": False, "message": "session not found"}
return {"ok": True, "session_id": session_id}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Session detail endpoints
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _session_latest_descendant(session_id: str, db):
"""Resolve a session id to the newest child leaf session.
/model may create child sessions. Dashboard refresh should continue the
newest child instead of reopening the old parent.
"""
def row_get(row, key, index):
if isinstance(row, dict):
return row.get(key)
try:
return row[key]
except Exception:
try:
return row[index]
except Exception:
return None
sid = db.resolve_session_id(session_id)
if not sid or not db.get_session(sid):
return None, []
conn = (
getattr(db, "conn", None)
or getattr(db, "_conn", None)
or getattr(db, "connection", None)
or getattr(db, "_connection", None)
)
rows = []
if conn is not None:
raw_rows = conn.execute(
"""
WITH RECURSIVE descendants(id, parent_session_id, started_at) AS (
SELECT id, parent_session_id, started_at FROM sessions WHERE id = ?
UNION
SELECT s.id, s.parent_session_id, s.started_at
FROM sessions s
JOIN descendants d ON s.parent_session_id = d.id
)
SELECT id, parent_session_id, started_at FROM descendants
""",
(sid,),
).fetchall()
for row in raw_rows:
rows.append({
"id": row_get(row, "id", 0),
"parent_session_id": row_get(row, "parent_session_id", 1),
"started_at": row_get(row, "started_at", 2),
})
else:
rows = db.list_sessions_rich(limit=10000, offset=0, compact_rows=True)
children = {}
for row in rows:
rid = row.get("id")
parent = row.get("parent_session_id")
if rid and parent:
children.setdefault(parent, []).append(row)
def started(row):
try:
return float(row.get("started_at") or 0)
except Exception:
return 0.0
current = sid
path = [sid]
seen = {sid}
while children.get(current):
candidates = [r for r in children[current] if r.get("id") not in seen]
if not candidates:
break
candidates.sort(key=started, reverse=True)
current = candidates[0]["id"]
path.append(current)
seen.add(current)
return current, path
# CRITICAL — every literal-path route below MUST be declared BEFORE the
# templated ``/api/sessions/{session_id}`` family that follows. FastAPI/
# Starlette match routes in registration order, and the ``{session_id}``
# pattern is unconstrained — it would otherwise swallow e.g.
# ``DELETE /api/sessions/empty``, ``POST /api/sessions/bulk-delete``, or
# ``GET /api/sessions/stats`` as "operate on the session with id
# 'empty'" / "'bulk-delete'" / "'stats'", which would 404 (or worse,
# succeed and delete the wrong row). Same story as the older
# ``/api/sessions/search`` endpoint up at line ~1191. If you split or
# reorder this block, move every route in it together.
class BulkDeleteSessions(BaseModel):
ids: List[str]
profile: Optional[str] = None
class SessionImport(BaseModel):
sessions: List[Dict[str, Any]]
profile: Optional[str] = None
# Keep the dashboard import endpoint stream-safe: FastAPI otherwise parses and
# buffers an arbitrarily large JSON body before SessionDB can enforce its own
# per-session and transaction-work limits.
_SESSION_IMPORT_MAX_BYTES = 25 * 1024 * 1024
async def _read_session_import_body(request: Request) -> bytes:
body = bytearray()
async for chunk in request.stream():
if len(body) + len(chunk) > _SESSION_IMPORT_MAX_BYTES:
raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="Session import payload is too large")
body.extend(chunk)
return bytes(body)
def _import_sessions_for_profile(profile: Optional[str], sessions: List[Dict[str, Any]]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
db = _open_session_db_for_profile(profile)
try:
return db.import_sessions(sessions)
finally:
db.close()
@app.post("/api/sessions/bulk-delete")
async def bulk_delete_sessions_endpoint(body: BulkDeleteSessions):
"""Delete every session in ``body.ids`` in a single DB transaction.
Backs the dashboard's bulk-select-and-delete flow on the sessions
page. POST (not DELETE) because most HTTP clients refuse to send a
request body on DELETE and a body is the natural shape for a list
of IDs — Starlette accepts both, but POSTing a list keeps proxies,
curl, and the browser ``fetch`` API consistent.
Per-row contract matches :meth:`SessionDB.delete_sessions`:
* Unknown IDs are silently skipped (the response ``deleted`` count
reflects what really happened, not the input length). This is
deliberate — UI selection state can race against another tab's
delete, and we'd rather succeed-on-the-rest than fail-the-whole-
batch.
* Children of every deleted parent are orphaned, not cascade-
deleted.
* Active and archived sessions ARE deleted when explicitly
selected — unlike ``DELETE /api/sessions/empty``, the user
hand-picked the rows so we trust the selection.
* Like the other session-delete endpoints, this does NOT pass a
``sessions_dir`` through; on-disk transcript / request-dump
cleanup runs at the CLI/agent layer on the next prune pass.
The response carries the actual deleted count, so the dashboard
can surface it in a toast. The IDs that were removed are not
echoed back because the client already knows what it asked to
delete (unknown IDs are silently skipped — see contract above)
and can prune its in-memory list directly from the request.
"""
# Enforce a hard cap so a runaway/typo'd selection can't lock the
# DB writer for an extended window. The dashboard pages 20 rows
# at a time; 500 covers a "select all on every page in a
# reasonable scrollback" worst case without opening the door to
# multi-thousand-row transactions.
if len(body.ids) > 500:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="ids must contain at most 500 entries",
)
def _delete() -> int:
db = _open_session_db_for_profile(body.profile)
try:
return db.delete_sessions(body.ids)
finally:
db.close()
deleted = await asyncio.to_thread(_delete)
return {"ok": True, "deleted": deleted}
@app.post("/api/sessions/import")
async def import_sessions_endpoint(request: Request):
"""Import one or more sessions exported from the dashboard or CLI.
This is intentionally separate from ``/api/ops/import``: that endpoint
restores a whole Hermes backup archive, while this endpoint is scoped to
session rows/messages and is safe to use from the Sessions page.
"""
try:
raw_body = await _read_session_import_body(request)
body = SessionImport.model_validate_json(raw_body)
except HTTPException:
raise
except ValueError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid session import payload") from exc
try:
result = await asyncio.to_thread(_import_sessions_for_profile, body.profile, body.sessions)
except ValueError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc)) from exc
if not result.get("ok", False):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=result)
return result
@app.get("/api/sessions/empty/count")
async def count_empty_sessions_endpoint(profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Return the number of empty, ended, non-archived sessions.
Drives the dashboard's "Delete empty (N)" button — when N is 0 the
UI hides the affordance so users aren't presented with a button
that does nothing. Cheap, single-COUNT query.
"""
def _count() -> int:
db = _open_session_db_for_profile(profile)
try:
return db.count_empty_sessions()
finally:
db.close()
return {"count": await asyncio.to_thread(_count)}
@app.delete("/api/sessions/empty")
async def delete_empty_sessions_endpoint(profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Delete every empty (``message_count == 0``), ended,
non-archived session in a single transaction.
Safety contract mirrors :meth:`SessionDB.delete_empty_sessions`:
* Active sessions are skipped (``ended_at IS NULL``) so a live
agent isn't yanked mid-handshake.
* Archived sessions are skipped — the user explicitly chose to
keep those rows.
* Children of deleted parents are orphaned, not cascade-deleted.
Like the single-session ``DELETE /api/sessions/{id}`` endpoint
below, this doesn't pass a ``sessions_dir`` through — the on-disk
transcript / request-dump cleanup is wired at the CLI/agent layer
but the web server historically leaves file cleanup to the next
prune-on-startup pass. Matching that pre-existing trade-off keeps
the two delete endpoints' DB-vs-disk behaviour consistent.
"""
def _delete() -> int:
db = _open_session_db_for_profile(profile)
try:
return db.delete_empty_sessions()
finally:
db.close()
deleted = await asyncio.to_thread(_delete)
return {"ok": True, "deleted": deleted}
@app.get("/api/sessions/stats")
async def get_session_stats(profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Session-store statistics for the Sessions page (mirrors `hermes sessions stats`).
Registered before ``/api/sessions/{session_id}`` so the literal ``stats``
path isn't captured as a session id by the parameterized route.
"""
db = _open_session_db_for_profile(profile)
try:
total = db.session_count(include_archived=True)
active_store = db.session_count(include_archived=False)
archived = db.session_count(archived_only=True)
messages = db.message_count()
by_source: Dict[str, int] = {}
try:
for s in db.list_sessions_rich(limit=10000, include_archived=True, compact_rows=True):
src = str(s.get("source") or "cli")
by_source[src] = by_source.get(src, 0) + 1
except Exception:
pass
return {
"total": total,
"active_store": active_store,
"archived": archived,
"messages": messages,
"by_source": by_source,
}
finally:
db.close()
def _open_session_db_for_profile(profile: Optional[str]):
"""Open a SessionDB for read paths, optionally for another profile.
``profile`` None/empty → this process's own ``state.db`` (the common,
single-profile case). A named profile opens that profile's on-disk
``state.db`` directly so the primary backend can serve cross-profile reads
(transcripts, detail) without spawning that profile's backend.
"""
from hermes_state import SessionDB
if not profile:
return SessionDB()
_name, home = _cron_profile_home(profile)
return SessionDB(db_path=Path(home) / "state.db")
@app.get("/api/sessions/{session_id}")
async def get_session_detail(session_id: str, profile: Optional[str] = None):
db = _open_session_db_for_profile(profile)
try:
sid = db.resolve_session_id(session_id)
session = db.get_session(sid) if sid else None
if not session:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Session not found")
if profile:
session["profile"] = _cron_profile_home(profile)[0]
return session
finally:
db.close()
@app.get("/api/sessions/{session_id}/latest-descendant")
async def get_session_latest_descendant(
session_id: str,
profile: Optional[str] = None,
):
def _lookup():
db = _open_session_db_for_profile(profile)
try:
return _session_latest_descendant(session_id, db)
finally:
db.close()
latest, path = await asyncio.to_thread(_lookup)
if not latest:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Session not found")
return {
"requested_session_id": path[0] if path else session_id,
"session_id": latest,
"path": path,
"changed": bool(path and latest != path[0]),
}
@app.get("/api/sessions/{session_id}/messages")
async def get_session_messages(
session_id: str,
profile: Optional[str] = None,
limit: Optional[int] = None,
offset: int = 0,
):
def _read():
db = _open_session_db_for_profile(profile)
try:
sid = db.resolve_session_id(session_id)
if not sid:
return None
sid = db.resolve_resume_session_id(sid)
# Clamp limit to prevent abuse (max 500 per page)
_limit = min(limit, 500) if limit is not None else None
return sid, _limit, db.get_messages(sid, limit=_limit, offset=offset)
finally:
db.close()
result = await asyncio.to_thread(_read)
if result is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Session not found")
sid, _limit, messages = result
return {
"session_id": sid,
"messages": messages,
"pagination": {
"limit": _limit,
"offset": offset,
"returned": len(messages),
},
}
@app.delete("/api/sessions/{session_id}")
async def delete_session_endpoint(session_id: str, profile: Optional[str] = None):
# ``profile`` deletes a session belonging to another (local) profile by
# opening its state.db directly. Remote profiles never reach here — the
# desktop routes their DELETE to the remote backend. Omit for current/default.
def _delete():
db = _open_session_db_for_profile(profile)
try:
# Resolve exact ids / unique prefixes like every other session endpoint
# (detail, messages, rename, export all do). A session that no longer
# exists is an idempotent success: DELETE's contract is "ensure it's
# gone", and the desktop optimistically removes the row then RESTORES it
# on any error — so a 404 on an already-absent row resurrected a ghost
# row and surfaced "session not found". /goal + auto-compression churn
# leaves transient empty rows (reaped by empty-session hygiene) that
# race the sidebar snapshot, which is exactly when this fired. Mirrors
# the bulk-delete endpoint, which already treats ghost ids as success.
sid = db.resolve_session_id(session_id)
if not sid:
return {"ok": True, "already_absent": True}
db.delete_session(sid)
return {"ok": True}
finally:
db.close()
return await asyncio.to_thread(_delete)
class SessionRename(BaseModel):
title: Optional[str] = None
archived: Optional[bool] = None
# Mutate a session belonging to another profile (opens its state.db). Omit
# for the current/default profile.
profile: Optional[str] = None
@app.patch("/api/sessions/{session_id}")
async def rename_session_endpoint(session_id: str, body: SessionRename):
"""Update a session: rename (or clear its title) and/or archive it.
``title`` renames (empty/null clears the title); ``archived`` soft-hides or
restores the session. Either field may be omitted. ``profile`` targets
another profile's session.
"""
db = _open_session_db_for_profile(body.profile)
try:
sid = db.resolve_session_id(session_id)
if not sid:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Session not found")
if body.title is None and body.archived is None:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="Nothing to update; provide 'title' and/or 'archived'.",
)
if body.title is not None:
try:
db.set_session_title(sid, body.title or "")
except ValueError as e:
# Title too long, invalid characters, or already in use.
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(e))
if body.archived is not None:
db.set_session_archived(sid, body.archived)
result = {"ok": True, "title": db.get_session_title(sid) or ""}
if body.archived is not None:
result["archived"] = bool(body.archived)
return result
finally:
db.close()
@app.get("/api/sessions/{session_id}/export")
async def export_session_endpoint(session_id: str, profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Export a single session (metadata + messages) as JSON."""
def _export():
db = _open_session_db_for_profile(profile)
try:
sid = db.resolve_session_id(session_id)
return db.export_session(sid) if sid else None
finally:
db.close()
data = await asyncio.to_thread(_export)
if data is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Session not found")
return data
class SessionPrune(BaseModel):
older_than_days: Optional[float] = 90
source: Optional[str] = None
profile: Optional[str] = None
# Extended filters (all optional, AND together — mirrors the CLI flags)
started_before: Optional[float] = None # epoch seconds
started_after: Optional[float] = None # epoch seconds
title_like: Optional[str] = None
end_reason: Optional[str] = None
cwd_prefix: Optional[str] = None
min_messages: Optional[int] = None
max_messages: Optional[int] = None
model_like: Optional[str] = None
provider: Optional[str] = None
user_id: Optional[str] = None
chat_id: Optional[str] = None
chat_type: Optional[str] = None
branch_like: Optional[str] = None
min_tokens: Optional[int] = None
max_tokens: Optional[int] = None
min_cost: Optional[float] = None
max_cost: Optional[float] = None
min_tool_calls: Optional[int] = None
max_tool_calls: Optional[int] = None
include_archived: bool = False
dry_run: bool = False
def _prune_sessions(body: SessionPrune):
"""Delete ended sessions matching filters (mirrors `hermes sessions prune`)."""
has_window = (
body.started_before is not None or body.started_after is not None
)
if body.older_than_days is not None and body.older_than_days < 1 and not has_window:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="older_than_days must be >= 1")
# Mirror the CLI: the implicit 90-day cutoff only applies to a truly bare
# prune. Any attribute filter (source, title, model, ...) suppresses it
# unless the caller explicitly sent older_than_days.
_attr_filters_set = any(
getattr(body, f) is not None
for f in (
"source", "title_like", "end_reason", "cwd_prefix",
"min_messages", "max_messages", "model_like", "provider",
"user_id", "chat_id", "chat_type", "branch_like",
"min_tokens", "max_tokens", "min_cost", "max_cost",
"min_tool_calls", "max_tool_calls",
)
)
_older_than_explicit = "older_than_days" in body.model_fields_set
_effective_older_than = body.older_than_days
if has_window or (_attr_filters_set and not _older_than_explicit):
_effective_older_than = None
profile_home = _cron_profile_home(body.profile)[1] if body.profile else get_hermes_home()
db = _open_session_db_for_profile(body.profile)
try:
filters = dict(
older_than_days=_effective_older_than,
source=(body.source or None),
started_before=body.started_before,
started_after=body.started_after,
title_like=(body.title_like or None),
end_reason=(body.end_reason or None),
cwd_prefix=(body.cwd_prefix or None),
min_messages=body.min_messages,
max_messages=body.max_messages,
model_like=(body.model_like or None),
provider=(body.provider or None),
user_id=(body.user_id or None),
chat_id=(body.chat_id or None),
chat_type=(body.chat_type or None),
branch_like=(body.branch_like or None),
min_tokens=body.min_tokens,
max_tokens=body.max_tokens,
min_cost=body.min_cost,
max_cost=body.max_cost,
min_tool_calls=body.min_tool_calls,
max_tool_calls=body.max_tool_calls,
archived=None if body.include_archived else False,
)
if body.dry_run:
rows = db.list_prune_candidates(**filters)
return {
"ok": True,
"removed": 0,
"matched": len(rows),
# Rows are ordered oldest-first.
"oldest_started_at": rows[0]["started_at"] if rows else None,
"newest_started_at": rows[-1]["started_at"] if rows else None,
"sessions": [
{
"id": r["id"],
"source": r["source"],
"title": r.get("title"),
"model": r.get("model"),
"started_at": r["started_at"],
"message_count": r["message_count"],
}
for r in rows
],
}
sessions_dir = profile_home / "sessions"
removed = db.prune_sessions(
sessions_dir=sessions_dir if sessions_dir.exists() else None,
**filters,
)
return {"ok": True, "removed": removed}
finally:
db.close()
@app.post("/api/sessions/prune")
async def prune_sessions_endpoint(body: SessionPrune):
"""Delete ended sessions matching filters without blocking the event loop."""
return await asyncio.to_thread(_prune_sessions, body)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Log viewer endpoint
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@app.get("/api/logs")
async def get_logs(
file: str = "agent",
lines: int = 100,
level: Optional[str] = None,
component: Optional[str] = None,
search: Optional[str] = None,
):
from hermes_cli.logs import _read_tail, LOG_FILES
log_name = LOG_FILES.get(file)
if not log_name:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Unknown log file: {file}")
log_path = get_hermes_home() / "logs" / log_name
if not log_path.exists():
return {"file": file, "lines": []}
try:
from hermes_logging import COMPONENT_PREFIXES
except ImportError:
COMPONENT_PREFIXES = {}
# Normalize "ALL" / "all" / empty → no filter. _matches_filters treats an
# empty tuple as "must match a prefix" (startswith(()) is always False),
# so passing () instead of None silently drops every line.
min_level = level if level and level.upper() != "ALL" else None
if component and component.lower() != "all":
comp_prefixes = COMPONENT_PREFIXES.get(component)
if comp_prefixes is None:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"Unknown component: {component}. "
f"Available: {', '.join(sorted(COMPONENT_PREFIXES))}",
)
else:
comp_prefixes = None
has_filters = bool(min_level or comp_prefixes or search)
result = _read_tail(
log_path, min(lines, 500) if not search else 2000,
has_filters=has_filters,
min_level=min_level,
component_prefixes=comp_prefixes,
)
# Post-filter by search term (case-insensitive substring match).
# _read_tail doesn't support free-text search, so we filter here and
# trim to the requested line count afterward.
if search:
needle = search.lower()
result = [l for l in result if needle in l.lower()][-min(lines, 500):]
return {"file": file, "lines": result}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Cron job management endpoints
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class CronJobCreate(BaseModel):
prompt: str = ""
schedule: str
name: str = ""
deliver: str = "local"
skills: Optional[List[str]] = None
model: Optional[str] = None
provider: Optional[str] = None
base_url: Optional[str] = None
script: Optional[str] = None
context_from: Optional[Any] = None
enabled_toolsets: Optional[List[str]] = None
workdir: Optional[str] = None
no_agent: bool = False
class CronJobUpdate(BaseModel):
updates: dict
def _cron_optional_text(value: Any, *, strip_trailing_slash: bool = False) -> Optional[str]:
if value is None:
return None
text = str(value).strip()
if strip_trailing_slash:
text = text.rstrip("/")
return text or None
def _cron_string_list(value: Any) -> Optional[List[str]]:
if value is None:
return None
if isinstance(value, str):
raw_items = re.split(r"[\n,]", value)
elif isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
raw_items = value
else:
return None
items = [str(item).strip() for item in raw_items if str(item).strip()]
return items or None
def _normalize_dashboard_cron_script(value: Any, profile_home: Path) -> Optional[str]:
"""Validate a dashboard-selected cron script against the profile sandbox."""
text = _cron_optional_text(value)
if not text:
return None
scripts_root = (profile_home / "scripts").resolve()
raw_path = Path(text).expanduser()
candidate = raw_path.resolve() if raw_path.is_absolute() else (scripts_root / raw_path).resolve()
try:
relative = candidate.relative_to(scripts_root)
except ValueError as exc:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"script must be inside {scripts_root}",
) from exc
if not candidate.exists():
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"script does not exist: {candidate}")
if not candidate.is_file():
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"script is not a file: {candidate}")
return str(relative)
def _validate_dashboard_cron_effective_job(job: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
prompt = _cron_optional_text(job.get("prompt"))
script = _cron_optional_text(job.get("script"))
skills = _cron_string_list(job.get("skills")) or _cron_string_list(job.get("skill"))
no_agent = bool(job.get("no_agent"))
if no_agent:
if not script:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="no_agent=True requires a script",
)
return
if not (prompt or skills or script):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="agent cron jobs require a prompt, skill, or script",
)
def _normalize_dashboard_cron_updates(
updates: Dict[str, Any],
profile_home: Path,
) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Normalize dashboard JSON into cron.jobs.update_job's storage shape.
This intentionally stays in the dashboard adapter layer: cron/jobs.py is the
source of truth for scheduling behaviour; the dashboard only translates form
payloads into the shapes that existing core functions already accept.
"""
normalized = dict(updates or {})
for key in ("model", "provider", "workdir"):
if key in normalized:
normalized[key] = _cron_optional_text(normalized[key])
if "script" in normalized:
normalized["script"] = _normalize_dashboard_cron_script(
normalized["script"],
profile_home,
)
if "base_url" in normalized:
normalized["base_url"] = _cron_optional_text(
normalized["base_url"], strip_trailing_slash=True
)
if "deliver" in normalized:
normalized["deliver"] = _cron_optional_text(normalized["deliver"]) or "local"
if "context_from" in normalized:
normalized["context_from"] = _cron_string_list(normalized["context_from"])
if "enabled_toolsets" in normalized:
normalized["enabled_toolsets"] = _cron_string_list(normalized["enabled_toolsets"])
return normalized
def _validate_dashboard_cron_context_from(
refs: Optional[List[str]],
profile_name: str,
) -> None:
if not refs:
return
for ref in refs:
if not _call_cron_for_profile(profile_name, "get_job", ref):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=(
f"context_from job '{ref}' not found in profile "
f"'{profile_name}'"
),
)
def _cron_profile_dicts() -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Return dashboard profile records, falling back to a directory scan."""
from hermes_cli import profiles as profiles_mod
try:
return [_profile_to_dict(p) for p in profiles_mod.list_profiles()]
except Exception:
_log.exception("Failed to list profiles for cron dashboard; falling back to directory scan")
return _fallback_profile_dicts(profiles_mod)
def _cron_default_profile() -> str:
"""Profile to target when a cron request carries no explicit ``profile``.
A desktop pool backend runs one process per profile (HERMES_HOME already
scoped), but these cron endpoints deliberately route storage through the
profiles tree via ``_cron_profile_home`` — so a hardcoded ``"default"``
fallback would write a non-default profile's job into ``~/.hermes``.
Resolve the process's own profile instead. ``custom`` (an unrecognized
HERMES_HOME outside the profiles tree) has no profile-dir equivalent, so
it keeps the legacy ``default`` fallback.
"""
try:
from hermes_cli.profiles import get_active_profile_name
name = get_active_profile_name()
except Exception:
return "default"
return "default" if name in ("default", "custom") else name
def _cron_profile_home(profile: Optional[str]) -> Tuple[str, Path]:
"""Resolve a profile query value to (profile_name, HERMES_HOME)."""
from hermes_cli import profiles as profiles_mod
raw = (profile or _cron_default_profile()).strip() or "default"
try:
canon = profiles_mod.normalize_profile_name(raw)
profiles_mod.validate_profile_name(canon)
except ValueError as e:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(e))
if not profiles_mod.profile_exists(canon):
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Profile '{canon}' does not exist.")
return canon, profiles_mod.get_profile_dir(canon)
def _annotate_cron_job(job: Dict[str, Any], profile: str, home: Path) -> Dict[str, Any]:
annotated = dict(job)
annotated["profile"] = profile
annotated["profile_name"] = profile
annotated["hermes_home"] = str(home)
annotated["is_default_profile"] = profile == "default"
return annotated
def _call_cron_for_profile(target_profile: Optional[str], func_name: str, *args, **kwargs):
"""Run cron.jobs helpers against the selected profile's cron directory.
The dashboard is a single process that can inspect many profiles. Route
storage through cron.jobs' execution-context override so dashboard calls
cannot retarget a concurrent desktop ticker's load/save transaction.
"""
profile_name, home = _cron_profile_home(target_profile)
from cron import jobs as cron_jobs
from hermes_constants import (
reset_hermes_home_override,
set_hermes_home_override,
)
token = set_hermes_home_override(str(home))
try:
with cron_jobs.use_cron_store(home):
result = getattr(cron_jobs, func_name)(*args, **kwargs)
finally:
reset_hermes_home_override(token)
if isinstance(result, list):
return [_annotate_cron_job(j, profile_name, home) for j in result]
if isinstance(result, dict):
return _annotate_cron_job(result, profile_name, home)
return result
def _find_cron_job_profile(job_id: str) -> Optional[str]:
for profile in _cron_profile_dicts():
name = str(profile.get("name") or "")
if not name:
continue
jobs = _call_cron_for_profile(name, "list_jobs", True)
if any(j.get("id") == job_id or j.get("name") == job_id for j in jobs):
return name
return None
def _list_cron_jobs_sync(profile: str = "all"):
requested = (profile or "all").strip()
if requested.lower() != "all":
return _call_cron_for_profile(requested, "list_jobs", True)
jobs: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for item in _cron_profile_dicts():
name = str(item.get("name") or "")
if not name:
continue
try:
jobs.extend(_call_cron_for_profile(name, "list_jobs", True))
except Exception:
_log.exception("Failed to list cron jobs for profile %s", name)
return jobs
async def _run_cron_dashboard_io(func, *args, **kwargs):
"""Run cron dashboard profile/job I/O outside the FastAPI event loop."""
if inspect.iscoroutinefunction(func):
raise TypeError("_run_cron_dashboard_io only accepts sync callables")
result = await run_in_threadpool(func, *args, **kwargs)
if inspect.isawaitable(result):
raise TypeError("_run_cron_dashboard_io sync callable returned an awaitable")
return result
@app.get("/api/cron/jobs")
async def list_cron_jobs(profile: str = "all"):
return await _run_cron_dashboard_io(_list_cron_jobs_sync, profile)
def _get_cron_job_sync(job_id: str, profile: Optional[str] = None):
selected = profile or _find_cron_job_profile(job_id)
if not selected:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Job not found")
job = _call_cron_for_profile(selected, "get_job", job_id)
if not job:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Job not found")
return job
@app.get("/api/cron/jobs/{job_id}")
async def get_cron_job(job_id: str, profile: Optional[str] = None):
return await _run_cron_dashboard_io(_get_cron_job_sync, job_id, profile)
def _list_cron_job_runs_sync(job_id: str, profile: Optional[str] = None, limit: int = 20):
"""Run sessions produced by a cron job, newest first.
Cron runs are stored as ordinary sessions whose id is
``cron_{job_id}_{timestamp}`` (see cron/scheduler.run_job). A job's history
is therefore every session whose id carries that prefix; ``source='cron'``
narrows it and the id prefix binds it to this job. Powers the run-history
list under each job in the desktop cron detail. Same row shape as
``/api/sessions`` so the frontend can reuse SessionInfo.
Backed by ``SessionDB.list_cron_job_runs`` — a bounded ``[prefix, hi)``
id-range scan, not the compression-chain CTE used for the recents list,
so the cost scales with the requested window and not the (unbounded) total
cron history.
"""
selected = profile or _find_cron_job_profile(job_id)
# job_id may be a human name; resolve to the canonical id used in run-session ids.
canonical = job_id
if selected:
job = _call_cron_for_profile(selected, "get_job", job_id)
if job and job.get("id"):
canonical = str(job["id"])
try:
limit_n = max(1, min(int(limit), 100))
except (TypeError, ValueError):
limit_n = 20
db = _open_session_db_for_profile(selected)
try:
runs = db.list_cron_job_runs(canonical, limit=limit_n, offset=0)
now = time.time()
for s in runs:
s["is_active"] = (
s.get("ended_at") is None
and (now - s.get("last_active", s.get("started_at", 0))) < 300
)
s["archived"] = bool(s.get("archived"))
if selected:
s["profile"] = selected
return {"runs": runs, "limit": limit_n}
finally:
db.close()
@app.get("/api/cron/jobs/{job_id}/runs")
async def list_cron_job_runs(job_id: str, profile: Optional[str] = None, limit: int = 20):
return await _run_cron_dashboard_io(_list_cron_job_runs_sync, job_id, profile, limit)
def _create_cron_job_sync(body: CronJobCreate, profile: Optional[str] = None):
try:
profile_name, profile_home = _cron_profile_home(profile)
script = _normalize_dashboard_cron_script(body.script, profile_home)
skills = _cron_string_list(body.skills)
context_from = _cron_string_list(body.context_from)
_validate_dashboard_cron_context_from(context_from, profile_name)
no_agent = bool(body.no_agent)
_validate_dashboard_cron_effective_job({
"prompt": body.prompt,
"skills": skills,
"script": script,
"no_agent": no_agent,
})
return _call_cron_for_profile(
profile_name,
"create_job",
prompt=body.prompt or "",
schedule=body.schedule,
name=body.name,
deliver=_cron_optional_text(body.deliver) or "local",
skills=skills,
model=_cron_optional_text(body.model),
provider=_cron_optional_text(body.provider),
base_url=_cron_optional_text(body.base_url, strip_trailing_slash=True),
script=script,
context_from=context_from,
enabled_toolsets=_cron_string_list(body.enabled_toolsets),
workdir=_cron_optional_text(body.workdir),
no_agent=no_agent,
)
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as e:
_log.exception("POST /api/cron/jobs failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(e))
@app.post("/api/cron/jobs")
async def create_cron_job(body: CronJobCreate, profile: Optional[str] = None):
return await _run_cron_dashboard_io(_create_cron_job_sync, body, profile)
@app.get("/api/cron/delivery-targets")
async def get_cron_delivery_targets():
"""Delivery targets the cron dropdown should offer.
Always includes the implicit ``local`` option. Beyond that, the list is
derived dynamically from the configured gateway platforms via
``cron.scheduler.cron_delivery_targets()`` — no hardcoded platform list. A
configured platform that hasn't set its cron home channel is still returned
with ``home_target_set: false`` so the UI can surface it as "configure a
home channel first" rather than hiding it.
"""
targets = [
{
"id": "local",
"name": "Local (save only)",
"home_target_set": True,
"home_env_var": None,
}
]
try:
from cron.scheduler import cron_delivery_targets
targets.extend(cron_delivery_targets())
except Exception:
_log.exception("GET /api/cron/delivery-targets failed")
return {"targets": targets}
def _update_cron_job_sync(job_id: str, body: CronJobUpdate, profile: Optional[str] = None):
selected = profile or _find_cron_job_profile(job_id)
if not selected:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Job not found")
try:
profile_name, profile_home = _cron_profile_home(selected)
existing = _call_cron_for_profile(profile_name, "get_job", job_id)
if not existing:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Job not found")
updates = _normalize_dashboard_cron_updates(
body.updates,
profile_home,
)
if "context_from" in updates:
_validate_dashboard_cron_context_from(
updates.get("context_from"),
profile_name,
)
execution_fields = {"prompt", "skill", "skills", "script", "no_agent"}
if execution_fields.intersection(updates):
effective = {**existing, **updates}
if "skills" in updates and "skill" not in updates:
effective["skill"] = None
_validate_dashboard_cron_effective_job(effective)
job = _call_cron_for_profile(profile_name, "update_job", job_id, updates)
except HTTPException:
raise
except ValueError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc)) from exc
if not job:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Job not found")
return job
@app.put("/api/cron/jobs/{job_id}")
async def update_cron_job(job_id: str, body: CronJobUpdate, profile: Optional[str] = None):
return await _run_cron_dashboard_io(_update_cron_job_sync, job_id, body, profile)
def _pause_cron_job_sync(job_id: str, profile: Optional[str] = None):
selected = profile or _find_cron_job_profile(job_id)
if not selected:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Job not found")
job = _call_cron_for_profile(selected, "pause_job", job_id)
if not job:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Job not found")
return job
@app.post("/api/cron/jobs/{job_id}/pause")
async def pause_cron_job(job_id: str, profile: Optional[str] = None):
return await _run_cron_dashboard_io(_pause_cron_job_sync, job_id, profile)
def _resume_cron_job_sync(job_id: str, profile: Optional[str] = None):
selected = profile or _find_cron_job_profile(job_id)
if not selected:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Job not found")
job = _call_cron_for_profile(selected, "resume_job", job_id)
if not job:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Job not found")
return job
@app.post("/api/cron/jobs/{job_id}/resume")
async def resume_cron_job(job_id: str, profile: Optional[str] = None):
return await _run_cron_dashboard_io(_resume_cron_job_sync, job_id, profile)
def _trigger_cron_job_sync(job_id: str, profile: Optional[str] = None):
selected = profile or _find_cron_job_profile(job_id)
if not selected:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Job not found")
job = _call_cron_for_profile(selected, "trigger_job", job_id)
if not job:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Job not found")
return job
@app.post("/api/cron/jobs/{job_id}/trigger")
async def trigger_cron_job(job_id: str, profile: Optional[str] = None):
return await _run_cron_dashboard_io(_trigger_cron_job_sync, job_id, profile)
def _delete_cron_job_sync(job_id: str, profile: Optional[str] = None):
selected = profile or _find_cron_job_profile(job_id)
if not selected:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Job not found")
try:
removed = _call_cron_for_profile(selected, "remove_job", job_id)
except ValueError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc)) from exc
if not removed:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Job not found")
return {"ok": True}
@app.delete("/api/cron/jobs/{job_id}")
async def delete_cron_job(job_id: str, profile: Optional[str] = None):
return await _run_cron_dashboard_io(_delete_cron_job_sync, job_id, profile)
def _fire_cron_job_for_profile(profile: str, job_id: str) -> bool:
"""Run ONE due cron job end-to-end for ``profile`` via the resolved
scheduler provider's ``fire_due`` (store CAS claim + ``run_one_job``).
Scope both cron storage and the runtime Hermes home so the job's store,
config, credentials, scripts, skills, and output all belong to the selected
profile. Runs with no live adapters; delivery falls back to the per-platform
send path.
