hermes-agent/gateway/relay/__init__.py
Ben Barclay 45bc4fb37f
feat(relay): declare relevance policy to the connector + document the management plane (#51248)
The gateway half of Phase 6 Unit ζ: project the agent's existing relevance
knobs into the connector's platform-agnostic vocabulary and declare them at boot
over the /relay/policy route, so the SAME mention-gating / free-response /
allow-bots behavior the agent applies directly also governs relay delivery (and
excluded chatter never wakes a scaled-to-zero agent).

- gateway/relay/__init__.py:
  - relay_relevance_policy(): project require_mention -> requireAddress,
    free_response_channels -> freeResponseScopes, {PLATFORM}_ALLOW_BOTS in
    {mentions,all} -> allowOtherBots. Reads the fronted platform's config block
    + bridged top-level keys. Returns None when all-default (the connector's
    quiet default already matches) or no concrete platform is fronted.
  - send_relay_policy(): POST /relay/policy authenticated with the gateway's own
    per-gateway upgrade token (make_upgrade_token — same bearer as the WS
    upgrade), so the connector attaches it to the authenticated instance, never
    a body-asserted id. Re-declares every boot (self-healing, full replace).
    NEVER raises, NEVER blocks boot — relevance is an optimization layered on
    the δ/ε authorization gate. Reuses the per-gateway secret + the
    /relay/provision host; no new inbound surface, no new credential.
  - _policy_url(): ws(s)://…/relay -> http(s)://…/relay/policy.
- gateway/run.py: call send_relay_policy() after register_relay_adapter()
  succeeds (the secret is resolved by then).
- docs/relay-connector-contract.md: new §7 documenting per-instance delivery +
  the management plane (/manage/* + /relay/policy) + the relevance-declaration
  contract; versioning renumbered to §8. Contract conformance test stays green
  (§2/§3 tables untouched).

Tests: +12 (projection mapping incl. comma-string + top-level fallback; send
auth/skip/fail-soft/non-200). Full relay suite 118 pass. The connector route is
already E2E-proven (connector repo gateway_policy_driver.py); this adds the real
gateway send-path it pairs with.

This completes Phase 6 (Team Gateway per-user isolation) end to end.
2026-06-23 18:43:19 +10:00

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"""Relay/connector support package for the Hermes gateway.
EXPERIMENTAL. This package implements the gateway side of the "Gateway Gateway"
relay design: a generic ``RelayAdapter`` plus the wire-serializable
``CapabilityDescriptor`` the connector hands it at handshake time, and the
production ``WebSocketRelayTransport`` that dials the connector. The public API
(module names, descriptor field set, transport protocol) MAY CHANGE without a
deprecation cycle until at least two real Class-1 platforms (Discord + Telegram)
have shaken out the schema.
See ``docs/relay-connector-contract.md`` for the formal cross-repo interface.
Activation is driven by configuration, not a separate feature flag: the relay
platform is registered when a connector relay URL is configured
(``GATEWAY_RELAY_URL`` env or ``gateway.relay_url`` in config.yaml). Deployments
that don't set it are unaffected — exactly the same shape as ``gateway.proxy_url``.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
from typing import Optional
def relay_url() -> Optional[str]:
"""The connector relay endpoint URL, or None when relay is not configured.
Checks ``GATEWAY_RELAY_URL`` (convenient for Docker) first, then
``gateway.relay_url`` in config.yaml. A non-empty value activates the relay
platform; absence means a normal direct/single-tenant gateway.
"""
url = os.environ.get("GATEWAY_RELAY_URL", "").strip()
if url:
return url.rstrip("/")
try:
from gateway.run import _load_gateway_config # late import to avoid cycle
cfg = _load_gateway_config()
url = (cfg.get("gateway") or {}).get("relay_url", "").strip()
if url:
return url.rstrip("/")
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - config absence/parse must never crash registration
pass
return None
def relay_platform_identity() -> tuple[str, str]:
"""Platform + bot id this gateway fronts over the relay (for the handshake hello).
Defaults to ``("relay", "")``; overridable via ``GATEWAY_RELAY_PLATFORM`` /
``GATEWAY_RELAY_BOT_ID`` so one connector can front several platforms.
