hermes-agent/agent/secret_sources/command.py
Michael Valentin 3d5dd8efa5 feat(secrets): add command secret source + unified secrets.provider selector
Brings the agent's secret-source system to parity with the desktop app's
`command` secrets provider (hermes-desktop src/main/secrets/commandProvider.ts),
so a vault helper configured for the desktop also resolves on the gateway/CLI.

NEW agent/secret_sources/command.py — ports the TS provider's security model:
- Runs a user-configured helper via `/bin/sh -c`; the requested key travels
  ONLY in the HERMES_SECRET_KEY env var, never interpolated into the command
  string, so a hostile key name is inert data (not code).
- parse_secret_output mirrors the TS parser: exact dotenv-key match wins; >=2
  env-shaped lines without the wanted key -> None; otherwise a bare value;
  base64 '='-padding disambiguation; cross-key misroute guard (a single
  OTHER_KEY=realvalue line never leaks into a different wanted key).
- Hard 3s timeout (kills the whole process group via killpg, so a forking
  helper can't keep the pipe open), 1 MiB output cap, POSIX-only (Windows
  degrades to an empty result + warning). Every failure degrades to "no value";
  it never raises and never blocks startup.
- Logs ONLY structured fields (code=/signal=/errno=) to stderr; the helper's
  stderr is piped and DISCARDED; the command string and secret values are
  never logged. Reuses bitwarden.py's FetchResult so env_loader consumes both
  sources identically.

hermes_cli/env_loader.py — _apply_external_secret_sources now reads a unified
`secrets.provider` selector ("env" | "command" | "bitwarden"):
- provider=command routes to apply_command_secrets, records the provenance as
  "command" in _SECRET_SOURCES (so format_secret_source_suffix labels keys
  "(from command)" — already generic, not duplicated), and re-runs the ASCII
  credential sanitizer like the bitwarden path.
- provider=bitwarden keeps the existing behavior byte-for-byte.
- env / unset is a no-op (today's default — zero change for existing users).
- BACK-COMPAT: a config with only `secrets.bitwarden.enabled: true` and no
  `provider` key is treated as provider=bitwarden, so existing Bitwarden users
  are unaffected.

Config (the provider selector, command path, timeouts) lives in config.yaml
under `secrets:` per the project rubric — only resolved secret VALUES touch env.

Tests: NEW tests/test_command_secret_source.py — 27 cases, E2E against a real
temp HERMES_HOME with real chmod+x shell helpers (not mocks): bare/dotenv/
base64 round-trip, cross-key misroute, injection-inert key (canary not
created), timeout kill within bound, non-zero-exit degrade, no-secret-in-logs,
precedence/override, dispatch via config.yaml provider:command, idempotency,
and back-compat bitwarden routing. 27 new + 50 baseline green; wider
secrets/env_loader/config surface 229 passed / 5 skipped, no regression.
2026-07-22 04:39:28 -07:00

385 lines
14 KiB
Python

"""``command`` secret source — resolve secrets via a user-configured helper.
Ports the security semantics of the desktop app's TypeScript
``CommandSecretsProvider`` (hermes-desktop ``src/main/secrets/commandProvider.ts``)
to the Python agent. The helper command (e.g. ``keepassxc-cli``,
``secret-tool``, or a script that cats a tmpfs env file) comes from
``secrets.command`` in ``config.yaml`` — NEVER from ``.env``, which holds
only secret values.
Security model (mirrors the TS provider line-for-line where it matters):
* The command string is the USER'S OWN configuration (same trust level as
the ``.env`` file they control), so it is run via ``/bin/sh -c <command>``.
* The requested key is passed to the child ONLY via the ``HERMES_SECRET_KEY``
environment variable — it is NEVER interpolated into the shell string, so
a hostile key name (e.g. ``"; rm -rf ~``) is inert data, not code.
* Hard timeout (default 3s) + output cap (default 1 MiB); any failure
(non-zero exit, timeout, spawn failure, oversized output) degrades to
"no value" rather than raising.