"""
_profile_name, home = _cron_profile_home(profile)
from cron import jobs as cron_jobs
from cron.scheduler_provider import resolve_cron_scheduler
from hermes_constants import (
reset_hermes_home_override,
set_hermes_home_override,
)
token = set_hermes_home_override(str(home))
try:
with cron_jobs.use_cron_store(home):
provider = resolve_cron_scheduler()
return bool(provider.fire_due(job_id, adapters=None, loop=None))
finally:
reset_hermes_home_override(token)
@app.post("/api/cron/fire")
async def cron_fire_webhook(request: Request):
"""Chronos managed-cron fire webhook (NAS -> agent).
Authenticated by a short-lived NAS-minted JWT (verified by the pluggable
Chronos fire-verifier), NOT the dashboard session cookie — so this path is
in ``PUBLIC_API_PATHS`` to bypass the dashboard auth gate, and the JWT is
the real gate. This is the inbound half of scale-to-zero managed cron: NAS
POSTs here at fire time, the agent verifies, claims the job (store CAS, so
at-most-once across replicas / on a NAS retry), runs it, and re-arms the
next one-shot.
Lives on the dashboard app (not the api_server adapter) because the
dashboard is the agent's always-reachable public HTTP surface on hosted
deployments; the gateway may be idle/scaled down.
Returns 202 immediately and runs the job in the background so a long agent
turn never trips NAS's HTTP timeout.
"""
from plugins.cron_providers.chronos.verify import get_fire_verifier
auth = request.headers.get("Authorization", "")
token = auth[7:].strip() if auth.startswith("Bearer ") else ""
cfg = load_config()
claims = get_fire_verifier()(
token=token,
expected_audience=cfg_get(cfg, "cron", "chronos", "expected_audience", default=""),
jwks_or_key=cfg_get(cfg, "cron", "chronos", "nas_jwks_url", default="") or None,
issuer=cfg_get(cfg, "cron", "chronos", "portal_url", default="") or None,
)
if claims is None:
return JSONResponse({"error": "invalid fire token"}, status_code=401)
try:
body = await request.json()
except Exception:
body = {}
job_id = (body or {}).get("job_id") if isinstance(body, dict) else None
if not job_id:
return JSONResponse({"error": "missing job_id"}, status_code=400)
# _find_cron_job_profile walks every profile and lists its jobs (file
# I/O per profile) — run it off the event loop like the other cron
# dashboard endpoints.
profile = await _run_cron_dashboard_io(_find_cron_job_profile, job_id)
if not profile:
# Job is gone (cancelled / completed) — nothing to fire. 200 so NAS
# does not retry a fire that is intentionally absent.
return JSONResponse({"status": "gone", "job_id": job_id}, status_code=200)
# Run in the background; the store CAS claim inside fire_due de-dupes a
# NAS/scheduler retry that arrives while this is in flight.
asyncio.create_task(
asyncio.to_thread(_fire_cron_job_for_profile, profile, job_id)
)
return JSONResponse({"status": "accepted", "job_id": job_id}, status_code=202)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Automation Blueprints — parameterized automation blueprints. The dashboard renders the
# slot schema as a form; submitting instantiates a real cron job via the same
# create_job path. See cron/blueprint_catalog.py for the single source of truth.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class AutomationBlueprintInstantiate(BaseModel):
blueprint: str # blueprint key, e.g. "morning-brief"
values: Dict[str, Any] = {} # filled slot values from the form
@app.get("/api/cron/blueprints")
async def list_cron_blueprints():
"""Return the blueprint catalog as form schemas for the dashboard gallery.
The ``deliver`` slot's options are rewritten from the user's actually
configured gateway platforms (plus the universal origin/local/all), so the
form never offers a platform that isn't connected.
"""
try:
from cron.blueprint_catalog import CATALOG, blueprint_catalog_entry
deliver_options = None
try:
from cron.scheduler import cron_delivery_targets
platforms = [t["id"] for t in cron_delivery_targets() if t.get("id")]
deliver_options = ["origin", "local", *platforms]
except Exception:
_log.debug("cron_delivery_targets unavailable; using static deliver options", exc_info=True)
entries = []
for r in CATALOG:
entry = blueprint_catalog_entry(r)
if deliver_options:
for f in entry.get("fields", []):
if f.get("name") == "deliver":
f["options"] = deliver_options
entries.append(entry)
return {"blueprints": entries}
except Exception as e:
_log.exception("GET /api/cron/blueprints failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=str(e))
@app.post("/api/cron/blueprints/instantiate")
async def instantiate_blueprint(body: AutomationBlueprintInstantiate, profile: str = "default"):
"""Fill a blueprint's slots and create the cron job (form-submit path)."""
try:
from cron.blueprint_catalog import fill_blueprint, get_blueprint, BlueprintFillError
blueprint = get_blueprint(body.blueprint)
if blueprint is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Unknown blueprint: {body.blueprint}")
try:
spec = fill_blueprint(blueprint, body.values)
except BlueprintFillError as exc:
# Field-level validation error — 422 so the form can show it inline.
raise HTTPException(status_code=422, detail=str(exc)) from exc
# Blueprint-created jobs deliver to the dashboard's configured target by
# default; the form's deliver slot overrides via spec["deliver"].
spec.pop("origin", None)
# create_job does per-profile file I/O — keep it off the event loop
# like the sibling cron endpoints (partial avoids **spec keys ever
# colliding with the wrapper's own parameters).
_create = functools.partial(_call_cron_for_profile, profile, "create_job", **spec)
return await _run_cron_dashboard_io(_create)
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as e:
_log.exception("POST /api/cron/blueprints/instantiate failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(e))
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# MCP server endpoints — list / add / remove / test.
#
# Wraps the same config data layer the CLI uses (hermes_cli.mcp_config), so
# servers managed here show up under `hermes mcp list` and vice versa. Secrets
# in stdio `env` blocks are redacted on read; the agent picks them up from
# config.yaml at session start exactly as with CLI-added servers.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class MCPServerCreate(BaseModel):
name: str
url: Optional[str] = None
command: Optional[str] = None
args: List[str] = []
# env: KEY=VALUE map for stdio servers (API keys, etc.)
env: Dict[str, str] = {}
# auth: "none" | "oauth" | "header" | None
auth: Optional[str] = None
# One-time provisioning input; persisted only to the profile's .env.
bearer_token: Optional[SecretStr] = None
profile: Optional[str] = None
class MCPServersReplace(BaseModel):
# Whole-map replace (name → raw server config) for the GUI mcp.json editor.
servers: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
profile: Optional[str] = None
def _normalize_mcp_server_create(
body: MCPServerCreate,
) -> tuple[str, Dict[str, Any], Optional[str]]:
"""Validate a Dashboard MCP create request and build its safe config.
The returned config never contains the submitted Bearer token. Callers
persist the token with the shared Bearer helper only after they enter the
intended profile scope. Keeping this conversion shared makes the
standalone MCP page and the Profile Builder enforce the same
transport/auth contract.
"""
from hermes_cli.mcp_config import (
_bearer_auth_headers,
_strip_bearer_prefix,
)
from hermes_cli.mcp_security import validate_mcp_server_entry
name = (body.name or "").strip()
if not name:
raise ValueError("Server name is required")
url = (body.url or "").strip()
command = (body.command or "").strip()
auth = (body.auth or "none").strip().lower()
bearer_token = (
body.bearer_token.get_secret_value()
if body.bearer_token is not None
else None
)
if bool(url) == bool(command):
raise ValueError("Provide exactly one of URL (HTTP/SSE) or command (stdio)")
if auth not in {"none", "header", "oauth"}:
raise ValueError(f"Unsupported auth mode: {auth}")
server_config: Dict[str, Any] = {}
if url:
if body.args:
raise ValueError("Arguments are only supported for stdio MCP servers")
if body.env:
raise ValueError(
"Environment variables are only supported for stdio MCP servers"
)
if auth == "header":
normalized = _strip_bearer_prefix(bearer_token) if bearer_token else ""
if not normalized or normalized.lower() == "bearer":
raise ValueError("Bearer token is required")
server_config["headers"] = _bearer_auth_headers(name)
elif body.bearer_token is not None:
raise ValueError("Bearer token requires header authentication")
server_config["url"] = url
if auth == "oauth":
server_config["auth"] = "oauth"
else:
if auth != "none" or body.bearer_token is not None:
raise ValueError(
"HTTP authentication is not supported for stdio MCP servers"
)
server_config["command"] = command
if body.args:
server_config["args"] = list(body.args)
if body.env:
server_config["env"] = dict(body.env)
issues = validate_mcp_server_entry(name, server_config)
if issues:
raise ValueError(f"Server '{name}' rejected: {'; '.join(issues)}")
return name, server_config, bearer_token
def _redact_mcp_env(env: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, str]:
"""Mask secret-shaped MCP env values for read responses."""
out: Dict[str, str] = {}
for k, v in (env or {}).items():
try:
out[str(k)] = redact_key(str(v)) if v else ""
except Exception:
out[str(k)] = "***"
return out
def _mcp_server_summary(name: str, cfg: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
transport = "http" if cfg.get("url") else ("stdio" if cfg.get("command") else "unknown")
auth = cfg.get("auth")
headers = cfg.get("headers") or {}
if not auth and isinstance(headers, dict) and any(
str(key).lower() == "authorization" for key in headers
):
auth = "header"
return {
"name": name,
"transport": transport,
"url": cfg.get("url"),
"command": cfg.get("command"),
"args": list(cfg.get("args") or []),
"env": _redact_mcp_env(cfg.get("env") or {}),
"auth": auth,
"enabled": cfg.get("enabled", True) is not False,
# Tool selection: list of enabled tool names, or None = all.
"tools": cfg.get("tools"),
}
@app.get("/api/mcp/servers")
async def list_mcp_servers(profile: Optional[str] = None):
from hermes_cli.mcp_config import _get_mcp_servers
with _profile_scope(profile):
servers = _get_mcp_servers()
return {
"servers": [
_mcp_server_summary(name, cfg) for name, cfg in sorted(servers.items())
]
}
@app.post("/api/mcp/servers")
async def add_mcp_server(body: MCPServerCreate, profile: Optional[str] = None):
from hermes_cli.mcp_config import (
_get_mcp_servers,
_save_bearer_auth_token,
_save_mcp_server,
)
try:
name, server_config, bearer_token = _normalize_mcp_server_create(body)
except ValueError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc)) from exc
with _profile_scope(body.profile or profile):
existing = _get_mcp_servers()
if name in existing:
raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail=f"Server '{name}' already exists")
try:
with _profile_scope(body.profile or profile):
if bearer_token is not None:
server_config["headers"] = _save_bearer_auth_token(name, bearer_token)
if not _save_mcp_server(name, server_config):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"Server '{name}' rejected: suspicious command/args configuration",
)
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("POST /api/mcp/servers failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc)) from exc
return _mcp_server_summary(name, server_config)
@app.put("/api/mcp/servers")
async def replace_mcp_servers(body: MCPServersReplace, profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Replace the entire ``mcp_servers`` map (the GUI mcp.json editor's save).
The generic ``/api/config`` endpoint deep-merges maps, so it can never
delete a server key, drop an ``enabled: false`` flag, or remove a nested
field — edits looked saved but the stale entry survived on disk. This
endpoint sets the whole map so removals actually persist. Storage stays
the config.yaml ``mcp_servers`` key the CLI/TUI already read.
"""
from hermes_cli.mcp_config import _replace_mcp_servers
with _profile_scope(body.profile or profile):
ok, issues = _replace_mcp_servers(body.servers)
if not ok:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="; ".join(issues))
return {"ok": True}
@app.delete("/api/mcp/servers/{name}")
async def remove_mcp_server(name: str, profile: Optional[str] = None):
from hermes_cli.mcp_config import _remove_mcp_server
with _profile_scope(profile):
removed = _remove_mcp_server(name)
if not removed:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Server '{name}' not found")
return {"ok": True}
@app.post("/api/mcp/servers/{name}/test")
async def test_mcp_server(name: str, profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Connect to the server, list its tools, disconnect. Returns tool list."""
from hermes_cli.mcp_config import (
_get_mcp_servers,
_oauth_tokens_present,
_probe_single_server,
)
with _profile_scope(profile):
servers = _get_mcp_servers()
if name not in servers:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Server '{name}' not found")
details: Dict[str, Any] = {}
# An `auth: oauth` server that serves tools/list anonymously would probe OK
# with no token — a false green. Require a token on disk for it, matching the
# /auth verification (some providers don't enforce auth on tools/list).
needs_oauth_token = servers[name].get("auth") == "oauth"
def _probe_scoped():
# Home-only scope (contextvar), NOT _profile_scope. A probe blocks for
# as long as the server takes to spawn/connect — a stdio `npx` cold
# start is many seconds — and _profile_scope holds a process-global
# skills lock for its ENTIRE body. Holding that across the probe
# serialized every other endpoint (config/skills/toolsets all take the
# same lock), so a slow server made unrelated requests time out at 15s.
# The probe touches no skills globals; it only needs the HERMES_HOME
# override for .env interpolation + OAuth token resolution, which the
# contextvar provides (copied into this to_thread worker; and
# _run_on_mcp_loop re-wraps it onto the MCP event-loop thread).
with _config_profile_scope(profile):
tools = _probe_single_server(name, servers[name], details=details)
token_present = _oauth_tokens_present(name) if needs_oauth_token else True
return tools, token_present
try:
# Probe blocks on a dedicated MCP event loop — run in a thread so the
# FastAPI event loop is never blocked.
tools, token_present = await asyncio.to_thread(_probe_scoped)
except Exception as exc:
return {
"ok": False,
"error": str(exc),
"tools": [],
}
if not token_present:
return {
"ok": False,
"error": "OAuth authentication required — no token found.",
"tools": [],
}
return {
"ok": True,
"tools": [{"name": t, "description": d} for t, d in tools],
"prompts": details.get("prompts", 0),
"resources": details.get("resources", 0),
}
_MCP_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_TTL = 15 * 60
_MAX_PENDING_MCP_OAUTH_FLOWS = 8
_mcp_oauth_flows: dict[str, "DashboardOAuthFlow"] = {}
_mcp_oauth_flows_lock = threading.Lock()
_mcp_oauth_transactions: dict[tuple[str, str], threading.Lock] = {}
_mcp_oauth_transactions_lock = threading.Lock()
def _gc_mcp_oauth_flows() -> None:
cutoff = time.time() - _MCP_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_TTL
with _mcp_oauth_flows_lock:
stale = [
flow_id
for flow_id, flow in _mcp_oauth_flows.items()
if getattr(flow, "created_at", 0) < cutoff
]
for flow_id in stale:
_mcp_oauth_flows.pop(flow_id, None)
def _mcp_oauth_callback_url_from_base(base_url: str, server_name: str) -> str:
from urllib.parse import quote
return f"{base_url.rstrip('/')}/api/mcp/oauth/callback/{quote(server_name, safe='')}"
def _mcp_oauth_callback_url(request: Request, server_name: str) -> str:
"""Build the externally reachable callback URL for a dashboard flow."""
from urllib.parse import urlparse, urlunparse
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.prefix import prefix_from_request, resolve_public_url
from urllib.parse import quote
suffix = f"/api/mcp/oauth/callback/{quote(server_name, safe='')}"
public_url = resolve_public_url()
if public_url:
return f"{public_url}{suffix}"
base = urlparse(str(request.base_url))
prefix = prefix_from_request(request)
return urlunparse(base._replace(path=f"{prefix}{suffix}", params="", query="", fragment=""))
def _mcp_oauth_transaction(flow) -> threading.Lock:
key = (flow.hermes_home, flow.server_name)
with _mcp_oauth_transactions_lock:
return _mcp_oauth_transactions.setdefault(key, threading.Lock())
def _run_dashboard_mcp_oauth(flow, cfg: dict) -> None:
"""Run the normal MCP probe with dashboard redirect/callback handlers."""
from hermes_cli.mcp_config import (
_oauth_tokens_present,
_probe_single_server,
_save_mcp_server,
)
try:
from agent.secret_scope import (
build_profile_secret_scope,
reset_secret_scope,
set_secret_scope,
)
from hermes_constants import reset_hermes_home_override, set_hermes_home_override
from tools.mcp_dashboard_oauth import dashboard_oauth_flow
from tools.mcp_oauth import HermesTokenStorage, force_interactive_oauth
from tools.mcp_oauth_manager import get_manager
home_token = set_hermes_home_override(flow.hermes_home)
secret_token = set_secret_scope(build_profile_secret_scope(Path(flow.hermes_home)))
try:
transaction = _mcp_oauth_transaction(flow)
with transaction, force_interactive_oauth(), dashboard_oauth_flow(flow):
manager = get_manager()
storage = HermesTokenStorage(flow.server_name)
backup = storage.snapshot()
previous_entry = None
try:
previous_entry = manager.remove(
flow.server_name,
hermes_home=flow.hermes_home,
)
tools = _probe_single_server(
flow.server_name,
cfg,
connect_timeout=max(float(cfg.get("connect_timeout", 0) or 0), 315),
)
if not _oauth_tokens_present(flow.server_name):
raise RuntimeError(
"The server responded, but no OAuth token was obtained — "
"this provider may require a manually-registered OAuth client."
)
_save_mcp_server(flow.server_name, cfg)
flow.tools = [{"name": t, "description": d} for t, d in tools]
flow.mark_approved()
if flow.reconnect_live:
from tools.mcp_tool import reconnect_mcp_server
reconnect_mcp_server(flow.server_name)
except Exception:
storage.restore(backup, only_if_absent=True)
manager.restore_entry(
flow.server_name,
previous_entry,
hermes_home=flow.hermes_home,
)
raise
finally:
reset_secret_scope(secret_token)
reset_hermes_home_override(home_token)
except Exception as exc:
msg = str(exc)
# Providers that gate RFC 7591 registration to pre-approved clients
# (Figma's MCP catalog, etc.) 403 the register call before any
# authorization URL exists — surface what's actually happening
# instead of a bare "403 Forbidden".
lowered = msg.lower()
if "403" in msg and ("regist" in lowered or "forbidden" in lowered):
msg = (
f"'{flow.server_name}' only allows pre-approved OAuth clients — it rejected "
"client registration (403), so no browser flow can start. "
"Options: add a pre-registered client to this server's entry "
"(oauth: {client_id: ..., client_secret: ...}), or use the "
"provider's stdio / API-key server instead."
)
flow.mark_error(msg)
finally:
flow.mark_worker_done()
@app.post("/api/mcp/servers/{name}/auth")
async def auth_mcp_server(name: str, request: Request, profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Start MCP OAuth and hand the authorization URL to the dashboard browser."""
from hermes_cli.mcp_config import _get_mcp_servers
from tools.mcp_dashboard_oauth import DashboardOAuthFlow
_require_token(request)
_gc_mcp_oauth_flows()
from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home
process_home = str(get_hermes_home().expanduser().resolve(strict=False))
with _profile_scope(profile):
servers = _get_mcp_servers()
flow_home = str(get_hermes_home().expanduser().resolve(strict=False))
if name not in servers:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Server '{name}' not found")
cfg = dict(servers[name])
if not cfg.get("url"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="stdio servers authenticate via env keys, not OAuth")
if cfg.get("headers") and cfg.get("auth") != "oauth":
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="This server uses header/API-key auth, not OAuth")
cfg["auth"] = "oauth"
flow_id = secrets.token_urlsafe(24)
flow = DashboardOAuthFlow(
flow_id=flow_id,
server_name=name,
profile=profile,
hermes_home=flow_home,
redirect_uri=(cfg.get("oauth") or {}).get("redirect_uri")
or _mcp_oauth_callback_url(request, name),
reconnect_live=flow_home == process_home,
)
with _mcp_oauth_flows_lock:
pending = sum(
not flow.worker_done
for flow in _mcp_oauth_flows.values()
)
if pending >= _MAX_PENDING_MCP_OAUTH_FLOWS:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=429,
detail="Too many MCP OAuth flows are already in progress",
)
if any(
flow.server_name == name
and flow.hermes_home == flow_home
and not flow.worker_done
for flow in _mcp_oauth_flows.values()
):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=409,
detail=f"MCP OAuth for '{name}' is already in progress",
)
_mcp_oauth_flows[flow_id] = flow
threading.Thread(
target=_run_dashboard_mcp_oauth,
args=(flow, cfg),
daemon=True,
name=f"mcp-oauth-{name}",
).start()
try:
await flow.wait_for_authorization_url(timeout=30)
except Exception as exc:
flow.mark_error(str(exc))
return flow.snapshot()
@app.get("/api/mcp/oauth/flows/{flow_id}")
async def mcp_oauth_flow_status(flow_id: str, request: Request):
_require_token(request)
_gc_mcp_oauth_flows()
flow = _mcp_oauth_flows.get(flow_id)
if flow is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="OAuth flow not found or expired")
snapshot = flow.snapshot()
snapshot["tools"] = flow.tools
return snapshot
@app.get("/api/mcp/oauth/callback/{server_name:path}")
async def mcp_oauth_callback(
server_name: str,
code: Optional[str] = None,
state: Optional[str] = None,
error: Optional[str] = None,
):
_gc_mcp_oauth_flows()
with _mcp_oauth_flows_lock:
candidates = [
flow
for flow in _mcp_oauth_flows.values()
if flow.server_name == server_name
and flow.status == "authorization_required"
]
flow = next(
(
candidate
for candidate in candidates
if candidate.expected_state is not None
and state is not None
and secrets.compare_digest(candidate.expected_state, state)
),
None,
)
if flow is None:
return HTMLResponse("<h1>OAuth flow expired</h1><p>Return to Hermes and try again.</p>", status_code=404)
try:
flow.deliver_callback(code=code, state=state, error=error)
except ValueError as exc:
reason = str(exc)
status_code = 409 if "already received" in reason else 400
return HTMLResponse(
"<h1>OAuth callback rejected</h1>"
"<p>The callback was invalid or already used.</p>",
status_code=status_code,
)
if error:
return HTMLResponse("<h1>Authorization failed</h1><p>Return to Hermes for details.</p>", status_code=400)
return HTMLResponse("<h1>Authorization received</h1><p>You can close this tab and return to Hermes.</p>")
class MCPEnabledToggle(BaseModel):
enabled: bool
profile: Optional[str] = None
@app.put("/api/mcp/servers/{name}/enabled")
async def set_mcp_server_enabled(
name: str, body: MCPEnabledToggle, profile: Optional[str] = None
):
"""Enable or disable an MCP server (takes effect on next session/gateway).
Toggles the ``enabled`` key on the server's config.yaml entry — the same
flag the agent reads at startup. Disabled servers stay in config so they
can be re-enabled without re-entering their settings.
"""
with _profile_scope(body.profile or profile):
cfg = load_config()
servers = cfg.get("mcp_servers")
if not isinstance(servers, dict) or name not in servers:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Server '{name}' not found")
if not isinstance(servers[name], dict):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Malformed server config")
servers[name]["enabled"] = bool(body.enabled)
save_config(cfg)
return {"ok": True, "name": name, "enabled": bool(body.enabled)}
@app.get("/api/mcp/catalog")
async def list_mcp_catalog(profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Browse the Nous-approved MCP catalog (the optional-mcps/ manifests).
Each entry reports whether it's already installed and enabled so the UI
can show install / enabled state inline. This is the same catalog
`hermes mcp catalog` / `hermes mcp install` read. ``profile`` scopes
the installed/enabled annotations (the catalog itself is repo-shipped
and identical for every profile).
"""
try:
from hermes_cli import mcp_catalog
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("mcp_catalog import failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Catalog unavailable: {exc}")
entries = []
try:
with _profile_scope(profile):
catalog_entries = list(mcp_catalog.list_catalog())
installed_state = {
e.name: (mcp_catalog.is_installed(e.name), mcp_catalog.is_enabled(e.name))
for e in catalog_entries
}
for entry in catalog_entries:
auth = entry.auth
transport = entry.transport
install = entry.install
entries.append({
"name": entry.name,
"description": entry.description,
"source": entry.source,
"transport": transport.type,
"auth_type": getattr(auth, "type", "none"),
# Env vars the user must supply (names + prompts only, never values).
"required_env": [
{"name": e.name, "prompt": e.prompt, "required": e.required}
for e in getattr(auth, "env", []) or []
],
# Transport details so the UI can show exactly what connects/runs.
# The trust model (docs: user-guide/features/mcp) tells users to
# inspect command/args/url and the install bootstrap before
# installing — surface them rather than hiding them in the repo.
"command": transport.command,
"args": list(transport.args or []),
"url": transport.url,
# Git bootstrap (present only for entries that clone + build).
"install_url": install.url if install else None,
"install_ref": install.ref if install else None,
"bootstrap": list(install.bootstrap) if install else [],
# Default tool pre-selection hint and post-install guidance.
"default_enabled": list(entry.tools.default_enabled)
if entry.tools.default_enabled is not None
else None,
"post_install": entry.post_install or "",
"needs_install": entry.install is not None,
"installed": installed_state.get(entry.name, (False, False))[0],
"enabled": installed_state.get(entry.name, (False, False))[1],
})
except HTTPException:
# Unknown/invalid profile → 404, not a silently-empty catalog.
raise
except Exception:
_log.exception("list_mcp_catalog failed")
diagnostics = []
try:
diagnostics = [
{"name": n, "kind": k, "message": m}
for (n, k, m) in mcp_catalog.catalog_diagnostics()
]
except Exception:
pass
return {"entries": entries, "diagnostics": diagnostics}
class MCPCatalogInstall(BaseModel):
name: str
# env: KEY=VALUE map for catalog entries that declare required env vars.
env: Dict[str, str] = {}
enable: bool = True
profile: Optional[str] = None
@app.post("/api/mcp/catalog/install")
async def install_mcp_catalog_entry(body: MCPCatalogInstall, profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Install a catalog MCP into config.yaml.
For HTTP/stdio entries with required env vars, those are written to .env
via the standard env path so the agent can read them at session start.
Entries that need a git bootstrap (``needs_install``) are installed via
the CLI action path because the clone can take time.
"""
from hermes_cli import mcp_catalog
name = (body.name or "").strip()
entry = mcp_catalog.get_entry(name)
if entry is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"No catalog entry '{name}'")
# Persist any supplied env vars first (catalog entries declare which names
# they need; we only write the ones the user provided).
effective_profile = body.profile or profile
if body.env:
with _profile_scope(effective_profile):
for k, v in body.env.items():
if v:
save_env_value(k, v)
# Git-bootstrap entries can take a while to clone — run via the background
# action path so the request returns immediately and the UI can tail logs.
# The -p subprocess rebinds HERMES_HOME-derived paths in the child.
if entry.install is not None:
# Unique per-entry action name: a shared "mcp-install" would let a
# re-click (or a second entry) overwrite the tracked process/log while
# the first clone is still running.
action = _mcp_install_action_name(name)
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(
_profile_cli_args(effective_profile) + ["mcp", "install", name],
action,
)
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Install failed: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "name": name, "background": True, "action": action}
# No git step — install synchronously via the catalog API. install_entry
# routes through load_config/save_config + save_env_value, all call-time
# resolvers, so the context override scopes it. Wrap the to_thread body
# in the scope INSIDE the thread (contextvars don't propagate into
# to_thread the other way around — asyncio.to_thread copies context, so
# setting it here works; keep it explicit for clarity).
def _install_scoped():
with _profile_scope(effective_profile):
mcp_catalog.install_entry(entry, enable=body.enable)
try:
await asyncio.to_thread(_install_scoped)
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("install_mcp_catalog_entry failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc))
return {"ok": True, "name": name, "background": False}
def _mcp_install_action_name(name: str) -> str:
"""Unique per-entry mcp-install action name (+ registered log file), so a
re-click or a second catalog install doesn't overwrite the first's tracked
process/log while its git clone is still running."""
slug = re.sub(r"[^a-z0-9]+", "-", name.lower()).strip("-")[:48] or "server"
digest = hashlib.sha1(name.encode()).hexdigest()[:8]
action = f"mcp-install-{slug}-{digest}"
_ACTION_LOG_FILES.setdefault(action, f"action-{action}.log")
return action
_ACTION_LOG_FILES.setdefault("computer-use-grant", "action-computer-use-grant.log")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Pairing endpoints — approve / revoke / list messaging pairing codes.
#
# These are how a remote admin onboards messaging users (Telegram, Discord, …)
# without shell access. Wraps gateway.pairing.PairingStore directly.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class PairingApprove(BaseModel):
platform: str
code: str
class PairingRevoke(BaseModel):
platform: str
user_id: str
def _pairing_store():
from gateway.pairing import PairingStore
return PairingStore()
@app.get("/api/pairing")
async def list_pairing():
store = _pairing_store()
return {
"pending": store.list_pending(),
"approved": store.list_approved(),
}
@app.post("/api/pairing/approve")
async def approve_pairing(body: PairingApprove):
store = _pairing_store()
platform = (body.platform or "").lower().strip()
code = (body.code or "").upper().strip()
if not platform or not code:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="platform and code are required")
result = store.approve_code(platform, code)
if result:
return {"ok": True, "user": result}
if store._is_locked_out(platform):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=429,
detail=f"Platform '{platform}' is locked out after too many failed approvals.",
)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404,
detail=f"Code '{code}' not found or expired for platform '{platform}'.",
)
@app.post("/api/pairing/revoke")
async def revoke_pairing(body: PairingRevoke):
store = _pairing_store()
platform = (body.platform or "").lower().strip()
if not platform or not body.user_id:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="platform and user_id are required")
if store.revoke(platform, body.user_id):
return {"ok": True}
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404,
detail=f"User {body.user_id} not found in approved list for {platform}.",
)
@app.post("/api/pairing/clear-pending")
async def clear_pending_pairing():
store = _pairing_store()
count = store.clear_pending()
return {"ok": True, "cleared": count}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Webhook subscription endpoints — list / subscribe / remove.
#
# Wraps the same JSON store the CLI uses (hermes_cli.webhook); the webhook
# adapter hot-reloads it without a gateway restart. Per-route HMAC secrets
# are redacted on read and surfaced once on create.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class WebhookCreate(BaseModel):
name: str
description: Optional[str] = None
events: List[str] = []
prompt: Optional[str] = None
script: Optional[str] = None
skills: List[str] = []
deliver: str = "log"
deliver_only: bool = False
deliver_chat_id: Optional[str] = None
# secret: omit to auto-generate
secret: Optional[str] = None
def _webhook_route_summary(name: str, route: Dict[str, Any], base_url: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
return {
"name": name,
"description": route.get("description", ""),
"events": list(route.get("events") or []),
"deliver": route.get("deliver", "log"),
"deliver_only": bool(route.get("deliver_only")),
"prompt": route.get("prompt", ""),
"script": route.get("script", ""),
"skills": list(route.get("skills") or []),
"created_at": route.get("created_at"),
"url": f"{base_url}/webhooks/{name}",
# Secret is masked on read; full value only returned on create.
"secret_set": bool(route.get("secret")),
# Default-enabled; only an explicit enabled:false turns a route off.
"enabled": route.get("enabled", True) is not False,
}
@app.get("/api/webhooks")
async def list_webhooks():
import hermes_cli.webhook as wh
base_url = wh._get_webhook_base_url()
subs = wh._load_subscriptions()
return {
"enabled": wh._is_webhook_enabled(),
"base_url": base_url,
"subscriptions": [
_webhook_route_summary(name, route, base_url)
for name, route in subs.items()
],
}
@app.post("/api/webhooks/enable")
async def enable_webhooks():
try:
_write_platform_enabled("webhook", True)
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to enable webhook platform from dashboard")
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500,
detail="Failed to enable webhook platform.",
) from exc
restart_result = _restart_gateway_after_webhook_enable()
return {
"ok": True,
"platform": "webhook",
"enabled": True,
"needs_restart": not restart_result["restart_started"],
**restart_result,
}
@app.post("/api/webhooks")
async def create_webhook(body: WebhookCreate):
import re as _re
import secrets as _secrets
import time as _time
import hermes_cli.webhook as wh
if not wh._is_webhook_enabled():
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="Webhook platform is not enabled. Enable it from the Webhooks page first.",
)
name = (body.name or "").strip().lower().replace(" ", "-")
if not _re.match(r"^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]*$", name):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="Invalid name. Use lowercase alphanumeric with hyphens/underscores.",
)
if body.deliver_only and body.deliver == "log":
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="Direct delivery requires a real target (telegram, discord, …), not 'log'.",
)
secret = body.secret or _secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
route: Dict[str, Any] = {
"description": body.description or f"Dashboard-created subscription: {name}",
"events": [e.strip() for e in body.events if e.strip()],
"secret": secret,
"prompt": body.prompt or "",
"skills": [s.strip() for s in body.skills if s.strip()],
"deliver": body.deliver or "log",
"created_at": _time.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ", _time.gmtime()),
}
if body.script and body.script.strip():
route["script"] = body.script.strip()
if body.deliver_only:
route["deliver_only"] = True
if body.deliver_chat_id:
route["deliver_extra"] = {"chat_id": body.deliver_chat_id}
subs = wh._load_subscriptions()
subs[name] = route
wh._save_subscriptions(subs)
base_url = wh._get_webhook_base_url()
summary = _webhook_route_summary(name, route, base_url)
# Surface the secret exactly once, on create.
summary["secret"] = secret
return summary
@app.delete("/api/webhooks/{name}")
async def delete_webhook(name: str):
import hermes_cli.webhook as wh
key = (name or "").strip().lower()
subs = wh._load_subscriptions()
if key not in subs:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"No subscription named '{key}'")
del subs[key]
wh._save_subscriptions(subs)
return {"ok": True}
class WebhookEnabledToggle(BaseModel):
enabled: bool
@app.put("/api/webhooks/{name}/enabled")
async def set_webhook_enabled(name: str, body: WebhookEnabledToggle):
"""Enable or disable a webhook route.
Disabled routes stay in the subscriptions file (so they can be
re-enabled) but the gateway rejects incoming events with 403. The
gateway hot-reloads the subscriptions file, so this takes effect on the
next event without a restart.
"""
import hermes_cli.webhook as wh
key = (name or "").strip().lower()
subs = wh._load_subscriptions()
if key not in subs:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"No subscription named '{key}'")
subs[key]["enabled"] = bool(body.enabled)
wh._save_subscriptions(subs)
return {"ok": True, "name": key, "enabled": bool(body.enabled)}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Gateway lifecycle endpoints — start / stop.
