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Second, deeper pass over tools/gateway/hermes_cli plus first pass over the trees wave 1 missed (acp, acp_adapter, skills, computer_use, docker, dashboard, conformance, monitoring, secret_sources, hermes_state, providers). Same rubric as wave 1 (AGENTS.md test policy); security, alternation/caching invariants, issue-number regressions, and E2E kept. Real test-quality fixes found and rooted out along the way: - tests/tools/test_command_guards.py made real auxiliary-LLM HTTPS calls (DEFAULT_CONFIG smart-approval leaked in) — pinned approval mode=manual via autouse fixture: 17.4s → 0.4s. - test_model_switch_custom_providers.py / test_user_providers_model_switch.py silently probed live provider catalogs (~2s/test) — stubbed cached_provider_model_ids/provider_model_ids/fetch_api_models. - test_telegram_noise_filter.py: 15-platform copy-paste matrix over shared gateway.run logic → 3 representative platforms (55s → 3.9s). - test_gateway_shutdown.py: stop()'s 5s interrupt-deadline loop spun on MagicMock agents — interrupt.side_effect now clears _running_agents (22s → 1.0s). - test_gateway_inactivity_timeout.py poll-harness timings shrunk 3-5x (24s → 1.1s); test_mcp_stability.py backoff/SIGTERM-grace sleeps patched (15.4s → 2.5s); test_async_delegation.py negative-drain wait 5s → 0.5s. - test_telegram_init_deadline.py: loop-block margin restored to 1.0s with rationale comment — the watchdog-dump assertion needs the loop blocked well past deadline+grace under parallel load (flaked once in the 40-worker verification run at a 0.2s margin). Verification: full hermetic suite via scripts/run_tests.sh — 2,438 files, 21,718 tests passed, 0 failed, 293.9s wall. Suite totals vs original baseline: 46,820 → 19,757 test functions (−57.8%), wall 583.5s → 293.9s (−50%), subprocess CPU 13,564s → 11,623s.
309 lines
14 KiB
Python
309 lines
14 KiB
Python
"""Regression tests for Nous Portal inference_base_url host-allowlist validation.
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A poisoned ``inference_base_url`` from a Portal refresh response (network
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MITM, malicious response injection) would otherwise be persisted to
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auth.json and forwarded with the user's legitimate invoke JWT
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bearer on every subsequent proxy request, exfiltrating their inference
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budget and opening a response-injection channel into the IDE / chat
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client. ``_validate_nous_inference_url_from_network()`` blocks any URL
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outside the allowlist at the source.
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These tests verify:
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1. The validator's host + scheme rules.
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2. Each of the two NETWORK call sites in ``auth.py`` calls the validator
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rather than the unrestricted ``_optional_base_url`` helper.
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3. The proxy adapter applies the validator as belt-and-suspenders.
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4. The env-var override path (``NOUS_INFERENCE_BASE_URL``) is NOT
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gated by the validator — that's the documented dev/staging escape
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hatch.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import logging
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from hermes_cli.auth import (
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DEFAULT_NOUS_INFERENCE_URL,
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_ALLOWED_NOUS_INFERENCE_HOSTS,
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_validate_nous_inference_url_from_network,
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)
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class TestValidatorRules:
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def test_attacker_host_rejected(self, caplog):
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with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="hermes_cli.auth"):
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assert (
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_validate_nous_inference_url_from_network("https://attacker.com/v1")
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is None
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)
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assert any("attacker.com" in rec.message for rec in caplog.records)
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def test_default_inference_url_is_in_allowlist(self):
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"""Sanity check: DEFAULT_NOUS_INFERENCE_URL must itself validate.
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If anyone retargets the default away from
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``inference-api.nousresearch.com``, they MUST update the allowlist
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in the same change — otherwise the allowlist would reject the
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Portal's own legitimate default and break every install.
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"""
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assert (
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_validate_nous_inference_url_from_network(DEFAULT_NOUS_INFERENCE_URL)
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== DEFAULT_NOUS_INFERENCE_URL.rstrip("/")
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)
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class TestCallSiteWiring:
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"""Verify the validator is actually wired into all auth.py NETWORK call sites.
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These are not behaviour-end-to-end tests (the surrounding code is
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several hundred lines per site with extensive HTTP mocking
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requirements). They're text-grep contracts: if anyone replaces
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``_validate_nous_inference_url_from_network`` with the un-validated
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``_optional_base_url`` again, the test catches it.
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Each site lives inside ``resolve_nous_runtime_credentials`` and one
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helper (``_extend_state_from_refresh``). The shape we guard against
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is ``<helper>_url = _optional_base_url(<payload>.get("inference_base_url"))``
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— that's what the unsafe pre-fix code looked like, and the only
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semantic difference between the safe and unsafe helpers is the
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host-allowlist check.
