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Two parallel public-path allowlists drifted: _PUBLIC_API_PATHS in
hermes_cli/web_server.py (legacy _SESSION_TOKEN middleware) and
_GATE_PUBLIC_PREFIXES in hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/middleware.py
(OAuth gate). The legacy list included /api/status (documented as a
non-sensitive read-only liveness target); the OAuth gate's list did not.
Effect: every wildcard-subdomain agent surfaced as STARTING/down to the
portal even though the dashboard was serving correctly. Nous account
service (src/server/agents/fly-provider.ts
getInstanceRuntimeStatus) fetches ``/api/status`` without a cookie
as its sole liveness probe; the OAuth gate's 401 looked identical to
'agent dead' on the portal side.
Fix: lift the allowlist into hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/public_paths.py
and have both middlewares import it. _path_is_public now consults
the shared frozenset first, then falls back to the gate's
auth-bootstrap/static prefix list. Future additions to the public list
hit both gates automatically.
Endpoint inventory (verified safe to remain public):
* /api/status — version, gateway state, active session count,
auth-gate shape. Portal liveness probe target.
* /api/config/defaults — config-defaults feed for the SPA's Config page
* /api/config/schema — config schema for the SPA's Config page
* /api/model/info — model catalogue metadata (context windows)
* /api/dashboard/themes — theme manifests for the skin engine
* /api/dashboard/plugins — plugin manifests for the dashboard
No user data, no session content, no secrets. Same shape an external
monitoring agent would hit on /healthz.
Tests:
* New: test_gated_status_is_public (regression guard with the NAS
fly-provider.ts liveness-probe rationale spelled out in the docstring)
* New: test_other_public_api_paths_are_public_under_gate (parametrised
over the rest of PUBLIC_API_PATHS — proves 401 / 302-to-login is
never the response)
* New: docker integration check #3 in
test_dashboard_oauth_gate_engaged_by_default — /api/status
remains 200 under the gate AND reports auth_required=True so the
portal can distinguish modes
* Updated: test_full_login_round_trip_unlocks_gated_api now probes
/api/sessions instead of /api/status (status is public, so it
can no longer distinguish 'logged in' from 'gate accidentally
disabled')
* Updated: TestApi401Envelope (the no-cookie / invalid-cookie /
dead-cookie tests) probes /api/sessions for the same reason
* Updated: docker integration check #2 in
test_dashboard_oauth_gate_engaged_by_default probes
/api/sessions to prove the gate is intercepting
* Removed: dead _login() helper in
test_dashboard_auth_status_endpoint.py (no longer needed since
/api/status is reachable cold)
Companion to docs/handover/hermes-agent-dashboard-s6-insecure-fix.md
(the --insecure flag fix that shipped earlier).
226 lines
8.4 KiB
Python
226 lines
8.4 KiB
Python
"""Auth-gate middleware for the dashboard.
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Engaged when ``app.state.auth_required is True``. The gate's job:
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1. Allow a small set of routes through unauthenticated (login page,
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``/auth/*`` OAuth round trip, ``/api/auth/providers``, static
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assets).
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2. For everything else, demand a valid session cookie and attach the
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verified :class:`Session` to ``request.state.session``.
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3. On HTML routes, redirect missing/invalid cookies to ``/login``.
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On ``/api/*`` routes, return 401 JSON.
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The middleware is a no-op when ``auth_required`` is False (loopback
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mode); the legacy ``_SESSION_TOKEN`` ``auth_middleware`` handles those
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binds.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import logging
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from typing import Awaitable, Callable
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from fastapi import Request
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from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse, RedirectResponse, Response
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth import list_providers
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.audit import AuditEvent, audit_log
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.base import ProviderError
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.cookies import read_session_cookies
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.public_paths import PUBLIC_API_PATHS
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_log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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# Prefixes that bypass the auth gate. Match via ``path == prefix`` or
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# ``path.startswith(prefix)`` — so ``/assets/`` (with trailing slash)
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# matches ``/assets/foo.css`` but not ``/assetsleak``. Auth-bootstrap
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# (login page, OAuth round trip, provider listing) and static asset
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# mounts go here.
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_GATE_PUBLIC_PREFIXES: tuple[str, ...] = (
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"/auth/login",
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"/auth/callback",
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"/auth/logout",
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"/login",
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"/api/auth/providers",
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"/assets/",
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"/favicon.ico",
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"/ds-assets/",
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"/fonts/",
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"/fonts-terminal/",
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)
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def _path_is_public(path: str) -> bool:
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"""True if ``path`` bypasses the OAuth auth gate.
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Two sources of public-ness:
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* :data:`PUBLIC_API_PATHS` — the shared ``/api/*`` allowlist that
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the legacy ``_SESSION_TOKEN`` middleware also honours. Matched
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exactly (no prefix expansion) so adding ``/api/status`` doesn't
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accidentally expose ``/api/status/secret-extension``.
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* :data:`_GATE_PUBLIC_PREFIXES` — auth-bootstrap routes and static
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mounts. Prefix-matched so ``/assets/foo.css`` lights up via
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``/assets/``.