#
# restart + update already exist above; these complete the lifecycle so a
# remote admin can bring the gateway up or down without shell access. Both
# spawn the real `hermes gateway <verb>` so behaviour matches the CLI exactly.
# Status is already surfaced by /api/status (gateway_running/state/platforms).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@app.post("/api/gateway/start")
async def start_gateway(profile: Optional[str] = None):
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(_gateway_subcommand(profile, "start"), "gateway-start")
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to spawn gateway start")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to start gateway: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "pid": proc.pid, "name": "gateway-start"}
@app.post("/api/gateway/stop")
async def stop_gateway(profile: Optional[str] = None):
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(_gateway_subcommand(profile, "stop"), "gateway-stop")
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to spawn gateway stop")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to stop gateway: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "pid": proc.pid, "name": "gateway-stop"}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Credential pool endpoints — list / add / remove rotation keys.
#
# The credential pool (auth.json -> credential_pool.<provider>[]) holds the
# rotating API keys the agent round-robins through. Secrets are redacted on
# read; only the agent ever sees the raw values at session start.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class CredentialPoolAdd(BaseModel):
provider: str
# api_key for API-key providers; OAuth pooling stays CLI-only (it needs
# an interactive browser flow that doesn't belong in a single POST).
api_key: str
label: Optional[str] = None
def _pool_entry_summary(entry: Any, index: int) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Redacted, display-safe view of one PooledCredential.
``index`` is 1-based to match CredentialPool.remove_index().
"""
token = getattr(entry, "access_token", "") or ""
return {
"index": index,
"id": getattr(entry, "id", None),
"label": getattr(entry, "label", None),
"auth_type": getattr(entry, "auth_type", None),
"source": getattr(entry, "source", None),
"priority": getattr(entry, "priority", 0),
"last_status": getattr(entry, "last_status", None),
"request_count": getattr(entry, "request_count", 0),
"token_preview": redact_key(token) if token else "",
"has_refresh": bool(getattr(entry, "refresh_token", None)),
}
@app.get("/api/credentials/pool")
async def list_credential_pool():
from agent.credential_pool import load_pool
from hermes_cli.auth import read_credential_pool
providers = []
# read_credential_pool(None) lists every provider that has pooled entries;
# load_pool() then gives us the rich PooledCredential objects per provider.
raw_pool = read_credential_pool()
for provider_id in sorted(raw_pool.keys()):
try:
pool = load_pool(provider_id)
except Exception:
_log.exception("load_pool(%s) failed", provider_id)
continue
entries = pool.entries()
if not entries:
continue
providers.append({
"provider": provider_id,
"entries": [
_pool_entry_summary(e, i) for i, e in enumerate(entries, start=1)
],
})
return {"providers": providers}
@app.post("/api/credentials/pool")
async def add_credential_pool_entry(body: CredentialPoolAdd):
import uuid as _uuid
from agent.credential_pool import (
load_pool,
PooledCredential,
AUTH_TYPE_API_KEY,
CUSTOM_POOL_PREFIX,
SOURCE_MANUAL,
)
provider = (body.provider or "").strip().lower()
api_key = (body.api_key or "").strip()
if not provider or not api_key:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="provider and api_key are required")
try:
pool = load_pool(provider)
label = (body.label or "").strip() or f"key #{len(pool.entries()) + 1}"
entry = PooledCredential(
provider=provider,
id=_uuid.uuid4().hex[:6],
label=label,
auth_type=AUTH_TYPE_API_KEY,
priority=0,
source=SOURCE_MANUAL,
access_token=api_key,
)
pool.add_entry(entry)
# Re-adding a credential is an explicit re-engagement signal: lift
# every suppression for this provider so a source deleted earlier
# (via DELETE below or `hermes auth remove`) can seed again.
# Mirrors the `hermes auth add` behaviour in auth_commands.py.
if not provider.startswith(CUSTOM_POOL_PREFIX):
try:
from hermes_cli.auth import (
_load_auth_store,
unsuppress_credential_source,
)
suppressed = _load_auth_store().get("suppressed_sources", {})
for src in list(suppressed.get(provider, []) or []):
unsuppress_credential_source(provider, src)
except Exception:
_log.exception("unsuppress after pool add failed (non-fatal)")
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("POST /api/credentials/pool failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc)) from exc
return {"ok": True, "provider": provider, "count": len(pool.entries())}
@app.delete("/api/credentials/pool/{provider}/{index}")
async def remove_credential_pool_entry(provider: str, index: int):
"""Remove a pool entry. ``index`` is 1-based (matches the list response).
Removal must be sticky (#55217): ``load_pool()`` re-seeds entries from
their backing source (.env var, OAuth singleton file, custom-provider
config) on every call, so deleting only the pool row silently reverts on
the next dashboard refresh. We dispatch through the same RemovalStep
registry the CLI ``hermes auth remove`` uses: each source cleans up its
external state and suppresses ``(provider, source)`` so the seeders skip
it. Manual entries have no registered step — nothing external to clean,
no suppression needed (they aren't re-seeded).
"""
from agent.credential_pool import load_pool
from agent.credential_sources import find_removal_step
from hermes_cli.auth import suppress_credential_source
provider = (provider or "").strip().lower()
try:
pool = load_pool(provider)
removed = pool.remove_index(index)
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("DELETE /api/credentials/pool failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc)) from exc
if removed is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="No pool entry at that index")
cleaned: List[str] = []
hints: List[str] = []
step = find_removal_step(provider, removed.source or "")
if step is not None:
try:
result = step.remove_fn(provider, removed)
cleaned = list(result.cleaned)
hints = list(result.hints)
if result.suppress:
suppress_credential_source(provider, removed.source)
except Exception:
# Cleanup is best-effort, but suppression is the actual bug fix —
# without it the entry resurrects on the next load_pool(). Apply
# it even when source-specific cleanup blew up.
_log.exception(
"credential source cleanup failed for %s/%s; suppressing anyway",
provider, removed.source,
)
try:
suppress_credential_source(provider, removed.source)
except Exception:
_log.exception("suppress_credential_source failed")
return {
"ok": True,
"provider": provider,
"count": len(pool.entries()),
"cleaned": cleaned,
"hints": hints,
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Memory provider endpoints — status / list providers / select / disable / reset.
#
# Provider setup is dashboard-native when a provider exposes get_config_schema().
# The dashboard never runs interactive provider setup hooks; activation is only
# allowed once the provider is discoverable, available, and has required config.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class MemoryProviderSelect(BaseModel):
# "" or "built-in" disables the external provider (built-in only).
provider: str
class MemoryReset(BaseModel):
# "all" | "memory" | "user"
target: str = "all"
@app.get("/api/memory")
async def get_memory_status():
cfg = load_config()
active = ""
mem = cfg.get("memory")
if isinstance(mem, dict):
active = _normalize_memory_provider_name(mem.get("provider"))
# Built-in memory file sizes (so the UI can show what a reset would erase).
mem_dir = get_hermes_home() / "memories"
files = {}
for fname, key in (("MEMORY.md", "memory"), ("USER.md", "user")):
path = mem_dir / fname
files[key] = path.stat().st_size if path.exists() else 0
return {
"active": active,
"providers": _discover_memory_provider_statuses(),
"builtin_files": files,
}
@app.put("/api/memory/provider")
async def set_memory_provider(body: MemoryProviderSelect):
provider = _normalize_memory_provider_name(body.provider)
_require_memory_provider_ready(provider)
cfg = load_config()
if not isinstance(cfg.get("memory"), dict):
cfg["memory"] = {}
cfg["memory"]["provider"] = provider
save_config(cfg)
return {"ok": True, "active": provider}
@app.post("/api/memory/reset")
async def reset_memory(body: MemoryReset):
target = (body.target or "all").strip().lower()
if target not in {"all", "memory", "user"}:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="target must be all, memory, or user")
mem_dir = get_hermes_home() / "memories"
deleted = []
targets = []
if target in {"all", "memory"}:
targets.append("MEMORY.md")
if target in {"all", "user"}:
targets.append("USER.md")
for fname in targets:
path = mem_dir / fname
if path.exists():
try:
path.unlink()
deleted.append(fname)
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not delete {fname}: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "deleted": deleted}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Operations endpoints — doctor / security audit / backup / import /
# checkpoints / hooks.
#
# Diagnostic and maintenance commands. The long-running / text-output ones
# (doctor, security audit, backup, import, skills install) are spawned as
# background actions whose logs the dashboard tails via
# /api/actions/{name}/status — same pattern as gateway restart and update.
# The cheap, structured reads (hooks list, checkpoints list) return JSON
# directly.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@app.post("/api/ops/doctor")
async def run_doctor():
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(["doctor"], "doctor")
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to spawn doctor")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to run doctor: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "pid": proc.pid, "name": "doctor"}
@app.post("/api/ops/security-audit")
async def run_security_audit():
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(["security", "audit"], "security-audit")
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to spawn security audit")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to run security audit: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "pid": proc.pid, "name": "security-audit"}
class BackupRequest(BaseModel):
# Optional output path; defaults to a timestamped zip in the home dir.
output: Optional[str] = None
def _dashboard_backup_dir() -> Path:
return get_hermes_home() / "backups"
def _new_dashboard_backup_path() -> Path:
stamp = datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d-%H%M%S")
return _dashboard_backup_dir() / f"hermes-backup-{stamp}-{secrets.token_hex(4)}.zip"
@app.post("/api/ops/backup")
async def run_backup(body: BackupRequest):
args = ["backup"]
archive: Optional[Path] = None
output = (body.output or "").strip()
if output:
args.extend(["-o", output])
else:
archive = _new_dashboard_backup_path()
try:
archive.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500,
detail=f"Could not create backup directory: {exc}",
)
args.extend(["-o", str(archive)])
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(args, "backup")
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to spawn backup")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to run backup: {exc}")
response = {"ok": True, "pid": proc.pid, "name": "backup"}
if archive is not None:
response["archive"] = str(archive)
return response
@app.get("/api/ops/backup/download")
async def download_dashboard_backup(archive: str):
try:
backup_dir = _dashboard_backup_dir().expanduser().resolve(strict=False)
target = Path(archive).expanduser().resolve(strict=True)
except FileNotFoundError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Backup not found")
except (OSError, RuntimeError):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid backup path")
if not _path_is_under(backup_dir, target):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Backup is outside the dashboard backup directory")
if not target.is_file():
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Backup not found")
return FileResponse(
path=str(target),
media_type="application/zip",
filename=target.name,
content_disposition_type="attachment",
)
class ImportRequest(BaseModel):
archive: str
# Pass --force to `hermes import`. The spawned action runs with
# stdin=DEVNULL, so the CLI's interactive "Continue? [y/N]" overwrite
# prompt hits EOF and auto-aborts ("Aborted.", exit 1) whenever the
# target already has a config — which it always does when the dashboard
# itself is running from it. The dashboard shows its own confirm modal
# before calling this endpoint, then sends force=True so the restore
# proceeds non-interactively.
force: bool = False
@app.post("/api/ops/import")
async def run_import(body: ImportRequest):
archive = (body.archive or "").strip()
if not archive:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="archive path is required")
if not os.path.isfile(archive):
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Archive not found: {archive}")
args = ["import", archive]
if body.force:
args.append("--force")
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(args, "import")
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to spawn import")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to run import: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "pid": proc.pid, "name": "import"}
def _safe_backup_upload_name(filename: str | None) -> str:
name = Path(filename or "backup.zip").name.strip()
name = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9._-]+", "-", name).strip(".-")
if not name:
name = "backup.zip"
if not name.lower().endswith(".zip"):
name = f"{name}.zip"
return name
@app.post("/api/ops/import-upload")
async def run_import_upload(
file: UploadFile = File(...),
force: bool = Form(False),
):
staging_dir = _dashboard_backup_dir()
try:
staging_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500,
detail=f"Could not create import staging directory: {exc}",
)
safe_name = _safe_backup_upload_name(file.filename)
stamp = datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y%m%d-%H%M%S")
target = staging_dir / f"dashboard-import-{stamp}-{secrets.token_hex(4)}-{safe_name}"
tmp_fd, tmp_name = tempfile.mkstemp(
prefix=f".{target.name}.",
suffix=".upload",
dir=str(staging_dir),
)
tmp_path = Path(tmp_name)
total = 0
renamed = False
try:
with os.fdopen(tmp_fd, "wb") as out:
while True:
chunk = await file.read(_UPLOAD_CHUNK_BYTES)
if not chunk:
break
total += len(chunk)
if total > _MANAGED_FILE_MAX_BYTES:
raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="Archive is too large")
out.write(chunk)
os.replace(tmp_path, target)
renamed = True
except HTTPException:
raise
except PermissionError:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail="Import staging directory is not writable",
)
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500,
detail=f"Could not write uploaded archive: {exc}",
)
finally:
if not renamed:
tmp_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
await file.close()
if not zipfile.is_zipfile(target):
target.unlink(missing_ok=True)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="Uploaded archive is not a valid zip file",
)
args = ["import", str(target)]
if force:
args.append("--force")
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(args, "import")
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to spawn import")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to run import: {exc}")
return {
"ok": True,
"pid": proc.pid,
"name": "import",
"archive": str(target),
"uploaded_bytes": total,
}
@app.get("/api/ops/hooks")
async def list_hooks():
"""List configured shell hooks from config.yaml with consent + health.
Reports each hook's allowlist (consent) status and whether the script is
currently executable, plus the set of valid hook events so the create
form can offer them.
"""
from hermes_cli.config import load_config as _load_config
from agent import shell_hooks
try:
from hermes_cli.plugins import VALID_HOOKS
valid_events = sorted(VALID_HOOKS)
except Exception:
valid_events = []
specs = []
try:
specs = shell_hooks.iter_configured_hooks(_load_config())
except Exception:
_log.exception("iter_configured_hooks failed")
out = []
for spec in specs:
entry = None
try:
entry = shell_hooks.allowlist_entry_for(spec.event, spec.command)
except Exception:
pass
executable = False
try:
executable = shell_hooks.script_is_executable(spec.command)
except Exception:
pass
out.append({
"event": spec.event,
"matcher": spec.matcher,
"command": spec.command,
"timeout": spec.timeout,
"allowed": entry is not None,
"approved_at": (entry or {}).get("approved_at"),
"executable": executable,
})
return {"hooks": out, "valid_events": valid_events}
class HookCreate(BaseModel):
event: str
command: str
matcher: Optional[str] = None
timeout: Optional[int] = None
# approve: write the consent allowlist entry too (the operator using the
# authenticated dashboard is giving consent). Without it the hook is
# configured but won't fire until approved.
approve: bool = True
@app.post("/api/ops/hooks")
async def create_hook(body: HookCreate):
"""Add a shell hook to config.yaml (and optionally approve it).
Shell hooks run arbitrary commands, so this is a privileged action: it
writes to the ``hooks:`` config block and, when ``approve`` is set, records
consent in the allowlist so the hook actually fires. Takes effect on the
next session / gateway restart.
"""
from agent import shell_hooks
event = (body.event or "").strip()
command = (body.command or "").strip()
if not event or not command:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="event and command are required")
try:
from hermes_cli.plugins import VALID_HOOKS
if event not in VALID_HOOKS:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"Unknown event '{event}'. Valid: {', '.join(sorted(VALID_HOOKS))}",
)
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception:
pass
cfg = load_config()
hooks_cfg = cfg.get("hooks")
if not isinstance(hooks_cfg, dict):
hooks_cfg = {}
cfg["hooks"] = hooks_cfg
entries = hooks_cfg.get(event)
if not isinstance(entries, list):
entries = []
hooks_cfg[event] = entries
new_entry: Dict[str, Any] = {"command": command}
if body.matcher:
new_entry["matcher"] = body.matcher
if body.timeout is not None:
new_entry["timeout"] = int(body.timeout)
entries.append(new_entry)
save_config(cfg)
approved = False
if body.approve:
try:
shell_hooks._record_approval(event, command)
approved = True
except Exception:
_log.exception("hook consent record failed")
return {"ok": True, "event": event, "command": command, "approved": approved}
class HookDelete(BaseModel):
event: str
command: str
@app.delete("/api/ops/hooks")
async def delete_hook(body: HookDelete):
"""Remove a hook from config.yaml and revoke its consent allowlist entry."""
from agent import shell_hooks
event = (body.event or "").strip()
command = (body.command or "").strip()
if not event or not command:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="event and command are required")
cfg = load_config()
hooks_cfg = cfg.get("hooks")
removed = False
if isinstance(hooks_cfg, dict) and isinstance(hooks_cfg.get(event), list):
before = len(hooks_cfg[event])
hooks_cfg[event] = [
e for e in hooks_cfg[event]
if not (isinstance(e, dict) and e.get("command") == command)
]
removed = len(hooks_cfg[event]) < before
if not hooks_cfg[event]:
del hooks_cfg[event]
if not hooks_cfg:
cfg.pop("hooks", None)
save_config(cfg)
# Revoke consent regardless so a re-add re-prompts.
try:
shell_hooks.revoke(command)
except Exception:
pass
if not removed:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="No matching hook found")
return {"ok": True}
@app.get("/api/ops/checkpoints")
async def list_checkpoints():
"""List the /rollback shadow store checkpoints (read-only)."""
# Checkpoints live under <hermes_home>/checkpoints/. Surface a count +
# total size so the dashboard can show what a prune would reclaim; the
# actual prune is a spawned action so confirmation/pruning logic stays
# in one place (the CLI).
cp_dir = get_hermes_home() / "checkpoints"
sessions = []
total_bytes = 0
if cp_dir.is_dir():
for child in sorted(cp_dir.iterdir()):
if not child.is_dir():
continue
size = 0
count = 0
for f in child.rglob("*"):
if f.is_file():
try:
size += f.stat().st_size
count += 1
except OSError:
pass
total_bytes += size
sessions.append({
"session": child.name,
"files": count,
"bytes": size,
})
return {"sessions": sessions, "total_bytes": total_bytes}
@app.post("/api/ops/checkpoints/prune")
async def prune_checkpoints():
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(["checkpoints", "prune"], "checkpoints-prune")
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to spawn checkpoints prune")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to prune checkpoints: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "pid": proc.pid, "name": "checkpoints-prune"}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Skills hub endpoints — search / install / uninstall / update.
#
# Search and install touch the network (GitHub, hub sources) and run the same
# complex source-router pipeline the CLI uses, so they're spawned as background
# actions whose logs the dashboard tails. The already-installed skill list +
# enable/disable toggle live in the existing /api/skills endpoints.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class SkillInstallRequest(BaseModel):
identifier: str
profile: Optional[str] = None
def _profile_cli_args(profile: Optional[str]) -> List[str]:
"""Return ``["-p", <name>]`` for a validated non-default profile.
Hub install/uninstall/update run in a fresh ``hermes`` subprocess, and
``_apply_profile_override()`` reads ``-p`` from argv in the child — the
only mechanism that reaches import-time-bound globals like
``skills_hub.SKILLS_DIR``. Empty/"current" means the dashboard's own
profile (no args, legacy behavior).
"""
requested = (profile or "").strip()
if not requested or requested.lower() in {"current", "default"}:
return []
from hermes_cli import profiles as profiles_mod
_resolve_profile_dir(requested)
return ["-p", profiles_mod.normalize_profile_name(requested)]
def _hub_action_name(verb: str, key: str) -> str:
"""Unique per-skill hub action name (+ registered log file).
``_spawn_hermes_action`` tracks one process/log per name, so a shared
"skills-install"/"skills-uninstall" would make concurrent row-level actions
overwrite each other's status/log while the UI polls per identifier. Slug
(readable) + hash (collision-proof) keys each action to its own row.
"""
slug = re.sub(r"[^a-z0-9]+", "-", key.lower()).strip("-")[:48] or "skill"
digest = hashlib.sha1(key.encode()).hexdigest()[:8]
name = f"skills-{verb}-{slug}-{digest}"
_ACTION_LOG_FILES.setdefault(name, f"action-{name}.log")
return name
@app.post("/api/skills/hub/install")
async def install_skill_hub(body: SkillInstallRequest, profile: Optional[str] = None):
identifier = (body.identifier or "").strip()
if not identifier:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="identifier is required")
name = _hub_action_name("install", identifier)
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(
_profile_cli_args(body.profile or profile)
+ ["skills", "install", identifier, "--yes"],
name,
)
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to spawn skills install")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to install skill: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "pid": proc.pid, "name": name}
class SkillUninstallRequest(BaseModel):
name: str
profile: Optional[str] = None
@app.post("/api/skills/hub/uninstall")
async def uninstall_skill_hub(body: SkillUninstallRequest, profile: Optional[str] = None):
name = (body.name or "").strip()
if not name:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="name is required")
action = _hub_action_name("uninstall", name)
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(
_profile_cli_args(body.profile or profile) + ["skills", "uninstall", name, "--yes"],
action,
)
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to spawn skills uninstall")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to uninstall skill: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "pid": proc.pid, "name": action}
class SkillsUpdateRequest(BaseModel):
profile: Optional[str] = None
@app.post("/api/skills/hub/update")
async def update_skills_hub(
body: Optional[SkillsUpdateRequest] = None, profile: Optional[str] = None
):
try:
effective = (body.profile if body else None) or profile
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(
_profile_cli_args(effective) + ["skills", "update"], "skills-update"
)
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to spawn skills update")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to update skills: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "pid": proc.pid, "name": "skills-update"}
# Human-readable labels for each hub source id (matches `hermes skills search`
# provenance). Keep in sync with create_source_router()'s source list.
_SKILL_HUB_SOURCE_LABELS = {
"official": "Official (Nous)",
"hermes-index": "Hermes Index",
"skills-sh": "skills.sh",
"well-known": "Well-Known",
"url": "Direct URL",
"github": "GitHub",
"clawhub": "ClawHub",
"claude-marketplace": "Claude Marketplace",
"lobehub": "LobeHub",
"browse-sh": "browse.sh",
}
def _skill_meta_to_payload(m) -> dict:
return {
"name": m.name,
"description": m.description,
"source": m.source,
"identifier": m.identifier,
"trust_level": m.trust_level,
"repo": m.repo,
"tags": list(m.tags or []),
}
def _installed_hub_identifiers(profile: Optional[str] = None) -> dict:
"""Map identifier -> installed lock entry for hub-installed skills.
Lets the UI mark search results that are already installed. Scoped to
``profile``'s skills/.hub/lock.json when provided (HubLockFile takes an
explicit path, sidestepping the import-time LOCK_FILE binding).
Best-effort: returns an empty dict if the lock file can't be read.
"""
try:
from tools.skills_hub import HubLockFile
requested = (profile or "").strip()
if requested and requested.lower() != "current":
profile_dir = _resolve_profile_dir(requested)
lock = HubLockFile(profile_dir / "skills" / ".hub" / "lock.json")
else:
lock = HubLockFile()
out = {}
for entry in lock.list_installed():
ident = entry.get("identifier")
if ident:
out[ident] = {
"name": entry.get("name"),
"trust_level": entry.get("trust_level"),
"scan_verdict": entry.get("scan_verdict"),
}
return out
except Exception:
return {}
@app.get("/api/skills/hub/sources")
async def list_skills_hub_sources(profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""List the configured skill-hub sources and installed-skill provenance.
Gives the dashboard something to show BEFORE a search runs — which hubs
are wired up, their trust tier, and a set of featured skills pulled from
the centralized index (zero extra API calls). Without this the Browse-hub
tab is a blank page with no indication it's even connected to anything.
``profile`` scopes the installed-skill provenance to that profile.
"""
def _run():
from tools.skills_hub import create_source_router
with _config_profile_scope(profile):
sources = create_source_router()
out = []
index_available = False
featured = []
for src in sources:
sid = src.source_id()
entry = {
"id": sid,
"label": _SKILL_HUB_SOURCE_LABELS.get(sid, sid),
}
# GitHub exposes a rate-limit flag; the index an availability flag.
if sid == "github":
try:
entry["rate_limited"] = bool(getattr(src, "is_rate_limited", False))
except Exception:
entry["rate_limited"] = False
if sid == "hermes-index":
try:
index_available = bool(getattr(src, "is_available", False))
except Exception:
index_available = False
entry["available"] = index_available
# Empty-query search on the index returns featured/popular skills.
if index_available:
try:
featured = [
_skill_meta_to_payload(m) for m in src.search("", limit=12)
]
except Exception:
featured = []
out.append(entry)
# Tell the UI which sources are worth searching individually (for its
# progressive per-source fan-out). Mirror parallel_search_sources: when
# the centralized index is available it already subsumes the external
# API sources, so they're redundant — skipping them avoids ~70 GitHub
# calls per keystroke. Keep this set in sync with that function's
# ``_api_source_ids``.
_api_source_ids = frozenset(
{"github", "skills-sh", "clawhub", "claude-marketplace", "lobehub", "well-known"}
)
for entry in out:
entry["searchable"] = not (index_available and entry["id"] in _api_source_ids)
return {
"sources": out,
"index_available": index_available,
"featured": featured,
"installed": _installed_hub_identifiers(profile),
}
try:
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("skills hub sources listing failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail=f"Hub sources failed: {exc}")
@app.get("/api/skills/hub/search")
async def search_skills_hub(
q: str = "", source: str = "all", limit: int = 20, profile: Optional[str] = None
):
"""Search the skill hub across all configured sources.
Network-bound (parallel source search); runs in a thread so the FastAPI
loop isn't blocked. Returns structured results the UI installs by
identifier via POST /api/skills/hub/install, previews via
/api/skills/hub/preview, and scans via /api/skills/hub/scan.
"""
query = (q or "").strip()
if not query:
return {"results": [], "source_counts": {}, "timed_out": [], "installed": {}}
def _run():
from tools.skills_hub import create_source_router, parallel_search_sources
with _config_profile_scope(profile):
sources = create_source_router()
capped = min(max(limit, 1), 50)
all_results, source_counts, timed_out = parallel_search_sources(
sources, query=query, source_filter=source or "all", overall_timeout=30
)
# Dedupe by identifier, preferring higher trust (mirrors unified_search).
_rank = {"builtin": 2, "trusted": 1, "community": 0}
seen = {}
for r in all_results:
if r.identifier not in seen:
seen[r.identifier] = r
elif _rank.get(r.trust_level, 0) > _rank.get(seen[r.identifier].trust_level, 0):
seen[r.identifier] = r
deduped = list(seen.values())[:capped]
return {
"results": [_skill_meta_to_payload(m) for m in deduped],
"source_counts": source_counts,
"timed_out": timed_out,
"installed": _installed_hub_identifiers(profile),
}
try:
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("skills hub search failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail=f"Hub search failed: {exc}")
@app.get("/api/skills/hub/preview")
async def preview_skill_hub(identifier: str = "", profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Fetch a hub skill's SKILL.md content + metadata for in-dashboard reading.
Resolves the identifier across configured sources (same path the CLI
installer uses), then returns the rendered SKILL.md text and the file
manifest WITHOUT installing anything. This is the 'read the actual skill
before installing' affordance the Browse-hub tab was missing.
Scoped to ``profile`` so a non-default profile with different hub taps
resolves against ITS source router, not the default profile's.
"""
ident = (identifier or "").strip()
if not ident:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="identifier is required")
def _run():
from hermes_cli.skills_hub import _resolve_source_meta_and_bundle
from tools.skills_hub import create_source_router
with _config_profile_scope(profile):
sources = create_source_router()
meta, bundle, _src = _resolve_source_meta_and_bundle(ident, sources)
if not bundle and not meta:
return None
files = {}
skill_md = ""
if bundle:
for rel, content in (bundle.files or {}).items():
if isinstance(content, bytes):
# Some sources (e.g. official optional skills) store every
# file as bytes. Decode text so SKILL.md / docs render;
# only fall back to a placeholder for genuinely-binary data.
try:
files[rel] = content.decode("utf-8")
except UnicodeDecodeError:
files[rel] = "(binary file)"
else:
files[rel] = content
skill_md = files.get("SKILL.md", "") or ""
m = meta or bundle
return {
"name": getattr(m, "name", ident),
"description": getattr(m, "description", "") or "",
"source": getattr(m, "source", "") or "",
"identifier": getattr(m, "identifier", ident) or ident,
"trust_level": getattr(m, "trust_level", "community") or "community",
"repo": getattr(m, "repo", None),
"tags": list(getattr(m, "tags", None) or []),
"skill_md": skill_md,
"files": sorted(files.keys()),
}
try:
result = await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("skills hub preview failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail=f"Hub preview failed: {exc}")
if result is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Skill not found: {ident}")
return result
@app.get("/api/skills/hub/scan")
async def scan_skill_hub(identifier: str = "", profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Run the install-time security scan on a hub skill WITHOUT installing it.
Fetches the bundle, quarantines it, and runs the same `scan_skill` /
`should_allow_install` pipeline the CLI installer uses — then cleans up the
quarantine. Returns the verdict, per-finding detail, trust tier, and the
install-policy decision so the dashboard can show a visual safety result
on demand (the 'scan' button the Browse-hub tab was missing).
Scoped to ``profile`` so the bundle resolves against that profile's hub
source router, matching where an install would pull it from.
"""
ident = (identifier or "").strip()
if not ident:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="identifier is required")
def _run():
import shutil as _shutil
from hermes_cli.skills_hub import _resolve_source_meta_and_bundle
from tools.skills_hub import create_source_router, quarantine_bundle
from tools.skills_guard import scan_skill, should_allow_install
with _config_profile_scope(profile):
sources = create_source_router()
meta, bundle, _src = _resolve_source_meta_and_bundle(ident, sources)
if not bundle:
return None
if bundle.source == "official":
scan_source = "official"
else:
scan_source = (
getattr(bundle, "identifier", "")
or getattr(meta, "identifier", "")
or ident
)
q_path = None
try:
q_path = quarantine_bundle(bundle)
result = scan_skill(q_path, source=scan_source)
finally:
if q_path is not None:
_shutil.rmtree(q_path, ignore_errors=True)
allowed, reason = should_allow_install(result, force=False)
# `allowed` may be None ("ask") for agent-created/dangerous gates.
if allowed is True:
policy = "allow"
elif allowed is None:
policy = "ask"
else:
policy = "block"
findings = [
{
"severity": f.severity,
"category": f.category,
"file": f.file,
"line": f.line,
"description": f.description,
}
for f in result.findings
]
# Per-severity tally for an at-a-glance summary.
counts = {"critical": 0, "high": 0, "medium": 0, "low": 0}
for f in result.findings:
if f.severity in counts:
counts[f.severity] += 1
return {
"name": result.skill_name,
"identifier": ident,
"source": result.source,
"trust_level": result.trust_level,
"verdict": result.verdict,
"summary": result.summary,
"policy": policy,
"policy_reason": reason,
"findings": findings,
"severity_counts": counts,
}
try:
result = await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("skills hub scan failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail=f"Hub scan failed: {exc}")
if result is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Skill not found: {ident}")
return result
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Profile management endpoints (minimal — list/create/rename/delete + SOUL.md)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class ProfileCreate(BaseModel):
name: str
clone_from: Optional[str] = None
# Backward compatibility for older dashboard/desktop clients. New clients
# send clone_from="default" (or another profile name) explicitly.
clone_from_default: bool = False
clone_all: bool = False
no_skills: bool = False
description: Optional[str] = None
provider: Optional[str] = None
model: Optional[str] = None
# Profile-builder additions — all optional, all applied best-effort AFTER
# the profile directory exists, so a hiccup in any of them never 500s the
# create (the user can fix it from the relevant dashboard page afterward).
# MCP servers to write into the new profile's config.yaml.
mcp_servers: List["MCPServerCreate"] = []
# Built-in / optional skills to KEEP active. When this list is non-empty,
# the builder uses "replace" semantics: the bundle is seeded, then every
# seeded skill NOT in this list is added to the profile's disabled list.
# Empty list = leave the seeded bundle untouched (legacy behaviour).
keep_skills: List[str] = []
# Skills-hub identifiers to install into the new profile. Installed async
# via a subprocess scoped to the profile (`hermes -p <name> skills install`)
# because skills_hub.SKILLS_DIR is import-time-bound and the HERMES_HOME
# override can't redirect it. Returns spawned PIDs for the UI to poll.
hub_skills: List[str] = []
class ProfileRename(BaseModel):
new_name: str
class ProfileSoulUpdate(BaseModel):
content: str
class ProfileActiveUpdate(BaseModel):
name: str
class ProfileDescriptionUpdate(BaseModel):
description: str = ""
class ProfileModelUpdate(BaseModel):
provider: str
model: str
class ProfileDescribeAuto(BaseModel):
overwrite: bool = False
def _profile_attr(info, name: str, default: Any = None) -> Any:
try:
return getattr(info, name)
except Exception:
return default
def _profile_to_dict(info) -> Dict[str, Any]:
return {
"name": _profile_attr(info, "name", ""),
"path": str(_profile_attr(info, "path", "")),
"is_default": bool(_profile_attr(info, "is_default", False)),
"model": _profile_attr(info, "model"),
"provider": _profile_attr(info, "provider"),
"has_env": bool(_profile_attr(info, "has_env", False)),
"skill_count": int(_profile_attr(info, "skill_count", 0) or 0),
"gateway_running": bool(_profile_attr(info, "gateway_running", False)),
"description": _profile_attr(info, "description", "") or "",
"description_auto": bool(_profile_attr(info, "description_auto", False)),
"distribution_name": _profile_attr(info, "distribution_name"),
"distribution_version": _profile_attr(info, "distribution_version"),
"distribution_source": _profile_attr(info, "distribution_source"),
"has_alias": _profile_attr(info, "alias_path") is not None,
}
def _fallback_profile_dicts(profiles_mod) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
def _safe(callable_, default):
try:
return callable_()
except Exception:
return default
profiles: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
default_home = profiles_mod._get_default_hermes_home()
if default_home.is_dir():
model, provider = _safe(lambda: profiles_mod._read_config_model(default_home), (None, None))
profiles.append({
"name": "default",
"path": str(default_home),
"is_default": True,
"model": model,
"provider": provider,
"has_env": (default_home / ".env").exists(),
"skill_count": _safe(lambda: profiles_mod._count_skills(default_home), 0),
"gateway_running": _safe(lambda: profiles_mod._check_gateway_running(default_home), False),
"description": _safe(lambda: profiles_mod.read_profile_meta(default_home).get("description", ""), ""),
"description_auto": _safe(lambda: profiles_mod.read_profile_meta(default_home).get("description_auto", False), False),
"distribution_name": None,
"distribution_version": None,
"distribution_source": None,
"has_alias": False,
})
profiles_root = profiles_mod._get_profiles_root()
if profiles_root.is_dir():
for entry in sorted(profiles_root.iterdir()):
if not entry.is_dir() or not profiles_mod._PROFILE_ID_RE.match(entry.name):
continue
model, provider = _safe(lambda entry=entry: profiles_mod._read_config_model(entry), (None, None))
profiles.append({
"name": entry.name,
"path": str(entry),
"is_default": False,
"model": model,
"provider": provider,
"has_env": (entry / ".env").exists(),
"skill_count": _safe(lambda entry=entry: profiles_mod._count_skills(entry), 0),
"gateway_running": _safe(lambda entry=entry: profiles_mod._check_gateway_running(entry), False),
"description": _safe(lambda entry=entry: profiles_mod.read_profile_meta(entry).get("description", ""), ""),
"description_auto": _safe(lambda entry=entry: profiles_mod.read_profile_meta(entry).get("description_auto", False), False),
"distribution_name": None,
"distribution_version": None,
"distribution_source": None,
"has_alias": False,
})
return profiles
def _resolve_profile_dir(name: str) -> Path:
"""Validate ``name`` and resolve to its directory or raise an HTTPException."""
from hermes_cli import profiles as profiles_mod
try:
profiles_mod.validate_profile_name(name)
except ValueError as e:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(e))
if not profiles_mod.profile_exists(name):
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Profile '{name}' does not exist.")
return profiles_mod.get_profile_dir(name)
def _profile_setup_command(name: str) -> str:
"""Return the shell command used to configure a profile in the CLI."""