"""
platform = os.environ.get("GATEWAY_RELAY_PLATFORM", "relay").strip() or "relay"
bot_id = os.environ.get("GATEWAY_RELAY_BOT_ID", "").strip()
return platform, bot_id
def relay_connection_auth() -> tuple[Optional[str], Optional[str]]:
"""The (gateway_id, upgrade_secret) this gateway authenticates the WS upgrade with.
Both come from enrollment (``hermes gateway enroll`` writes them to
``~/.hermes/.env``): ``GATEWAY_RELAY_ID`` identifies the enrolled instance,
``GATEWAY_RELAY_SECRET`` is the per-gateway signing secret. Either absent ->
``(None, None)`` and the transport dials unauthenticated (dev/test, or a
connector that doesn't enforce auth). Checks env first (Docker), then
``gateway.relay_id`` / ``gateway.relay_secret`` in config.yaml.
"""
gateway_id = os.environ.get("GATEWAY_RELAY_ID", "").strip()
secret = os.environ.get("GATEWAY_RELAY_SECRET", "").strip()
if not (gateway_id and secret):
try:
from gateway.run import _load_gateway_config # late import to avoid cycle
cfg = (_load_gateway_config().get("gateway") or {})
gateway_id = gateway_id or str(cfg.get("relay_id", "") or "").strip()
secret = secret or str(cfg.get("relay_secret", "") or "").strip()
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - config absence/parse must never crash registration
pass
return (gateway_id or None, secret or None)
def relay_endpoint() -> Optional[str]:
"""The gateway's own PUBLIC inbound URL, asserted to the connector at provision.
The connector delivers signed inbound POSTs to this URL and stores it on the
tenant's route rows. It is gateway-asserted (the connector scopes it to the
verified tenant, so a dishonest gateway can only misdirect its OWN inbound).
The *source* of the value differs by deployment but the code path is uniform:
a self-hosted operator sets ``GATEWAY_RELAY_ENDPOINT`` (mirrors how they set
``HERMES_DASHBOARD_PUBLIC_URL``); a hosted/NAS container has the same var
stamped in (NAS knows the public URL only in that case). Absent -> the
gateway provisions outbound-only (no inbound routes written).
Env first (Docker), then ``gateway.relay_endpoint`` in config.yaml.
"""
url = os.environ.get("GATEWAY_RELAY_ENDPOINT", "").strip()
if not url:
try:
from gateway.run import _load_gateway_config # late import to avoid cycle
cfg = (_load_gateway_config().get("gateway") or {})
url = str(cfg.get("relay_endpoint", "") or "").strip()
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - config absence/parse must never crash boot
url = ""
return url.rstrip("/") or None
def relay_route_keys() -> list[str]:
"""Discriminators (guild_ids / chat_ids / paths) this gateway's tenant owns.
Gateway-provided config, paired with ``relay_endpoint()``: the connector
writes one route row per (routeKey -> tenant, endpoint), so route keys only
take effect alongside an endpoint. Empty -> outbound-only provisioning (the
connector accepts an empty set and writes no route rows).
``GATEWAY_RELAY_ROUTE_KEYS`` is comma-separated; config.yaml
``gateway.relay_route_keys`` may be a list or a comma string.
"""
raw = os.environ.get("GATEWAY_RELAY_ROUTE_KEYS", "").strip()
if not raw:
try:
from gateway.run import _load_gateway_config # late import to avoid cycle
cfg = (_load_gateway_config().get("gateway") or {})
val = cfg.get("relay_route_keys", "")
if isinstance(val, (list, tuple)):
return [str(k).strip() for k in val if str(k).strip()]
raw = str(val or "").strip()
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
raw = ""
return [k.strip() for k in raw.split(",") if k.strip()]
def relay_instance_id() -> Optional[str]:
"""Stable per-instance id this gateway forwards at provision (Phase 6 Unit α).
Binds the connector's ``gatewayId -> instanceId`` so the connector can route
inbound per-instance (not tenant-broadcast) once Phase 6 delivery lands. The
value is the NAS ``AgentInstance.id`` for a managed agent (NAS stamps
``GATEWAY_RELAY_INSTANCE_ID`` into the container env, beside
``GATEWAY_RELAY_URL``); a self-hosted operator may set it explicitly. It is
gateway-asserted but safely scoped: the org/tenant stays token-verified, so a
dishonest gateway can only bind ITS OWN tenant's instance — the same posture
as ``relay_endpoint()``. Absent -> the connector stores null and per-instance
routing simply has no binding for this connection yet (back-compat).