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"""
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def _read_auth_source(self):
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import hermes_cli.auth as _auth_mod
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from pathlib import Path
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return Path(_auth_mod.__file__).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
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def test_no_unvalidated_inference_base_url_assignments_remain(self):
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"""No remaining ``_optional_base_url(...inference_base_url...)`` reads
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from Portal payloads. If you see a failure here, you've either
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added a new NETWORK site that needs validation, or downgraded an
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existing one back to the unsafe helper."""
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source = self._read_auth_source()
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for needle in (
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'_optional_base_url(refreshed.get("inference_base_url"))',
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'_optional_base_url(mint_payload.get("inference_base_url"))',
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):
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assert needle not in source, (
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f"Found unvalidated network read: {needle!r}. "
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f"Use _validate_nous_inference_url_from_network() instead."
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)
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def test_validator_wired_at_all_known_call_sites(self):
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"""All 2 known auth.py NETWORK sites use the validator. If this count
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drops, someone removed protection; if it grows, audit the new
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site to be sure validation is appropriate."""
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source = self._read_auth_source()
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refresh_count = source.count(
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'_validate_nous_inference_url_from_network(refreshed.get("inference_base_url"))'
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)
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mint_count = source.count(
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'_validate_nous_inference_url_from_network(mint_payload.get("inference_base_url"))'
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)
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assert refresh_count == 2, f"expected 2 refresh sites, found {refresh_count}"
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assert mint_count == 0, f"expected 0 mint sites, found {mint_count}"
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def test_proxy_adapter_also_validates(self):
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"""The Nous proxy adapter applies the validator as defense-in-depth
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even though auth.py already validates at the source, so a future
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bypass at the source layer still gets caught at the forward
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boundary."""
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from pathlib import Path
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import hermes_cli.proxy.adapters.nous_portal as _nous_adapter
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source = Path(_nous_adapter.__file__).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
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assert "_validate_nous_inference_url_from_network" in source
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class TestEnvOverrideNotGated:
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"""The documented dev/staging env-var override must keep working.
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``NOUS_INFERENCE_BASE_URL`` is read by ``resolve_nous_runtime_credentials``
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via ``os.getenv`` — that path doesn't pass through the validator
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(env values are trusted because the user set them themselves).
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Verify the env-var read site does NOT consult the validator, so a
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user running against a non-allowlisted staging host via env is not
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inadvertently broken by this fix.
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"""
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def test_env_override_path_does_not_call_validator(self):
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"""In resolve_nous_runtime_credentials, the env override is
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read via os.getenv directly, not via the validator. Grep the
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source to confirm: the env line should NOT mention the
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validator."""
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import hermes_cli.auth as _auth_mod
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from pathlib import Path
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source = Path(_auth_mod.__file__).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
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# Find the env-override read line.
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for line in source.splitlines():
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if "NOUS_INFERENCE_BASE_URL" in line and "os.getenv" in line:
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assert "_validate_nous_inference_url_from_network" not in line, (
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"env override path must not gate through the network "
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"validator — it would break documented dev/staging use."
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)
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class TestHealsPoisonedStoredValue:
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"""A stored inference_base_url that is NOT in the allowlist (e.g. a
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stale ``stg-inference-api.nousresearch.com`` persisted before the
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allowlist existed) must be HEALED back to the production default on
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the next refresh — not silently retained.
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Before the fix, the refresh sites only assigned the validated URL
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``if refreshed_url:`` and otherwise left the poisoned value in place,
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so the "falling back to default" warning was logged but never
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actually took effect — every subsequent call kept hitting the dead
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staging endpoint (real incident: opus-4.8 routed to nous, nous pinned
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to staging, every request + the aux compression call 401'd).
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"""
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def test_refresh_resets_rejected_url_to_default(self, monkeypatch):
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import hermes_cli.auth as auth
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poisoned = "https://stg-inference-api.nousresearch.com/v1"
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state = {
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"access_token": "tok",
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"refresh_token": "rtok",
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"client_id": "hermes-cli",
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"portal_base_url": auth.DEFAULT_NOUS_PORTAL_URL,
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"inference_base_url": poisoned,
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}
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# Force the refresh branch and return another rejected (staging) URL,
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# exercising the validator-returns-None heal path.
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monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "_nous_invoke_jwt_status", lambda *a, **k: "needs_refresh")
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monkeypatch.setattr(
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auth,
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"_refresh_access_token",
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lambda **k: {
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"access_token": "newtok",
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"refresh_token": "newrtok",
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"expires_in": 3600,
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"inference_base_url": poisoned, # Portal still hands back staging
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},
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)
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# Skip the JWT usability assertions (orthogonal to URL healing).
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monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "_assert_nous_inference_jwt_usable", lambda *a, **k: None)
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monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "_select_nous_invoke_jwt", lambda *a, **k: None)
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result = auth.refresh_nous_oauth_from_state(state, force_refresh=True)
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assert result["inference_base_url"] == auth.DEFAULT_NOUS_INFERENCE_URL, (
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"rejected Portal URL must heal to the production default, "
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f"got {result['inference_base_url']!r}"
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)
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class TestEnvOverrideWins:
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"""``NOUS_INFERENCE_BASE_URL`` must win over the stored value for the
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URL used to build the inference client / returned to callers.
