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39975613b1
Second, deeper pass over tools/gateway/hermes_cli plus first pass over the trees wave 1 missed (acp, acp_adapter, skills, computer_use, docker, dashboard, conformance, monitoring, secret_sources, hermes_state, providers). Same rubric as wave 1 (AGENTS.md test policy); security, alternation/caching invariants, issue-number regressions, and E2E kept. Real test-quality fixes found and rooted out along the way: - tests/tools/test_command_guards.py made real auxiliary-LLM HTTPS calls (DEFAULT_CONFIG smart-approval leaked in) — pinned approval mode=manual via autouse fixture: 17.4s → 0.4s. - test_model_switch_custom_providers.py / test_user_providers_model_switch.py silently probed live provider catalogs (~2s/test) — stubbed cached_provider_model_ids/provider_model_ids/fetch_api_models. - test_telegram_noise_filter.py: 15-platform copy-paste matrix over shared gateway.run logic → 3 representative platforms (55s → 3.9s). - test_gateway_shutdown.py: stop()'s 5s interrupt-deadline loop spun on MagicMock agents — interrupt.side_effect now clears _running_agents (22s → 1.0s). - test_gateway_inactivity_timeout.py poll-harness timings shrunk 3-5x (24s → 1.1s); test_mcp_stability.py backoff/SIGTERM-grace sleeps patched (15.4s → 2.5s); test_async_delegation.py negative-drain wait 5s → 0.5s. - test_telegram_init_deadline.py: loop-block margin restored to 1.0s with rationale comment — the watchdog-dump assertion needs the loop blocked well past deadline+grace under parallel load (flaked once in the 40-worker verification run at a 0.2s margin). Verification: full hermetic suite via scripts/run_tests.sh — 2,438 files, 21,718 tests passed, 0 failed, 293.9s wall. Suite totals vs original baseline: 46,820 → 19,757 test functions (−57.8%), wall 583.5s → 293.9s (−50%), subprocess CPU 13,564s → 11,623s.
113 lines
4.1 KiB
Python
113 lines
4.1 KiB
Python
"""Tests for the Chronos cron-fire webhook ON THE DASHBOARD APP (web_server).
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Regression guard for the relocation bug: the fire webhook MUST live on the
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dashboard FastAPI app (`hermes_cli.web_server.app`) — the agent's public HTTP
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surface on hosted deployments — not only on the aiohttp APIServerAdapter (which
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hosted agents don't expose). It must:
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- be a registered route on the dashboard app,
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- be in PUBLIC_API_PATHS so the dashboard cookie gate doesn't 401 it before
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the JWT verifier runs,
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- reject a bad/missing NAS-JWT with 401 (the JWT is the real gate),
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- 400 on missing job_id,
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- on a valid token, resolve the job's profile and run fire_due in the
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background, returning 202.
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"""
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import pytest
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from starlette.testclient import TestClient
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from hermes_cli import web_server
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.public_paths import PUBLIC_API_PATHS
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def _client(auth_required: bool):
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prev_auth = getattr(web_server.app.state, "auth_required", None)
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prev_host = getattr(web_server.app.state, "bound_host", None)
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web_server.app.state.auth_required = auth_required
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web_server.app.state.bound_host = None
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client = TestClient(web_server.app)
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return client, prev_auth, prev_host
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def _restore(prev_auth, prev_host):
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if prev_auth is None:
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if hasattr(web_server.app.state, "auth_required"):
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delattr(web_server.app.state, "auth_required")
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else:
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web_server.app.state.auth_required = prev_auth
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if prev_host is None:
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if hasattr(web_server.app.state, "bound_host"):
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delattr(web_server.app.state, "bound_host")
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else:
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web_server.app.state.bound_host = prev_host
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def test_fire_path_is_public():
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"""Must bypass the dashboard cookie gate so the NAS bearer-JWT callback
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reaches the verifier (the JWT is the real auth)."""
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assert "/api/cron/fire" in PUBLIC_API_PATHS
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def test_bad_token_401(monkeypatch):
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"""Invalid NAS-JWT -> 401, even with the dashboard auth gate ENGAGED
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(proves the route is reachable past the cookie gate and the verifier is the
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gate). fire_due must NOT run."""
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fired = []
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monkeypatch.setattr(
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"plugins.cron_providers.chronos.verify.get_fire_verifier",
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lambda: (lambda **kw: None), # verification fails
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)
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monkeypatch.setattr(web_server, "_find_cron_job_profile", lambda jid: "default")
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monkeypatch.setattr(web_server, "_fire_cron_job_for_profile",
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lambda p, j: fired.append((p, j)))
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client, pa, ph = _client(auth_required=True)
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try:
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resp = client.post("/api/cron/fire",
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headers={"Authorization": "Bearer forged"},
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json={"job_id": "abc"})
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assert resp.status_code == 401
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assert fired == []
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finally:
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_restore(pa, ph)
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client.close()
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def test_missing_job_id_400(monkeypatch):
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monkeypatch.setattr(
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"plugins.cron_providers.chronos.verify.get_fire_verifier",
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lambda: (lambda **kw: {"purpose": "cron_fire"}),
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)
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client, pa, ph = _client(auth_required=False)
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try:
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resp = client.post("/api/cron/fire",
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headers={"Authorization": "Bearer good"},
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json={})
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assert resp.status_code == 400
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finally:
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_restore(pa, ph)
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client.close()
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def test_unknown_job_200_gone(monkeypatch):
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"""Valid token but the job isn't found in any profile -> 200 'gone'
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(NAS shouldn't retry a fire for a cancelled/completed job)."""
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monkeypatch.setattr(
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"plugins.cron_providers.chronos.verify.get_fire_verifier",
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lambda: (lambda **kw: {"purpose": "cron_fire"}),
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)
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monkeypatch.setattr(web_server, "_find_cron_job_profile", lambda jid: None)
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client, pa, ph = _client(auth_required=False)
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try:
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resp = client.post("/api/cron/fire",
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headers={"Authorization": "Bearer good"},
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json={"job_id": "ghost"})
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assert resp.status_code == 200
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assert resp.json().get("status") == "gone"
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finally:
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_restore(pa, ph)
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client.close()
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