_resolve_profile_dir(name)
return "hermes setup" if name == "default" else f"{name} setup"
def _write_profile_model(profile_dir: Path, provider: str, model: str) -> None:
"""Write the main model assignment into a specific profile's config.yaml.
Scopes ``load_config``/``save_config`` to ``profile_dir`` via the
context-local HERMES_HOME override so the write lands in the target
profile's config rather than the dashboard process's active profile.
Clears any stale ``base_url`` / ``context_length`` the same way
``POST /api/model/set`` does, since the new model may differ.
"""
from hermes_constants import set_hermes_home_override, reset_hermes_home_override
token = set_hermes_home_override(str(profile_dir))
try:
provider, model = _normalize_main_model_assignment(provider, model)
cfg = load_config()
cfg["model"] = _apply_main_model_assignment(cfg.get("model", {}), provider, model)
save_config(cfg)
finally:
reset_hermes_home_override(token)
def _write_profile_mcp_servers(profile_dir: Path, servers: List["MCPServerCreate"]) -> int:
"""Write MCP server entries into a specific profile's config.yaml.
Scopes ``load_config``/``save_config`` to ``profile_dir`` via the
context-local HERMES_HOME override (same mechanism as
``_write_profile_model``) so the entries land in the target profile's
config rather than the dashboard process's active profile.
Mirrors the per-server shape the ``POST /api/mcp/servers`` endpoint builds,
but batched so the whole profile-create write is a single config save.
Returns the number of servers written.
"""
from hermes_constants import set_hermes_home_override, reset_hermes_home_override
from hermes_cli.mcp_config import _save_bearer_auth_token
written = 0
token = set_hermes_home_override(str(profile_dir))
try:
cfg = load_config()
mcp = cfg.setdefault("mcp_servers", {})
for server in servers:
try:
name, entry, bearer_token = _normalize_mcp_server_create(server)
except ValueError as exc:
display_name = (server.name or "").strip() or "<unnamed>"
_log.warning(
"Profile-create: skipping MCP server '%s': %s",
display_name,
exc,
)
continue
if bearer_token is not None:
entry["headers"] = _save_bearer_auth_token(name, bearer_token)
mcp[name] = entry
written += 1
if written:
save_config(cfg)
elif not mcp:
# We created an empty mcp_servers dict but wrote nothing — don't
# leave a stray empty key in the new profile's config.
cfg.pop("mcp_servers", None)
save_config(cfg)
finally:
reset_hermes_home_override(token)
return written
def _disable_unselected_skills(profile_dir: Path, keep: List[str]) -> int:
"""Disable every installed skill in ``profile_dir`` not in ``keep``.
Profiles manage skill activation via a *disabled* list — all installed
skills are active by default and users opt out. The builder's skill step
uses "replace" semantics: the user picks exactly which seeded built-in /
optional skills stay active, and everything else gets added to the disabled
list. (Hub skills are installed separately via subprocess and are active on
install.) Scoped to the profile via the HERMES_HOME override. Returns the
number of skills newly disabled.
"""
from hermes_constants import set_hermes_home_override, reset_hermes_home_override
from hermes_cli.skills_config import get_disabled_skills, save_disabled_skills
keep_set = {s.strip() for s in keep if s and s.strip()}
disabled_count = 0
token = set_hermes_home_override(str(profile_dir))
try:
installed: List[str] = []
skills_root = profile_dir / "skills"
if skills_root.is_dir():
for md in skills_root.rglob("SKILL.md"):
installed.append(md.parent.name)
cfg = load_config()
disabled = get_disabled_skills(cfg)
for name in installed:
if name not in keep_set and name not in disabled:
disabled.add(name)
disabled_count += 1
if disabled_count:
save_disabled_skills(cfg, disabled)
finally:
reset_hermes_home_override(token)
return disabled_count
@app.get("/api/profiles")
async def list_profiles_endpoint():
from hermes_cli import profiles as profiles_mod
try:
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
profiles = await loop.run_in_executor(None, profiles_mod.list_profiles)
return {"profiles": [_profile_to_dict(p) for p in profiles]}
except Exception:
_log.exception("GET /api/profiles failed; falling back to profile directory scan")
return {"profiles": _fallback_profile_dicts(profiles_mod)}
@app.post("/api/profiles")
async def create_profile_endpoint(body: ProfileCreate):
from hermes_cli import profiles as profiles_mod
explicit_source = (body.clone_from or "").strip()
if explicit_source:
# Duplicating a specific profile: clone its config/skills/SOUL (or full
# state when clone_all) from the named source rather than "default".
clone = True
clone_from = explicit_source
clone_config = not body.clone_all
elif body.clone_all:
# Preserve the dashboard's historical clone-all behavior: a full-copy
# request with no explicit dropdown source copies from default.
clone = True
clone_from = "default"
clone_config = False
else:
clone = body.clone_from_default
clone_from = "default" if clone else None
clone_config = clone
try:
path = profiles_mod.create_profile(
name=body.name,
clone_from=clone_from,
clone_all=body.clone_all,
clone_config=clone_config,
no_skills=body.no_skills,
description=body.description,
)
# Match the CLI's profile-create flow: fresh named profiles get the
# bundled skills installed. When cloning from default, create_profile()
# has already copied the source profile's skills, including any
# user-installed skills. When no_skills=True, create_profile() wrote
# the opt-out marker and seed_profile_skills() will no-op.
if not clone:
profiles_mod.seed_profile_skills(path, quiet=True)
# Match the CLI's profile-create flow: named profiles should get a
# wrapper in ~/.local/bin when the alias is safe to create.
collision = profiles_mod.check_alias_collision(body.name)
if not collision:
profiles_mod.create_wrapper_script(body.name)
except (ValueError, FileExistsError, FileNotFoundError) as e:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(e))
except Exception as e:
_log.exception("POST /api/profiles failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=str(e))
# Optional explicit model assignment for the new profile. Best-effort:
# the profile already exists, so a model-write hiccup must not 500 the
# whole create — the user can set the model later from the Models page
# or `<profile> setup`.
provider = (body.provider or "").strip()
model = (body.model or "").strip()
model_set = False
if provider and model:
try:
_write_profile_model(path, provider, model)
model_set = True
except Exception:
_log.exception("Setting model for new profile %s failed", body.name)
# Optional MCP servers. Best-effort, same rationale as model assignment.
mcp_written = 0
if body.mcp_servers:
try:
mcp_written = _write_profile_mcp_servers(path, body.mcp_servers)
except Exception:
_log.exception("Writing MCP servers for new profile %s failed", body.name)
# Optional "keep" skill selection — replace semantics. When the builder
# sends an explicit keep list, disable every seeded skill not in it.
# Best-effort. Skipped when keep_skills is empty (legacy: keep the bundle).
skills_disabled = 0
if body.keep_skills:
try:
skills_disabled = _disable_unselected_skills(path, body.keep_skills)
except Exception:
_log.exception("Applying skill selection for new profile %s failed", body.name)
# Optional skills-hub installs. Spawned async, scoped to the new profile
# via `-p <name>` (a fresh subprocess re-binds skills_hub.SKILLS_DIR to the
# profile's HERMES_HOME at import). Returns PIDs for the UI to poll.
hub_installs: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for identifier in body.hub_skills:
ident = (identifier or "").strip()
if not ident:
continue
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(
["-p", body.name, "skills", "install", ident, "--yes"],
_hub_action_name("install", ident),
)
hub_installs.append({"identifier": ident, "pid": proc.pid})
except Exception:
_log.exception(
"Spawning hub-skill install %s for new profile %s failed",
ident,
body.name,
)
hub_installs.append({"identifier": ident, "pid": None})
return {
"ok": True,
"name": body.name,
"path": str(path),
"model_set": model_set,
"mcp_written": mcp_written,
"skills_disabled": skills_disabled,
"hub_installs": hub_installs,
}
@app.get("/api/profiles/active")
async def get_active_profile_endpoint():
"""Return the sticky active profile and the profile this dashboard
process is currently running as.
``active`` is the sticky default written by ``hermes profile use`` —
the profile new CLI invocations pick up. ``current`` is the profile
the running dashboard/gateway is scoped to (derived from HERMES_HOME).
"""
from hermes_cli import profiles as profiles_mod
try:
active = profiles_mod.get_active_profile() or "default"
except Exception:
active = "default"
try:
current = profiles_mod.get_active_profile_name() or "default"
except Exception:
current = "default"
return {"active": active, "current": current}
@app.post("/api/profiles/active")
async def set_active_profile_endpoint(body: ProfileActiveUpdate):
"""Set the sticky active profile (mirrors ``hermes profile use``).
Note: this does not retarget the already-running dashboard process —
it changes which profile subsequent CLI commands and gateways use.
"""
from hermes_cli import profiles as profiles_mod
try:
profiles_mod.set_active_profile(body.name)
except FileNotFoundError as e:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=str(e))
except ValueError as e:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(e))
except Exception as e:
_log.exception("POST /api/profiles/active failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=str(e))
return {"ok": True, "active": profiles_mod.normalize_profile_name(body.name)}
@app.get("/api/profiles/{name}/setup-command")
async def get_profile_setup_command(name: str):
return {"command": _profile_setup_command(name)}
@app.post("/api/profiles/{name}/open-terminal")
async def open_profile_terminal_endpoint(name: str):
try:
command = _profile_setup_command(name)
if sys.platform.startswith("win"):
subprocess.Popen(["cmd.exe", "/c", "start", "", command])
elif sys.platform == "darwin":
escaped = command.replace("\\", "\\\\").replace('"', '\\"')
applescript = (
'tell application "Terminal"\n'
"activate\n"
f'do script "{escaped}"\n'
"end tell"
)
subprocess.Popen(["osascript", "-e", applescript])
else:
terminal_commands = [
("x-terminal-emulator", ["x-terminal-emulator", "-e", "sh", "-lc", command]),
("gnome-terminal", ["gnome-terminal", "--", "sh", "-lc", command]),
("konsole", ["konsole", "-e", "sh", "-lc", command]),
("xfce4-terminal", ["xfce4-terminal", "-e", f"sh -lc '{command}'"]),
("mate-terminal", ["mate-terminal", "-e", f"sh -lc '{command}'"]),
("lxterminal", ["lxterminal", "-e", f"sh -lc '{command}'"]),
("tilix", ["tilix", "-e", "sh", "-lc", command]),
("alacritty", ["alacritty", "-e", "sh", "-lc", command]),
("kitty", ["kitty", "sh", "-lc", command]),
("xterm", ["xterm", "-e", "sh", "-lc", command]),
]
for executable, popen_args in terminal_commands:
if subprocess.call(
["which", executable],
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
) == 0:
subprocess.Popen(popen_args)
break
else:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="No supported terminal emulator found",
)
except FileNotFoundError as e:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=str(e))
except ValueError as e:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(e))
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as e:
_log.exception("POST /api/profiles/%s/open-terminal failed", name)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=str(e))
return {"ok": True, "command": command}
@app.patch("/api/profiles/{name}")
async def rename_profile_endpoint(name: str, body: ProfileRename):
from hermes_cli import profiles as profiles_mod
try:
path = profiles_mod.rename_profile(name, body.new_name)
except FileNotFoundError as e:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=str(e))
except (ValueError, FileExistsError) as e:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(e))
except Exception as e:
_log.exception("PATCH /api/profiles/%s failed", name)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=str(e))
return {"ok": True, "name": body.new_name, "path": str(path)}
@app.delete("/api/profiles/{name}")
async def delete_profile_endpoint(name: str):
"""Delete a profile. The dashboard collects the user's confirmation in
its own dialog before this request, so we always pass ``yes=True`` to
skip the CLI's interactive prompt."""
from hermes_cli import profiles as profiles_mod
try:
path = profiles_mod.delete_profile(name, yes=True)
except FileNotFoundError as e:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=str(e))
except ValueError as e:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(e))
except Exception as e:
_log.exception("DELETE /api/profiles/%s failed", name)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=str(e))
return {"ok": True, "path": str(path)}
@app.get("/api/profiles/{name}/soul")
async def get_profile_soul(name: str):
soul_path = _resolve_profile_dir(name) / "SOUL.md"
if soul_path.exists():
try:
return {"content": soul_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"), "exists": True}
except OSError as e:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not read SOUL.md: {e}")
return {"content": "", "exists": False}
@app.put("/api/profiles/{name}/soul")
async def update_profile_soul(name: str, body: ProfileSoulUpdate):
soul_path = _resolve_profile_dir(name) / "SOUL.md"
try:
soul_path.write_text(body.content, encoding="utf-8")
except OSError as e:
_log.exception("PUT /api/profiles/%s/soul failed", name)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not write SOUL.md: {e}")
return {"ok": True}
@app.put("/api/profiles/{name}/description")
async def update_profile_description_endpoint(name: str, body: ProfileDescriptionUpdate):
"""Set or clear a profile's role description (kanban routing signal).
Empty string clears the description. Non-empty stores it as a
user-authored description (``description_auto: false``) so the
auto-describer won't overwrite it on a sweep.
"""
from hermes_cli import profiles as profiles_mod
profile_dir = _resolve_profile_dir(name)
text = (body.description or "").strip()
try:
profiles_mod.write_profile_meta(
profile_dir,
description=text,
description_auto=False,
)
except Exception as e:
_log.exception("PUT /api/profiles/%s/description failed", name)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=str(e))
return {"ok": True, "description": text, "description_auto": False}
@app.put("/api/profiles/{name}/model")
async def update_profile_model_endpoint(name: str, body: ProfileModelUpdate):
"""Set the main model (``model.default`` + ``model.provider``) for a
specific profile's config.yaml, without touching the dashboard's own
active profile. Mirrors ``POST /api/model/set`` (main scope) but scoped
to the named profile via the HERMES_HOME override.
"""
profile_dir = _resolve_profile_dir(name)
provider = (body.provider or "").strip()
model = (body.model or "").strip()
if not provider or not model:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="provider and model are required")
try:
_write_profile_model(profile_dir, provider, model)
except Exception as e:
_log.exception("PUT /api/profiles/%s/model failed", name)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=str(e))
return {"ok": True, "provider": provider, "model": model}
@app.post("/api/profiles/{name}/describe-auto")
async def describe_profile_auto_endpoint(name: str, body: ProfileDescribeAuto):
"""Auto-generate a profile's description via the auxiliary LLM
(``auxiliary.profile_describer``). Mirrors ``hermes profile describe
<name> --auto``.
A failed generation (no aux client, LLM error, …) is returned as
``ok: false`` with a reason rather than an HTTP error so the UI can
surface it inline and let the operator fix config and retry.
"""
_resolve_profile_dir(name)
try:
from hermes_cli import profile_describer
outcome = profile_describer.describe_profile(name, overwrite=bool(body.overwrite))
except Exception as e:
_log.exception("POST /api/profiles/%s/describe-auto failed", name)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=str(e))
return {
"ok": bool(outcome.ok),
"reason": outcome.reason,
"description": outcome.description,
# Only a successful generation is an auto-authored description. A failed
# sweep leaves any existing description untouched, so don't claim it's
# auto-generated.
"description_auto": bool(outcome.ok),
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Skills & Tools endpoints
#
# Every read/write below accepts an optional ``profile`` query param so the
# dashboard can manage ANY profile's skills/toolsets, not just the profile
# the dashboard process happens to be running under. Without this, "Set as
# active" on the Profiles page (which only flips the sticky ``active_profile``
# file for FUTURE CLI/gateway invocations) misled users into thinking skill
# toggles would land in the activated profile — they silently wrote into the
# dashboard's own config instead. See _profile_scope() for the mechanism.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_SKILLS_PROFILE_LOCK = threading.RLock()
@contextmanager
def _profile_scope(profile: Optional[str]):
"""Scope config + skill-directory resolution to ``profile`` for one request.
Two seams must be redirected for skills/toolsets endpoints:
1. ``load_config``/``save_config`` resolve ``get_hermes_home()`` at call
time — the context-local override from ``set_hermes_home_override``
reaches them (same pattern as ``_write_profile_model``).
2. ``tools.skills_tool`` and ``tools.skill_manager_tool`` bind
``SKILLS_DIR`` at import time, so the override CANNOT reach them.
Like ``_call_cron_for_profile`` does for cron's module globals,
temporarily retarget both under a lock and restore them
immediately after.
``profile`` of None/""/"current" means "the dashboard's own profile"
config resolution is untouched, but the skill-module globals are still
retargeted to the *current* ``get_hermes_home()`` so writes land in the
live home even when the import-time binding is stale (e.g. the process
imported the modules before a HERMES_HOME override, or under test
isolation).
"""
requested = (profile or "").strip()
from hermes_constants import (
get_hermes_home,
set_hermes_home_override,
reset_hermes_home_override,
)
from tools import skills_tool as _skills_tool
from tools import skill_manager_tool as _skill_mgr
token = None
if not requested or requested.lower() == "current":
profile_dir = get_hermes_home()
else:
profile_dir = _resolve_profile_dir(requested)
token = set_hermes_home_override(str(profile_dir))
with _SKILLS_PROFILE_LOCK:
old_home = _skills_tool.HERMES_HOME
old_skills_dir = _skills_tool.SKILLS_DIR
old_mgr_home = _skill_mgr.HERMES_HOME
old_mgr_skills_dir = _skill_mgr.SKILLS_DIR
_skills_tool.HERMES_HOME = profile_dir
_skills_tool.SKILLS_DIR = profile_dir / "skills"
_skill_mgr.HERMES_HOME = profile_dir
_skill_mgr.SKILLS_DIR = profile_dir / "skills"
try:
yield profile_dir if token is not None else None
finally:
_skills_tool.HERMES_HOME = old_home
_skills_tool.SKILLS_DIR = old_skills_dir
_skill_mgr.HERMES_HOME = old_mgr_home
_skill_mgr.SKILLS_DIR = old_mgr_skills_dir
if token is not None:
reset_hermes_home_override(token)
@contextmanager
def _config_profile_scope(profile: Optional[str]):
"""Await-safe, config-only profile scope for handlers that ``await``.
Unlike ``_profile_scope`` this touches ONLY the context-local
``set_hermes_home_override`` contextvar — it does NOT swap the
process-global ``skills_tool``/``skill_manager`` module attributes.
Those globals are shared across all event-loop tasks, so holding them
across an ``await`` lets a concurrent skills request restore THIS
request's profile dir on its ``finally`` (cross-contamination). The
contextvar override is task-local and survives an ``await`` cleanly,
which is all endpoints that resolve ``get_hermes_home()`` at call time
(config, env, gateway status) actually need.
None/""/"current" means the dashboard's own profile — no override.
"""
requested = (profile or "").strip()
if not requested or requested.lower() == "current":
yield None
return
from hermes_constants import (
set_hermes_home_override,
reset_hermes_home_override,
)
profile_dir = _resolve_profile_dir(requested)
token = set_hermes_home_override(str(profile_dir))
try:
yield profile_dir
finally:
reset_hermes_home_override(token)
class SkillToggle(BaseModel):
name: str
enabled: bool
profile: Optional[str] = None
@app.get("/api/skills")
async def get_skills(profile: Optional[str] = None):
from tools.skills_tool import _find_all_skills
from hermes_cli.skills_config import get_disabled_skills
from tools.skill_usage import (
_read_bundled_manifest_names,
_read_hub_installed_names,
activity_count,
load_usage,
)
with _profile_scope(profile):
config = load_config()
disabled = get_disabled_skills(config)
skills = _find_all_skills(skip_disabled=True)
usage = load_usage()
# Set-based provenance (same classification as skill_usage.provenance,
# without a per-skill manifest read): hub > bundled > agent, where
# "agent" covers agent-authored AND local hand-made skills — the ones
# the user may edit/delete from the UI.
bundled_names = _read_bundled_manifest_names()
hub_names = _read_hub_installed_names()
for s in skills:
s["enabled"] = s["name"] not in disabled
s["usage"] = activity_count(usage.get(s["name"], {}))
s["provenance"] = (
"hub" if s["name"] in hub_names
else "bundled" if s["name"] in bundled_names
else "agent"
)
return skills
@app.put("/api/skills/toggle")
async def toggle_skill(body: SkillToggle, profile: Optional[str] = None):
from hermes_cli.skills_config import get_disabled_skills, save_disabled_skills
with _profile_scope(body.profile or profile):
config = load_config()
disabled = get_disabled_skills(config)
if body.enabled:
disabled.discard(body.name)
else:
disabled.add(body.name)
save_disabled_skills(config, disabled)
return {"ok": True, "name": body.name, "enabled": body.enabled}
class SkillCreate(BaseModel):
name: str
content: str
category: Optional[str] = None
profile: Optional[str] = None
class SkillContentUpdate(BaseModel):
name: str
content: str
profile: Optional[str] = None
def _clear_skills_prompt_cache() -> None:
"""Best-effort: invalidate the skills system-prompt snapshot after a write.
Mirrors what ``skill_manage`` does so a dashboard-authored skill is picked
up by the next session without a manual cache reset.
"""
try:
from agent.prompt_builder import clear_skills_system_prompt_cache
clear_skills_system_prompt_cache(clear_snapshot=True)
except Exception:
pass
@app.get("/api/skills/content")
async def get_skill_content(name: str, profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Return the raw SKILL.md text for a skill, for the dashboard editor."""
from tools.skill_manager_tool import _find_skill
with _profile_scope(profile):
found = _find_skill(name)
if not found:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Skill '{name}' not found.")
skill_md = found["path"] / "SKILL.md"
if not skill_md.exists():
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Skill '{name}' has no SKILL.md.")
try:
content = skill_md.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=str(exc)) from exc
return {"name": name, "content": content, "path": str(skill_md)}
@app.post("/api/skills")
async def create_skill(body: SkillCreate):
"""Create a new custom skill (SKILL.md) from the dashboard editor.
Calls the same validated write path as the agent's ``skill_manage``
tool (frontmatter validation, name/category validation, size limit,
optional security scan) — but bypasses the agent write-approval gate:
a write from the authenticated dashboard IS the user acting directly.
"""
from tools.skill_manager_tool import _create_skill
with _profile_scope(body.profile):
result = _create_skill(body.name, body.content, body.category or None)
if not result.get("success"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=result.get("error", "Failed to create skill."))
_clear_skills_prompt_cache()
return result
@app.put("/api/skills/content")
async def update_skill_content(body: SkillContentUpdate):
"""Replace the SKILL.md of an existing skill (full rewrite) from the editor."""
from tools.skill_manager_tool import _edit_skill
with _profile_scope(body.profile):
result = _edit_skill(body.name, body.content)
if not result.get("success"):
err = result.get("error", "Failed to update skill.")
status = 404 if "not found" in str(err).lower() else 400
raise HTTPException(status_code=status, detail=err)
_clear_skills_prompt_cache()
return result
@app.get("/api/tools/toolsets")
async def get_toolsets(profile: Optional[str] = None):
from hermes_cli.tools_config import (
_get_effective_configurable_toolsets,
_get_platform_tools,
_toolset_configuration_platform,
_toolset_has_keys,
gui_toolset_label,
)
from hermes_cli.platforms import platform_label
from toolsets import resolve_toolset
with _profile_scope(profile):
config = load_config()
toolset_rows = _get_effective_configurable_toolsets()
target_platforms = {
_toolset_configuration_platform(name) for name, _, _ in toolset_rows
}
enabled_by_platform = {
platform: _get_platform_tools(
config,
platform,
include_default_mcp_servers=False,
)
for platform in target_platforms
}
result = []
for name, label, desc in toolset_rows:
try:
tools = sorted(set(resolve_toolset(name)))
except Exception:
tools = []
target_platform = _toolset_configuration_platform(name)
is_enabled = name in enabled_by_platform[target_platform]
result.append({
"name": name,
"label": gui_toolset_label(label),
"description": desc,
"platform": target_platform,
"platform_label": gui_toolset_label(
platform_label(target_platform, target_platform)
),
"enabled": is_enabled,
"available": is_enabled,
"configured": _toolset_has_keys(name, config),
"tools": tools,
})
return result
class ToolsetToggle(BaseModel):
enabled: bool
profile: Optional[str] = None
@app.put("/api/tools/toolsets/{name}")
async def toggle_toolset(name: str, body: ToolsetToggle, profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Enable/disable a configurable toolset for its configuration platform.
Most toolsets persist to ``platform_toolsets.cli``. Platform-restricted
toolsets instead target their supported platform (for example, Discord's
native toolsets persist to ``platform_toolsets.discord``). The shared
``_save_platform_tools`` helper keeps the GUI and CLI in lockstep. Scoped
to ``body.profile`` when provided. Returns 400 for unknown toolset keys.
"""
from hermes_cli.tools_config import (
_get_effective_configurable_toolsets,
_get_platform_tools,
_save_platform_tools,
_toolset_configuration_platform,
)
valid = {ts_key for ts_key, _, _ in _get_effective_configurable_toolsets()}
if name not in valid:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Unknown toolset: {name}")
target_platform = _toolset_configuration_platform(name)
with _profile_scope(body.profile or profile):
config = load_config()
enabled = set(
_get_platform_tools(
config,
target_platform,
include_default_mcp_servers=False,
)
)
if body.enabled:
enabled.add(name)
else:
enabled.discard(name)
_save_platform_tools(config, target_platform, enabled)
return {
"ok": True,
"name": name,
"platform": target_platform,
"enabled": body.enabled,
}
@app.get("/api/tools/toolsets/{name}/config")
async def get_toolset_config(name: str, profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Return the provider matrix + key status for a toolset's config panel.
Surfaces the same provider rows the CLI ``hermes tools`` picker shows
(via ``_visible_providers``), each with its ``env_vars`` annotated with
current ``is_set`` state so the GUI can render provider selection + key
entry. Toolsets without a ``TOOL_CATEGORIES`` entry return an empty
provider list and ``has_category: false``. Returns 400 for unknown keys.
"""
from hermes_cli.tools_config import (
TOOL_CATEGORIES,
_get_effective_configurable_toolsets,
_is_provider_active,
_visible_providers,
provider_readiness_status,
web_provider_capabilities,
)
from hermes_cli.config import get_env_value
from hermes_cli.nous_subscription import get_nous_subscription_features
valid = {ts_key for ts_key, _, _ in _get_effective_configurable_toolsets()}
if name not in valid:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Unknown toolset: {name}")
with _profile_scope(profile):
config = load_config()
cat = TOOL_CATEGORIES.get(name)
providers = []
active_provider = None
active_search_backend = None
active_extract_backend = None
if cat:
# Fetch portal/entitlement state once for the whole matrix — the
# per-provider readiness computation below reuses it instead of
# re-probing per row.
features = get_nous_subscription_features(config, force_fresh=True)
for prov in _visible_providers(cat, config, force_fresh=True):
env_vars = [
{
"key": e["key"],
"prompt": e.get("prompt", e["key"]),
"url": e.get("url"),
"default": e.get("default"),
"is_set": bool(get_env_value(e["key"])),
}
for e in prov.get("env_vars", [])
]
# Surface the same active-provider determination the CLI picker
# uses (``_is_provider_active``) so the GUI highlights the provider
# actually written to config (e.g. web.backend), not just the first
# keyless one in the list.
is_active = _is_provider_active(prov, config, force_fresh=True)
if is_active and active_provider is None:
active_provider = prov["name"]
row = {
"name": prov["name"],
"badge": prov.get("badge", ""),
"tag": prov.get("tag", ""),
"env_vars": env_vars,
"post_setup": prov.get("post_setup"),
"requires_nous_auth": bool(prov.get("requires_nous_auth")),
"is_active": is_active,
# Honest server-side readiness. The GUI's old client-side
# heuristic showed "Ready" for every zero-env-var row —
# including logged-out Nous Subscription rows and never-run
# post_setup installs (see provider_readiness_status).
"status": provider_readiness_status(
prov, config, features=features, is_active=is_active
),
}
if name == "web" and prov.get("web_backend"):
# The runtime split web into two capabilities long ago
# (web.search_backend / web.extract_backend); surface each
# row's backend key and which capabilities it can serve so
# the GUI can offer per-capability selection.
row["web_backend"] = prov["web_backend"]
row["capabilities"] = web_provider_capabilities(prov["web_backend"])
if name == "tts" and prov.get("tts_provider"):
# The provider key written to tts.provider on selection.
# Doubles as the config section holding the provider's
# voice/model settings (tts.<key>.*) so the GUI can render
# those fields inline in the Capabilities panel.
row["tts_provider"] = prov["tts_provider"]
providers.append(row)
if name == "web":
# Resolve the per-capability active backends exactly the way the
# web_search / web_extract dispatchers do (per-capability key →
# shared web.backend → credential auto-detect), so the GUI badges
# reflect what a tool call would actually hit right now.
try:
from tools.web_tools import _get_extract_backend, _get_search_backend
active_search_backend = _get_search_backend()
active_extract_backend = _get_extract_backend()
except Exception:
active_search_backend = None
active_extract_backend = None
payload = {
"name": name,
"has_category": cat is not None,
"providers": providers,
"active_provider": active_provider,
}
if name == "web":
payload["active_search_backend"] = active_search_backend
payload["active_extract_backend"] = active_extract_backend
return payload
class ToolsetProviderSelect(BaseModel):
provider: str
# Web-only capability scope: 'search' | 'extract'. Omitted → whole-provider
# selection through the legacy apply_provider_selection path (web.backend).
capability: Optional[str] = None
profile: Optional[str] = None
# Toolsets whose backends carry a selectable model catalog, mapped to the
# config.yaml section their `model` key lives in. Mirrors the CLI's
# post-selection model pickers (`_configure_imagegen_model_for_plugin` /
# `_configure_videogen_model_for_plugin` in tools_config.py).
_MODEL_CATALOG_TOOLSETS = {
"image_gen": "image_gen",
"video_gen": "video_gen",
}
def _resolve_toolset_model_plugin(ts_key: str, provider_row: dict) -> Optional[str]:
"""Map a provider picker row to its model-catalog plugin name.
Plugin-backed rows carry ``image_gen_plugin_name`` / ``video_gen_plugin_name``;
the managed "Nous Subscription" image row instead carries the legacy
``imagegen_backend: "fal"`` marker (same underlying FAL catalog).
"""
if ts_key == "image_gen":
return provider_row.get("image_gen_plugin_name") or (
"fal" if provider_row.get("imagegen_backend") else None
)
if ts_key == "video_gen":
return provider_row.get("video_gen_plugin_name")
return None
def _toolset_model_catalog(ts_key: str, plugin_name: str):
"""Return ``(catalog_dict, default_model)`` for a toolset's plugin backend."""
from hermes_cli.tools_config import (
_plugin_image_gen_catalog,
_plugin_video_gen_catalog,
)
if ts_key == "image_gen":
return _plugin_image_gen_catalog(plugin_name)
return _plugin_video_gen_catalog(plugin_name)
def _find_toolset_provider_row(ts_key: str, config: dict, provider: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict]:
"""Resolve a provider picker row by name, or the active row when omitted."""
from hermes_cli.tools_config import (
TOOL_CATEGORIES,
_is_provider_active,
_visible_providers,
)
cat = TOOL_CATEGORIES.get(ts_key)
if cat is None:
return None
rows = _visible_providers(cat, config, force_fresh=True)
if provider:
return next((p for p in rows if p.get("name") == provider), None)
return next(
(p for p in rows if _is_provider_active(p, config, force_fresh=True)), None
)
@app.get("/api/tools/toolsets/{name}/models")
async def get_toolset_models(
name: str, provider: Optional[str] = None, profile: Optional[str] = None
):
"""Return the model catalog for a toolset backend (image/video gen).
The GUI counterpart of the model picker `hermes tools` runs after a
backend is selected — e.g. FAL's multi-model catalog (speed / strengths /
price per model). ``provider`` names a picker row; omitted, the currently
active provider is used. Toolsets without model catalogs return
``has_models: false``.
"""
section = _MODEL_CATALOG_TOOLSETS.get(name)
if section is None:
return {"name": name, "has_models": False, "models": [], "current": None, "default": None}
with _profile_scope(profile):
config = load_config()
row = _find_toolset_provider_row(name, config, provider)
plugin = _resolve_toolset_model_plugin(name, row) if row else None
if not plugin:
return {
"name": name,
"has_models": False,
"models": [],
"current": None,
"default": None,
}
catalog, default_model = _toolset_model_catalog(name, plugin)
section_cfg = config.get(section)
current = None
if isinstance(section_cfg, dict):
raw = section_cfg.get("model")
if isinstance(raw, str) and raw.strip():
current = raw.strip()
if current not in catalog:
current = default_model if default_model in catalog else None
models = [
{
"id": model_id,
"display": meta.get("display", model_id),
"speed": meta.get("speed", ""),
"strengths": meta.get("strengths", ""),
"price": meta.get("price", ""),
}
for model_id, meta in catalog.items()
]
return {
"name": name,
"has_models": bool(models),
"provider": row.get("name") if row else None,
"plugin": plugin,
"models": models,
"current": current,
"default": default_model,
}
class ToolsetModelSelect(BaseModel):
model: str
provider: Optional[str] = None
profile: Optional[str] = None
@app.put("/api/tools/toolsets/{name}/model")
async def select_toolset_model(
name: str, body: ToolsetModelSelect, profile: Optional[str] = None
):
"""Persist a backend model selection (``image_gen.model`` / ``video_gen.model``).
Validates the model against the resolved backend's catalog — the same
write the CLI's post-selection model picker performs. Returns 400 for
toolsets without model catalogs or unknown model ids.
