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When TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_URL was set but TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET was not, python-telegram-bot received secret_token=None and the webhook endpoint accepted any HTTP POST. Anyone who could reach the listener could inject forged updates — spoofed user IDs, spoofed chat IDs, attacker-controlled message text — and trigger handlers as if Telegram delivered them. The fix refuses to start the adapter in webhook mode without the secret. Polling mode (default, no webhook URL) is unaffected — polling is authenticated by the bot token directly. BREAKING CHANGE for webhook-mode deployments that never set TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET. The error message explains remediation: export TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET="$(openssl rand -hex 32)" and instructs registering it with Telegram via setWebhook's secret_token parameter. Release notes must call this out. Reported in GHSA-3vpc-7q5r-276h by @bupt-Yy-young. Hardening — not CVE per SECURITY.md §3 "Public Exposure: Deploying the gateway to the public internet without external authentication or network protection" covers the historical default, but shipping a fail-open webhook as the default was the wrong choice and the guard aligns us with the SECURITY.md threat model. |
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| .. | ||
| builtin_hooks | ||
| platforms | ||
| __init__.py | ||
| channel_directory.py | ||
| config.py | ||
| delivery.py | ||
| display_config.py | ||
| hooks.py | ||
| mirror.py | ||
| pairing.py | ||
| restart.py | ||
| run.py | ||
| session.py | ||
| session_context.py | ||
| status.py | ||
| sticker_cache.py | ||
| stream_consumer.py | ||