* Failures log ONLY structured fields (exit code / signal / errno) to
stderr — never the command string, the helper's stderr, or any secret
value. The helper's stderr is captured via a pipe and DISCARDED so its
diagnostics (which can carry secret material) never reach our stderr.
* The startup/apply path runs the helper exactly ONCE (with an empty
``HERMES_SECRET_KEY``) — it is never called per-key in a loop, so a
helper that blocks (e.g. on a vault unlock prompt) can't be spawned
dozens of times.
* PLATFORM: the provider is POSIX-only (needs ``/bin/sh``). On Windows it
degrades to an empty result with a warning; Windows users stay on the
default ``env`` provider.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import platform
import re
import signal as _signal
import subprocess
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Dict, Optional
# Reuse the exact result shape the bitwarden source returns so
# hermes_cli.env_loader can consume both providers identically.
from agent.secret_sources.bitwarden import FetchResult
__all__ = [
"FetchResult",
"apply_command_secrets",
"get_command_secret",
"list_command_secrets",
"parse_secret_output",
"unquote_dotenv_value",
]
# Hard cap so a hung helper can never wedge startup. Kept deliberately
# TIGHT (3s) — a configured helper MUST be fast and NON-INTERACTIVE
# (e.g. `keepassxc-cli` against an already-unlocked DB, `secret-tool
# lookup`, or `cat`-ing a tmpfs env file), NOT something that prompts
# for a touch/PIN.
_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 3.0
# Defensive cap on helper output (1 MiB) — a misbehaving command can't OOM us.
_MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES = 1024 * 1024
# A line is treated as a KEY=VALUE pair only when it matches an env-key
# shape before the '='. Anchored; `.` does not cross newlines, so a
# multi-line blob never matches as a single "env-shaped" value.
_ENV_LINE = re.compile(r"^([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)=(.*)$")
def _is_windows() -> bool:
return os.name == "nt" or platform.system() == "Windows"
def unquote_dotenv_value(raw: str) -> str:
"""Strip a single layer of matching surrounding quotes from a dotenv value.
Requires length >= 2 so a lone quote (``"``) is left intact rather than
collapsing to empty, and ``""``/``''`` correctly yield an empty string.
Shared by the single-key parser and the list path so both unquote
identically.
"""
t = raw.strip()
if len(t) >= 2 and (
(t.startswith('"') and t.endswith('"'))
or (t.startswith("'") and t.endswith("'"))
):
return t[1:-1]
return t
def parse_secret_output(stdout: str, wanted_key: str) -> Optional[str]:
"""Parse a secret-fetch helper's stdout. Supports BOTH shapes:
* a bare value (single secret): the whole trimmed stdout is the value.
* a dotenv blob (KEY=VALUE lines): parse them and return the entry for
``wanted_key``.
Mirrors the TS ``parseSecretOutput`` exactly, including the cross-key
misroute guard and the base64-padding disambiguation.
"""
text = stdout.replace("\r\n", "\n")
lines = text.split("\n")
# 1. Exact dotenv match wins: scan for a `wanted_key=...` line. This
# is deterministic and never returns another key's value.
dotenv_lines = [
line
for line in (raw.strip() for raw in lines)
if line and not line.startswith("#") and _ENV_LINE.match(line)
]
for line in dotenv_lines:
m = _ENV_LINE.match(line)
assert m is not None # filtered above
if m.group(1) == wanted_key:
value = unquote_dotenv_value(m.group(2))
