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Contract V1 of nous-account-service PR #180 ships no refresh tokens, so the original Phase 6 silent-refresh design is replaced with a thinner '401 → redirect to /login' UX. The dashboard's gated middleware now emits a structured envelope on any auth failure; the SPA's fetch wrapper sees it and full-page-navigates the user through re-auth. hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/cookies.py: set_session_cookies(refresh_token='') SKIPS writing the hermes_session_rt cookie. Forward-compat: a non-empty refresh_token still emits the cookie unchanged, so a future Portal contract that starts issuing RTs flips the persistence on with no other change. clear_session_cookies still emits a Max-Age=0 deletion for the RT cookie so stale cookies from earlier deployments get flushed on logout / session expiry. Deprecation marker + rationale in module docstring per the user's docstring-only deprecation pattern. hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/middleware.py: _unauth_response now builds a structured JSON envelope for API 401s: { error: 'session_expired' | 'unauthenticated', detail: 'Unauthorized', reason: <internal>, login_url: '/login?next=<safe-path>' } HTML redirects also carry next= so a user landing on /sessions without a cookie bounces back to /sessions after re-auth. _safe_next_target validates same-origin: drops protocol-relative paths (//evil.com), absolute URLs, and any /login or /auth/* loop. Dead cookies are cleared on the 401 path so the browser stops replaying invalid tokens. hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/routes.py: /auth/callback accepts next= query param and validates via _validate_post_login_target (same rules as the gate's _safe_next_target — defence-in-depth because next= survived a full IDP round trip and attacker-controlled state can re-enter via the callback URL). Open-redirect attempts land at '/' instead. web/src/lib/api.ts: fetchJSON parses the 401 envelope and full-page-navigates to body.login_url ONLY on the known session-expiry error codes. Domain-level 401s (e.g. permission errors) bubble up as regular errors. credentials: 'include' added so cookie auth works for all fetches routed through this wrapper. sessionStorage.lastLocation is preserved for future use by AuthWidget / hermes_status. Test files marked with pytest.mark.xdist_group so the four files that mutate web_server.app.state.auth_required serialize onto the same xdist worker — eliminates 'works locally, fails in CI' app-state bleed. 20 new tests in test_dashboard_auth_401_reauth.py: - set_session_cookies(refresh_token='') skips RT cookie - clear_session_cookies still emits RT deletion - 401 envelope shape (unauthenticated vs session_expired) - dead cookie cleared on invalid-token 401 - login_url carries next= for deep paths - login loop avoided when path is /login/auth/api-auth - protocol-relative URL rejected - _safe_next_target unit tests (accept same-origin, reject loops/abs) - /auth/callback respects safe next= but rejects open redirects 2 pre-existing tests updated to accept the new /login?next=%2F shape. Full dashboard-auth suite: 168 passed, 1 skipped (Phase 0 pre-existing).
371 lines
12 KiB
Python
371 lines
12 KiB
Python
"""HTTP routes for the dashboard-auth OAuth round trip.
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Mounted at root (no prefix) by ``web_server.py``. The router does not
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auto-gate; gating is performed by ``gated_auth_middleware``, which
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allowlists everything under ``/auth/*`` and ``/api/auth/providers``.
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The routes:
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GET /login → server-rendered login page
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GET /auth/login?provider=N → 302 to IDP, sets PKCE cookie
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GET /auth/callback?code,state → completes login, sets session cookies
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POST /auth/logout → clears cookies, best-effort revoke
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GET /api/auth/providers → list registered providers (login bootstrap)
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GET /api/auth/me → current Session as JSON (auth-required)
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import logging
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import time
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from typing import Any
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from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Request
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from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse, JSONResponse, RedirectResponse
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth import (
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get_provider,
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list_providers,
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)
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.audit import AuditEvent, audit_log
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.base import (
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InvalidCodeError,
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ProviderError,
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)
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.cookies import (
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clear_pkce_cookie,
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clear_session_cookies,
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detect_https,
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read_pkce_cookie,
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read_session_cookies,
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set_pkce_cookie,
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set_session_cookies,
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)
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.login_page import render_login_html
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_log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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router = APIRouter()
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def _redirect_uri(request: Request) -> str:
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"""Reconstruct the absolute callback URL the IDP redirects back to.
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Reads from the request URL — under uvicorn's ``proxy_headers=True``
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this picks up the public https URL from ``X-Forwarded-Host`` plus
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``X-Forwarded-Proto``.