Env first (Docker/NAS), then ``gateway.relay_instance_id`` in config.yaml.
"""
value = os.environ.get("GATEWAY_RELAY_INSTANCE_ID", "").strip()
if not value:
try:
from gateway.run import _load_gateway_config # late import to avoid cycle
cfg = (_load_gateway_config().get("gateway") or {})
value = str(cfg.get("relay_instance_id", "") or "").strip()
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - config absence/parse must never crash boot
value = ""
return value or None
def _provision_url(relay_dial_url: str) -> str:
"""Map the ``ws(s)://…/relay`` dial URL to the ``http(s)://…/relay/provision`` POST URL."""
raw = relay_dial_url.rstrip("/")
if raw.startswith("ws://"):
raw = "http://" + raw[len("ws://"):]
elif raw.startswith("wss://"):
raw = "https://" + raw[len("wss://"):]
if raw.endswith("/relay"):
raw = raw[: -len("/relay")]
return f"{raw}/relay/provision"
def _policy_url(relay_dial_url: str) -> str:
"""Map the ``ws(s)://…/relay`` dial URL to the ``http(s)://…/relay/policy`` POST URL.
Same host derivation as ``_provision_url``; the connector mounts the
relevance-policy update channel at ``/relay/policy`` (Phase 6 Unit ζ).
"""
raw = relay_dial_url.rstrip("/")
if raw.startswith("ws://"):
raw = "http://" + raw[len("ws://"):]
elif raw.startswith("wss://"):
raw = "https://" + raw[len("wss://"):]
if raw.endswith("/relay"):
raw = raw[: -len("/relay")]
return f"{raw}/relay/policy"
def relay_relevance_policy() -> Optional[dict]:
"""Project this gateway's RELEVANCE config into the connector's generic vocabulary.
The connector's relevance gate (Phase 6 Unit ζ) reasons over a
platform-agnostic policy — ``requireAddress`` / ``freeResponseScopes`` /
``allowOtherBots`` — NOT over Discord/Telegram words. This is the gateway
side of that contract: it reads the agent's existing relevance knobs and
emits the generic shape the connector stores per-instance.
Mapping (the connector vocabulary ← the gateway's existing config):
- ``requireAddress`` ← the platform's ``require_mention`` (the agent
only engages a non-owner message that @mentions it / replies to it).
- ``freeResponseScopes`` ← the platform's ``free_response_channels`` (the
channel/scope ids where ``require_mention`` is waived — same scope
vocabulary the connector's δ scope grants + ε floor use).
- ``allowOtherBots`` ← ``{PLATFORM}_ALLOW_BOTS`` in {"mentions","all"}
(whether bot-authored messages are admitted; default off).
Read from the relay platform's config block (the platform the connector
fronts, e.g. ``discord:``), falling back to the bridged top-level keys, then
the ``{PLATFORM}_*`` env. Returns the generic dict, or None when relay isn't
configured or the platform exposes no relevance knobs (⇒ the connector's
quiet default already matches, so there's nothing to declare).
"""
platform, _bot_id = relay_platform_identity()
if not platform or platform == "relay":
# No concrete fronted platform resolved ⇒ nothing platform-specific to project.
return None
# Resolve the platform's config block + the bridged top-level keys.
require_mention = None
free_response: list[str] = []
try:
from gateway.run import _load_gateway_config # late import to avoid cycle
cfg = _load_gateway_config() or {}
plat_cfg = cfg.get(platform)
if not isinstance(plat_cfg, dict):
plat_cfg = ((cfg.get("gateway") or {}).get("platforms") or {}).get(platform)
if not isinstance(plat_cfg, dict):
plat_cfg = (cfg.get("platforms") or {}).get(platform)
plat_cfg = plat_cfg if isinstance(plat_cfg, dict) else {}
if "require_mention" in plat_cfg:
require_mention = plat_cfg.get("require_mention")
elif cfg.get("require_mention") is not None:
require_mention = cfg.get("require_mention")
frc = plat_cfg.get("free_response_channels")
if frc is None:
frc = cfg.get("free_response_channels")
if isinstance(frc, (list, tuple)):
free_response = [str(c).strip() for c in frc if str(c).strip()]
elif isinstance(frc, str) and frc.strip():
free_response = [c.strip() for c in frc.split(",") if c.strip()]
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - config absence/parse must never crash boot
