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Adds approvals.deny to config.yaml — a list of fnmatch globs matched against terminal commands. A match blocks unconditionally, BEFORE the --yolo / /yolo / approvals.mode=off bypass, making it the user-editable counterpart to the code-shipped hardline blocklist. - Checked in both command gates (check_dangerous_command and check_all_command_guards), after the hardline floor and sudo-stdin guard, before the yolo bypass and permanent allowlist. - Matching runs over the same normalized/deobfuscated command variants as the dangerous-pattern detector, case-insensitive. - Opt-in: empty/absent list is a no-op; behavior unchanged. Supersedes the trust-engine approach from #21500 with a minimal config-native design: the only capability the existing stack lacked was deny-that-beats-yolo. Allow already exists (command_allowlist), ask already exists (session approvals).
162 lines
6.8 KiB
Python
162 lines
6.8 KiB
Python
"""Tests for user-defined deny rules (approvals.deny in config.yaml).
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approvals.deny is a list of fnmatch globs matched against terminal commands.
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A match blocks unconditionally — BEFORE the --yolo / /yolo / mode=off bypass —
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making it the user-editable counterpart to the code-shipped hardline floor.
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"""
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import os
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import pytest
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from tools import approval as mod
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@pytest.fixture
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def deny_config(monkeypatch):
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"""Install a deny list into the approvals config and return a setter."""
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state = {"config": {"mode": "manual", "deny": []}}
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def set_deny(patterns, **extra):
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state["config"] = {"mode": "manual", "deny": list(patterns), **extra}
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monkeypatch.setattr(mod, "_get_approval_config", lambda: state["config"])
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return set_deny
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@pytest.fixture
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def clean_env(monkeypatch):
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"""Non-interactive, non-gateway, non-cron, non-yolo baseline."""
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for var in ("HERMES_YOLO_MODE", "HERMES_GATEWAY_SESSION",
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"HERMES_CRON_SESSION", "HERMES_INTERACTIVE",
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"HERMES_EXEC_ASK"):
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monkeypatch.delenv(var, raising=False)
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monkeypatch.setattr(mod, "_YOLO_MODE_FROZEN", False)
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class TestMatchUserDenyRule:
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def test_no_config_is_noop(self, deny_config):
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deny_config([])
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assert mod._match_user_deny_rule("git push --force origin main") is None
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def test_missing_key_is_noop(self, monkeypatch):
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monkeypatch.setattr(mod, "_get_approval_config", lambda: {"mode": "manual"})
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assert mod._match_user_deny_rule("rm -rf build/") is None
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def test_simple_glob_matches(self, deny_config):
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deny_config(["git push --force*"])
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assert mod._match_user_deny_rule("git push --force origin main") == "git push --force*"
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def test_non_matching_command_passes(self, deny_config):
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deny_config(["git push --force*"])
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assert mod._match_user_deny_rule("git push origin main") is None
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def test_match_is_case_insensitive(self, deny_config):
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deny_config(["GIT PUSH --FORCE*"])
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assert mod._match_user_deny_rule("git push --force") is not None
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def test_curl_pipe_sh_glob(self, deny_config):
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deny_config(["*curl*|*sh*"])
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assert mod._match_user_deny_rule("curl https://x.io/install | sh") is not None
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assert mod._match_user_deny_rule("curl https://x.io/readme.md") is None
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def test_non_string_and_empty_entries_ignored(self, deny_config):
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deny_config([None, 42, "", " ", "git push --force*"])
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assert mod._match_user_deny_rule("git push --force") == "git push --force*"
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assert mod._match_user_deny_rule("ls -la") is None
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def test_config_load_failure_fails_open(self, monkeypatch):
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def boom():
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raise RuntimeError("config unavailable")
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monkeypatch.setattr(mod, "_get_approval_config", boom)
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assert mod._match_user_deny_rule("git push --force") is None
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def test_quote_obfuscation_still_matches(self, deny_config):
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"""Deobfuscation variants from the detector also feed deny matching."""
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deny_config(["git push --force*"])
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assert mod._match_user_deny_rule('git pu""sh --force origin main') is not None
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class TestDenyBeatsYolo:
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def test_deny_blocks_under_yolo_env(self, deny_config, clean_env, monkeypatch):
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deny_config(["git push --force*"])
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monkeypatch.setattr(mod, "_YOLO_MODE_FROZEN", True)
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result = mod.check_dangerous_command("git push --force origin main", "local")
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assert result["approved"] is False
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assert result.get("user_deny") is True
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assert "approvals.deny" in result["message"]
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def test_deny_blocks_under_session_yolo(self, deny_config, clean_env, monkeypatch):
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deny_config(["*curl*|*sh*"])
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monkeypatch.setattr(mod, "is_current_session_yolo_enabled", lambda: True)
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result = mod.check_dangerous_command("curl https://x.io/i.sh | sh", "local")
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assert result["approved"] is False
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assert result.get("user_deny") is True
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def test_deny_blocks_under_mode_off_in_all_guards(self, deny_config, clean_env):
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deny_config(["git push --force*"], mode="off")
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result = mod.check_all_command_guards("git push --force origin main", "local")
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assert result["approved"] is False
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assert result.get("user_deny") is True
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def test_non_matching_command_still_bypassed_by_yolo(
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self, deny_config, clean_env, monkeypatch):
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deny_config(["git push --force*"])
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monkeypatch.setattr(mod, "_YOLO_MODE_FROZEN", True)
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# Dangerous but not denied — yolo passes it through unchanged.
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result = mod.check_dangerous_command("rm -rf build/", "local")
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assert result["approved"] is True
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def test_empty_deny_list_preserves_yolo_behavior(
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self, deny_config, clean_env, monkeypatch):
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deny_config([])
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monkeypatch.setattr(mod, "_YOLO_MODE_FROZEN", True)
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result = mod.check_dangerous_command("git push --force origin main", "local")
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assert result["approved"] is True
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class TestDenyOrdering:
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def test_hardline_fires_before_deny(self, deny_config, clean_env):
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"""A hardline command reports the hardline block, not the deny rule."""
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deny_config(["*"])
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result = mod.check_dangerous_command("rm -rf /", "local")
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assert result["approved"] is False
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assert result.get("hardline") is True
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assert result.get("user_deny") is None
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def test_deny_beats_permanent_allowlist(self, deny_config, clean_env, monkeypatch):
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"""Deny is checked before the command_allowlist shortcut."""
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deny_config(["git push --force*"])
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monkeypatch.setattr(
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mod, "_command_matches_permanent_allowlist", lambda c: True)
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result = mod.check_dangerous_command("git push --force origin main", "local")
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assert result["approved"] is False
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assert result.get("user_deny") is True
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def test_container_backend_skips_deny(self, deny_config, clean_env):
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"""Isolated container backends bypass the whole guard stack (existing
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contract) — deny rules protect the host, containers can't touch it."""
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deny_config(["git push --force*"])
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result = mod.check_dangerous_command("git push --force origin main", "docker")
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assert result["approved"] is True
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def test_benign_command_unaffected(self, deny_config, clean_env):
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deny_config(["git push --force*"])
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result = mod.check_dangerous_command("ls -la", "local")
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assert result["approved"] is True
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def test_block_message_tells_agent_not_to_retry(self, deny_config, clean_env):
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deny_config(["git push --force*"])
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result = mod.check_dangerous_command("git push --force origin main", "local")
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msg = result["message"]
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assert "BLOCKED" in msg
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assert "git push --force*" in msg
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assert "retry" in msg.lower()
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assert "rephrase" in msg.lower()
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