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"""
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return str(request.url_for("auth_callback"))
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def _client_ip(request: Request) -> str:
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fwd = request.headers.get("x-forwarded-for", "")
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if fwd:
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return fwd.split(",")[0].strip()
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return request.client.host if request.client else ""
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Public: login page (server-rendered HTML, no SPA bundle)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@router.get("/login", name="login_page")
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async def login_page(request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
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return HTMLResponse(
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render_login_html(),
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headers={"Cache-Control": "no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate"},
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)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Public: provider list for the login-page bootstrap
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@router.get("/api/auth/providers", name="auth_providers")
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async def api_auth_providers() -> Any:
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providers = list_providers()
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if not providers:
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# Q13: fail-closed when zero providers are registered.
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return JSONResponse(
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{"detail": "no auth providers registered"},
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status_code=503,
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)
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return {
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"providers": [
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{"name": p.name, "display_name": p.display_name}
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for p in providers
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],
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}
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Public: OAuth round trip
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@router.get("/auth/login", name="auth_login")
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async def auth_login(request: Request, provider: str):
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p = get_provider(provider)
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if p is None:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=404,
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detail=f"Unknown provider: {provider!r}",
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)
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try:
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ls = p.start_login(redirect_uri=_redirect_uri(request))
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except ProviderError as e:
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audit_log(
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AuditEvent.LOGIN_FAILURE,
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provider=provider,
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reason="provider_unreachable",
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ip=_client_ip(request),
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)
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=503,
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detail=f"Provider unreachable: {e}",
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)
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audit_log(
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AuditEvent.LOGIN_START,
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provider=provider,
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ip=_client_ip(request),
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)
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resp = RedirectResponse(url=ls.redirect_url, status_code=302)
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# Pack the provider name into the PKCE cookie so the callback can
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# find it without a separate cookie. Provider may or may not have
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# already included a ``provider=`` segment.
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pkce = ls.cookie_payload.get("hermes_session_pkce", "")
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if "provider=" not in pkce:
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pkce = f"provider={provider};{pkce}" if pkce else f"provider={provider}"
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set_pkce_cookie(resp, payload=pkce, use_https=detect_https(request))
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return resp
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@router.get("/auth/callback", name="auth_callback")
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async def auth_callback(
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request: Request,
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code: str = "",
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state: str = "",
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error: str = "",
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error_description: str = "",
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next: str = "",
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):
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pkce_raw = read_pkce_cookie(request)
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if not pkce_raw:
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audit_log(
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AuditEvent.LOGIN_FAILURE,
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reason="missing_pkce_cookie",
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ip=_client_ip(request),
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)
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=400,
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detail="Missing PKCE state cookie",
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)
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# Parse ``provider=...;state=...;verifier=...``
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parts = dict(
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seg.split("=", 1) for seg in pkce_raw.split(";") if "=" in seg
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)
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provider_name = parts.get("provider", "")
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expected_state = parts.get("state", "")
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verifier = parts.get("verifier", "")
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p = get_provider(provider_name)
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if p is None:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=400,
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detail=f"Unknown provider in cookie: {provider_name!r}",
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)
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if error:
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audit_log(
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AuditEvent.LOGIN_FAILURE,
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provider=provider_name,
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reason="idp_error",
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error=error,
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ip=_client_ip(request),
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)
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=400,
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detail=f"OAuth error from provider: {error} ({error_description})",
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)
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if not state or state != expected_state:
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audit_log(
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AuditEvent.LOGIN_FAILURE,
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provider=provider_name,
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reason="state_mismatch",
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ip=_client_ip(request),
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)
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=400,
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detail="OAuth state mismatch (CSRF check failed)",
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)
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try:
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session = p.complete_login(
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code=code,
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state=state,
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code_verifier=verifier,
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redirect_uri=_redirect_uri(request),
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)
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except InvalidCodeError as e:
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audit_log(
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AuditEvent.LOGIN_FAILURE,
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provider=provider_name,
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reason="invalid_code",
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ip=_client_ip(request),
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)
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raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Invalid code: {e}")
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except ProviderError as e:
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audit_log(
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AuditEvent.LOGIN_FAILURE,
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provider=provider_name,
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reason="provider_unreachable",
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ip=_client_ip(request),
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)
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=503,
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detail=f"Provider unreachable: {e}",
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)
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audit_log(
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AuditEvent.LOGIN_SUCCESS,
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provider=provider_name,
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user_id=session.user_id,
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email=session.email,
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org_id=session.org_id,
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ip=_client_ip(request),
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)
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expires_in = max(60, session.expires_at - int(time.time()))
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# Honour the ``next=`` query param the gate's _unauth_response set in
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# the redirect URL. Validated against the same same-origin rules as
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# the gate's _safe_next_target — any absolute URL / protocol-relative
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# path / loop back to /login is dropped in favour of ``/``.