"""
section = _MODEL_CATALOG_TOOLSETS.get(name)
if section is None:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400, detail=f"Toolset has no model catalog: {name}"
)
model_id = (body.model or "").strip()
if not model_id:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="model is required")
with _profile_scope(body.profile or profile):
config = load_config()
row = _find_toolset_provider_row(name, config, body.provider)
plugin = _resolve_toolset_model_plugin(name, row) if row else None
if not plugin:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"No model-capable backend is active for {name}",
)
catalog, _default = _toolset_model_catalog(name, plugin)
if model_id not in catalog:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"Unknown model {model_id!r} for backend {plugin!r}",
)
section_cfg = config.setdefault(section, {})
if not isinstance(section_cfg, dict):
section_cfg = {}
config[section] = section_cfg
section_cfg["model"] = model_id
save_config(config)
return {"ok": True, "name": name, "model": model_id, "plugin": plugin}
@app.put("/api/tools/toolsets/{name}/provider")
async def select_toolset_provider(
name: str, body: ToolsetProviderSelect, profile: Optional[str] = None
):
"""Persist a provider selection for a toolset (no key prompting).
Delegates to ``apply_provider_selection`` — the shared, non-interactive
core extracted from the CLI configurator — so the GUI and ``hermes tools``
write identical config keys (``web.backend``, ``tts.provider``, etc.).
API keys and post-setup flows are handled by separate endpoints. Returns
400 for unknown toolset or provider names.
For the ``web`` toolset only, an optional ``capability`` ('search' |
'extract') scopes the selection to ``web.search_backend`` /
``web.extract_backend`` — the same per-capability overrides the runtime
dispatchers (``tools.web_tools._get_search_backend`` /
``_get_extract_backend``) resolve first. The provider must actually
support the requested capability (a search-only backend can't be the
extract backend). Omitting ``capability`` keeps the legacy whole-provider
behavior (writes ``web.backend``).
Managed Nous rows (``managed_nous_feature``) additionally report the
Portal entitlement state: the CLI flow gates these selections on
``ensure_nous_portal_access`` (inline login), but the GUI has no inline
prompt, so selecting one while logged out / unentitled used to write the
config keys and then never activate (``_is_provider_active`` requires
``managed_by_nous``). The response now carries an additive
``needs_nous_auth: true`` + ``feature`` so the client can drive the
existing Nous Portal OAuth flow (``POST /api/providers/oauth/nous/start``)
and refetch.
"""
from hermes_cli.tools_config import (
TOOL_CATEGORIES,
apply_provider_selection,
web_provider_capabilities,
_get_effective_configurable_toolsets,
_visible_providers,
)
from hermes_cli.nous_subscription import (
MANAGED_FEATURE_COVERAGE_CATEGORY,
get_nous_subscription_features,
)
valid = {ts_key for ts_key, _, _ in _get_effective_configurable_toolsets()}
if name not in valid:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Unknown toolset: {name}")
if body.capability is not None:
if name != "web":
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="capability selection is only supported for the web toolset",
)
if body.capability not in ("search", "extract"):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"Unknown capability: {body.capability!r} (expected 'search' or 'extract')",
)
with _profile_scope(body.profile or profile):
config = load_config()
if body.capability is not None:
# Per-capability path: resolve the picker row to its backend key
# and write web.<capability>_backend. Does NOT touch web.backend,
# so the other capability keeps resolving through the shared
# fallback chain.
cat = TOOL_CATEGORIES.get(name)
providers = _visible_providers(cat, config, force_fresh=True) if cat else []
prov = next((p for p in providers if p.get("name") == body.provider), None)
if prov is None:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"Unknown provider {body.provider!r} for toolset {name!r}",
)
backend = prov.get("web_backend")
if not backend:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"Provider {body.provider!r} has no web backend key",
)
if body.capability not in web_provider_capabilities(backend):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"{body.provider} does not support {body.capability}",
)
web_cfg = config.setdefault("web", {})
if not isinstance(web_cfg, dict):
web_cfg = {}
config["web"] = web_cfg
web_cfg[f"{body.capability}_backend"] = backend
else:
try:
apply_provider_selection(name, body.provider, config)
except KeyError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc).strip('"'))
save_config(config)
response: Dict[str, Any] = {"ok": True, "name": name, "provider": body.provider}
if body.capability is not None:
response["capability"] = body.capability
# Entitlement check for managed Nous rows — mirrors the gate the CLI
# applies via ensure_nous_portal_access at selection time.
cat = TOOL_CATEGORIES.get(name)
row = None
if cat:
row = next(
(
p
for p in _visible_providers(cat, config, force_fresh=True)
if p.get("name") == body.provider
),
None,
)
managed_feature = (row or {}).get("managed_nous_feature")
if managed_feature:
features = get_nous_subscription_features(config, force_fresh=True)
acct = features.account_info
category = MANAGED_FEATURE_COVERAGE_CATEGORY.get(managed_feature)
entitled = bool(
acct
and acct.logged_in
and (
acct.tool_gateway_entitled_for(category)
if category
else acct.tool_gateway_entitled
)
)
if not entitled:
response["needs_nous_auth"] = True
response["feature"] = managed_feature
return response
class ToolsetEnvUpdate(BaseModel):
env: Dict[str, str]
profile: Optional[str] = None
@app.put("/api/tools/toolsets/{name}/env")
async def save_toolset_env(name: str, body: ToolsetEnvUpdate, profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Persist API keys for a toolset's provider env vars.
Writes each ``key: value`` to ``~/.hermes/.env`` via ``save_env_value`` —
the same store ``hermes tools`` writes when it prompts for keys. Keys are
validated against the env-var allowlist for the toolset's category (the
union of every visible provider's ``env_vars``), so the GUI can't write an
arbitrary env var through this endpoint. A blank value is treated as
"leave unchanged" and skipped. Returns the saved/skipped key lists and the
refreshed ``is_set`` status. Returns 400 for unknown toolset or env keys.
"""
from hermes_cli.tools_config import (
TOOL_CATEGORIES,
_get_effective_configurable_toolsets,
_visible_providers,
)
from hermes_cli.config import get_env_value, save_env_value
valid_ts = {ts_key for ts_key, _, _ in _get_effective_configurable_toolsets()}
if name not in valid_ts:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Unknown toolset: {name}")
with _profile_scope(body.profile or profile):
config = load_config()
cat = TOOL_CATEGORIES.get(name)
allowed: set[str] = set()
if cat:
for prov in _visible_providers(cat, config, force_fresh=True):
for e in prov.get("env_vars", []):
allowed.add(e["key"])
unknown = [k for k in body.env if k not in allowed]
if unknown:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"Unknown env var(s) for toolset {name}: {', '.join(sorted(unknown))}",
)
saved: List[str] = []
skipped: List[str] = []
for key, value in body.env.items():
if value and value.strip():
try:
save_env_value(key, value.strip())
except ValueError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc))
saved.append(key)
else:
skipped.append(key)
status = {k: bool(get_env_value(k)) for k in allowed}
return {"ok": True, "name": name, "saved": saved, "skipped": skipped, "is_set": status}
class ToolsetPostSetup(BaseModel):
key: str
profile: Optional[str] = None
@app.post("/api/tools/toolsets/{name}/post-setup")
async def run_toolset_post_setup(
name: str, body: ToolsetPostSetup, profile: Optional[str] = None
):
"""Spawn a provider's post-setup install hook as a background action.
Post-setup hooks (npm install for browser/Camofox, pip install for
KittenTTS/Piper/ddgs, cua-driver fetch, etc.) are long-running and
text-output, so this follows the spawn-action pattern: it launches
``hermes tools post-setup <key>`` and the frontend tails the log via
``GET /api/actions/tools-post-setup/status``. The ``key`` is validated
against the declared post-setup allowlist before spawning. Returns 400
for unknown toolset or post-setup key.
``profile`` spawns the hook as ``hermes -p <profile> tools post-setup``.
Most hooks install machine-level artifacts (repo node_modules, shared
pip packages) where the scope is inert, but hooks that read config or
write per-profile state must see the same HERMES_HOME the rest of the
drawer's writes targeted — so the scope is threaded for consistency.
"""
from hermes_cli.tools_config import (
_get_effective_configurable_toolsets,
valid_post_setup_keys,
)
valid_ts = {ts_key for ts_key, _, _ in _get_effective_configurable_toolsets()}
if name not in valid_ts:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Unknown toolset: {name}")
if body.key not in valid_post_setup_keys():
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400, detail=f"Unknown post-setup key: {body.key}"
)
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(
_profile_cli_args(body.profile or profile)
+ ["tools", "post-setup", body.key],
"tools-post-setup",
)
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to spawn tools post-setup")
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to run post-setup: {exc}"
)
return {"ok": True, "pid": proc.pid, "name": "tools-post-setup", "key": body.key}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Terminal execution backend picker — the GUI counterpart of terminal.backend
# in config.yaml. Each row carries a fast, defensive health probe (Docker
# daemon reachable, SSH host configured, Modal/Daytona credentials present) so
# the Capabilities panel can render Ready / Needs setup guidance instead of a
# bare enum (issues #57738 / #63783). Probes must never raise — a probe
# failure renders as a status, not a 500.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Table-driven backend metadata — kept in sync with the dispatch ladder in
# tools/terminal_tool.py::_create_environment and the terminal.backend enum
# surfaced in the desktop raw-config settings.
_TERMINAL_BACKENDS: List[Dict[str, str]] = [
{
"name": "local",
"label": "Local",
"description": "Run commands directly on this machine. No isolation.",
},
{
"name": "docker",
"label": "Docker",
"description": "Run commands in an isolated Docker container with a persistent workspace.",
},
{
"name": "singularity",
"label": "Singularity / Apptainer",
"description": "Run commands in a Singularity/Apptainer container (HPC-friendly, rootless).",
},
{
"name": "modal",
"label": "Modal",
"description": "Run commands in a Modal cloud sandbox.",
},
{
"name": "daytona",
"label": "Daytona",
"description": "Run commands in a Daytona cloud sandbox.",
},
{
"name": "ssh",
"label": "SSH",
"description": "Run commands on a remote host over SSH.",
},
]
_TERMINAL_BACKEND_NAMES = {row["name"] for row in _TERMINAL_BACKENDS}
def _terminal_cfg_value(terminal_cfg: dict, key: str, env_var: str) -> str:
"""Read a terminal.* setting from config.yaml, falling back to its env var."""
value = terminal_cfg.get(key)
if value is not None and str(value).strip():
return str(value).strip()
try:
from hermes_cli.config import get_env_value
return (get_env_value(env_var) or "").strip()
except Exception:
return ""
def _probe_docker_backend() -> tuple:
if not shutil.which("docker"):
return (
"needs_setup",
"Docker CLI not found — install Docker Desktop or docker-ce.",
)
try:
proc = subprocess.run(
["docker", "info", "--format", "{{.ServerVersion}}"],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=2,
)
if proc.returncode == 0:
return ("ready", "")
return (
"needs_setup",
"Docker daemon not reachable — start Docker and retry.",
)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
return ("needs_setup", "Docker daemon not responding (timed out).")
except Exception as exc:
return ("unavailable", f"Docker probe failed: {exc}")
def _probe_singularity_backend() -> tuple:
if shutil.which("singularity") or shutil.which("apptainer"):
return ("ready", "")
return (
"needs_setup",
"Neither singularity nor apptainer found on PATH.",
)
def _probe_ssh_backend(terminal_cfg: dict) -> tuple:
host = _terminal_cfg_value(terminal_cfg, "ssh_host", "TERMINAL_SSH_HOST")
user = _terminal_cfg_value(terminal_cfg, "ssh_user", "TERMINAL_SSH_USER")
missing = []
if not host:
missing.append("terminal.ssh_host")
if not user:
missing.append("terminal.ssh_user")
if missing:
return (
"needs_setup",
f"Set {' and '.join(missing)} in config.yaml (or the matching TERMINAL_SSH_* env vars).",
)
return ("ready", f"{user}@{host}")
def _probe_modal_backend() -> tuple:
try:
from tools.tool_backend_helpers import has_direct_modal_credentials
if has_direct_modal_credentials():
return ("ready", "")
except Exception:
pass
try:
from hermes_cli.config import get_env_value
if get_env_value("MODAL_TOKEN_ID") and get_env_value("MODAL_TOKEN_SECRET"):
return ("ready", "")
except Exception:
pass
return (
"needs_setup",
"Modal credentials not found — set MODAL_TOKEN_ID and MODAL_TOKEN_SECRET (or run `modal setup`).",
)
def _probe_daytona_backend() -> tuple:
try:
from hermes_cli.config import get_env_value
if get_env_value("DAYTONA_API_KEY"):
return ("ready", "")
except Exception:
pass
return ("needs_setup", "Set DAYTONA_API_KEY to use the Daytona backend.")
def _probe_terminal_backend(name: str, terminal_cfg: dict) -> tuple:
"""Return ``(status, detail)`` for one backend. Never raises."""
try:
if name == "local":
return ("ready", "")
if name == "docker":
return _probe_docker_backend()
if name == "singularity":
return _probe_singularity_backend()
if name == "ssh":
return _probe_ssh_backend(terminal_cfg)
if name == "modal":
return _probe_modal_backend()
if name == "daytona":
return _probe_daytona_backend()
return ("unavailable", f"Unknown backend: {name}")
except Exception as exc: # pragma: no cover — belt-and-braces guard
return ("unavailable", f"Probe failed: {exc}")
@app.get("/api/tools/terminal/backends")
async def get_terminal_backends(profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Terminal execution backend rows with health probes for the picker panel.
Returns ``{active, backends: [{name, label, description, active, status,
detail}]}`` where ``status`` is ``ready`` / ``needs_setup`` /
``unavailable`` and ``detail`` carries setup guidance for non-ready rows.
Probes are fast (<~2s each) and defensive — a probe failure surfaces as a
status, never an error response.
"""
with _profile_scope(profile):
config = load_config()
terminal_cfg = config.get("terminal")
if not isinstance(terminal_cfg, dict):
terminal_cfg = {}
active = str(terminal_cfg.get("backend") or "local").strip().lower()
if active not in _TERMINAL_BACKEND_NAMES:
active = "local"
backends = []
for row in _TERMINAL_BACKENDS:
status, detail = _probe_terminal_backend(row["name"], terminal_cfg)
backends.append({
"name": row["name"],
"label": row["label"],
"description": row["description"],
"active": row["name"] == active,
"status": status,
"detail": detail,
})
return {"active": active, "backends": backends}
class TerminalBackendSelect(BaseModel):
backend: str
profile: Optional[str] = None
@app.put("/api/tools/terminal/backend")
async def select_terminal_backend(
body: TerminalBackendSelect, profile: Optional[str] = None
):
"""Persist ``terminal.backend`` in config.yaml.
Validates against the known backend set (the same enum the raw-config
settings row exposes). Selecting a backend that still needs setup is
allowed — the picker shows guidance instead of blocking, matching the CLI.
"""
backend = (body.backend or "").strip().lower()
if backend not in _TERMINAL_BACKEND_NAMES:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"Unknown terminal backend: {body.backend!r}. "
f"Use one of: {', '.join(sorted(_TERMINAL_BACKEND_NAMES))}",
)
with _profile_scope(body.profile or profile):
config = load_config()
terminal_cfg = config.setdefault("terminal", {})
if not isinstance(terminal_cfg, dict):
terminal_cfg = {}
config["terminal"] = terminal_cfg
terminal_cfg["backend"] = backend
save_config(config)
return {"ok": True, "backend": backend}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Computer Use (cua-driver) — cross-platform readiness + macOS permission grant
#
# cua-driver runs on macOS, Windows, and Linux. The desktop card reflects
# per-OS readiness: on macOS the Accessibility + Screen Recording TCC grants
# (which attach to cua-driver's OWN identity, com.trycua.driver — not Hermes,
# so no app entitlement is involved); elsewhere, driver health from
# `cua-driver doctor`. The grant flow is macOS-only (no TCC toggles to request
# on Windows/Linux).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@app.get("/api/tools/computer-use/status")
async def get_computer_use_status(profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Cross-platform Computer Use readiness for the desktop card.
See ``tools.computer_use.permissions.computer_use_status`` for the payload
shape. Read-only and fast (shells ``cua-driver doctor`` + macOS
``permissions status``).
"""
from tools.computer_use.permissions import computer_use_status
with _profile_scope(profile):
return computer_use_status()
@app.post("/api/tools/computer-use/permissions/grant")
async def grant_computer_use_permissions(profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Spawn ``hermes computer-use permissions grant`` as a background action.
macOS-only: ``cua-driver permissions grant`` launches CuaDriver via
LaunchServices so the TCC dialog is attributed to com.trycua.driver, then
waits for approval. The frontend polls ``GET /api/actions/computer-use-
grant/status`` and re-reads ``/status`` once it exits. Windows/Linux have
no TCC toggles to grant, so this returns 400 there.
"""
if sys.platform != "darwin":
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="Computer Use permission grants are a macOS concept.",
)
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(
_profile_cli_args(profile)
+ ["computer-use", "permissions", "grant"],
"computer-use-grant",
)
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to spawn computer-use permissions grant")
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to request permissions: {exc}"
)
return {"ok": True, "pid": proc.pid, "name": "computer-use-grant"}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Raw YAML config endpoint
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class RawConfigUpdate(BaseModel):
yaml_text: str
profile: Optional[str] = None
@app.get("/api/config/raw")
async def get_config_raw(profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Raw config.yaml text plus its resolved path.
``path`` is resolved inside ``_profile_scope`` so the Config page header
shows the file the switched profile actually reads/writes — /api/status's
``config_path`` is machine-global and always reports the dashboard
process's own profile, which is wrong under the global profile switcher.
"""
with _profile_scope(profile):
path = get_config_path()
if not path.exists():
return {"yaml": "", "path": str(path)}
return {"yaml": path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"), "path": str(path)}
@app.put("/api/config/raw")
async def update_config_raw(body: RawConfigUpdate, profile: Optional[str] = None):
try:
parsed = yaml.safe_load(body.yaml_text)
if not isinstance(parsed, dict):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="YAML must be a mapping")
with _profile_scope(body.profile or profile):
# Full-document replacement: the editor owns the whole file; do not
# merge omitted sections back from disk (#62723).
save_config(parsed, merge_existing=False)
return {"ok": True}
except yaml.YAMLError as e:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Invalid YAML: {e}")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Token / cost analytics endpoint
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _aux_usage_rows(db, cutoff: float) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Per-(model, task) auxiliary usage within the window (issue #23270).
Reads the task-dimension rows (task != '') that record_auxiliary_usage
writes into session_model_usage. Returns [] when the table predates the
task column (older DB opened read-only by newer code).
"""
try:
cur = db._conn.execute("""
SELECT u.model,
u.task,
u.billing_provider,
SUM(u.input_tokens) as input_tokens,
SUM(u.output_tokens) as output_tokens,
SUM(u.cache_read_tokens) as cache_read_tokens,
SUM(u.reasoning_tokens) as reasoning_tokens,
COALESCE(SUM(u.estimated_cost_usd), 0) as estimated_cost,
COUNT(DISTINCT u.session_id) as sessions,
SUM(COALESCE(u.api_call_count, 0)) as api_calls,
MAX(u.last_seen) as last_used_at
FROM session_model_usage u
JOIN sessions s ON s.id = u.session_id
WHERE s.started_at > ? AND u.task != ''
GROUP BY u.model, u.task, u.billing_provider
ORDER BY SUM(u.input_tokens) + SUM(u.output_tokens) DESC
""", (cutoff,))
return [dict(r) for r in cur.fetchall()]
except Exception:
# Table predates the task column (older DB opened by newer code) —
# aux breakdown is simply unavailable.
return []
def _merge_aux_into_by_model(
by_model: List[Dict[str, Any]], aux_rows: List[Dict[str, Any]]
) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Fold aux usage rows into the sessions-derived per-model list.
Aux usage lives only in session_model_usage (never in the sessions
counters), so adding it here cannot double-count. Models that ONLY
appear via aux calls (e.g. a dedicated vision model) get their own
entry — previously they were entirely invisible.
"""
if not aux_rows:
return by_model
merged: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
for row in by_model:
merged[row.get("model") or "unknown"] = row
for aux in aux_rows:
model = aux.get("model") or "unknown"
target = merged.get(model)
if target is None:
target = {
"model": model,
"input_tokens": 0,
"output_tokens": 0,
"estimated_cost": 0,
"sessions": 0,
"api_calls": 0,
}
merged[model] = target
target["input_tokens"] = (target.get("input_tokens") or 0) + (aux.get("input_tokens") or 0)
target["output_tokens"] = (target.get("output_tokens") or 0) + (aux.get("output_tokens") or 0)
target["estimated_cost"] = (target.get("estimated_cost") or 0) + (aux.get("estimated_cost") or 0)
target["api_calls"] = (target.get("api_calls") or 0) + (aux.get("api_calls") or 0)
tasks = target.setdefault("aux_tasks", [])
tasks.append({
"task": aux.get("task") or "",
"input_tokens": aux.get("input_tokens") or 0,
"output_tokens": aux.get("output_tokens") or 0,
"estimated_cost": aux.get("estimated_cost") or 0,
"api_calls": aux.get("api_calls") or 0,
})
result = list(merged.values())
result.sort(
key=lambda r: (r.get("input_tokens") or 0) + (r.get("output_tokens") or 0),
reverse=True,
)
return result
def _aux_task_summary(aux_rows: List[Dict[str, Any]]) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Aggregate aux usage rows across models into a per-task summary."""
by_task: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
for aux in aux_rows:
task = aux.get("task") or ""
d = by_task.setdefault(task, {
"task": task,
"input_tokens": 0,
"output_tokens": 0,
"estimated_cost": 0,
"api_calls": 0,
"models": [],
})
d["input_tokens"] += aux.get("input_tokens") or 0
d["output_tokens"] += aux.get("output_tokens") or 0
d["estimated_cost"] += aux.get("estimated_cost") or 0
d["api_calls"] += aux.get("api_calls") or 0
model = aux.get("model") or "unknown"
if model not in d["models"]:
d["models"].append(model)
result = list(by_task.values())
result.sort(
key=lambda r: (r.get("input_tokens") or 0) + (r.get("output_tokens") or 0),
reverse=True,
)
return result
def _get_usage_analytics(days: int = 30, profile: Optional[str] = None):
from agent.insights import InsightsEngine
db = _open_session_db_for_profile(profile)
try:
cutoff = time.time() - (days * 86400)
cur = db._conn.execute("""
SELECT date(started_at, 'unixepoch') as day,
SUM(input_tokens) as input_tokens,
SUM(output_tokens) as output_tokens,
SUM(cache_read_tokens) as cache_read_tokens,
SUM(reasoning_tokens) as reasoning_tokens,
COALESCE(SUM(estimated_cost_usd), 0) as estimated_cost,
COALESCE(SUM(actual_cost_usd), 0) as actual_cost,
COUNT(*) as sessions,
SUM(COALESCE(api_call_count, 0)) as api_calls
FROM sessions WHERE started_at > ?
GROUP BY day ORDER BY day
""", (cutoff,))
daily = [dict(r) for r in cur.fetchall()]
cur2 = db._conn.execute("""
SELECT model,
SUM(input_tokens) as input_tokens,
SUM(output_tokens) as output_tokens,
COALESCE(SUM(estimated_cost_usd), 0) as estimated_cost,
COUNT(*) as sessions,
SUM(COALESCE(api_call_count, 0)) as api_calls
FROM sessions WHERE started_at > ? AND model IS NOT NULL
GROUP BY model ORDER BY SUM(input_tokens) + SUM(output_tokens) DESC
""", (cutoff,))
by_model = [dict(r) for r in cur2.fetchall()]
# Fold in auxiliary usage (vision, compression, title_generation, ...)
# recorded per (model, task) in session_model_usage. Aux calls never
# touch the sessions counters, so this is add-only — no double count.
# Without it the models list shows only the main agent model even when
# aux models are actively burning tokens (issue #23270).
aux_rows = _aux_usage_rows(db, cutoff)
by_model = _merge_aux_into_by_model(by_model, aux_rows)
cur3 = db._conn.execute("""
SELECT SUM(input_tokens) as total_input,
SUM(output_tokens) as total_output,
SUM(cache_read_tokens) as total_cache_read,
SUM(reasoning_tokens) as total_reasoning,
COALESCE(SUM(estimated_cost_usd), 0) as total_estimated_cost,
COALESCE(SUM(actual_cost_usd), 0) as total_actual_cost,
COUNT(*) as total_sessions,
SUM(COALESCE(api_call_count, 0)) as total_api_calls
FROM sessions WHERE started_at > ?
""", (cutoff,))
totals = dict(cur3.fetchone())
insights_report = InsightsEngine(db).generate(days=days)
skills = insights_report.get("skills", {
"summary": {
"total_skill_loads": 0,
"total_skill_edits": 0,
"total_skill_actions": 0,
"distinct_skills_used": 0,
},
"top_skills": [],
})
return {
"daily": daily,
"by_model": by_model,
# Aux-task summary across models (vision, compression, ...). Lets
# the dashboard answer "what is compression costing me" directly.
"by_task": _aux_task_summary(aux_rows),
"totals": totals,
"period_days": days,
"skills": skills,
# Per-tool-name call counts (already computed by InsightsEngine);
# the desktop Capabilities page aggregates these per toolset.
"tools": insights_report.get("tools", []),
}
finally:
db.close()
@app.get("/api/analytics/usage")
async def get_usage_analytics(days: int = 30, profile: Optional[str] = None):
return await asyncio.to_thread(_get_usage_analytics, days, profile)
def _get_models_analytics(days: int = 30, profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Rich per-model analytics for the Models dashboard page.
Returns token/cost/session breakdown per model plus capability metadata
from models.dev (context window, vision, tools, reasoning, etc.).
"""
db = _open_session_db_for_profile(profile)
try:
cutoff = time.time() - (days * 86400)
cur = db._conn.execute("""
SELECT model,
billing_provider,
SUM(input_tokens) as input_tokens,
SUM(output_tokens) as output_tokens,
SUM(cache_read_tokens) as cache_read_tokens,
SUM(reasoning_tokens) as reasoning_tokens,
COALESCE(SUM(estimated_cost_usd), 0) as estimated_cost,
COALESCE(SUM(actual_cost_usd), 0) as actual_cost,
COUNT(*) as sessions,
SUM(COALESCE(api_call_count, 0)) as api_calls,
SUM(tool_call_count) as tool_calls,
MAX(started_at) as last_used_at,
AVG(input_tokens + output_tokens) as avg_tokens_per_session
FROM sessions WHERE started_at > ? AND model IS NOT NULL AND model != ''
GROUP BY model, billing_provider
ORDER BY SUM(input_tokens) + SUM(output_tokens) DESC
""", (cutoff,))
raw_rows = [dict(r) for r in cur.fetchall()]
# Add auxiliary usage as (model, provider) rows so aux-only models
# (dedicated vision/compression models) appear on the Models page
# instead of being invisible (issue #23270). Keyed by
# model+billing_provider to match the GROUP BY above.
for aux in _aux_usage_rows(db, cutoff):
raw_rows.append({
"model": aux.get("model") or "unknown",
"billing_provider": aux.get("billing_provider") or "",
"input_tokens": aux.get("input_tokens") or 0,
"output_tokens": aux.get("output_tokens") or 0,
"cache_read_tokens": aux.get("cache_read_tokens") or 0,
"reasoning_tokens": aux.get("reasoning_tokens") or 0,
"estimated_cost": aux.get("estimated_cost") or 0,
"actual_cost": 0,
"sessions": aux.get("sessions") or 0,
"api_calls": aux.get("api_calls") or 0,
"tool_calls": 0,
"last_used_at": aux.get("last_used_at"),
"avg_tokens_per_session": 0,
"aux_task": aux.get("task") or "",
})
# Session rows can be created before the first billable provider call
# finishes. If that early row records only the model name, and a later
# row for the same model has real accounting + billing_provider, the
# Models page used to show a duplicate "0 tokens / — API calls" card
# next to the real provider card. Fold those session-only rows into
# the single accounted provider row when the ownership is unambiguous.
rows_by_model: Dict[str, List[Dict[str, Any]]] = {}
for row in raw_rows:
rows_by_model.setdefault(row.get("model") or "", []).append(row)
rows: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for model_rows in rows_by_model.values():
provider_rows = [r for r in model_rows if r.get("billing_provider")]
if len(provider_rows) == 1:
target = provider_rows[0]
for row in model_rows:
if row is target or row.get("billing_provider"):
continue
has_usage = any(
(row.get(key) or 0) != 0
for key in (
"input_tokens",
"output_tokens",
"cache_read_tokens",
"reasoning_tokens",
"estimated_cost",
"actual_cost",
"api_calls",
"tool_calls",
)
)
if has_usage:
continue
target["sessions"] = (target.get("sessions") or 0) + (row.get("sessions") or 0)
target["last_used_at"] = max(target.get("last_used_at") or 0, row.get("last_used_at") or 0)
total_tokens = (target.get("input_tokens") or 0) + (target.get("output_tokens") or 0)
sessions = target.get("sessions") or 0
target["avg_tokens_per_session"] = total_tokens / sessions if sessions else 0
rows.append(target)
rows.extend(
r for r in model_rows
if r is not target
and (r.get("billing_provider") or any(
(r.get(key) or 0) != 0
for key in (
"input_tokens",
"output_tokens",
"cache_read_tokens",
"reasoning_tokens",
"estimated_cost",
"actual_cost",
"api_calls",
"tool_calls",
)
))
)
else:
rows.extend(model_rows)
rows.sort(
key=lambda r: (r.get("input_tokens") or 0) + (r.get("output_tokens") or 0),
reverse=True,
)
models = []
for row in rows:
provider = row.get("billing_provider") or ""
model_name = row["model"]
caps = {}
try:
from agent.models_dev import get_model_capabilities
mc = get_model_capabilities(provider=provider, model=model_name)
if mc is not None:
caps = {
"supports_tools": mc.supports_tools,
"supports_vision": mc.supports_vision,
"supports_reasoning": mc.supports_reasoning,
"context_window": mc.context_window,
"max_output_tokens": mc.max_output_tokens,
"model_family": mc.model_family,
}
except Exception:
pass
models.append({
"model": model_name,
"provider": provider,
"input_tokens": row["input_tokens"],
"output_tokens": row["output_tokens"],
"cache_read_tokens": row["cache_read_tokens"],
"reasoning_tokens": row["reasoning_tokens"],
"estimated_cost": row["estimated_cost"],
"actual_cost": row["actual_cost"],
"sessions": row["sessions"],
"api_calls": row["api_calls"],
"tool_calls": row["tool_calls"],
"last_used_at": row["last_used_at"],
"avg_tokens_per_session": row["avg_tokens_per_session"],
"capabilities": caps,
})
totals_cur = db._conn.execute("""
SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT model) as distinct_models,
SUM(input_tokens) as total_input,
SUM(output_tokens) as total_output,
SUM(cache_read_tokens) as total_cache_read,
SUM(reasoning_tokens) as total_reasoning,
COALESCE(SUM(estimated_cost_usd), 0) as total_estimated_cost,
COALESCE(SUM(actual_cost_usd), 0) as total_actual_cost,
COUNT(*) as total_sessions,
SUM(COALESCE(api_call_count, 0)) as total_api_calls
FROM sessions WHERE started_at > ? AND model IS NOT NULL AND model != ''
""", (cutoff,))
totals = dict(totals_cur.fetchone())
return {
"models": models,
"totals": totals,
"period_days": days,
}
finally:
db.close()
@app.get("/api/analytics/models")
async def get_models_analytics(days: int = 30, profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Return model analytics without blocking the serving event loop."""
return await asyncio.to_thread(_get_models_analytics, days, profile)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# /api/pty — PTY-over-WebSocket bridge for the dashboard "Chat" tab.
#
# The endpoint spawns the same ``hermes --tui`` binary the CLI uses, behind
# a POSIX pseudo-terminal, and forwards bytes + resize escapes across a
# WebSocket. The browser renders the ANSI through xterm.js (see
# web/src/pages/ChatPage.tsx).
#
# Auth: ``?token=<session_token>`` query param (browsers can't set
# Authorization on the WS upgrade). Same ephemeral ``_SESSION_TOKEN`` as
# REST. Localhost-only — we defensively reject non-loopback clients even
# though uvicorn binds to 127.0.0.1.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# PTY bridge: POSIX uses pty_bridge (fcntl/termios/ptyprocess); native Windows
# uses win_pty_bridge (pywinpty/ConPTY, already a declared dependency). Both
# expose the same public surface — spawn/read/write/resize/close/is_available —
# so the /api/pty WebSocket handler needs no platform guards.
if sys.platform.startswith("win"):
try:
from hermes_cli.win_pty_bridge import WinPtyBridge as PtyBridge, PtyUnavailableError
_PTY_BRIDGE_AVAILABLE = True
except ImportError: # pragma: no cover - pywinpty missing
PtyBridge = None # type: ignore[assignment]
_PTY_BRIDGE_AVAILABLE = False
class PtyUnavailableError(RuntimeError): # type: ignore[no-redef]
"""Stub when win_pty_bridge cannot be imported."""
pass
else:
try:
from hermes_cli.pty_bridge import PtyBridge, PtyUnavailableError
_PTY_BRIDGE_AVAILABLE = True
except ImportError: # pragma: no cover - dev env without ptyprocess
PtyBridge = None # type: ignore[assignment]
_PTY_BRIDGE_AVAILABLE = False
class PtyUnavailableError(RuntimeError): # type: ignore[no-redef]
"""Stub on platforms where pty_bridge can't be imported."""
pass
_RESIZE_RE = re.compile(rb"\x1b\[RESIZE:(\d+);(\d+)\]")
_PTY_READ_CHUNK_TIMEOUT = 0.2
# Keep-alive PTY sessions: a terminal connecting with ``?attach=<token>`` is
# bound to a process that survives disconnect/refresh and is reattachable.
from hermes_cli.pty_session import PtySessionRegistry, RegistryFull, run_reaper # noqa: E402
PTY_REGISTRY = PtySessionRegistry(
ttl=30 * 60,
max_sessions=16,
buffer_cap=1 * 1024 * 1024,
read_timeout=_PTY_READ_CHUNK_TIMEOUT,
)
async def _legacy_pump(ws: "WebSocket", bridge) -> None:
"""Original 1:1 socket<->PTY pump: stream until disconnect, then close the
bridge. Used when no ``?attach=`` token is supplied (keep-alive opt-in).