# Whitespace-only (e.g. a quoted `K=" "` placeholder) is "no
# value": it would otherwise flow into an Authorization header
# → guaranteed 401.
return value if value.strip() != "" else None
# 2. The output is a multi-key dotenv dump that does NOT contain the
# wanted key → None, rather than mis-returning an unrelated line as
# a bare value. Only >=2 env-shaped lines count as a dump: a SINGLE
# non-matching env-shaped line falls through to the bare-value
# branch, because a bare secret can itself match the KEY=VALUE shape
# (e.g. base64 with '=' padding, "dGVzdA==") and must not be
# misclassified as a dump.
if len(dotenv_lines) > 1:
return None
# 3. Otherwise treat the whole output as a single bare value (a per-key
# helper that printed just the secret). Trim first so whitespace-only
# output (a ' '/'\t' placeholder entry) resolves to None, never a "key".
value = text.strip()
if value == "":
return None
# SECURITY (S2): a single env-shaped line for a DIFFERENT key must not
# be returned as the wanted secret. A sloppy helper (e.g. `head -1
# env-file`, or a grep that matched the wrong line) emitting
# `OTHER_KEY=realvalue` would otherwise flow — key name, '=' and the
# OTHER key's value — into an Authorization header sent to the WANTED
# key's endpoint: cross-provider credential leakage, not just a 401.
# Disambiguation from a bare base64 secret: base64 padding only ever
# produces an env-shaped line whose "value" part is empty or all '='
# (`dGVzdA==` → key `dGVzdA`, value `=`), so a non-trivial value part
# after a non-matching key means a misrouted dotenv entry → None.
env_shaped = _ENV_LINE.match(value)
if (
env_shaped
and env_shaped.group(1) != wanted_key
and re.fullmatch(r"=*", env_shaped.group(2).strip()) is None
):
return None
return value
def _run_helper(
command: str,
secret_key: str,
timeout_seconds: float,
max_output_bytes: int,
) -> Optional[str]:
"""Run the helper via ``/bin/sh -c`` and return its stdout, or None.
The key is passed as DATA via ``HERMES_SECRET_KEY`` — never interpolated
into the command string. Both stdout and stderr are captured via pipes
(never inherited); stderr is discarded. Any failure logs structured
fields only and returns None — never raises.
"""
if _is_windows():
print(
"[secrets:command] the 'command' provider is POSIX-only "
"(needs /bin/sh); resolving no value on Windows",
file=sys.stderr,
)
return None
env = os.environ.copy()
env["HERMES_SECRET_KEY"] = secret_key
try:
proc = subprocess.Popen( # noqa: S602 — command is the user's own config
["/bin/sh", "-c", command],
env=env,
stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,
stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=subprocess.PIPE, # captured and DISCARDED — never inherited
start_new_session=True, # so the hard timeout can kill the whole group
)
except OSError as exc:
print(
f"[secrets:command] helper failed to spawn; resolving no value: "
f"errno={exc.errno}",
file=sys.stderr,
)
return None
try:
stdout_bytes, _stderr_discarded = proc.communicate(timeout=timeout_seconds)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
# Hard timeout: kill the whole process group (a helper script may
# have forked children that would otherwise keep the pipe open).
try:
os.killpg(os.getpgid(proc.pid), _signal.SIGKILL)
except (ProcessLookupError, PermissionError, OSError):
proc.kill()
try:
proc.communicate(timeout=1.0)
except (subprocess.TimeoutExpired, ValueError, OSError):
pass
print(
f"[secrets:command] helper timed out after {timeout_seconds:g}s; "
f"resolving no value",
file=sys.stderr,
)
return None
if proc.returncode != 0:
# Structured fields ONLY — never the command string or the helper's
# stderr (either can carry secret material).
if proc.returncode < 0:
try:
sig = _signal.Signals(-proc.returncode).name
except ValueError:
sig = str(-proc.returncode)
code, signame = "?", sig
else:
code, signame = str(proc.returncode), "none"
print(
f"[secrets:command] helper failed; resolving no value: "
f"code={code} signal={signame}",
file=sys.stderr,
)
return None
if len(stdout_bytes) > max_output_bytes:
print(
f"[secrets:command] helper output exceeded the "
f"{max_output_bytes}-byte cap; resolving no value",
file=sys.stderr,
)
return None
return stdout_bytes.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
def _parse_dotenv_map(stdout: str) -> Dict[str, str]:
"""Parse a KEY=VALUE blob into a map (the list/enumerate path).