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This is the documented dev/staging escape hatch. The breakage it
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regresses against: the security allowlist (#30611) plus the refresh
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heal (#49735) mean a staging login's stored ``inference_base_url`` is
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rejected and rewritten to the production default, and the runtime
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resolver previously read that stored (prod) value *before* the env
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var — so an OAuth user could not reach staging at all, even with the
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env override set. The override is consulted FIRST here, while the
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PERSISTED value stays the validated, network-provenance one (the env
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override is a runtime overlay, never written to auth.json).
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"""
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STAGING = "https://stg-inference-api.nousresearch.com/v1"
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def _patch_no_refresh(self, monkeypatch, auth, state):
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import contextlib
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# No refresh fires: the stored access token is a usable invoke JWT.
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monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "_nous_invoke_jwt_status", lambda *a, **k: None)
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monkeypatch.setattr(
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auth, "_auth_store_lock", lambda *a, **k: contextlib.nullcontext()
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)
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monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "_load_auth_store", lambda *a, **k: {})
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monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "_load_provider_state", lambda store, pid: state)
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monkeypatch.setattr(
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auth,
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"_load_provider_state_with_source",
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lambda store, pid: (state, None),
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)
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monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "_save_provider_state", lambda *a, **k: None)
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monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "_save_provider_state_to_source", lambda *a, **k: None)
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monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "_save_auth_store", lambda *a, **k: None)
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monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "_write_shared_nous_state", lambda *a, **k: None)
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monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "_sync_nous_pool_from_auth_store", lambda *a, **k: None)
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monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "_resolve_verify", lambda *a, **k: True)
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monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "_assert_nous_inference_jwt_usable", lambda *a, **k: None)
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monkeypatch.setattr(auth, "_select_nous_invoke_jwt", lambda *a, **k: None)
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def _base_state(self, auth, stored):
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return {
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"access_token": "tok",
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"refresh_token": "rtok",
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"client_id": "hermes-cli",
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"portal_base_url": auth.DEFAULT_NOUS_PORTAL_URL,
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"inference_base_url": stored,
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"agent_key": "ak-123",
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}
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def test_no_refresh_env_override_not_persisted(self, monkeypatch):
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"""The env override is a runtime overlay: it must never be written
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back into the stored state (auth.json)."""
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import hermes_cli.auth as auth
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state = self._base_state(auth, auth.DEFAULT_NOUS_INFERENCE_URL)
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self._patch_no_refresh(monkeypatch, auth, state)
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monkeypatch.setenv("NOUS_INFERENCE_BASE_URL", self.STAGING)
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auth.resolve_nous_runtime_credentials()
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assert state["inference_base_url"] == auth.DEFAULT_NOUS_INFERENCE_URL, (
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"env override leaked into persisted state — it must stay a "
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f"runtime overlay, got {state['inference_base_url']!r}"
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)
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def test_no_refresh_heals_poisoned_stored_without_env(self, monkeypatch):
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"""A poisoned stored staging host (persisted before the allowlist)
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still heals to the default when no env override is present — the
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#50265 no-refresh-read-path heal, folded in here."""
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import hermes_cli.auth as auth
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state = self._base_state(auth, self.STAGING)
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self._patch_no_refresh(monkeypatch, auth, state)
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monkeypatch.delenv("NOUS_INFERENCE_BASE_URL", raising=False)
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result = auth.resolve_nous_runtime_credentials()
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assert result["base_url"] == auth.DEFAULT_NOUS_INFERENCE_URL, (
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"poisoned stored URL must heal to the production default on the "
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f"no-refresh read path, got {result['base_url']!r}"
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)
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class TestProxyAdapterEnvOverride:
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"""The Nous proxy adapter is the second chokepoint: it re-validates the
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base_url returned by resolve_nous_runtime_credentials() against the prod
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allowlist. That re-validation must not clobber a legitimate
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NOUS_INFERENCE_BASE_URL staging override.
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"""
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def test_proxy_adapter_consults_env_override(self):
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"""Grep contract: the proxy adapter's forward-boundary base_url
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resolution consults the env override before the network validator,
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so a staging override survives the defense-in-depth re-validation."""
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from pathlib import Path
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import hermes_cli.proxy.adapters.nous_portal as _nous_adapter
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source = Path(_nous_adapter.__file__).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
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assert "_nous_inference_env_override()" in source, (
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"proxy adapter must layer the env override on top of the network "
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"validator, else a staging override is rejected at the forward boundary"
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)
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# The validator must still be present (defense-in-depth preserved).
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assert "_validate_nous_inference_url_from_network" in source
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