emozilla 2abe11a7fe security(ci): pass untrusted refs through env, not run: interpolation ... lint.yml inlined github.head_ref (the fork PR branch name, attacker- controlled) into the diff-summary run: block. GitHub expands ${{ }} into the script text before bash tokenizes it, so a branch like x$(id) runs on the lint runner. The pull_request trigger keeps the token read-only, but the sink still allows CI resource abuse and cache/artifact tampering, and would become RCE-with-secrets under pull_request_target. Route head_ref through an env var (env values are not subject to expression injection) and reference "$HEAD_REF". Apply the same to the two docker.yml sites that interpolate github.event.release.tag_name. Fixes GHSA-jpw6-c7jr-c56v, GHSA-2843-hjmf-7x96. Credit: @technotion, @youngstar-eth.		2026-07-03 12:44:30 -04:00
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actions	change(ci): migrate docker smoketests to real tests	2026-06-26 19:15:18 -07:00
ISSUE_TEMPLATE	feat: add openrouter/elephant-alpha to curated model lists (#9378)	2026-04-13 21:16:14 -07:00
pr-screenshots	feat(billing): /billing terminal billing — interactive TUI + CLI client (#45449)	2026-06-19 01:53:32 +05:30
workflows	security(ci): pass untrusted refs through env, not run: interpolation	2026-07-03 12:44:30 -04:00
dependabot.yml	chore(security): add OSV-Scanner CI + Dependabot for github-actions only (#20037)	2026-05-04 20:58:21 -07:00
PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md	docs: add documentation & housekeeping checklist to PR template	2026-03-05 07:23:52 -08:00