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https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent.git
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5edb346c75
build_write_denied_paths() resolved the protected ``.env`` via get_hermes_home(), which is profile-aware. When a profile is active HERMES_HOME points at ``<root>/profiles/<name>`` and ``hermes_home / ".env"`` expands to the *profile* env file only — the global ``<root>/.env`` is left off the deny list and a write_file call against it succeeds. Since the top-level .env supplies credentials inherited by every profile, this is a P0 credential-exfiltration / overwrite path. Add a parallel ``_hermes_root_path()`` helper that returns the Hermes root (via the existing ``get_default_hermes_root()`` constant) and include ``<root>/.env`` in the deny list alongside ``<active_profile>/.env``. Both paths now refuse write_file/patch regardless of profile state. The active HERMES_HOME .env entry is preserved so the protection in non-profile mode is unchanged. A regression test exercises the profile-active scenario by pointing HERMES_HOME at ``<tmp>/profiles/coder`` and asserting that ``<tmp>/.env`` is denied. Fixes #15981
125 lines
4.3 KiB
Python
125 lines
4.3 KiB
Python
"""Shared file safety rules used by both tools and ACP shims."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import os
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from pathlib import Path
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from typing import Optional
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def _hermes_home_path() -> Path:
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"""Resolve the active HERMES_HOME (profile-aware) without circular imports."""
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try:
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from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home # local import to avoid cycles
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return get_hermes_home()
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except Exception:
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return Path(os.path.expanduser("~/.hermes"))
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def _hermes_root_path() -> Path:
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"""Resolve the Hermes root dir (always the parent of any profile, never per-profile)."""
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try:
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from hermes_constants import get_default_hermes_root # local import to avoid cycles
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return get_default_hermes_root()
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except Exception:
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return Path(os.path.expanduser("~/.hermes"))
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def build_write_denied_paths(home: str) -> set[str]:
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"""Return exact sensitive paths that must never be written."""
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hermes_home = _hermes_home_path()
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hermes_root = _hermes_root_path()
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return {
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os.path.realpath(p)
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for p in [
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os.path.join(home, ".ssh", "authorized_keys"),
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os.path.join(home, ".ssh", "id_rsa"),
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os.path.join(home, ".ssh", "id_ed25519"),
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os.path.join(home, ".ssh", "config"),
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# Active profile .env (or top-level .env when not in profile mode).
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str(hermes_home / ".env"),
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# Top-level .env, even when running under a profile — overwriting it
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# leaks credentials across every profile that inherits from root (#15981).
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str(hermes_root / ".env"),
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os.path.join(home, ".bashrc"),
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os.path.join(home, ".zshrc"),
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os.path.join(home, ".profile"),
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os.path.join(home, ".bash_profile"),
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os.path.join(home, ".zprofile"),
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os.path.join(home, ".netrc"),
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os.path.join(home, ".pgpass"),
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os.path.join(home, ".npmrc"),
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os.path.join(home, ".pypirc"),
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"/etc/sudoers",
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"/etc/passwd",
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"/etc/shadow",
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]
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}
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def build_write_denied_prefixes(home: str) -> list[str]:
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"""Return sensitive directory prefixes that must never be written."""
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return [
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os.path.realpath(p) + os.sep
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for p in [
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os.path.join(home, ".ssh"),
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os.path.join(home, ".aws"),
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os.path.join(home, ".gnupg"),
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os.path.join(home, ".kube"),
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"/etc/sudoers.d",
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"/etc/systemd",
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os.path.join(home, ".docker"),
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os.path.join(home, ".azure"),
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os.path.join(home, ".config", "gh"),
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]
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]
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def get_safe_write_root() -> Optional[str]:
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"""Return the resolved HERMES_WRITE_SAFE_ROOT path, or None if unset."""
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root = os.getenv("HERMES_WRITE_SAFE_ROOT", "")
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if not root:
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return None
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try:
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return os.path.realpath(os.path.expanduser(root))
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except Exception:
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return None
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def is_write_denied(path: str) -> bool:
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"""Return True if path is blocked by the write denylist or safe root."""
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home = os.path.realpath(os.path.expanduser("~"))
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resolved = os.path.realpath(os.path.expanduser(str(path)))
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if resolved in build_write_denied_paths(home):
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return True
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for prefix in build_write_denied_prefixes(home):
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if resolved.startswith(prefix):
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return True
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safe_root = get_safe_write_root()
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if safe_root and not (resolved == safe_root or resolved.startswith(safe_root + os.sep)):
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return True
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return False
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def get_read_block_error(path: str) -> Optional[str]:
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"""Return an error message when a read targets internal Hermes cache files."""
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resolved = Path(path).expanduser().resolve()
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hermes_home = _hermes_home_path().resolve()
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blocked_dirs = [
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hermes_home / "skills" / ".hub" / "index-cache",
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hermes_home / "skills" / ".hub",
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]
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for blocked in blocked_dirs:
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try:
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resolved.relative_to(blocked)
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except ValueError:
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continue
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return (
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f"Access denied: {path} is an internal Hermes cache file "
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"and cannot be read directly to prevent prompt injection. "
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"Use the skills_list or skill_view tools instead."
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)
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return None
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