Behavior is identical to the pre-keep-alive ``pty_ws`` body, including the
#54028 half-open-socket protection (reader EOF → close the WS so the
writer's ``ws.receive()`` unparks) and the #53227 ``to_thread`` offloads
for the blocking ``bridge.close()``.
"""
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
# --- reader task: PTY master → WebSocket ----------------------------
async def pump_pty_to_ws() -> None:
try:
while True:
chunk = await loop.run_in_executor(
None, bridge.read, _PTY_READ_CHUNK_TIMEOUT
)
if chunk is None: # EOF
return
if not chunk: # no data this tick; yield control and retry
await asyncio.sleep(0)
continue
try:
await ws.send_bytes(chunk)
except Exception:
return
finally:
# The child has exited (EOF) or the send side broke. Close the
# WebSocket so the writer loop's ``ws.receive()`` returns instead
# of blocking forever — otherwise, when the browser's socket is
# half-open (no FIN delivered, common on macOS/launchd) the
# handler never reaches its ``finally`` and the PTY's fds leak.
# With dashboard auto-reconnect (#52962) every dropped socket then
# stacks a fresh PTY on top of the orphaned one, exhausting fds.
#
# Reap the bridge here too (close() is idempotent): on child EOF the
# writer loop's ``finally`` is the usual closer, but if the handler
# task is cancelled the instant we close the WS, that ``finally``
# can be skipped, leaking the PTY. Closing from the EOF path makes
# the reap independent of that cancellation race (#54028).
try:
await asyncio.to_thread(bridge.close)
except Exception:
pass
try:
await ws.close()
except Exception:
pass
reader_task = asyncio.create_task(pump_pty_to_ws())
# --- writer loop: WebSocket → PTY master ----------------------------
try:
while True:
try:
msg = await ws.receive()
except RuntimeError:
# Raised when ws.receive() is called after the socket is
# already disconnected (e.g. closed by the reader task above).
break
if msg.get("type") == "websocket.disconnect":
break
raw = msg.get("bytes")
if raw is None:
text = msg.get("text")
raw = text.encode("utf-8") if isinstance(text, str) else b""
if not raw:
continue
# Resize escape is consumed locally, never written to the PTY.
match = _RESIZE_RE.match(raw)
if match and match.end() == len(raw):
bridge.resize(cols=int(match.group(1)), rows=int(match.group(2)))
continue
bridge.write(raw)
except WebSocketDisconnect:
pass
finally:
reader_task.cancel()
try:
await reader_task
except (asyncio.CancelledError, Exception):
pass
await asyncio.to_thread(bridge.close)
_VALID_CHANNEL_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{1,128}$")
# Starlette's TestClient reports the peer as "testclient"; treat it as
# loopback so tests don't need to rewrite request scope.
_LOOPBACK_HOSTS = frozenset({"127.0.0.1", "::1", "localhost", "testclient"})
def _ws_client_reason(ws: "WebSocket") -> Optional[str]:
"""Return a rejection reason for the client IP, or None when allowed.
Reasons are short machine-parseable tokens logged on the rejection path
so a "WS keeps closing" report can be diagnosed from agent.log without a
repro. ``None`` means the peer IP passed this gate.
See :func:`_ws_client_is_allowed` for the full policy rationale.
"""
if getattr(app.state, "auth_required", False):
return None
bound_host = (getattr(app.state, "bound_host", "") or "").strip().lower()
if bound_host and bound_host not in _LOOPBACK_HOSTS:
return None
client_host = ws.client.host if ws.client else ""
if not client_host:
# Fail-closed: a loopback-bound dashboard with auth disabled must
# not accept a WebSocket with no identifiable peer. ASGI servers
# behind a misconfigured proxy or unix socket can deliver
# ws.client == None or "" — treating that as "allowed" would let
# an unidentified peer reach a loopback-only surface.
return f"missing_or_empty_peer bound={bound_host or '?'}"
if client_host in _LOOPBACK_HOSTS:
return None
return f"peer_not_loopback peer={client_host} bound={bound_host or '?'}"
def _ws_client_is_allowed(ws: "WebSocket") -> bool:
"""Check if the WebSocket client IP is acceptable.
Loopback bind: only loopback clients allowed — the legacy
``?token=<_SESSION_TOKEN>`` path is the only auth we have, so we
don't want LAN hosts guessing tokens.
Explicit non-loopback bind (``--host 0.0.0.0``, ``--host ::``, or a
specific address such as a Tailscale/LAN IP, always with
``--insecure``): allow any peer. The operator explicitly opted into
non-loopback exposure, so the loopback-only peer restriction does not
apply. DNS-rebinding is still blocked by the Host/Origin guard in
:func:`_ws_host_origin_is_allowed`, which mirrors the HTTP layer and
requires the Host header to match the bound interface — the same
defence ``_is_accepted_host`` applies to non-loopback HTTP requests.
Gated mode: any peer is allowed — uvicorn's ``proxy_headers=True``
(enabled when the OAuth gate is active so cookies can pick up
``X-Forwarded-Proto``) rewrites ``ws.client.host`` to the
X-Forwarded-For value, which is the real internet client IP. The
OAuth gate + single-use ``?ticket=`` is the auth at that point; the
Host/Origin guard in :func:`_ws_host_origin_is_allowed` is what
blocks DNS-rebinding here, not the peer IP.
"""
if getattr(app.state, "auth_required", False):
return True
# Any explicit non-loopback bind (0.0.0.0, ::, or a specific LAN /
# Tailscale address) means the operator opted into non-loopback
# access via --insecure. The loopback-only peer gate only applies to
# an actual loopback bind; otherwise the WS handshake is rejected even
# though same-bind HTTP requests pass _is_accepted_host.
bound_host = (getattr(app.state, "bound_host", "") or "").strip().lower()
if bound_host and bound_host not in _LOOPBACK_HOSTS:
return True
client_host = ws.client.host if ws.client else ""
if not client_host:
# Fail-closed: see _ws_client_reason for rationale. An empty
# client_host on a loopback-bound dashboard with auth disabled
# must be rejected, not accepted as a default-allow.
return False
return client_host in _LOOPBACK_HOSTS
def _ws_host_origin_reason(ws: "WebSocket") -> Optional[str]:
"""Return a Host/Origin rejection reason, or None when allowed.
Mirrors :func:`_ws_host_origin_is_allowed` but yields a short
machine-parseable token (``host_mismatch …`` / ``origin_mismatch …``)
on rejection so the close path can log *why* the upgrade was refused.
"""
bound_host = getattr(app.state, "bound_host", None)
if not bound_host:
return None
host_header = ws.headers.get("host", "")
if not _is_accepted_host(host_header, bound_host):
return f"host_mismatch host={host_header or '?'} bound={bound_host}"
origin = ws.headers.get("origin", "")
if not origin:
return None
parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(origin)
if parsed.scheme not in {"http", "https"}:
# Non-web origin (packaged Electron: file://, null, app://). The
# upstream credential check is the real auth boundary; trust it.
# See _ws_host_origin_is_allowed for the full rationale.
return None
if not parsed.netloc:
return f"origin_mismatch origin={origin} bound={bound_host}"
if not _is_accepted_host(parsed.netloc, bound_host):
return f"origin_mismatch origin={origin} bound={bound_host}"
return None
def _ws_host_origin_is_allowed(ws: "WebSocket") -> bool:
"""Apply the dashboard Host/Origin guard to WebSocket upgrades.
FastAPI HTTP middleware does not run for WebSocket routes, so the
DNS-rebinding Host check used for normal dashboard HTTP requests must be
repeated here before accepting the upgrade. Browsers also send an Origin
header on WebSocket handshakes; when present, require it to target the
same bound dashboard host.
"""
return _ws_host_origin_reason(ws) is None
def _ws_request_reason(ws: "WebSocket") -> Optional[str]:
"""First Host/Origin or peer-IP rejection reason, or None when allowed."""
return _ws_host_origin_reason(ws) or _ws_client_reason(ws)
def _ws_request_is_allowed(ws: "WebSocket") -> bool:
"""Return True when the WebSocket upgrade matches dashboard boundaries."""
return _ws_host_origin_is_allowed(ws) and _ws_client_is_allowed(ws)
def _ws_auth_mode() -> str:
"""Short label for the active WS auth mode — logged on every connection."""
if getattr(app.state, "auth_required", False):
return "gated"
bound_host = (getattr(app.state, "bound_host", "") or "").strip().lower()
if bound_host and bound_host not in _LOOPBACK_HOSTS:
return "insecure"
return "loopback"
def _ws_auth_reason(ws: "WebSocket") -> tuple[Optional[str], str]:
"""Validate WS-upgrade auth; return ``(reason, credential)``.
``reason`` is None when the credential is accepted, else a short
machine-parseable token explaining the rejection (``no_credential``,
``token_mismatch``, ``ticket_invalid``, ``internal_invalid``).
``credential`` names which credential type was presented (``ticket``,
``internal``, ``token``, or ``none``) so the accepted path can log *how*
a peer authed, not just that it did.
Loopback / ``--insecure``: legacy ``?token=<_SESSION_TOKEN>`` query
parameter, constant-time compared.
Gated (public bind, no ``--insecure``): one of two credentials —
* ``?ticket=<single-use>`` — a browser-minted, single-use, 30s-TTL ticket
consumed against the dashboard-auth ticket store. This is what the SPA
(and native clients) use.
* ``?internal=<process-credential>`` — the process-lifetime internal
credential, used only by WS clients the server spawns itself (the
embedded-TUI PTY child attaching to ``/api/ws`` and ``/api/pub``). It
is multi-use and never expires so the child can reconnect, and is never
injected into the SPA — see ``dashboard_auth.ws_tickets`` for the
threat model.
The legacy ``?token=`` path is unconditionally rejected in gated mode
(the SPA bundle isn't carrying the token any longer, and a leaked
``_SESSION_TOKEN`` must not grant WS access once the gate is engaged).
Audit-logs the rejection so operators can debug "WS keeps closing"
issues from the log.
"""
auth_required = bool(getattr(app.state, "auth_required", False))
if auth_required:
# Lazy import — keeps this function importable in test harnesses
# that don't bring in the dashboard_auth layer.
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.audit import AuditEvent, audit_log
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.ws_tickets import (
TicketInvalid,
consume_internal_credential,
consume_ticket,
)
# Server-spawned children (PTY child → /api/ws, /api/pub) present the
# multi-use internal credential rather than a single-use ticket, so
# they survive reconnects and slow cold boots.
internal = ws.query_params.get("internal", "")
if internal:
try:
consume_internal_credential(internal)
return None, "internal"
except TicketInvalid as exc:
audit_log(
AuditEvent.WS_TICKET_REJECTED,
reason=f"internal: {exc}",
ip=(ws.client.host if ws.client else ""),
path=ws.url.path,
)
return "internal_invalid", "internal"
ticket = ws.query_params.get("ticket", "")
if not ticket:
return "no_credential", "none"
try:
consume_ticket(ticket)
return None, "ticket"
except TicketInvalid as exc:
audit_log(
AuditEvent.WS_TICKET_REJECTED,
reason=str(exc),
ip=(ws.client.host if ws.client else ""),
path=ws.url.path,
)
return "ticket_invalid", "ticket"
token = ws.query_params.get("token", "")
if not token:
return "no_credential", "none"
if hmac.compare_digest(token.encode(), _SESSION_TOKEN.encode()):
return None, "token"
return "token_mismatch", "token"
def _ws_auth_ok(ws: "WebSocket") -> bool:
"""True when the WS-upgrade credential is accepted. See _ws_auth_reason."""
return _ws_auth_reason(ws)[0] is None
# Per-channel subscriber registry used by /api/pub (PTY-side gateway → dashboard)
# and /api/events (dashboard → browser sidebar). Keyed by an opaque channel id
# the chat tab generates on mount; entries auto-evict when the last subscriber
# drops AND the publisher has disconnected.
# (Channel state and the chat-argv lock are initialised in _lifespan on app
# startup — see _get_event_state / _get_chat_argv_lock above.)
def _resolve_chat_argv(
resume: Optional[str] = None,
sidecar_url: Optional[str] = None,
profile: Optional[str] = None,
active_session_file: Optional[str] = None,
) -> tuple[list[str], Optional[str], Optional[dict]]:
"""Resolve the argv + cwd + env for the chat PTY.
Default: whatever ``hermes --tui`` would run. Tests monkeypatch this
function to inject a tiny fake command (``cat``, ``sh -c 'printf …'``)
so nothing has to build Node or the TUI bundle.
Session resume is propagated via the ``HERMES_TUI_RESUME`` env var —
matching what ``hermes_cli.main._launch_tui`` does for the CLI path.
Appending ``--resume <id>`` to argv doesn't work because ``ui-tui`` does
not parse its argv.
``HERMES_TUI_GATEWAY_URL`` is injected so the PTY child can attach to
this process's in-memory ``tui_gateway`` instance instead of spawning
its own Python gateway subprocess.
`sidecar_url` (when set) is forwarded as ``HERMES_TUI_SIDECAR_URL`` so
the spawned ``tui_gateway.entry`` can mirror dispatcher emits to the
dashboard's ``/api/pub`` endpoint (see :func:`pub_ws`).
`active_session_file` (when set) is forwarded as
``HERMES_TUI_ACTIVE_SESSION_FILE``. The TUI writes the current session id
there whenever it creates/resumes/switches sessions, giving the dashboard a
small cross-process breadcrumb for reconnecting after an unexpected browser
WebSocket close.
`profile` (when set) scopes the ENTIRE chat to that profile by pointing
``HERMES_HOME`` at the profile dir in the child env. Every spawned
process (the TUI and the ``tui_gateway.entry`` it launches) resolves
``get_hermes_home()`` from that env var at its own import, so the child
binds the profile's config, skills, memory, and state.db from the start
— the same propagation ``hermes -p <name>`` performs. The in-process
``HERMES_TUI_GATEWAY_URL`` attach is SKIPPED for scoped chats: the
dashboard's in-memory gateway runs under the dashboard's own profile,
so a profile-scoped chat must spawn its own gateway subprocess.
"""
from hermes_cli.main import PROJECT_ROOT, _apply_tui_python_env, _make_tui_argv
profile_dir: Optional[Path] = None
requested = (profile or "").strip()
if requested and requested.lower() != "current":
profile_dir = _resolve_profile_dir(requested)
argv, cwd = _make_tui_argv(PROJECT_ROOT / "ui-tui", tui_dev=False)
env = os.environ.copy()
try:
from hermes_cli.config import apply_terminal_config_to_env
apply_terminal_config_to_env(env=env)
except Exception:
_log.debug("Failed to apply terminal config bridge for dashboard chat", exc_info=True)
_apply_tui_python_env(env)
env.setdefault("NODE_ENV", "production")
# Browser-embedded chat should prefer stable wheel-based scrollback over
# native terminal mouse tracking. When mouse tracking is enabled, wheel
# events are consumed by the TUI and forwarded as terminal input, which
# makes browser-side transcript scrolling feel broken. Keep the terminal
# build unchanged for native CLI usage; only disable mouse tracking for
# the dashboard PTY path.
env.setdefault("HERMES_TUI_DISABLE_MOUSE", "1")
env.setdefault("HERMES_TUI_INLINE", "1")
# The dashboard terminal is xterm.js, which always renders 24-bit RGB.
# But chalk inside the TUI child decides its color depth from the
# SERVER process env — and hosted/cloud deploys run the dashboard under
# a process manager (container init, systemd) with no COLORTERM, so
# chalk downgrades every hex color to the xterm 256 palette. The skin's
# bronze border #CD7F32 snaps to palette 173 (#D7875F, salmon-red) and
# the banner reads red/yellow instead of gold. Local launches dodge
# this only because the operator's interactive terminal leaks
# COLORTERM=truecolor into os.environ. Backfill it for the PTY child;
# setdefault so an explicit operator value still wins.
env.setdefault("COLORTERM", "truecolor")
env["HERMES_TUI_DASHBOARD"] = "1"
if profile_dir is not None:
env["HERMES_HOME"] = str(profile_dir)
if resume:
_resume_db = _open_session_db_for_profile(
requested if profile_dir is not None else None
)
try:
latest_resume, _latest_path = _session_latest_descendant(resume, _resume_db)
finally:
_resume_db.close()
if latest_resume:
resume = latest_resume
env["HERMES_TUI_RESUME"] = resume
if sidecar_url:
env["HERMES_TUI_SIDECAR_URL"] = sidecar_url
if active_session_file:
env["HERMES_TUI_ACTIVE_SESSION_FILE"] = active_session_file
# Profile-scoped chats must NOT attach to the dashboard's in-memory
# gateway — it runs under the dashboard's own profile. Without the
# attach URL, gatewayClient spawns its own `tui_gateway.entry`, which
# inherits the profile HERMES_HOME set above.
if profile_dir is None:
if gateway_ws_url := _build_gateway_ws_url():
env["HERMES_TUI_GATEWAY_URL"] = gateway_ws_url
return list(argv), str(cwd) if cwd else None, env
# Hosts that mean "listen on every interface" — the server should bind to
# them, but an in-container client must NOT dial them: dialing 0.0.0.0
# resolves to "any local interface", which on most platforms routes through
# the kernel's wildcard stack and behind a forward proxy (HTTPS_PROXY with
# a NO_PROXY that doesn't list 0.0.0.0) gets MITM'd into a failed handshake
# (issue #58993). The fix is to use a loopback address for the client
# netloc while leaving the bind host alone.
_WILDCARD_HOSTS = frozenset({"0.0.0.0", "::"})
def _resolve_client_ws_host() -> Optional[str]:
"""Return the host the in-container WS client should dial.
Resolution order:
1. Explicit ``HERMES_DASHBOARD_WS_HOST`` env var — wins always. Operators
running the dashboard behind a forward proxy can pin a routable host
(e.g. ``127.0.0.1``, the container's internal IP, or a sidecar DNS
name) and bypass auto-detection entirely.
2. The configured bind host — if it's a wildcard (``0.0.0.0`` / ``::``),
substitute ``127.0.0.1`` since both the dashboard and its TUI child
run in the same container.
3. Any other bind host (loopback or LAN IP) — preserved verbatim.
"""
explicit = os.environ.get("HERMES_DASHBOARD_WS_HOST", "").strip()
if explicit:
return explicit
host = getattr(app.state, "bound_host", None)
if not host:
return None
if host in _WILDCARD_HOSTS:
return "127.0.0.1"
return host
def _build_gateway_ws_url() -> Optional[str]:
"""ws:// URL the PTY child should attach to for JSON-RPC gateway traffic.
Loopback / ``--insecure``: ``?token=<_SESSION_TOKEN>``.
Gated mode: the legacy token path is rejected by ``_ws_auth_ok``, so the
server-spawned PTY child authenticates with the process-lifetime internal
credential (``?internal=``). It must NOT use a single-use browser ticket:
the child reads this URL once at startup and reuses it on every reconnect,
and a 30s-TTL ticket can expire before a slow cold boot even dials.
"""
host = _resolve_client_ws_host()
port = getattr(app.state, "bound_port", None)
if not host or not port:
return None
netloc = (
f"[{host}]:{port}"
if ":" in host and not host.startswith("[")
else f"{host}:{port}"
)
if getattr(app.state, "auth_required", False):
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.ws_tickets import internal_ws_credential
qs = urllib.parse.urlencode({"internal": internal_ws_credential()})
else:
qs = urllib.parse.urlencode({"token": _SESSION_TOKEN})
return f"ws://{netloc}/api/ws?{qs}"
async def _resolve_chat_argv_async(
resume: Optional[str] = None,
sidecar_url: Optional[str] = None,
profile: Optional[str] = None,
active_session_file: Optional[str] = None,
) -> tuple[list[str], Optional[str], Optional[dict]]:
"""Resolve chat argv without blocking the dashboard event loop.
``_resolve_chat_argv`` may run ``npm install`` / ``npm run build`` through
``_make_tui_argv``. Keep that synchronous work off the WebSocket event
loop so reverse proxies and existing dashboard connections can continue
to exchange keepalives while the TUI launch command is prepared. The
async lock preserves the previous one-build-at-a-time behavior when
multiple browser tabs connect at once without occupying worker threads
while queued connections wait.
"""
kwargs = {
"resume": resume,
"sidecar_url": sidecar_url,
"profile": profile,
}
if active_session_file is not None:
kwargs["active_session_file"] = active_session_file
async with _get_chat_argv_lock(app):
return await asyncio.to_thread(
_resolve_chat_argv,
**kwargs,
)
def _build_sidecar_url(channel: str) -> Optional[str]:
"""ws:// URL the PTY child should publish events to, or None when unbound.
Loopback / ``--insecure``: uses ``?token=<_SESSION_TOKEN>``.
Gated mode: authenticates with the process-lifetime internal credential
(``?internal=``), the same one ``_build_gateway_ws_url`` uses. The PTY
child is a server-spawned process we trust; the credential is multi-use
and never expires, so the child can reconnect ``/api/pub`` without a new
URL. (This previously minted a single-use 30s ticket, which meant the
child could not reconnect and could miss the window on a slow cold boot.)
Connections authenticated this way are recorded under the
``server-internal`` identity in the audit log.
"""
host = _resolve_client_ws_host()
port = getattr(app.state, "bound_port", None)
if not host or not port:
return None
netloc = f"[{host}]:{port}" if ":" in host and not host.startswith("[") else f"{host}:{port}"
if getattr(app.state, "auth_required", False):
# Gated mode — use the internal credential so the WS upgrade survives
# _ws_auth_ok and the child can reconnect.
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.ws_tickets import internal_ws_credential
qs = urllib.parse.urlencode(
{"internal": internal_ws_credential(), "channel": channel}
)
else:
qs = urllib.parse.urlencode({"token": _SESSION_TOKEN, "channel": channel})
return f"ws://{netloc}/api/pub?{qs}"
async def _broadcast_event(app: Any, channel: str, payload: str) -> None:
"""Fan out one publisher frame to every subscriber on `channel`."""
event_channels, event_lock = _get_event_state(app)
async with event_lock:
subs = list(event_channels.get(channel, ()))
for sub in subs:
try:
await sub.send_text(payload)
except Exception:
# Subscriber went away mid-send; the /api/events finally clause
# will remove it from the registry on its next iteration.
_log.warning("broadcast send failed for subscriber on %s", channel, exc_info=True)
def _channel_or_close_code(ws: WebSocket) -> Optional[str]:
"""Return the channel id from the query string or None if invalid."""
channel = ws.query_params.get("channel", "")
return channel if _VALID_CHANNEL_RE.match(channel) else None
def _active_session_file_for_channel(app: "FastAPI", channel: str) -> Path:
"""Return the per-channel file where a dashboard TUI writes its active sid."""
files = _get_pty_active_session_files(app)
existing = files.get(channel)
if existing is not None:
return existing
fd, raw_path = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix="hermes-pty-active-", suffix=".json")
os.close(fd)
path = Path(raw_path)
files[channel] = path
return path
def _read_active_session_file(path: Path) -> Optional[str]:
try:
data = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError):
return None
session_id = str(data.get("session_id") or "").strip()
return session_id or None
def _forget_active_session_file(path: Path) -> None:
try:
path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
except OSError:
pass
def _ws_close_reason(text: str) -> str:
"""Clamp a WS close reason to the protocol's 123-byte UTF-8 limit.
RFC 6455 caps the close-frame reason at 123 bytes; uvicorn raises if a
longer string is passed. Our reasons embed an attacker-controlled origin,
so truncate defensively rather than crash the close handler.
"""
encoded = text.encode("utf-8", "replace")
if len(encoded) <= 123:
return text
return encoded[:120].decode("utf-8", "ignore") + "..."
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# /api/console — safe Hermes Console command WebSocket.
#
# Unlike /api/pty, this endpoint never spawns a PTY, shell, or full Hermes CLI
# subprocess. It runs the curated console engine in-process and exchanges
# structured JSON frames with the dashboard xterm overlay.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_CONSOLE_PROMPT = "hermes> "
_CONSOLE_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 60.0
_CONSOLE_OUTPUT_LIMIT = 50000
# Console commands run in a worker thread. On a timeout, asyncio.wait_for cancels
# the *awaitable*, but Python threads aren't preemptible, so a genuinely stuck
# worker keeps running to completion. To keep that from exhausting the shared
# default thread pool (asyncio.to_thread), we run console commands on a small
# dedicated, bounded pool: a leaked worker is capped, and concurrent console
# execution is bounded to a fixed number of threads regardless of reconnects.
_CONSOLE_EXECUTOR_MAX_WORKERS = 4
_console_executor: Optional[concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor] = None
_console_executor_lock = threading.Lock()
def _get_console_executor() -> concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor:
"""Lazily create the bounded console worker pool (once per process)."""
global _console_executor
if _console_executor is None:
with _console_executor_lock:
if _console_executor is None:
_console_executor = concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(
max_workers=_CONSOLE_EXECUTOR_MAX_WORKERS,
thread_name_prefix="hermes-console",
)
# Ensure the pool is torn down on interpreter exit. Don't wait on
# in-flight workers: a stuck 60s console command must not block
# shutdown (cancel_futures drops anything not yet started).
atexit.register(
lambda: _console_executor
and _console_executor.shutdown(wait=False, cancel_futures=True)
)
return _console_executor
def _console_profile_from_ws(ws: WebSocket) -> Optional[str]:
profile = (ws.query_params.get("profile") or "").strip()
return profile or None
def _execute_console_line(
engine: Any,
line: str,
*,
confirmed: bool,
profile: Optional[str],
) -> Any:
# _profile_scope swaps process-global skill module paths; keep it inside
# the worker thread and never hold it across awaits.
with _profile_scope(profile):
return engine.execute(line, confirmed=confirmed)
async def _console_send(
ws: WebSocket,
send_lock: asyncio.Lock,
payload: Dict[str, Any],
) -> None:
async with send_lock:
await ws.send_json(payload)
async def _console_send_result(
ws: WebSocket,
send_lock: asyncio.Lock,
result: Any,
*,
command_id: int,
) -> None:
command = result.command or ""
status = result.status
if status == "ok":
if result.output:
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "output",
"id": command_id,
"stream": "stdout",
"data": result.output,
"command": command,
},
)
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "complete",
"id": command_id,
"status": "ok",
"command": command,
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
return
if status == "error":
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "error",
"id": command_id,
"message": result.output or "Command failed.",
"command": command,
},
)
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "complete",
"id": command_id,
"status": "error",
"command": command,
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
return
if status == "confirm_required":
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "confirm_required",
"id": command_id,
"command": command,
"message": result.confirmation_message or f"Run `{command}`?",
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "complete",
"id": command_id,
"status": "confirm_required",
"command": command,
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
return
if status == "clear":
await _console_send(ws, send_lock, {"type": "clear", "id": command_id})
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "complete",
"id": command_id,
"status": "clear",
"command": command,
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
return
if status == "exit":
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "complete",
"id": command_id,
"status": "exit",
"command": command,
"prompt": "",
},
)
return
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "error",
"id": command_id,
"message": f"Unknown console result status: {status}",
"command": command,
},
)
def _console_json_payload(msg: Any) -> tuple[Optional[dict[str, Any]], Optional[str]]:
raw: str | bytes | None = msg.get("text")
if raw is None:
raw = msg.get("bytes")
if raw is None:
return None, None
if isinstance(raw, bytes):
try:
raw = raw.decode("utf-8")
except UnicodeDecodeError:
return None, "Console frames must be UTF-8 JSON."
try:
payload = json.loads(raw)
except json.JSONDecodeError:
return None, "Console frames must be JSON objects."
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
return None, "Console frames must be JSON objects."
return payload, None
@app.websocket("/api/console")
async def console_ws(ws: WebSocket) -> None:
peer = ws.client.host if ws.client else "?"
if not _DASHBOARD_EMBEDDED_CHAT_ENABLED:
_log.info("console refused: embedded chat disabled peer=%s", peer)
await ws.close(code=4404, reason="embedded chat disabled")
return
auth_reason, cred = _ws_auth_reason(ws)
mode = _ws_auth_mode()
if auth_reason is not None:
_log.warning(
"console auth rejected reason=%s mode=%s cred=%s peer=%s",
auth_reason, mode, cred, peer,
)
await ws.close(code=4401, reason=_ws_close_reason(f"auth: {auth_reason}"))
return
host_origin_reason = _ws_host_origin_reason(ws)
if host_origin_reason is not None:
_log.warning("console refused: %s peer=%s", host_origin_reason, peer)
await ws.close(code=4403, reason=_ws_close_reason(host_origin_reason))
return
client_reason = _ws_client_reason(ws)
if client_reason is not None:
_log.warning("console refused: %s", client_reason)
await ws.close(code=4408, reason=_ws_close_reason(client_reason))
return
await ws.accept()
profile = _console_profile_from_ws(ws)
send_lock = asyncio.Lock()
try:
from hermes_cli.console_engine import HermesConsoleEngine
engine = HermesConsoleEngine(output_limit=_CONSOLE_OUTPUT_LIMIT)
if profile and profile.lower() != "current":
_resolve_profile_dir(profile)
except HTTPException as exc:
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "error",
"message": str(exc.detail),
"prompt": "",
},
)
await ws.close(code=4400, reason=_ws_close_reason(str(exc.detail)))
return
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("console failed to initialize")
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "error",
"message": f"Console unavailable: {exc}",
"prompt": "",
},
)
await ws.close(code=1011)
return
_log.info(
"console accepted peer=%s mode=%s cred=%s profile=%s",
peer,
mode,
cred,
profile or "current",
)
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "ready",
"profile": profile or "current",
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
active_task: asyncio.Task | None = None
pending_confirmation: Optional[str] = None
command_generation = 0
async def run_command(line: str, *, confirmed: bool, command_id: int) -> None:
nonlocal active_task, pending_confirmation, command_generation
try:
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
result = await asyncio.wait_for(
loop.run_in_executor(
_get_console_executor(),
functools.partial(
_execute_console_line,
engine,
line,
confirmed=confirmed,
profile=profile,
),
),
timeout=_CONSOLE_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
)
except asyncio.CancelledError:
raise
except asyncio.TimeoutError:
if command_id == command_generation:
pending_confirmation = None
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "error",
"id": command_id,
"message": (
"Command timed out. Hermes Console returned to the prompt."
),
"command": line,
},
)
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "complete",
"id": command_id,
"status": "timeout",
"command": line,
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
except Exception as exc:
if command_id == command_generation:
pending_confirmation = None
_log.exception("console command failed")
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "error",
"id": command_id,
"message": str(exc) or exc.__class__.__name__,
"command": line,
},
)
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "complete",
"id": command_id,
"status": "error",
"command": line,
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
else:
if command_id != command_generation:
return
pending_confirmation = (
result.command if result.status == "confirm_required" else None
)
await _console_send_result(
ws,
send_lock,
result,
command_id=command_id,
)
if result.status == "exit":
await ws.close(code=1000)
finally:
if command_id == command_generation:
active_task = None
async def start_command(line: str, *, confirmed: bool = False) -> None:
nonlocal active_task, command_generation
command_generation += 1
command_id = command_generation
active_task = asyncio.create_task(
run_command(line, confirmed=confirmed, command_id=command_id)
)
try:
while True:
try:
msg = await ws.receive()
except RuntimeError:
break
msg_type = msg.get("type")
if msg_type == "websocket.disconnect":
break
payload, error = _console_json_payload(msg)
if error:
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "error",
"message": error,
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
continue
if payload is None:
continue
frame_type = str(payload.get("type") or "").strip().lower()
if frame_type == "ping":
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "pong",
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
continue
if frame_type == "cancel":
if active_task and not active_task.done():
command_generation += 1
active_task.cancel()
active_task = None
pending_confirmation = None
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "complete",
"status": "cancelled",
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
elif pending_confirmation:
pending_confirmation = None
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "complete",
"status": "cancelled",
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
else:
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "complete",
"status": "idle",
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
continue
if active_task and not active_task.done():
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "error",
"message": "A console command is already running.",
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
continue
if frame_type == "confirm":
command = str(payload.get("command") or pending_confirmation or "").strip()
if not pending_confirmation:
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "error",
"message": "No command is waiting for confirmation.",
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
continue
if command != pending_confirmation:
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "error",
"message": "Confirmation does not match the pending command.",
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
continue
pending_confirmation = None
await start_command(command, confirmed=True)
continue
if frame_type in {"input", "command"}:
line = str(payload.get("line") or payload.get("command") or "").strip()
if not line:
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "complete",
"status": "ok",
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
continue
if pending_confirmation:
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "error",
"message": (
"Confirm or cancel the pending command before "
"running another one."