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"""
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if path in PUBLIC_API_PATHS:
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return True
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return any(
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path == prefix or path.startswith(prefix)
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for prefix in _GATE_PUBLIC_PREFIXES
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)
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def _client_ip(request: Request) -> str:
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fwd = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for", "")
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if fwd:
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return fwd.split(",")[0].strip()
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return request.client.host if request.client else ""
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def _unauth_response(request: Request, *, reason: str) -> Response:
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"""API routes → 401 JSON with ``login_url``; HTML routes → 302 → /login.
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The JSON envelope carries a ``login_url`` field with a ``next=`` query
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string so the SPA's global 401 handler can drop the user back where
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they were after re-auth. The contract is intentionally simple so any
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fetch-wrapper can implement the redirect without parsing details:
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if response.status === 401 && body.error in ("unauthenticated",
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"session_expired"):
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window.location.assign(body.login_url);
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HTML redirects also carry the ``next=`` query string so direct
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navigation to ``/sessions`` (etc.) without a cookie comes back to
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``/sessions`` after login.
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Under a reverse proxy with ``X-Forwarded-Prefix: /hermes``, the
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``login_url`` is prefixed (``/hermes/login?next=...``) so the
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browser's window.location.assign / Location: follow lands on the
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proxied login page rather than the bare ``/login`` (which the
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proxy doesn't route to the dashboard).
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"""
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.prefix import prefix_from_request
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path = request.url.path
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next_param = _safe_next_target(request)
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prefix = prefix_from_request(request)
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login_url = (
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f"{prefix}/login?next={next_param}" if next_param
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else f"{prefix}/login"
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)
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if path.startswith("/api/"):
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# API routes never get redirects: the browser fetch() API would
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# follow a 302 into the cross-origin OAuth dance opaquely. Return
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# 401 with a structured envelope so the SPA can full-page-navigate
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# to login_url.
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error_code = (
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"session_expired"
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if reason == "invalid_or_expired_session"
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else "unauthenticated"
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)
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return JSONResponse(
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{
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"error": error_code,
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"detail": "Unauthorized",
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"reason": reason,
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"login_url": login_url,
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},
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status_code=401,
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)
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return RedirectResponse(url=login_url, status_code=302)
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def _safe_next_target(request: Request) -> str:
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"""Build the URL-encoded ``next`` query value, or empty string.
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Only same-origin relative paths are accepted; absolute URLs or
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``//evil.com`` open-redirect attempts are silently dropped. The empty
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string return means the caller produces a bare ``/login`` URL — fine,
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user lands at the dashboard root after re-auth.
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"""
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path = request.url.path
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# Reject anything that doesn't start with "/" or starts with "//"
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# (protocol-relative URL — would open-redirect to an attacker host).
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if not path or not path.startswith("/") or path.startswith("//"):
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return ""
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# Don't redirect back to the auth routes themselves — that loops.
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if any(
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path == p or path.startswith(p)
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for p in ("/login", "/auth/", "/api/auth/")
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):
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return ""
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# Preserve query string if present (e.g. /sessions?page=2).
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query = request.url.query
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target = f"{path}?{query}" if query else path
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# urlencode the whole thing as a single value.
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from urllib.parse import quote
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return quote(target, safe="")
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async def gated_auth_middleware(
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request: Request,
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call_next: Callable[[Request], Awaitable[Response]],
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) -> Response:
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"""Engaged only when ``app.state.auth_required is True``.
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No-op pass-through in loopback mode so the legacy auth_middleware can
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handle those binds via ``_SESSION_TOKEN``.
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"""
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if not getattr(request.app.state, "auth_required", False):
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return await call_next(request)
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path = request.url.path
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if _path_is_public(path):
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return await call_next(request)
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at, _rt = read_session_cookies(request)
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if not at:
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return _unauth_response(request, reason="no_cookie")
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# Try every registered provider's verify_session in turn. Providers
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# MUST return None for tokens they don't recognise (not raise). This
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# lets multiple providers stack — the first one that recognises a
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# token wins.
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session = None
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for provider in list_providers():
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try:
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session = provider.verify_session(access_token=at)
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except ProviderError as e:
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_log.warning(
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"dashboard-auth: provider %r unreachable during verify: %s",
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provider.name, e,
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)
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audit_log(
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AuditEvent.SESSION_VERIFY_FAILURE,
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provider=provider.name,
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reason="provider_unreachable",
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ip=_client_ip(request),
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)
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return JSONResponse(
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{"detail": f"Auth provider {provider.name!r} unreachable"},
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status_code=503,
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)
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if session is not None:
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break
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if session is None:
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audit_log(
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AuditEvent.SESSION_VERIFY_FAILURE,
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reason="no_provider_recognises",
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ip=_client_ip(request),
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)
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response = _unauth_response(request, reason="invalid_or_expired_session")
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# Clear the dead cookie so the browser doesn't keep sending it.
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# Contract v1: no refresh token to retry with, so the only correct
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# next step is full re-auth via /login. Importing locally avoids a
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# cycle with cookies → middleware at module load. Pass the active
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# prefix so the deletion's Path matches the set-Path (otherwise
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# the browser ignores it).
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.cookies import clear_session_cookies
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.prefix import prefix_from_request
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clear_session_cookies(response, prefix=prefix_from_request(request))
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return response
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request.state.session = session
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return await call_next(request)
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