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/api/status is the only public liveness route, and its handler loads the gateway config, probes gateway health, and counts sessions before it can answer. That work is wrong for a readiness probe: a caller that only needs to know the process is up pays for a cold plugin import tree. Add /api/health, which returns process liveness, version, and the auth-gate shape and touches nothing else.
60 lines
2.9 KiB
Python
60 lines
2.9 KiB
Python
"""Shared allowlist of ``/api/*`` paths that bypass dashboard auth.
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Two middlewares enforce dashboard auth and previously kept independent
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copies of this list:
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* ``hermes_cli.web_server.auth_middleware`` — loopback / ``--insecure``
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mode, gates on the ephemeral ``_SESSION_TOKEN``.
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* ``hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.middleware.gated_auth_middleware`` —
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non-loopback mode, gates on the OAuth session cookie.
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When the lists drifted, ``/api/status`` ended up public under the legacy
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gate but 401'd under the OAuth gate. That broke the portal's wildcard
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liveness probe (``nous-account-service`` ``fly-provider.ts``
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``getInstanceRuntimeStatus``), which fetches ``/api/status`` without a
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cookie as its sole signal of "agent dashboard is alive": every healthy
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wildcard-subdomain agent surfaced as STARTING/down in the portal UI even
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though the dashboard was serving correctly.
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Centralising the allowlist here so both middlewares import the same
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frozenset prevents the next drift. Keep this list minimal — only truly
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non-sensitive, read-only endpoints belong here. As a sanity check, every
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entry should be safe to expose to:
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* external uptime probes (Pingdom, Better Stack, NAS),
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* the dashboard SPA before the user has logged in,
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* anyone who happens to ``curl`` the hostname.
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If a new endpoint doesn't pass all three tests, it should be gated and
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the SPA should bootstrap it after login instead.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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PUBLIC_API_PATHS: frozenset[str] = frozenset({
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# Minimal process liveness probe for desktop/backend boot handshakes. It
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# intentionally avoids gateway config, platform discovery, MCP setup, and
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# host-local detail so readiness checks cannot spend their budget inside
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# cold plugin imports.
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"/api/health",
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# Liveness probe target. Returns version, gateway state, active
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# session count, and the dashboard auth-gate shape. No bodies, no
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# session content, no secrets. Documented as the portal's wildcard
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# liveness probe in
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# ``docs/agent-dashboard-public-url-contract.md`` (NAS side).
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"/api/status",
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# Read-only config-defaults / schema feeds for the SPA's Config page.
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"/api/config/defaults",
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"/api/config/schema",
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# Read-only model metadata (context windows, etc.) — same shape as
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# provider catalogs already exposed on the public internet.
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"/api/model/info",
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# Read-only theme + plugin manifests for the dashboard skin engine.
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"/api/dashboard/themes",
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"/api/dashboard/plugins",
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# Chronos managed-cron fire webhook (NAS -> agent). NOT cookie-gated: it
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# carries its own short-lived NAS-minted JWT (purpose=cron_fire), which the
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# handler verifies as the real auth. Must bypass the dashboard auth gate so
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# the NAS relay's bearer-only callback reaches the verifier instead of a
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# 401 no_cookie. The JWT — not this allowlist — is the security boundary.
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"/api/cron/fire",
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})
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