),
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
continue
await start_command(line)
continue
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "error",
"message": f"Unsupported console frame: {frame_type or '?'}",
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
except WebSocketDisconnect:
pass
finally:
if active_task and not active_task.done():
active_task.cancel()
try:
await active_task
except (asyncio.CancelledError, Exception):
pass
@app.websocket("/api/pty")
async def pty_ws(ws: WebSocket) -> None:
peer = ws.client.host if ws.client else "?"
if not _DASHBOARD_EMBEDDED_CHAT_ENABLED:
_log.info("pty refused: embedded chat disabled peer=%s", peer)
await ws.close(code=4404, reason="embedded chat disabled")
return
# --- auth + host/origin/peer check (before accept so we can close
# cleanly AND tell the client WHY via the close code + reason).
# Each gate maps to a distinct close code so the log and the
# browser banner agree on the cause:
# 4401 bad credential 4403 host/origin mismatch
# 4408 peer not allowed 4404 chat disabled
auth_reason, cred = _ws_auth_reason(ws)
mode = _ws_auth_mode()
if auth_reason is not None:
_log.warning(
"pty auth rejected reason=%s mode=%s cred=%s peer=%s",
auth_reason, mode, cred, peer,
)
await ws.close(code=4401, reason=_ws_close_reason(f"auth: {auth_reason}"))
return
host_origin_reason = _ws_host_origin_reason(ws)
if host_origin_reason is not None:
_log.warning("pty refused: %s peer=%s", host_origin_reason, peer)
await ws.close(code=4403, reason=_ws_close_reason(host_origin_reason))
return
client_reason = _ws_client_reason(ws)
if client_reason is not None:
_log.warning("pty refused: %s", client_reason)
await ws.close(code=4408, reason=_ws_close_reason(client_reason))
return
await ws.accept()
_log.info("pty accepted peer=%s mode=%s cred=%s", peer, mode, cred)
# On native Windows, the POSIX PTY bridge can't be imported. Tell the
# client and close cleanly rather than pretending the feature works.
if not _PTY_BRIDGE_AVAILABLE:
await ws.send_text(
"\r\n\x1b[31mChat unavailable: the embedded terminal requires a "
"POSIX PTY, which native Windows Python doesn't provide.\x1b[0m\r\n"
"\x1b[33mInstall Hermes inside WSL2 to use the dashboard's /chat "
"tab — the rest of the dashboard works here.\x1b[0m\r\n"
)
await ws.close(code=1011)
return
# --- spawn PTY ------------------------------------------------------
raw_resume = ws.query_params.get("resume") or None
resume = raw_resume
profile = ws.query_params.get("profile") or None
channel = _channel_or_close_code(ws)
sidecar_url = _build_sidecar_url(channel) if channel else None
force_fresh = (ws.query_params.get("fresh") or "").strip().lower() in {
"1",
"true",
"yes",
"on",
}
active_session_file: Optional[Path] = None
if channel:
active_session_file = _active_session_file_for_channel(ws.app, channel)
if force_fresh:
resume = None
_forget_active_session_file(active_session_file)
elif not resume:
resume = _read_active_session_file(active_session_file)
resolve_kwargs = {
"resume": resume,
"sidecar_url": sidecar_url,
"profile": profile,
}
if active_session_file is not None:
resolve_kwargs["active_session_file"] = str(active_session_file)
try:
argv, cwd, env = await _resolve_chat_argv_async(**resolve_kwargs)
except HTTPException as exc:
# Unknown/invalid profile from _resolve_profile_dir.
await ws.send_text(f"\r\n\x1b[31mChat unavailable: {exc.detail}\x1b[0m\r\n")
await ws.close(code=1011)
return
except SystemExit as exc:
# _make_tui_argv calls sys.exit(1) when node/npm is missing.
await ws.send_text(f"\r\n\x1b[31mChat unavailable: {exc}\x1b[0m\r\n")
await ws.close(code=1011)
return
attach_token = ws.query_params.get("attach") or None
registry_resume = raw_resume
if raw_resume and env:
registry_resume = env.get("HERMES_TUI_RESUME") or raw_resume
if attach_token is not None and (registry_resume or profile):
# Key explicit resumes on their canonical target, never the active-session fallback.
attach_token = f"{attach_token}\0{profile or ''}\0{registry_resume or ''}"
def _spawn():
return PtyBridge.spawn(argv, cwd=cwd, env=env)
if attach_token is None:
# Legacy path: 1:1 socket<->PTY, killed on disconnect (unchanged).
try:
bridge = _spawn()
except PtyUnavailableError as exc:
await ws.send_text(f"\r\n\x1b[31mChat unavailable: {exc}\x1b[0m\r\n")
await ws.close(code=1011)
return
except (FileNotFoundError, OSError) as exc:
await ws.send_text(f"\r\n\x1b[31mChat failed to start: {exc}\x1b[0m\r\n")
await ws.close(code=1011)
return
await _legacy_pump(ws, bridge)
return
# Keep-alive path: the PTY outlives this socket; reattach by token.
try:
session, _created = await PTY_REGISTRY.attach_or_spawn(
attach_token, spawn=_spawn
)
except PtyUnavailableError as exc:
await ws.send_text(f"\r\n\x1b[31mChat unavailable: {exc}\x1b[0m\r\n")
await ws.close(code=1011)
return
except (FileNotFoundError, OSError, RegistryFull) as exc:
await ws.send_text(f"\r\n\x1b[31mChat unavailable: {exc}\x1b[0m\r\n")
await ws.close(code=1011)
return
await session.attach(ws)
# --- writer loop: WebSocket → PTY master ----------------------------
# No reader task here: the session's drain task (spawned once per PTY,
# inside the registry) forwards PTY output to whichever socket is
# attached and rings-buffers it while detached. On child EOF the drain
# closes the attached socket with 4410, which unparks ``ws.receive()``
# below — same half-open-socket protection the legacy pump has (#54028).
try:
while True:
try:
msg = await ws.receive()
except RuntimeError:
# ws.receive() after the socket is already disconnected
# (e.g. closed by the drain task on process exit).
break
if msg.get("type") == "websocket.disconnect":
break
raw = msg.get("bytes")
if raw is None:
text = msg.get("text")
raw = text.encode("utf-8") if isinstance(text, str) else b""
if not raw:
continue
# Resize escape is consumed locally, never written to the PTY.
match = _RESIZE_RE.match(raw)
if match and match.end() == len(raw):
session.bridge.resize(cols=int(match.group(1)), rows=int(match.group(2)))
continue
session.bridge.write(raw)
except WebSocketDisconnect:
pass
finally:
# Detach only — the PTY keeps running for a reattach; the registry
# reaper closes it after the TTL (or immediately on process exit).
PTY_REGISTRY.detach(attach_token, ws)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# /api/ws — JSON-RPC WebSocket sidecar for the dashboard "Chat" tab.
#
# Drives the same `tui_gateway.dispatch` surface Ink uses over stdio, so the
# dashboard can render structured metadata (model badge, tool-call sidebar,
# slash launcher, session info) alongside the xterm.js terminal that PTY
# already paints. Both transports bind to the same session id when one is
# active, so a tool.start emitted by the agent fans out to both sinks.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@app.websocket("/api/ws")
async def gateway_ws(ws: WebSocket) -> None:
if not _DASHBOARD_EMBEDDED_CHAT_ENABLED:
await ws.close(code=4403)
return
if not _ws_auth_ok(ws):
await ws.close(code=4401)
return
if not _ws_request_is_allowed(ws):
await ws.close(code=4403)
return
from tui_gateway.ws import handle_ws
await handle_ws(ws)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# /api/pub + /api/events — chat-tab event broadcast.
#
# The PTY-side ``tui_gateway.entry`` opens /api/pub at startup (driven by
# HERMES_TUI_SIDECAR_URL set in /api/pty's PTY env) and writes every
# dispatcher emit through it. The dashboard fans those frames out to any
# subscriber that opened /api/events on the same channel id. This is what
# gives the React sidebar its tool-call feed without breaking the PTY
# child's stdio handshake with Ink.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@app.websocket("/api/pub")
async def pub_ws(ws: WebSocket) -> None:
if not _DASHBOARD_EMBEDDED_CHAT_ENABLED:
await ws.close(code=4403)
return
if not _ws_auth_ok(ws):
await ws.close(code=4401)
return
if not _ws_request_is_allowed(ws):
await ws.close(code=4403)
return
channel = _channel_or_close_code(ws)
if not channel:
await ws.close(code=4400)
return
await ws.accept()
try:
while True:
await _broadcast_event(ws.app, channel, await ws.receive_text())
except WebSocketDisconnect:
pass
@app.websocket("/api/events")
async def events_ws(ws: WebSocket) -> None:
if not _DASHBOARD_EMBEDDED_CHAT_ENABLED:
await ws.close(code=4403)
return
if not _ws_auth_ok(ws):
await ws.close(code=4401)
return
if not _ws_request_is_allowed(ws):
await ws.close(code=4403)
return
channel = _channel_or_close_code(ws)
if not channel:
await ws.close(code=4400)
return
await ws.accept()
event_channels, event_lock = _get_event_state(ws.app)
async with event_lock:
event_channels.setdefault(channel, set()).add(ws)
try:
while True:
# Subscribers don't speak — the receive() just blocks until
# disconnect so the connection stays open as long as the
# browser holds it.
await ws.receive_text()
except WebSocketDisconnect:
pass
finally:
async with event_lock:
subs = event_channels.get(channel)
if subs is not None:
subs.discard(ws)
if not subs:
event_channels.pop(channel, None)
def _normalise_prefix(raw: Optional[str]) -> str:
"""Normalise an X-Forwarded-Prefix header value.
Thin re-export of :func:`hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.prefix.normalise_prefix`
— the single source of truth lives in the dashboard_auth package so
the gate middleware, the OAuth routes, the cookie helpers, and the
SPA mount all agree on validation rules.
"""
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.prefix import normalise_prefix
return normalise_prefix(raw)
def _render_active_theme_bootstrap_css() -> str:
"""Critical-CSS shim for the active user theme.
Returns a ``<style>`` block with the ``:root`` CSS variables that
``ThemeProvider.applyTheme()`` installs once the
``/api/dashboard/themes`` round-trip completes. The goal is to
eliminate the green flash where the first paint shows the bundle's
default Hermes Teal canvas before the SPA flips the configured user
theme into place.
Built-in themes return an empty string — their full definitions live
in ``web/src/themes/presets.ts`` and are applied by the bundle
before paint, so no shim is needed for them.
"""
try:
config = load_config()
active = cfg_get(config, "dashboard", "theme", default="default")
if not active or not isinstance(active, str):
return ""
# Built-in: the bundle already owns the definition, no flash.
if any(b["name"] == active for b in _BUILTIN_DASHBOARD_THEMES):
return ""
for theme in _discover_user_themes():
if theme.get("name") != active:
continue
palette = theme.get("palette") or {}
bg = palette.get("background") or {}
mg = palette.get("midground") or {}
bg_hex = bg.get("hex", "#0a0a0a") if isinstance(bg, dict) else "#0a0a0a"
mg_hex = mg.get("hex", "#e5e5e5") if isinstance(mg, dict) else "#e5e5e5"
typo = theme.get("typography") or {}
font_sans = typo.get("fontSans") or _THEME_DEFAULT_TYPOGRAPHY["fontSans"]
base_size = typo.get("baseSize") or _THEME_DEFAULT_TYPOGRAPHY["baseSize"]
# Defensive ``</style>`` escape — current values are well-known
# hex/font strings, but this keeps the helper safe if it is
# later extended to ship user-authored CSS literals.
def _esc(s: str) -> str:
return str(s).replace("</", "<\\/")
# Variable names MUST match what the bundle actually consumes:
# - ``--background-base`` / ``--midground-base`` come from
# ``layerVars()`` in ``web/src/themes/context.tsx``.
# - ``--theme-font-sans`` / ``--theme-base-size`` come from
# ``typographyVars()`` there, and ``index.css`` applies them
# via ``html{font-family:var(--theme-font-sans);
# font-size:var(--theme-base-size)}``.
# The ``html,body`` canvas rule references the SAME variables
# instead of literal values so runtime theme switches stay
# live: ``applyTheme()`` writes these vars as inline styles on
# ``documentElement``, which outrank this stylesheet block in
# the cascade — the rule below re-resolves automatically and
# never goes stale when the user picks a different theme.
return (
'<style id="hermes-theme-bootstrap">'
":root{"
f"--background-base:{_esc(bg_hex)};"
f"--midground-base:{_esc(mg_hex)};"
f"--theme-font-sans:{_esc(font_sans)};"
f"--theme-base-size:{_esc(base_size)};"
"}"
"html,body{background-color:var(--background-base);"
"color:var(--midground-base);"
"font-family:var(--theme-font-sans);"
"font-size:var(--theme-base-size);}"
"</style>"
)
return ""
except Exception:
_log.debug("theme bootstrap render failed", exc_info=True)
return ""
def mount_spa(application: FastAPI):
"""Mount the built SPA. Falls back to index.html for client-side routing.
The session token is injected into index.html via a ``<script>`` tag so
the SPA can authenticate against protected API endpoints without a
separate (unauthenticated) token-dispensing endpoint.
When served behind a path-prefix reverse proxy (e.g.
``mission-control.tilos.com/hermes/*`` -> local Caddy -> :9119), the
proxy injects ``X-Forwarded-Prefix: /hermes`` on every request. We
rewrite the served ``index.html`` so absolute asset URLs (``/assets/...``)
and the SPA's runtime ``__HERMES_BASE_PATH__`` honour that prefix
without rebuilding the bundle.
"""
# `hermes serve` is the headless backend: it must NEVER serve the browser
# SPA, even if a dist is lying around from a prior `dashboard`/build. Take
# the no-frontend path so only the JSON-RPC/WS/API surface is reachable.
_headless = os.environ.get("HERMES_SERVE_HEADLESS") == "1"
if _headless or not WEB_DIST.exists():
_msg = (
"Headless backend (hermes serve): web UI disabled — use "
"`hermes dashboard` for the browser UI."
if _headless
else "Frontend not built. Run: cd web && npm run build"
)
@application.get("/{full_path:path}")
async def no_frontend(full_path: str):
return JSONResponse({"error": _msg}, status_code=404)
return
_index_path = WEB_DIST / "index.html"
def _serve_index(prefix: str = ""):
"""Return index.html with the session token + base-path injected.
``prefix`` is the normalised ``X-Forwarded-Prefix`` (e.g. ``/hermes``)
or empty string when served at root.
When the OAuth auth gate is active (``app.state.auth_required``),
the legacy ``_SESSION_TOKEN`` is NOT injected — the SPA reads
identity from ``/api/auth/me`` over cookie auth instead. The
``__HERMES_AUTH_REQUIRED__`` flag lets the SPA pick the right
auth scheme for /api/pty and /api/ws (ticket vs token).
"""
try:
html = _index_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
except OSError:
# The dist dir existed at mount time but index.html is missing or
# unreadable now (partial build, wiped dist, permissions). Without
# this guard every request raises FileNotFoundError (500). Return
# the same JSON 404 payload mount_spa uses for a fully-missing
# dist so clients get a clear, consistent signal.
return JSONResponse(
{"error": "Frontend not built. Run: cd web && npm run build"},
status_code=404,
)
chat_js = "true" if _DASHBOARD_EMBEDDED_CHAT_ENABLED else "false"
gated = bool(getattr(app.state, "auth_required", False))
gated_js = "true" if gated else "false"
if gated:
bootstrap_script = (
f"<script>"
f"window.__HERMES_DASHBOARD_EMBEDDED_CHAT__={chat_js};"
f'window.__HERMES_BASE_PATH__="{prefix}";'
f"window.__HERMES_AUTH_REQUIRED__={gated_js};"
f"</script>"
)
else:
bootstrap_script = (
f'<script>window.__HERMES_SESSION_TOKEN__="{_SESSION_TOKEN}";'
f"window.__HERMES_DASHBOARD_EMBEDDED_CHAT__={chat_js};"
f'window.__HERMES_BASE_PATH__="{prefix}";'
f"window.__HERMES_AUTH_REQUIRED__={gated_js};"
f"</script>"
)
if prefix:
# Rewrite absolute asset URLs baked into the Vite build so the
# browser fetches them through the same proxy prefix.
html = html.replace('href="/assets/', f'href="{prefix}/assets/')
html = html.replace('src="/assets/', f'src="{prefix}/assets/')
html = html.replace('href="/favicon.ico"', f'href="{prefix}/favicon.ico"')
html = html.replace('href="/fonts/', f'href="{prefix}/fonts/')
html = html.replace('href="/ds-assets/', f'href="{prefix}/ds-assets/')
html = html.replace('src="/ds-assets/', f'src="{prefix}/ds-assets/')
# Theme flash mitigation: when the active theme is a user theme
# (``HERMES_HOME/dashboard-themes/<name>.yaml``), inject a minimal
# critical-CSS block so the first paint uses the target palette.
# Without this the SPA paints the default Hermes Teal canvas, then
# ``ThemeProvider`` flips the CSS variables once
# ``/api/dashboard/themes`` resolves. Built-in themes are already
# in the bundle's ``presets.ts`` so no shim is needed for them.
theme_bootstrap = _render_active_theme_bootstrap_css()
if theme_bootstrap:
html = html.replace("</head>", f"{theme_bootstrap}</head>", 1)
html = html.replace("</head>", f"{bootstrap_script}</head>", 1)
return HTMLResponse(
html,
headers={"Cache-Control": "no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate"},
)
# When served behind a path-prefix proxy, the built CSS contains
# absolute ``url(/fonts/...)`` and ``url(/ds-assets/...)`` references.
# Browsers resolve those against the document origin, which means
# under ``/hermes`` they'd hit ``mission-control.tilos.com/fonts/...``
# (the MC Pages app), not the Hermes backend. Intercept CSS asset
# requests BEFORE the StaticFiles mount and rewrite the absolute paths
# when a prefix is in play.
@application.get("/assets/{filename}.css")
async def serve_css(filename: str, request: Request):
css_path = WEB_DIST / "assets" / f"{filename}.css"
if not css_path.is_file() or not css_path.resolve().is_relative_to(
WEB_DIST.resolve()
):
return JSONResponse({"error": "not found"}, status_code=404)
prefix = _normalise_prefix(request.headers.get("x-forwarded-prefix"))
css = css_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
if prefix:
for asset_dir in ("/fonts/", "/fonts-terminal/", "/ds-assets/", "/assets/"):
css = css.replace(f"url({asset_dir}", f"url({prefix}{asset_dir}")
css = css.replace(f"url(\"{asset_dir}", f"url(\"{prefix}{asset_dir}")
css = css.replace(f"url('{asset_dir}", f"url('{prefix}{asset_dir}")
return Response(content=css, media_type="text/css")
application.mount("/assets", StaticFiles(directory=WEB_DIST / "assets"), name="assets")
@application.get("/{full_path:path}")
async def serve_spa(full_path: str, request: Request):
prefix = _normalise_prefix(request.headers.get("x-forwarded-prefix"))
# An unmatched /api/* path is a missing/renamed endpoint, NOT a
# client-side route. Falling through to index.html here returns
# `<!doctype html>` with status 200, which makes JSON clients (the
# desktop app's fetchJson, dashboard fetch wrappers) blow up with an
# opaque `SyntaxError: Unexpected token '<'`. Return a real 404 JSON
# so the caller sees a clear "no such endpoint" instead.
if full_path == "api" or full_path.startswith("api/"):
return JSONResponse(
{"detail": f"No such API endpoint: /{full_path}"},
status_code=404,
)
file_path = WEB_DIST / full_path
# Prevent path traversal via url-encoded sequences (%2e%2e/)
if (
full_path
and file_path.resolve().is_relative_to(WEB_DIST.resolve())
and file_path.exists()
and file_path.is_file()
):
return FileResponse(file_path)
return _serve_index(prefix)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Dashboard theme endpoints
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Built-in dashboard themes — label + description only. The actual color
# definitions live in the frontend (web/src/themes/presets.ts).
_BUILTIN_DASHBOARD_THEMES = [
{"name": "default", "label": "Hermes Teal", "description": "Classic dark teal — the canonical Hermes look"},
{"name": "default-large", "label": "Hermes Teal (Large)", "description": "Hermes Teal with bigger fonts and roomier spacing"},
{"name": "nous-blue", "label": "Nous Blue", "description": "Light mode — vivid Nous-blue accents on cream canvas"},
{"name": "midnight", "label": "Midnight", "description": "Deep blue-violet with cool accents"},
{"name": "ember", "label": "Ember", "description": "Warm crimson and bronze — forge vibes"},
{"name": "mono", "label": "Mono", "description": "Clean grayscale — minimal and focused"},
{"name": "cyberpunk", "label": "Cyberpunk", "description": "Neon green on black — matrix terminal"},
{"name": "rose", "label": "Rosé", "description": "Soft pink and warm ivory — easy on the eyes"},
]
def _parse_theme_layer(value: Any, default_hex: str, default_alpha: float = 1.0) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Normalise a theme layer spec from YAML into `{hex, alpha}` form.
Accepts shorthand (a bare hex string) or full dict form. Returns
``None`` on garbage input so the caller can fall back to a built-in
default rather than blowing up.
"""
if value is None:
return {"hex": default_hex, "alpha": default_alpha}
if isinstance(value, str):
return {"hex": value, "alpha": default_alpha}
if isinstance(value, dict):
hex_val = value.get("hex", default_hex)
alpha_val = value.get("alpha", default_alpha)
if not isinstance(hex_val, str):
return None
try:
alpha_f = float(alpha_val)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
alpha_f = default_alpha
return {"hex": hex_val, "alpha": max(0.0, min(1.0, alpha_f))}
return None
_THEME_DEFAULT_TYPOGRAPHY: Dict[str, str] = {
"fontSans": 'system-ui, -apple-system, "Segoe UI", Roboto, "Helvetica Neue", Arial, sans-serif',
"fontMono": 'ui-monospace, "SF Mono", "Cascadia Mono", Menlo, Consolas, monospace',
"baseSize": "15px",
"lineHeight": "1.55",
"letterSpacing": "0",
}
_THEME_DEFAULT_LAYOUT: Dict[str, str] = {
"radius": "0.5rem",
"density": "comfortable",
}
_THEME_OVERRIDE_KEYS = {
"card", "cardForeground", "popover", "popoverForeground",
"primary", "primaryForeground", "secondary", "secondaryForeground",
"muted", "mutedForeground", "accent", "accentForeground",
"destructive", "destructiveForeground", "success", "warning",
"border", "input", "ring",
}
# Well-known named asset slots themes can populate. Any other keys under
# ``assets.custom`` are exposed as ``--theme-asset-custom-<key>`` CSS vars
# for plugin/shell use.
_THEME_NAMED_ASSET_KEYS = {"bg", "hero", "logo", "crest", "sidebar", "header"}
# Component-style buckets themes can override. The value under each bucket
# is a mapping from camelCase property name to CSS string; each pair emits
# ``--component-<bucket>-<kebab-property>`` on :root. The frontend's shell
# components (Card, App header, Backdrop, etc.) consume these vars so themes
# can restyle chrome (clip-path, border-image, segmented progress, etc.)
# without shipping their own CSS.
_THEME_COMPONENT_BUCKETS = {
"card", "header", "footer", "sidebar", "tab",
"progress", "badge", "backdrop", "page",
}
_THEME_LAYOUT_VARIANTS = {"standard", "cockpit", "tiled"}
# Cap on customCSS length so a malformed/oversized theme YAML can't blow up
# the response payload or the <style> tag. 32 KiB is plenty for every
# practical reskin (the Strike Freedom demo is ~2 KiB).
_THEME_CUSTOM_CSS_MAX = 32 * 1024
def _normalise_theme_definition(data: Dict[str, Any]) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Normalise a user theme YAML into the wire format `ThemeProvider`
expects. Returns ``None`` if the theme is unusable.
Accepts both the full schema (palette/typography/layout) and a loose
form with bare hex strings, so hand-written YAMLs stay friendly.
"""
if not isinstance(data, dict):
return None
name = data.get("name")
if not isinstance(name, str) or not name.strip():
return None
# Palette
palette_src = data.get("palette", {}) if isinstance(data.get("palette"), dict) else {}
# Allow top-level `colors.background` as a shorthand too.
colors_src = data.get("colors", {}) if isinstance(data.get("colors"), dict) else {}
def _layer(key: str, default_hex: str, default_alpha: float = 1.0) -> Dict[str, Any]:
spec = palette_src.get(key, colors_src.get(key))
parsed = _parse_theme_layer(spec, default_hex, default_alpha)
return parsed if parsed is not None else {"hex": default_hex, "alpha": default_alpha}
palette = {
"background": _layer("background", "#041c1c", 1.0),
"midground": _layer("midground", "#ffe6cb", 1.0),
"foreground": _layer("foreground", "#ffffff", 0.0),
"warmGlow": palette_src.get("warmGlow") or data.get("warmGlow") or "rgba(255, 189, 56, 0.35)",
"noiseOpacity": 1.0,
}
raw_noise = palette_src.get("noiseOpacity", data.get("noiseOpacity"))
try:
palette["noiseOpacity"] = float(raw_noise) if raw_noise is not None else 1.0
except (TypeError, ValueError):
palette["noiseOpacity"] = 1.0
# Typography
typo_src = data.get("typography", {}) if isinstance(data.get("typography"), dict) else {}
typography = dict(_THEME_DEFAULT_TYPOGRAPHY)
for key in ("fontSans", "fontMono", "fontDisplay", "fontUrl", "baseSize", "lineHeight", "letterSpacing"):
val = typo_src.get(key)
if isinstance(val, str) and val.strip():
typography[key] = val
# Layout
layout_src = data.get("layout", {}) if isinstance(data.get("layout"), dict) else {}
layout = dict(_THEME_DEFAULT_LAYOUT)
radius = layout_src.get("radius")
if isinstance(radius, str) and radius.strip():
layout["radius"] = radius
density = layout_src.get("density")
if isinstance(density, str) and density in {"compact", "comfortable", "spacious"}:
layout["density"] = density
# Color overrides — keep only valid keys with string values.
overrides_src = data.get("colorOverrides", {})
color_overrides: Dict[str, str] = {}
if isinstance(overrides_src, dict):
for key, val in overrides_src.items():
if key in _THEME_OVERRIDE_KEYS and isinstance(val, str) and val.strip():
color_overrides[key] = val
# Assets — named slots + arbitrary user-defined keys. Values must be
# strings (URLs or CSS ``url(...)``/``linear-gradient(...)`` expressions).
# We don't fetch remote assets here; the frontend just injects them as
# CSS vars. Empty values are dropped so a theme can explicitly clear a
# slot by setting ``hero: ""``.
assets_out: Dict[str, Any] = {}
assets_src = data.get("assets", {}) if isinstance(data.get("assets"), dict) else {}
for key in _THEME_NAMED_ASSET_KEYS:
val = assets_src.get(key)
if isinstance(val, str) and val.strip():
assets_out[key] = val
custom_assets_src = assets_src.get("custom")
if isinstance(custom_assets_src, dict):
custom_assets: Dict[str, str] = {}
for key, val in custom_assets_src.items():
if (
isinstance(key, str)
and key.replace("-", "").replace("_", "").isalnum()
and isinstance(val, str)
and val.strip()
):
custom_assets[key] = val
if custom_assets:
assets_out["custom"] = custom_assets
# Custom CSS — raw CSS text the frontend injects as a scoped <style>
# tag on theme apply. Clipped to _THEME_CUSTOM_CSS_MAX to keep the
# payload bounded. We intentionally do NOT parse/sanitise the CSS
# here — the dashboard is localhost-only and themes are user-authored
# YAML in ~/.hermes/, same trust level as the config file itself.
custom_css_val = data.get("customCSS")
custom_css: Optional[str] = None
if isinstance(custom_css_val, str) and custom_css_val.strip():
custom_css = custom_css_val[:_THEME_CUSTOM_CSS_MAX]
# Component style overrides — per-bucket dicts of camelCase CSS
# property -> CSS string. The frontend converts these into CSS vars
# that shell components (Card, App header, Backdrop) consume.
component_styles_src = data.get("componentStyles", {})
component_styles: Dict[str, Dict[str, str]] = {}
if isinstance(component_styles_src, dict):
for bucket, props in component_styles_src.items():
if bucket not in _THEME_COMPONENT_BUCKETS or not isinstance(props, dict):
continue
clean: Dict[str, str] = {}
for prop, value in props.items():
if (
isinstance(prop, str)
and prop.replace("-", "").replace("_", "").isalnum()
and isinstance(value, (str, int, float))
and str(value).strip()
):
clean[prop] = str(value)
if clean:
component_styles[bucket] = clean
layout_variant_src = data.get("layoutVariant")
layout_variant = (
layout_variant_src
if isinstance(layout_variant_src, str) and layout_variant_src in _THEME_LAYOUT_VARIANTS
else "standard"
)
result: Dict[str, Any] = {
"name": name,
"label": data.get("label") or name,
"description": data.get("description", ""),
"palette": palette,
"typography": typography,
"layout": layout,
"layoutVariant": layout_variant,
}
if color_overrides:
result["colorOverrides"] = color_overrides
if assets_out:
result["assets"] = assets_out
if custom_css is not None:
result["customCSS"] = custom_css
if component_styles:
result["componentStyles"] = component_styles
return result
def _discover_user_themes() -> list:
"""Scan ~/.hermes/dashboard-themes/*.yaml for user-created themes.
Returns a list of fully-normalised theme definitions ready to ship
to the frontend, so the client can apply them without a secondary
round-trip or a built-in stub.
Uses the dashboard process launch home, not ``get_hermes_home()``, so a
transient profile override from embedded chat does not hide themes that
live under the server's own ``HERMES_HOME``.
"""
themes_dir = get_process_hermes_home() / "dashboard-themes"
if not themes_dir.is_dir():
return []
result = []
for f in sorted(themes_dir.glob("*.yaml")):
try:
data = yaml.safe_load(f.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
except Exception:
continue
normalised = _normalise_theme_definition(data)
if normalised is not None:
result.append(normalised)
return result
@app.get("/api/dashboard/themes")
async def get_dashboard_themes():
"""Return available themes and the currently active one.
Built-in entries ship name/label/description only (the frontend owns
their full definitions in `web/src/themes/presets.ts`). User themes
from `~/.hermes/dashboard-themes/*.yaml` ship with their full
normalised definition under `definition`, so the client can apply
them without a stub.
"""
config = load_config()
active = cfg_get(config, "dashboard", "theme", default="default")
user_themes = _discover_user_themes()
seen = set()
themes = []
for t in _BUILTIN_DASHBOARD_THEMES:
seen.add(t["name"])
themes.append(t)
for t in user_themes:
if t["name"] in seen:
continue
themes.append({
"name": t["name"],
"label": t["label"],
"description": t["description"],
"definition": t,
})
seen.add(t["name"])
return {"themes": themes, "active": active}
class ThemeSetBody(BaseModel):
name: str
@app.put("/api/dashboard/theme")
async def set_dashboard_theme(body: ThemeSetBody):
"""Set the active dashboard theme (persists to config.yaml)."""
config = load_config()
if "dashboard" not in config:
config["dashboard"] = {}
config["dashboard"]["theme"] = body.name
save_config(config)
return {"ok": True, "theme": body.name}
# Curated font-override ids. Kept in sync with FONT_CHOICES in
# web/src/themes/fonts.ts — the frontend owns the stacks + webfont URLs;
# the backend only needs the id allow-list so it can reject anything not
# in the vetted catalog (the font's webfont URL is injected as a <link>,
# so we never accept an arbitrary user-supplied id/URL here).
_FONT_DEFAULT_ID = "theme"
_FONT_CHOICES = frozenset({
"system-sans", "system-serif", "system-mono",
"inter", "ibm-plex-sans", "work-sans", "atkinson-hyperlegible", "dm-sans",
"spectral", "fraunces", "source-serif",
"jetbrains-mono", "ibm-plex-mono", "space-mono",
})
@app.get("/api/dashboard/font")
async def get_dashboard_font():
"""Return the active font override (``"theme"`` = use the theme's font)."""
config = load_config()
font = cfg_get(config, "dashboard", "font", default=_FONT_DEFAULT_ID)
if font not in _FONT_CHOICES:
font = _FONT_DEFAULT_ID
return {"font": font}
class FontSetBody(BaseModel):
font: str
@app.put("/api/dashboard/font")
async def set_dashboard_font(body: FontSetBody):
"""Set the dashboard font override (persists to config.yaml).
Accepts any id in the curated catalog, or ``"theme"`` to clear the
override and fall back to the active theme's own font. Unknown ids are
coerced to ``"theme"`` rather than 400'd so a stale client can't wedge
the picker.
"""
font = body.font if body.font in _FONT_CHOICES else _FONT_DEFAULT_ID
config = load_config()
if "dashboard" not in config:
config["dashboard"] = {}
config["dashboard"]["font"] = font
save_config(config)
return {"ok": True, "font": font}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Dashboard plugin system
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _safe_plugin_api_relpath(api_field: Any, *, dashboard_dir: Path) -> Optional[str]:
"""Validate the manifest's ``api`` field for the plugin loader.
The web server later imports this file as a Python module via
``importlib.util.spec_from_file_location`` (arbitrary code
execution by design — that's how plugins extend the backend).
Pre-#29156 the field was used as-is, which meant:
* An absolute path swallowed the plugin's dashboard directory
entirely — ``Path('safe/dashboard') / '/tmp/evil.py'`` resolves
to ``/tmp/evil.py``, so any attacker-controlled manifest could
point the import at any Python file on disk (GHSA-5qr3-c538-wm9j).
* A ``../..`` traversal could climb out of the plugin into
neighbouring directories on the search path.
Return the original string when the resolved path stays under
``dashboard_dir``; return ``None`` (with a warning logged at the
call site) otherwise so the plugin still loads its static JS/CSS
but its backend ``api`` is rejected.
"""
if not isinstance(api_field, str) or not api_field.strip():
return None
candidate = Path(api_field)
if candidate.is_absolute():
return None
try:
resolved = (dashboard_dir / candidate).resolve()
base = dashboard_dir.resolve()
except (OSError, RuntimeError):
return None
try:
resolved.relative_to(base)
except ValueError:
return None
return api_field
def _discover_dashboard_plugins() -> list:
"""Scan plugins/*/dashboard/manifest.json for dashboard extensions.