pass
# allow_other_bots ← {PLATFORM}_ALLOW_BOTS in {"mentions","all"} (same gate as
# the gateway's own authz_mixin DISCORD_ALLOW_BOTS bypass).
allow_bots_env = os.environ.get(f"{platform.upper()}_ALLOW_BOTS", "").lower().strip()
allow_other_bots = allow_bots_env in {"mentions", "all"}
require_address = bool(require_mention) if require_mention is not None else False
# Nothing non-default to declare ⇒ let the connector keep its quiet default
# (matches absence-of-row semantics on the connector side).
if not require_address and not free_response and not allow_other_bots:
return None
return {
"platform": platform,
"requireAddress": require_address,
"freeResponseScopes": free_response,
"allowOtherBots": allow_other_bots,
}
def _post_provision(
*,
provision_url: str,
access_token: str,
gateway_id: str,
platform: str,
bot_id: str,
gateway_endpoint: Optional[str],
route_keys: list[str],
instance_id: Optional[str] = None,
timeout: float = 15.0,
) -> dict:
"""POST to the connector's ``/relay/provision`` and return the JSON body.
The connector validates ``access_token`` against NAS, derives the
authoritative tenant, mints the per-gateway secret + per-tenant delivery key,
upserts the tenant's route rows, and returns
``{secret, deliveryKey, tenant, gatewayId, routeKeys}``. Raises RuntimeError
with a user-facing message on any non-2xx / transport failure.
"""
import json
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
body: dict = {
"gatewayId": gateway_id,
"platform": platform,
"botId": bot_id,
"gatewayEndpoint": gateway_endpoint or "",
"routeKeys": route_keys,
}
# Only send instanceId when we actually have one — omitting it lets the
# connector store null (back-compat) rather than binding an empty string.
if instance_id:
body["instanceId"] = instance_id
data = json.dumps(body).encode("utf-8")
req = urllib.request.Request(
provision_url,
data=data,
method="POST",
headers={
"Authorization": f"Bearer {access_token}",
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"Accept": "application/json",
},
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:
payload = json.loads(resp.read().decode())
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
detail = ""
try:
detail = (json.loads(exc.read().decode()) or {}).get("error", "")
except Exception:
pass
raise RuntimeError(
f"connector returned HTTP {exc.code}" + (f": {detail}" if detail else "")
) from exc
except urllib.error.URLError as exc:
raise RuntimeError(f"could not reach connector: {exc.reason}") from exc
if not isinstance(payload, dict) or not payload.get("secret"):
raise RuntimeError("connector returned an unexpected response (no secret)")
return payload
def self_provision_relay() -> bool:
"""Boot-time relay self-provision: mint relay creds in-process, no human, no disk.
Fires when relay is configured (``relay_url()`` set) and NO per-gateway secret
is already present, AND the agent can resolve its own Nous access token. In
that case the runtime resolves the agent's own Nous access token (the same
``resolve_nous_access_token()`` the enroll CLI / dashboard register use),
POSTs ``/relay/provision`` asserting its own endpoint + route keys, and sets
``GATEWAY_RELAY_ID`` / ``GATEWAY_RELAY_SECRET`` / ``GATEWAY_RELAY_DELIVERY_KEY``
into ``os.environ`` so the subsequent ``register_relay_adapter()`` picks them
up. The creds live ONLY in process memory — never written to ``~/.hermes/.env``.
The trigger is deliberately NOT ``is_managed()``: that means
"package-manager/NixOS-managed" and is False on a NAS-hosted Fly agent (which
sets neither ``HERMES_MANAGED`` nor a ``.managed`` marker), so gating on it
blocked the exact hosted case this is for. The real signal is "you pointed me
at a connector and didn't pin a secret" — which is both NAS-independent and
self-guarding:
- A NAS-hosted agent: has ``GATEWAY_RELAY_URL``, no pinned secret, and a
bootstrapped NAS token -> self-provisions.
- A self-hosted operator who ran ``hermes gateway enroll``: has a PINNED
``GATEWAY_RELAY_SECRET`` -> skipped (the secret-present guard below).