Mirrors the TS ``list()``: only env-shaped lines contribute; comments
and non-matching lines are skipped. A bare-value helper yields ``{}``
— per-key resolution via :func:`get_command_secret` still works.
"""
out: Dict[str, str] = {}
for raw in stdout.replace("\r\n", "\n").split("\n"):
line = raw.strip()
if not line or line.startswith("#"):
continue
m = _ENV_LINE.match(line)
if not m:
continue
out[m.group(1)] = unquote_dotenv_value(m.group(2))
return out
def get_command_secret(
*,
command: str,
key: str,
timeout_seconds: float = _COMMAND_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
max_output_bytes: int = _MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES,
) -> Optional[str]:
"""Resolve a single secret by running the helper with the key in
``HERMES_SECRET_KEY``. Returns None on any failure — never raises."""
command = (command or "").strip()
if not command:
return None
stdout = _run_helper(command, key, timeout_seconds, max_output_bytes)
if stdout is None:
return None
return parse_secret_output(stdout, key)
def list_command_secrets(
*,
command: str,
timeout_seconds: float = _COMMAND_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
max_output_bytes: int = _MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES,
) -> Dict[str, str]:
"""Enumerate secrets by running the helper ONCE with an empty key.
Returns the dotenv map ONLY when the helper emits a KEY=VALUE blob;
a bare-value helper returns ``{}``. Never raises.
"""
command = (command or "").strip()
if not command:
return {}
stdout = _run_helper(command, "", timeout_seconds, max_output_bytes)
if stdout is None:
return {}
return _parse_dotenv_map(stdout)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Public entry point — called from hermes_cli.env_loader
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def apply_command_secrets(
*,
command: str,
override_existing: bool = False,
timeout_seconds: float = _COMMAND_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
max_output_bytes: int = _MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES,
home_path: Optional[Path] = None,
) -> FetchResult:
"""Run the helper once at startup and set its KEY=VALUE output on
``os.environ``.
This is the function ``load_hermes_dotenv()`` calls after the .env
files have loaded. It is intentionally defensive — any failure
degrades to an empty :class:`FetchResult`; it never raises.
Non-destructive by default: keys already present in the process env
(i.e. from the shell or .env) win unless ``override_existing`` is True
— the same precedence as the bitwarden source.
``home_path`` is accepted for signature symmetry with
``apply_bitwarden_secrets`` (no disk cache is kept for this provider —
the helper IS the cache, e.g. a tmpfs env file).
"""
result = FetchResult()
command = (command or "").strip()
if not command:
result.error = (
"secrets.provider is 'command' but secrets.command is empty. "
"Set the helper command in config.yaml under secrets.command."
)
return result
if _is_windows():
result.warnings.append(
"the 'command' secret provider is POSIX-only (needs /bin/sh); "
"skipping on Windows — use the default 'env' provider instead"
)
return result
# The list/enumerate path: run the helper exactly ONCE with an empty
# HERMES_SECRET_KEY and parse its stdout as a dotenv blob.
stdout = _run_helper(command, "", timeout_seconds, max_output_bytes)
if stdout is None:
# _run_helper already logged structured fields to stderr.
result.warnings.append(
"helper command failed at startup; no secrets applied "
"(process env / .env values remain in effect)"
)
return result
secrets = _parse_dotenv_map(stdout)
result.secrets = secrets
if not secrets:
result.warnings.append(
"helper output was not a KEY=VALUE map; nothing applied at "
"startup (a bare-value helper still resolves single keys on demand)"
)
return result
for key, value in secrets.items():
if value.strip() == "":
# Whitespace-only placeholder entries are "no value" — applying
# them would flow into an Authorization header → guaranteed 401.
result.skipped.append(key)
continue
if not override_existing and os.environ.get(key):
# Process env / .env win — same precedence as bitwarden.
result.skipped.append(key)
continue
os.environ[key] = value
result.applied.append(key)
return result