Checks three plugin sources (same as hermes_cli.plugins):
1. User plugins: ~/.hermes/plugins/<name>/dashboard/manifest.json
2. Bundled plugins: <repo>/plugins/<name>/dashboard/manifest.json (memory/, etc.)
3. Project plugins: ./.hermes/plugins/ (only if HERMES_ENABLE_PROJECT_PLUGINS)
"""
plugins = []
seen_names: set = set()
from hermes_cli.plugins import get_bundled_plugins_dir
bundled_root = get_bundled_plugins_dir()
# User dashboard plugins are a dashboard-owned asset (same category as
# theme YAML): resolve them from the process launch home so they don't
# vanish when a request is scoped to another profile via a context-local
# HERMES_HOME override (e.g. embedded /chat under --open-profile).
search_dirs = [
(get_process_hermes_home() / "plugins", "user"),
(bundled_root / "memory", "bundled"),
(bundled_root, "bundled"),
]
# GHSA-5qr3-c538-wm9j (#29156): the previous ``os.environ.get(...)``
# check treated *any* non-empty string as truthy, so ``=0``, ``=false``,
# and ``=no`` — all of which the agent loader and operators correctly
# read as "disabled" — silently *enabled* the untrusted project source
# in the web server. Combined with the absolute-path RCE primitive on
# the manifest's ``api`` field (now patched below), this turned the
# opt-in into a sticky always-on switch. Use the shared truthy
# semantics (``1`` / ``true`` / ``yes`` / ``on``) so the gate matches
# ``hermes_cli/plugins.py`` and the documented user contract.
if env_var_enabled("HERMES_ENABLE_PROJECT_PLUGINS"):
search_dirs.append((Path.cwd() / ".hermes" / "plugins", "project"))
for plugins_root, source in search_dirs:
if not plugins_root.is_dir():
continue
for child in sorted(plugins_root.iterdir()):
if not child.is_dir():
continue
manifest_file = child / "dashboard" / "manifest.json"
if not manifest_file.exists():
continue
try:
data = json.loads(manifest_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
name = data.get("name", child.name)
if name in seen_names:
continue
seen_names.add(name)
# Tab options: ``path`` + ``position`` for a new tab, optional
# ``override`` to replace a built-in route, and ``hidden`` to
# register the plugin component/slots without adding a tab
# (useful for slot-only plugins like a header-crest injector).
raw_tab = data.get("tab", {}) if isinstance(data.get("tab"), dict) else {}
tab_info = {
"path": raw_tab.get("path", f"/{name}"),
"position": raw_tab.get("position", "end"),
}
override_path = raw_tab.get("override")
if isinstance(override_path, str) and override_path.startswith("/"):
tab_info["override"] = override_path
if bool(raw_tab.get("hidden")):
tab_info["hidden"] = True
# Slots: list of named slot locations this plugin populates.
# The frontend exposes ``registerSlot(pluginName, slotName, Component)``
# on window; plugins with non-empty slots call it from their JS bundle.
slots_src = data.get("slots")
slots: List[str] = []
if isinstance(slots_src, list):
slots = [s for s in slots_src if isinstance(s, str) and s]
# Validate ``api`` at discovery time so the value cached
# on the plugin entry is already safe to feed into the
# importer. An attacker-controlled manifest can name
# any absolute path or ``..`` traversal here — the
# web server then imports that file as a Python module
# (RCE, GHSA-5qr3-c538-wm9j).
raw_api = data.get("api")
dashboard_dir = child / "dashboard"
safe_api = _safe_plugin_api_relpath(raw_api, dashboard_dir=dashboard_dir)
if raw_api and safe_api is None:
_log.warning(
"Plugin %s: refusing unsafe api path %r (must be a "
"relative file inside the plugin's dashboard/ "
"directory); backend routes from this plugin will "
"not be mounted",
name, raw_api,
)
plugins.append({
"name": name,
"label": data.get("label", name),
"description": data.get("description", ""),
"icon": data.get("icon", "Puzzle"),
"version": data.get("version", "0.0.0"),
"tab": tab_info,
"slots": slots,
"entry": data.get("entry", "dist/index.js"),
"css": data.get("css"),
"has_api": bool(safe_api),
"source": source,
"_dir": str(dashboard_dir),
"_api_file": safe_api,
})
except Exception as exc:
_log.warning("Bad dashboard plugin manifest %s: %s", manifest_file, exc)
continue
return plugins
# Cache discovered plugins per-process (refresh on explicit re-scan).
_dashboard_plugins_cache: Optional[list] = None
def _get_dashboard_plugins(force_rescan: bool = False) -> list:
global _dashboard_plugins_cache
if _dashboard_plugins_cache is None or force_rescan:
_dashboard_plugins_cache = _discover_dashboard_plugins()
elif _dashboard_plugins_cache:
if any(not Path(p["_dir"]).is_dir() for p in _dashboard_plugins_cache):
_dashboard_plugins_cache = _discover_dashboard_plugins()
return _dashboard_plugins_cache
@app.get("/api/dashboard/plugins")
async def get_dashboard_plugins():
"""Return discovered dashboard plugins (excludes user-hidden and non-enabled ones)."""
plugins = _get_dashboard_plugins()
# Read user's hidden plugins list from config.
config = load_config()
hidden: list = cfg_get(config, "dashboard", "hidden_plugins", default=[]) or []
# Gate: only serve user plugins that are in plugins.enabled and not
# in plugins.disabled. This prevents the frontend from loading JS/CSS
# from plugins the user has not explicitly activated. (#46435)
try:
from hermes_cli.plugins_cmd import _get_enabled_set, _get_disabled_set
enabled_set = _get_enabled_set()
disabled_set = _get_disabled_set()
except Exception:
enabled_set = set()
disabled_set = set()
def _is_active(p: dict) -> bool:
name = p.get("name", "")
if name in hidden:
return False
if p.get("source") == "user":
if name in disabled_set:
return False
if name not in enabled_set:
return False
elif p.get("source") == "bundled":
if name in disabled_set:
return False
return True
# Strip internal fields before sending to frontend.
return [
{k: v for k, v in p.items() if not k.startswith("_")}
for p in plugins
if _is_active(p)
]
@app.get("/api/dashboard/plugins/rescan")
async def rescan_dashboard_plugins():
"""Force re-scan of dashboard plugins."""
plugins = _get_dashboard_plugins(force_rescan=True)
return {"ok": True, "count": len(plugins)}
class _AgentPluginInstallBody(BaseModel):
identifier: str
force: bool = False
enable: bool = True
def _strip_dashboard_manifest(p: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
return {k: v for k, v in p.items() if not k.startswith("_")}
def _merged_plugins_hub() -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Agent discovery + dashboard manifests + optional provider picker metadata."""
from hermes_cli.plugins_cmd import (
_discover_all_plugins,
_get_current_context_engine,
_get_current_memory_provider,
_discover_context_engines,
_get_disabled_set,
_get_enabled_set,
_read_manifest as _read_plugin_manifest_at,
)
dashboard_list = _get_dashboard_plugins()
dash_by_name = {str(p["name"]): p for p in dashboard_list}
disabled_set = _get_disabled_set()
enabled_set = _get_enabled_set()
# Read user-hidden plugins from config for the user_hidden field.
config = load_config()
hidden_plugins: list = cfg_get(config, "dashboard", "hidden_plugins", default=[]) or []
plugins_root_resolved = (get_hermes_home() / "plugins").resolve()
rows: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for name, version, description, source, dir_str, key in _discover_all_plugins():
# Both the path-derived key (nested category plugins) and the bare
# manifest name count for enabled/disabled state, matching the runtime
# loader's back-compat lookup.
aliases = {name}
if key:
aliases.add(key)
if aliases & disabled_set:
runtime_status = "disabled"
elif aliases & enabled_set:
runtime_status = "enabled"
else:
runtime_status = "inactive"
dir_path = Path(dir_str)
dm = dash_by_name.get(name)
has_dash_manifest = dm is not None or (dir_path / "dashboard" / "manifest.json").exists()
under_user_tree = False
try:
dir_path.resolve().relative_to(plugins_root_resolved)
under_user_tree = True
except ValueError:
pass
can_remove_update = (
source in {"user", "git"} and under_user_tree and Path(dir_str).is_dir()
)
# Check if this plugin provides tools that require auth
auth_required = False
auth_command = ""
manifest_data = _read_plugin_manifest_at(dir_path)
provides_tools = manifest_data.get("provides_tools") or []
if provides_tools:
try:
from tools.registry import registry
for tname in provides_tools:
entry = registry.get_entry(tname)
if entry and entry.check_fn and not entry.check_fn():
auth_required = True
auth_command = f"hermes auth {name}"
break
except Exception:
pass
rows.append({
"name": name,
"version": version or "",
"description": description or "",
"source": source,
"runtime_status": runtime_status,
"has_dashboard_manifest": has_dash_manifest,
"dashboard_manifest": _strip_dashboard_manifest(dm) if dm else None,
"path": dir_str,
"can_remove": can_remove_update,
"can_update_git": can_remove_update and (Path(dir_str) / ".git").exists(),
"auth_required": auth_required,
"auth_command": auth_command,
"user_hidden": name in hidden_plugins,
})
agent_names = {r["name"] for r in rows}
orphan_dashboard = [
_strip_dashboard_manifest(p)
for p in dashboard_list
if str(p["name"]) not in agent_names
]
memory_providers = _discover_memory_provider_statuses()
context_engines: List[Dict[str, str]] = []
try:
for n, desc in _discover_context_engines():
context_engines.append({"name": n, "description": desc})
except Exception:
context_engines = []
return {
"plugins": rows,
"orphan_dashboard_plugins": orphan_dashboard,
"providers": {
"memory_provider": _normalize_memory_provider_name(_get_current_memory_provider()),
"memory_options": memory_providers,
"context_engine": _get_current_context_engine(),
"context_options": context_engines,
},
}
@app.get("/api/dashboard/plugins/hub")
async def get_plugins_hub(request: Request):
"""Unified agent plugins + dashboard extension metadata (session protected)."""
_require_token(request)
try:
return _merged_plugins_hub()
except Exception as exc:
_log.warning("plugins/hub failed: %s", exc)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to build plugins hub.") from exc
@app.post("/api/dashboard/agent-plugins/install")
async def post_agent_plugin_install(request: Request, body: _AgentPluginInstallBody):
_require_token(request)
from hermes_cli.plugins_cmd import dashboard_install_plugin
result = dashboard_install_plugin(
body.identifier.strip(),
force=body.force,
enable=body.enable,
)
if not result.get("ok"):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=result.get("error") or "Install failed.",
)
_get_dashboard_plugins(force_rescan=True)
# Strip internal paths from the response
result.pop("after_install_path", None)
return result
def _validate_plugin_name(name: str) -> str:
"""Reject path-traversal attempts in plugin name URL parameters."""
name = name.strip("/")
if not name or ".." in name or "\\" in name:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid plugin name.")
return name
@app.post("/api/dashboard/agent-plugins/{name:path}/enable")
async def post_agent_plugin_enable(request: Request, name: str):
_require_token(request)
name = _validate_plugin_name(name)
from hermes_cli.plugins_cmd import dashboard_set_agent_plugin_enabled
result = dashboard_set_agent_plugin_enabled(name, enabled=True)
if not result.get("ok"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=result.get("error") or "Enable failed.")
return result
@app.post("/api/dashboard/agent-plugins/{name:path}/disable")
async def post_agent_plugin_disable(request: Request, name: str):
_require_token(request)
name = _validate_plugin_name(name)
from hermes_cli.plugins_cmd import dashboard_set_agent_plugin_enabled
result = dashboard_set_agent_plugin_enabled(name, enabled=False)
if not result.get("ok"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=result.get("error") or "Disable failed.")
return result
@app.post("/api/dashboard/agent-plugins/{name:path}/update")
async def post_agent_plugin_update(request: Request, name: str):
_require_token(request)
name = _validate_plugin_name(name)
from hermes_cli.plugins_cmd import dashboard_update_user_plugin
result = dashboard_update_user_plugin(name)
if not result.get("ok"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=result.get("error") or "Update failed.")
_get_dashboard_plugins(force_rescan=True)
return result
@app.delete("/api/dashboard/agent-plugins/{name:path}")
async def delete_agent_plugin(request: Request, name: str):
_require_token(request)
name = _validate_plugin_name(name)
from hermes_cli.plugins_cmd import dashboard_remove_user_plugin
result = dashboard_remove_user_plugin(name)
if not result.get("ok"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=result.get("error") or "Remove failed.")
_get_dashboard_plugins(force_rescan=True)
return result
class _PluginProvidersPutBody(BaseModel):
memory_provider: Optional[str] = None
context_engine: Optional[str] = None
@app.put("/api/dashboard/plugin-providers")
async def put_plugin_providers(request: Request, body: _PluginProvidersPutBody):
"""Persist memory provider / context engine selection (writes config.yaml)."""
_require_token(request)
from hermes_cli.plugins_cmd import (
_save_context_engine,
_save_memory_provider,
)
if body.memory_provider is not None:
memory_provider = _normalize_memory_provider_name(body.memory_provider)
_require_memory_provider_ready(memory_provider)
_save_memory_provider(memory_provider)
if body.context_engine is not None:
_save_context_engine(body.context_engine)
return {"ok": True}
class _PluginVisibilityBody(BaseModel):
hidden: bool
@app.post("/api/dashboard/plugins/{name:path}/visibility")
async def post_plugin_visibility(request: Request, name: str, body: _PluginVisibilityBody):
"""Toggle a plugin's sidebar visibility (persists to config.yaml dashboard.hidden_plugins)."""
_require_token(request)
name = _validate_plugin_name(name)
config = load_config()
if "dashboard" not in config or not isinstance(config.get("dashboard"), dict):
config["dashboard"] = {}
hidden_list: list = config["dashboard"].get("hidden_plugins") or []
if not isinstance(hidden_list, list):
hidden_list = []
if body.hidden and name not in hidden_list:
hidden_list.append(name)
elif not body.hidden and name in hidden_list:
hidden_list.remove(name)
config["dashboard"]["hidden_plugins"] = hidden_list
save_config(config)
return {"ok": True, "name": name, "hidden": body.hidden}
@app.get("/dashboard-plugins/{plugin_name}/{file_path:path}")
async def serve_plugin_asset(plugin_name: str, file_path: str):
"""Serve static assets from a dashboard plugin directory.
Only serves files from the plugin's ``dashboard/`` subdirectory.
Path traversal is blocked by checking ``resolve().is_relative_to()``.
Restricted to a browser-fetchable suffix allowlist (JS/CSS/JSON/HTML/
SVG/PNG/JPG/WOFF). The dashboard loads plugin JS via ``<script src>``
and CSS via ``<link href>``, neither of which can attach a custom
auth header — so this route stays unauthenticated to keep the SPA
working. But user-installed plugins ship a ``plugin_api.py``
backend module that the browser never fetches; it's only imported
by :func:`_mount_plugin_api_routes` at startup. Without a suffix
allowlist, anyone on the loopback port can curl the ``.py`` source
of a private third-party plugin. Reject everything outside the
browser-asset set.
User plugins must be in plugins.enabled before their assets are
served. (#46435, GHSA-mcfc-hp25-cjv7)
"""
plugins = _get_dashboard_plugins()
plugin = next((p for p in plugins if p["name"] == plugin_name), None)
if not plugin:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Plugin not found")
# Gate: user plugins must be enabled to serve assets;
# bundled plugins must not be explicitly disabled.
try:
from hermes_cli.plugins_cmd import _get_enabled_set, _get_disabled_set
enabled_set = _get_enabled_set()
disabled_set = _get_disabled_set()
except Exception:
enabled_set = set()
disabled_set = set()
if plugin.get("source") == "user":
if plugin_name in disabled_set or plugin_name not in enabled_set:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Plugin not found")
elif plugin.get("source") == "bundled":
if plugin_name in disabled_set:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Plugin not found")
base = Path(plugin["_dir"])
target = (base / file_path).resolve()
if not target.is_relative_to(base.resolve()):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Path traversal blocked")
if not target.exists() or not target.is_file():
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="File not found")
# Browser-asset suffix allowlist. Everything outside this set is
# rejected with 404 so we don't leak ``.py`` backend sources, README
# files, ``.env.example`` templates, etc. — none of which the SPA
# actually fetches. Add to this set deliberately when a new asset
# type comes up; do NOT change the default fallback.
suffix = target.suffix.lower()
content_types = {
".js": "application/javascript",
".mjs": "application/javascript",
".css": "text/css",
".json": "application/json",
".html": "text/html",
".svg": "image/svg+xml",
".png": "image/png",
".jpg": "image/jpeg",
".jpeg": "image/jpeg",
".gif": "image/gif",
".webp": "image/webp",
".ico": "image/x-icon",
".woff2": "font/woff2",
".woff": "font/woff",
".ttf": "font/ttf",
".otf": "font/otf",
".map": "application/json",
}
if suffix not in content_types:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404,
detail="File not found",
)
media_type = content_types[suffix]
return FileResponse(
target,
media_type=media_type,
headers={"Cache-Control": "no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate"},
)
def _mount_plugin_api_routes():
"""Import and mount backend API routes from plugins that declare them.
Each plugin's ``api`` field points to a Python file that must expose
a ``router`` (FastAPI APIRouter). Routes are mounted under
``/api/plugins/<name>/``.
Backend import is restricted to ``bundled`` and ``user`` sources.
Project plugins (``./.hermes/plugins/``) ship with the CWD and are
therefore attacker-controlled in any threat model where the user
opens a malicious repo; they can extend the dashboard UI via
static JS/CSS but their Python ``api`` file is never auto-imported
by the web server. See GHSA-5qr3-c538-wm9j (#29156).
Additionally, user plugins must be explicitly enabled via the
``plugins.enabled`` allow-list in config.yaml before their backend
code is imported. Without this gate, an installed-but-not-enabled
plugin's Python code would execute at dashboard startup — a code
execution vector that bypasses the user's intent. (#46435,
GHSA-mcfc-hp25-cjv7)
"""
# Load the enabled/disabled sets once for the loop.
try:
from hermes_cli.plugins_cmd import _get_enabled_set, _get_disabled_set
enabled_set = _get_enabled_set()
disabled_set = _get_disabled_set()
except Exception:
enabled_set = set()
disabled_set = set()
for plugin in _get_dashboard_plugins():
api_file_name = plugin.get("_api_file")
if not api_file_name:
continue
plugin_name = plugin.get("name", "")
# Gate: user plugins must be in plugins.enabled and not in
# plugins.disabled before we import their Python code.
# Bundled plugins are trusted (they ship with the release) but
# still respect an explicit disable.
if plugin.get("source") == "user":
if plugin_name in disabled_set:
_log.debug(
"Plugin %s: skipping API mount (explicitly disabled)",
plugin_name,
)
continue
if plugin_name not in enabled_set:
_log.debug(
"Plugin %s: skipping API mount (not in plugins.enabled)",
plugin_name,
)
continue
elif plugin.get("source") == "bundled":
if plugin_name in disabled_set:
_log.debug(
"Plugin %s: skipping API mount (explicitly disabled)",
plugin_name,
)
continue
if plugin.get("source") == "project":
_log.warning(
"Plugin %s: ignoring backend api=%s (project plugins may "
"not auto-import Python code; move the plugin to "
"~/.hermes/plugins/ if you trust it)",
plugin["name"], api_file_name,
)
continue
dashboard_dir = Path(plugin["_dir"])
api_path = dashboard_dir / api_file_name
try:
resolved_api = api_path.resolve()
resolved_base = dashboard_dir.resolve()
resolved_api.relative_to(resolved_base)
except (OSError, RuntimeError, ValueError):
# Discovery already filters this, but re-check here in case
# ``_dir`` was tampered with after caching or a future caller
# bypasses the validator. Defence in depth keeps the import
# primitive contained even if the upstream check regresses.
_log.warning(
"Plugin %s: refusing to import api file outside its "
"dashboard directory (%s)", plugin["name"], api_path,
)
continue
if not api_path.exists():
_log.warning("Plugin %s declares api=%s but file not found", plugin["name"], api_file_name)
continue
try:
module_name = f"hermes_dashboard_plugin_{plugin['name']}"
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(module_name, api_path)
if spec is None or spec.loader is None:
continue
mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
# Register in sys.modules BEFORE exec_module so pydantic/FastAPI
# can resolve forward references (e.g. models defined in a file
# that uses `from __future__ import annotations`). Without this,
# TypeAdapter lazy-build fails at first request with
# "is not fully defined" because the module namespace isn't
# reachable by name for string-annotation resolution.
sys.modules[module_name] = mod
try:
spec.loader.exec_module(mod)
except Exception:
sys.modules.pop(module_name, None)
raise
router = getattr(mod, "router", None)
if router is None:
_log.warning("Plugin %s api file has no 'router' attribute", plugin["name"])
continue
app.include_router(router, prefix=f"/api/plugins/{plugin['name']}")
_log.info("Mounted plugin API routes: /api/plugins/%s/", plugin["name"])
except Exception as exc:
_log.warning("Failed to load plugin %s API routes: %s", plugin["name"], exc)
# Mount plugin API routes before the SPA catch-all.
_mount_plugin_api_routes()
# Mount the dashboard auth routes (/login, /auth/*, /api/auth/*) before the
# SPA catch-all so /{full_path:path} doesn't swallow them. These are
# always mounted — the gate middleware decides whether to enforce auth,
# not whether the routes exist.
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.routes import router as _dashboard_auth_router # noqa: E402
app.include_router(_dashboard_auth_router)
mount_spa(app)
def _read_bound_port(server: "uvicorn.Server", fallback: int) -> int:
"""Read the OS-assigned port from a live uvicorn server socket.
After ``server.startup()`` the socket is bound. Returns the actual
port so ephemeral (port-0) discovery works without a pre-bind TOCTOU.
Falls back to *fallback* if the socket list is empty (shouldn't happen
but guards against uvicorn internals changing).
"""
if server.servers and server.servers[0].sockets:
return server.servers[0].sockets[0].getsockname()[1]
return fallback
def _write_dashboard_ready_file(actual_port: int) -> None:
"""Optionally publish the dashboard port through an atomic ready file.
Windows Desktop can launch dashboard backends with ``pythonw.exe`` to avoid
console flashes. That path cannot rely on stdout for the port announcement,
so Electron passes ``HERMES_DESKTOP_READY_FILE`` and waits for this JSON.
Normal CLI/dashboard launches still use the stdout READY line below.
"""
target = os.environ.get("HERMES_DESKTOP_READY_FILE")
if not target:
return
tmp_name = ""
try:
path = Path(target)
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
payload = json.dumps({"port": int(actual_port)}, separators=(",", ":"))
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(
"w",
encoding="utf-8",
dir=str(path.parent),
prefix=f"{path.name}.",
suffix=".tmp",
delete=False,
) as fh:
fh.write(payload)
fh.flush()
os.fsync(fh.fileno())
tmp_name = fh.name
os.replace(tmp_name, path)
except Exception as exc:
if tmp_name:
try:
Path(tmp_name).unlink(missing_ok=True)
except Exception:
pass
_log.warning("Failed to write dashboard ready file %r: %s", target, exc)
def _maybe_open_browser(
host: str, actual_port: int, open_browser: bool, initial_profile: str
) -> None:
"""Open the dashboard URL in the user's browser if appropriate.
Skips on headless Linux (no ``DISPLAY`` / ``WAYLAND_DISPLAY``) to avoid
TUI browsers (links, lynx) that would SIGHUP the server process.
Maps ``0.0.0.0`` / ``::`` binds to ``127.0.0.1`` so the browser opens
a reachable URL.
"""
if not open_browser:
return
import webbrowser
_has_display = (
sys.platform != "linux"
or bool(os.environ.get("DISPLAY"))
or bool(os.environ.get("WAYLAND_DISPLAY"))
)
if not _has_display:
_log.debug(
"Skipping browser-open: no DISPLAY or WAYLAND_DISPLAY detected "
"(headless Linux). Pass --no-open to suppress this detection."
)
return
_display_host = host if host not in ("0.0.0.0", "::") else "127.0.0.1"
_open_url = f"http://{_display_host}:{actual_port}"
if initial_profile:
from urllib.parse import quote
_open_url += f"/?profile={quote(initial_profile)}"
def _open():
try:
time.sleep(1.0)
webbrowser.open(_open_url)
except Exception:
pass
threading.Thread(target=_open, daemon=True).start()
def start_server(
host: str = "127.0.0.1",
port: int = 9119,
open_browser: bool = True,
allow_public: bool = False,
initial_profile: str = "",
headless: bool = False,
ssh_session_token: Optional[str] = None,
ssh_owner_nonce: Optional[str] = None,
):
"""Start the web UI server.
``initial_profile`` (when set) is appended to the auto-opened browser
URL as ``?profile=<name>`` so the SPA's profile switcher preselects it
— used when a profile alias (``<profile> dashboard``) routes to the
machine dashboard.
``headless`` is the ``serve`` path: the JSON-RPC/WS backend with no UI
build and no SPA mount (mount_spa() honours ``HERMES_SERVE_HEADLESS``), so
the banner announces the bind rather than a browser URL.
``ssh_session_token`` and ``ssh_owner_nonce`` are process-local Desktop SSH
bootstrap state. Neither is persisted or exported to child processes.
"""
_apply_ssh_session_token(ssh_session_token or "")
_apply_ssh_owner_nonce(ssh_owner_nonce)
import uvicorn
try:
from hermes_cli.nous_auth_keepalive import start_nous_auth_keepalive
start_nous_auth_keepalive()
except Exception as exc:
_log.debug("Nous auth keepalive did not start: %s", exc)
# Phase 0: stash the auth-gate flag on app.state so middleware / SPA-token
# injection / WS-auth paths can branch on it consistently. Phase 3.5
# uses this to decide whether to refuse the bind, log the gate-on
# banner, and enable uvicorn proxy_headers.
app.state.auth_required = should_require_auth(host)
# ``--insecure`` no longer disables the auth gate (June 2026 hardening:
# the hermes-0day MCP-persistence campaign abused unauthenticated public
# dashboards). If a caller still passes it, warn that it is now a no-op
# rather than silently changing their expectation of an open bind.
if allow_public and host not in _LOOPBACK_HOST_VALUES:
_log.warning(
"--insecure no longer bypasses dashboard authentication. A "
"non-loopback bind (%s) now ALWAYS requires an auth provider "
"(OAuth or the bundled password provider). Configure one — see "
"below — or bind to 127.0.0.1 and reach it over an SSH tunnel / "
"Tailscale.", host,
)
if app.state.auth_required:
# The gate engages on every non-loopback bind. Require at least one
# provider to be registered, else fail closed — there is no longer an
# escape hatch that serves the dashboard without authentication.
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth import list_providers
if not list_providers():
# Surface the *specific* reason any bundled provider declined
# to register (e.g. missing HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID).
# Each provider plugin that ships with Hermes Agent exposes a
# module-level ``LAST_SKIP_REASON`` string for this purpose;
# without it the operator would only see "no providers" which
# is misleading when the provider IS installed but unconfigured.
skip_reasons: list[str] = []
try:
from plugins.dashboard_auth import nous as _nous_plugin
if _nous_plugin.LAST_SKIP_REASON:
skip_reasons.append(
f" • nous: {_nous_plugin.LAST_SKIP_REASON}"
)
except Exception:
pass
_fix_hint = (
"Configure an auth provider before exposing the dashboard:\n"
" • Password: set dashboard.basic_auth.username + "
"password_hash in config.yaml\n"
" (hash with: python -c \"from "
"plugins.dashboard_auth.basic import hash_password; "
"print(hash_password('your-password'))\")\n"
" • OAuth: run `hermes dashboard register` (Nous Portal) or "
"install a DashboardAuthProvider plugin.\n"
"There is no unauthenticated public-bind option — to keep it "
"local, bind 127.0.0.1 and tunnel in (SSH / Tailscale)."
)
# Hint when credentials exist but the bundled provider is blocked
# (#54489).
try:
from hermes_cli.config import load_config as _load_cfg
from hermes_cli.plugins_cmd import _BASIC_AUTH_PLUGIN_KEYS
_cfg = _load_cfg()
_ba = (_cfg.get("dashboard") or {}).get("basic_auth") or {}
_disabled = (_cfg.get("plugins") or {}).get("disabled") or []
# Basic auth only activates with a username AND a credential
# (plaintext password or password_hash); don't fire the hint on
# a half-configured block.
_has_creds = bool(_ba.get("username")) and bool(
_ba.get("password_hash") or _ba.get("password")
)
if _has_creds and (set(_disabled) & _BASIC_AUTH_PLUGIN_KEYS):
_fix_hint = (
"The 'basic' dashboard-auth plugin is in "
"plugins.disabled but dashboard.basic_auth is "
"configured.\n"
"Remove 'basic' from plugins.disabled (or run "
"`hermes plugins enable basic`), then restart the "
"dashboard.\n\n"
) + _fix_hint
except Exception:
pass
if skip_reasons:
raise SystemExit(
f"Refusing to bind dashboard to {host} — the auth gate "
f"engages on non-loopback binds, but no auth providers "
f"are registered.\n\n"
f"Bundled providers reported these issues:\n"
+ "\n".join(skip_reasons)
+ "\n\n"
+ _fix_hint
)
raise SystemExit(
f"Refusing to bind dashboard to {host} — the auth gate "
f"engages on non-loopback binds, but no auth providers are "
f"registered.\n\n" + _fix_hint
)
_log.info(
"Dashboard binding to %s with auth gate enabled. Providers: %s",
host,
", ".join(p.name for p in list_providers()),
)
# Record the bound host so host_header_middleware can validate incoming
# Host headers against it. Defends against DNS rebinding (GHSA-ppp5-vxwm-4cf7).
app.state.bound_host = host
# ── Start uvicorn with direct Server API ─────────────────────────
# We use uvicorn.Server directly (not uvicorn.run) so we can split
# startup from the main loop. After startup() the socket is actually
# bound — we read the OS-assigned port from the live socket, print
# HERMES_DASHBOARD_READY, open the browser, *then* serve.
#
# This eliminates the TOCTOU of the old pre-bind-then-close approach
# (bind port 0 → close → uvicorn rebind): the socket is held by
# uvicorn the entire time, so no other process can steal the port.
#
# For explicit non-zero ports, if the port is taken uvicorn catches
# OSError inside create_server() and exits with a clear error — no
# separate preflight probe needed.
# Loopback binds are the Desktop case: a single local client, no reverse
# proxy in front. uvicorn's ws keepalive ping runs ON the same event loop
# as agent turns, and a single synchronous GIL-holding call on a worker
# thread (e.g. a regex/scrub over a large model output, or a long
# delegate_task subagent turn) can starve that loop for *minutes* — the
# loop cannot process the incoming pong, so uvicorn declares the socket
# dead and closes it, dropping an otherwise-healthy local connection
# (#53773: "event loop stalled 226.3s"; #48445/#50005). A longer timeout
# only raises the threshold — a multi-minute stall sails past any finite
# window. The keepalive ping exists to detect *half-open* connections
# (reverse-proxy 524, dropped tunnels), which cannot happen on loopback:
# there is no network or proxy in the path, and a dead local client tears
# the socket down with a real FIN/RST that starlette surfaces as
# WebSocketDisconnect regardless of the ping. So on loopback the ping
# provides ~no liveness value while actively killing recoverable stalls —
# disable it entirely. Non-loopback binds sit behind a Cloudflare Tunnel
# (idle timeout ~100s) where half-open IS a real failure mode, so keep the
# ping at 20/20 to detect it promptly and stay under the tunnel's idle
# window.
_is_loopback = host in ("127.0.0.1", "localhost", "::1")
config = uvicorn.Config(
app, host=host, port=port, log_level="warning",
# proxy_headers defaults to False so _ws_client_is_allowed sees
# the real connection peer rather than X-Forwarded-For's rewritten
# value (which would defeat the loopback gate when behind a reverse
# proxy). When the OAuth gate is active we are explicitly running
# behind a TLS terminator (Fly.io) and need X-Forwarded-Proto to
# decide cookie Secure flags, so we flip proxy_headers on for that
# mode.
proxy_headers=bool(app.state.auth_required),
# Half-open detection for public binds only (see above). Loopback
# disables the protocol ping (None) so an event-loop stall can never
# trigger a false disconnect; a genuinely dead local client is still
# reaped via the WebSocketDisconnect → disconnect/reap path.
ws_ping_interval=None if _is_loopback else 20.0,
ws_ping_timeout=None if _is_loopback else 20.0,
)
server = uvicorn.Server(config)
async def _serve():
# Split startup from main_loop so we can read the bound port
# after the socket is live (ephemeral port discovery).
if not config.loaded:
config.load()
server.lifespan = config.lifespan_class(config)
with server.capture_signals():
await server.startup()
if server.should_exit:
return
actual_port = _read_bound_port(server, fallback=port)
app.state.bound_port = actual_port
_write_dashboard_ready_file(actual_port)
# Port-discovery sentinel parsed by the desktop spawn. `serve` is a
# plain backend, not a dashboard, so it announces a neutral token;
# `dashboard` keeps the legacy one. The desktop matches either.
ready_token = "HERMES_BACKEND_READY" if headless else "HERMES_DASHBOARD_READY"
print(f"{ready_token} port={actual_port}", flush=True)
if headless:
# No SPA, and the JSON-RPC/WS endpoints are auth-gated — don't
# advertise a paste-and-connect URL, just announce the bind.
print(f" Hermes backend listening on {host}:{actual_port}")
else:
print(f" Hermes Web UI → http://{host}:{actual_port}")
_maybe_open_browser(host, actual_port, open_browser, initial_profile)
# Collapse the peer-hangup teardown flood (#50005). When the Desktop
# forcibly closes its WebSocket mid-write, asyncio logs a full
# traceback per pending connection-lost callback — 50+ identical
# WinError 10054 (ConnectionResetError) lines per disconnect on
# Windows. This filter downgrades exactly that class to one debug
# line and passes every other loop error through unchanged.
try:
from tui_gateway.loop_noise import install_loop_noise_filter
install_loop_noise_filter(asyncio.get_running_loop())
except Exception as exc: # pragma: no cover - best-effort
_log.debug("loop noise filter install skipped: %s", exc)
# ── Loop heartbeat watchdog (CF-1) ───────────────────────────
# Confirm the GIL-pressure hypothesis in production. Re-arm a 2s
# tick and measure the drift between when it *should* fire and
# when it actually does: a healthy loop drifts ~0, but a turn that
# holds the GIL blocks the loop and the next tick fires late by the
# stall duration. We log that so a stalled-loop WS drop is
# diagnosable from the gateway log. Uses loop.time() (monotonic)
# for drift, and call_later (not a task) so it dies with the loop —
# nothing to cancel on shutdown.
_hb_interval = 2.0
_hb_stall_threshold = 5.0
_hb_loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
def _loop_heartbeat(expected: float) -> None:
now = _hb_loop.time()
drift = now - expected
if drift > _hb_stall_threshold:
_log.warning(
"event loop stalled %.1fs (GIL pressure suspected)",
drift,
)
_hb_loop.call_later(
_hb_interval, _loop_heartbeat, now + _hb_interval
)
_hb_loop.call_later(
_hb_interval, _loop_heartbeat, _hb_loop.time() + _hb_interval
)
await server.main_loop()
if server.started:
await server.shutdown()
# On POSIX, keep the long-standing ``asyncio.run(_serve())`` behavior
# unchanged — Python's default loop there is already a SelectorEventLoop
# (or uvloop when uvicorn[standard] installs it), which is exactly what
# uvicorn serves on. Touching that path would only widen the blast radius
# for no benefit.
#
# On Windows it is broken: ``asyncio.run`` defaults to a ProactorEventLoop,
# but uvicorn's socket-serving stack assumes a SelectorEventLoop on win32
# (``uvicorn/loops/asyncio.py`` forces it, and ``uvicorn.Server.run`` threads
# ``config.get_loop_factory()`` into its runner for exactly this reason).
# Driving uvicorn on the proactor loop makes ``server.startup()`` bind a
# socket that never accepts — the dashboard / desktop backend prints
# "Skipping web UI build" and then hangs forever with the port LISTENING but
# no TCP handshake completing (#50641). So *only on Windows* we mirror
# uvicorn's own machinery and run on the loop factory it picks.
if sys.platform != "win32":
asyncio.run(_serve())
return
# Windows-only path. Resolve the runner + loop factory FIRST (and fall back
# to a hand-installed Windows selector policy only when uvicorn predates the
# loop-factory API, < 0.36). The actual serve call is then OUTSIDE the
# try/except so genuine serve-time errors (port in use, KeyboardInterrupt)
# propagate normally instead of being swallowed and double-run.
try:
from uvicorn._compat import asyncio_run as _runner
_loop_factory = config.get_loop_factory()
except Exception:
_runner = None
_loop_factory = None
try:
asyncio.set_event_loop_policy(
asyncio.WindowsSelectorEventLoopPolicy() # type: ignore[attr-defined]
)
except Exception:
pass
if _runner is not None:
_runner(_serve(), loop_factory=_loop_factory)
else:
asyncio.run(_serve())