- A self-hosted box with a relay URL but no NAS identity:
``resolve_nous_access_token()`` fails -> graceful no-op.
Stateless: process-env creds don't survive a restart, so a hosted container
re-provisions every boot; the connector's rotation window covers a still-
connected prior instance. An explicitly-pinned ``GATEWAY_RELAY_SECRET`` (env
or config) is RESPECTED — self-provision skips so an operator pin isn't
stomped.
Returns True if it provisioned, False otherwise. NEVER raises: a provision
failure logs and returns False so the gateway still boots (and
``register_relay_adapter`` will simply dial unauthenticated / be rejected,
rather than the whole gateway crashing).
"""
import logging
logger = logging.getLogger("gateway.relay")
dial_url = relay_url()
if not dial_url:
return False
# Respect an already-present (pinned/stamped) secret — don't stomp it. This
# is also what makes a self-hosted, enrolled gateway skip self-provision.
existing_id, existing_secret = relay_connection_auth()
if existing_id and existing_secret:
logger.info("relay self-provision skipped: GATEWAY_RELAY_SECRET already set")
return False
try:
from hermes_cli.auth import resolve_nous_access_token
access_token = resolve_nous_access_token()
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 - boot must survive a token failure
# No resolvable NAS identity (e.g. a self-hosted box that hasn't enrolled)
# -> nothing to provision with; skip quietly and let the gateway boot.
logger.warning("relay self-provision skipped: could not resolve Nous token (%s)", exc)
return False
platform, bot_id = relay_platform_identity()
# gatewayId default mirrors the enroll CLI's hostname-based slug.
import socket
try:
host = socket.gethostname().strip()
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
host = ""
gateway_id = os.environ.get("GATEWAY_RELAY_ID", "").strip() or f"gw-{host or 'hermes'}"
endpoint = relay_endpoint()
route_keys = relay_route_keys()
instance_id = relay_instance_id()
try:
result = _post_provision(
provision_url=_provision_url(dial_url),
access_token=access_token,
gateway_id=gateway_id,
platform=platform,
bot_id=bot_id,
gateway_endpoint=endpoint,
route_keys=route_keys,
instance_id=instance_id,
)
except RuntimeError as exc:
logger.warning("relay self-provision failed (%s); gateway will boot without relay auth", exc)
return False
# Set creds in-process so register_relay_adapter() reads them from os.environ
# (the per-gateway secret authenticates the outbound WS upgrade). The delivery
# key is still issued by the connector and persisted for forward-compat, but
# inbound now rides the WS (no HTTP receiver), so it is not consumed here.
# Never logged.
os.environ["GATEWAY_RELAY_ID"] = str(result.get("gatewayId") or gateway_id)
os.environ["GATEWAY_RELAY_SECRET"] = str(result.get("secret") or "")
os.environ["GATEWAY_RELAY_DELIVERY_KEY"] = str(result.get("deliveryKey") or "")
tenant = str(result.get("tenant") or "")
logger.info(
"relay self-provisioned (gateway_id=%s tenant=%s routes=%d inbound=%s instance=%s)",
os.environ["GATEWAY_RELAY_ID"],
tenant or "?",
len(route_keys),
"yes" if endpoint else "outbound-only",
instance_id or "unbound",
)
return True
def _post_policy(*, policy_url: str, token: str, policy: dict, timeout: float = 15.0) -> int:
"""POST the relevance policy to the connector's ``/relay/policy``; return the HTTP status.
Authenticated with the gateway's own per-gateway upgrade token (the SAME
bearer shape as the WS upgrade — ``make_upgrade_token``), so the connector
resolves ``{tenant, instanceId}`` from its stored secret record, never the
body. Raises RuntimeError on transport failure (the caller treats any
failure as non-fatal — relevance is an optimization, not a boot dependency).
"""
import json
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
data = json.dumps(policy).encode("utf-8")
req = urllib.request.Request(
policy_url,
data=data,
method="POST",
headers={
"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}",
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"Accept": "application/json",
},
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:
return int(resp.status)
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
return int(exc.code)
except urllib.error.URLError as exc:
raise RuntimeError(f"could not reach connector: {exc.reason}") from exc
def send_relay_policy() -> bool:
"""Declare this gateway's relevance policy to the connector (Phase 6 Unit ζ).