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landing = _validate_post_login_target(next) or "/"
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resp = RedirectResponse(url=landing, status_code=302)
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set_session_cookies(
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resp,
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access_token=session.access_token,
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refresh_token=session.refresh_token,
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access_token_expires_in=expires_in,
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use_https=detect_https(request),
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)
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clear_pkce_cookie(resp)
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return resp
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def _validate_post_login_target(raw: str) -> str:
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"""Return ``raw`` if it's a safe same-origin path, else empty string.
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The ``next`` query param survives a full OAuth round trip — the gate
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encodes it into the /login redirect, the login page emits it back into
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/auth/login, and the IDP preserves it across /authorize/callback. We
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have to re-validate here because the value came back in via the
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URL (an attacker could craft a /auth/callback URL with their own
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``next=https://evil.example``).
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"""
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if not raw:
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return ""
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from urllib.parse import unquote
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decoded = unquote(raw)
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if not decoded.startswith("/") or decoded.startswith("//"):
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return ""
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# Don't loop back to login pages or auth flow.
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if any(
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decoded == p or decoded.startswith(p)
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for p in ("/login", "/auth/", "/api/auth/")
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):
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return ""
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return decoded
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@router.post("/auth/logout", name="auth_logout")
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async def auth_logout(request: Request):
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_at, rt = read_session_cookies(request)
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if rt:
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# Best-effort revoke. Try every provider so a session minted by
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# any registered provider is revoked correctly. Failures are
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# logged but never raised.
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for provider in list_providers():
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try:
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provider.revoke_session(refresh_token=rt)
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except Exception as e: # noqa: BLE001 — best-effort
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_log.warning(
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"dashboard-auth: revoke on %r failed: %s",
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provider.name, e,
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)
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sess = getattr(request.state, "session", None)
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audit_log(
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AuditEvent.LOGOUT,
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provider=(sess.provider if sess else "unknown"),
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user_id=(sess.user_id if sess else ""),
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ip=_client_ip(request),
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)
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resp = RedirectResponse(url="/login", status_code=302)
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clear_session_cookies(resp)
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clear_pkce_cookie(resp)
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return resp
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Auth-required: identity probe for the SPA
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@router.get("/api/auth/me", name="auth_me")
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async def api_auth_me(request: Request):
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"""Return the verified session as JSON. Auth-required (gate enforces)."""
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sess = getattr(request.state, "session", None)
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if sess is None:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Unauthorized")
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return {
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"user_id": sess.user_id,
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"email": sess.email,
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"display_name": sess.display_name,
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"org_id": sess.org_id,
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"provider": sess.provider,
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"expires_at": sess.expires_at,
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}
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Auth-required: WS upgrade ticket (Phase 5)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@router.post("/api/auth/ws-ticket", name="auth_ws_ticket")
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async def api_auth_ws_ticket(request: Request):
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"""Mint a short-lived single-use ticket for the authenticated session.
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Browsers cannot set ``Authorization`` on a WebSocket upgrade, so in
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gated mode the SPA POSTs this endpoint to get a ``?ticket=`` value to
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append to ``/api/pty``, ``/api/ws``, ``/api/pub``, or ``/api/events``.
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The ticket has a 30-second TTL and is single-use. Calling this endpoint
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multiple times in quick succession (e.g. one ticket per WS) is the
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expected pattern.
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"""
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sess = getattr(request.state, "session", None)
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if sess is None:
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# Middleware should already have rejected, but check defensively.
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raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Unauthorized")
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# Import here so the routes module stays usable in test contexts that
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# don't load the ticket store.
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.ws_tickets import TTL_SECONDS, mint_ticket
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ticket = mint_ticket(user_id=sess.user_id, provider=sess.provider)
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audit_log(
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AuditEvent.WS_TICKET_MINTED,
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provider=sess.provider,
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user_id=sess.user_id,
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ip=_client_ip(request),
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)
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return {"ticket": ticket, "ttl_seconds": TTL_SECONDS}
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