Runs at boot AFTER the per-gateway secret is resolved (self-provisioned or
pinned), projecting the agent's relevance config into the generic vocabulary
(``relay_relevance_policy``) and POSTing it to ``/relay/policy`` with the
gateway's own upgrade token. The connector stores it per-instance and the
relevance gate enforces it on delivery — so the SAME mention-gating /
free-response / allow-bots behavior the agent applies directly also governs
relay delivery, and excluded traffic never wakes a scaled-to-zero agent.
Self-healing: the agent is the source of truth and re-declares every boot
(mirrors the ``routeKeys`` upsert at provision). Idempotent — a full replace.
NEVER raises and NEVER blocks boot: relevance is an optimization layered on
the δ/ε authorization gate (which already protects isolation), so a failed
declaration just means the connector keeps the prior/quiet policy. Returns
True iff the connector accepted the policy (HTTP 200).
"""
import logging
logger = logging.getLogger("gateway.relay")
dial_url = relay_url()
if not dial_url:
return False
gateway_id, secret = relay_connection_auth()
if not gateway_id or not secret:
# No resolved per-gateway secret (unenrolled / provision failed) ⇒ we
# can't authenticate the policy POST; skip quietly (the WS upgrade would
# be unauthenticated too, so there's no instance to attach a policy to).
return False
policy = relay_relevance_policy()
if policy is None:
# Nothing non-default to declare ⇒ the connector's quiet default already
# matches; don't write a redundant row.
logger.info("relay policy: no non-default relevance config to declare; using connector default")
return False
try:
from gateway.relay.auth import make_upgrade_token
token = make_upgrade_token(gateway_id, secret)
status = _post_policy(policy_url=_policy_url(dial_url), token=token, policy=policy)
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 - boot must survive a policy-declare failure
logger.warning("relay policy declaration failed (%s); connector keeps prior/default policy", exc)
return False
if status == 200:
logger.info(
"relay policy declared (platform=%s require_address=%s free_scopes=%d allow_bots=%s)",
policy.get("platform"),
policy.get("requireAddress"),
len(policy.get("freeResponseScopes") or []),
policy.get("allowOtherBots"),
)
return True
logger.warning("relay policy declaration returned HTTP %s; connector keeps prior/default policy", status)
return False
def register_relay_adapter(force: bool = False, url: Optional[str] = None) -> bool:
"""Register the generic ``relay`` platform via the platform registry.
Registers when a relay URL is configured (or ``force=True`` for tests, which
builds a transport-less adapter — the unit-test posture). Returns True if
registration happened. Additive: uses the same registry path as plugin
adapters, so no core dispatch changes are needed.
When a URL is present the factory builds a live ``WebSocketRelayTransport``;
the ``RelayAdapter`` negotiates the real ``CapabilityDescriptor`` at
``connect()`` time via ``transport.handshake()``.
"""
resolved_url = url if url is not None else relay_url()
if not (force or resolved_url):
return False
from gateway.platform_registry import PlatformEntry, platform_registry
from gateway.relay.adapter import RelayAdapter
from gateway.relay.descriptor import CONTRACT_VERSION, CapabilityDescriptor
platform, bot_id = relay_platform_identity()
def _factory(config):
# Placeholder descriptor; replaced by the negotiated one at connect time
# when a transport is present. With no URL (force/test) the adapter is
# transport-less and keeps the placeholder.
placeholder = CapabilityDescriptor(
contract_version=CONTRACT_VERSION,
platform=platform,
label="Relay",
max_message_length=4096,
supports_draft_streaming=False,
supports_edit=True,
supports_threads=False,
markdown_dialect="plain",
len_unit="chars",
)
transport = None
if resolved_url:
from gateway.relay.ws_transport import WebSocketRelayTransport
gateway_id, upgrade_secret = relay_connection_auth()
transport = WebSocketRelayTransport(
resolved_url,
platform,
bot_id,
gateway_id=gateway_id,
upgrade_secret=upgrade_secret,
)
return RelayAdapter(config, placeholder, transport=transport)
platform_registry.register(
PlatformEntry(
name="relay",
label="Relay",
adapter_factory=_factory,
check_fn=lambda: True,
source="builtin",
emoji="\U0001f50c",
)
)
return True