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Contract V1 of nous-account-service PR #180 ships no refresh tokens, so the original Phase 6 silent-refresh design is replaced with a thinner '401 → redirect to /login' UX. The dashboard's gated middleware now emits a structured envelope on any auth failure; the SPA's fetch wrapper sees it and full-page-navigates the user through re-auth. hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/cookies.py: set_session_cookies(refresh_token='') SKIPS writing the hermes_session_rt cookie. Forward-compat: a non-empty refresh_token still emits the cookie unchanged, so a future Portal contract that starts issuing RTs flips the persistence on with no other change. clear_session_cookies still emits a Max-Age=0 deletion for the RT cookie so stale cookies from earlier deployments get flushed on logout / session expiry. Deprecation marker + rationale in module docstring per the user's docstring-only deprecation pattern. hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/middleware.py: _unauth_response now builds a structured JSON envelope for API 401s: { error: 'session_expired' | 'unauthenticated', detail: 'Unauthorized', reason: <internal>, login_url: '/login?next=<safe-path>' } HTML redirects also carry next= so a user landing on /sessions without a cookie bounces back to /sessions after re-auth. _safe_next_target validates same-origin: drops protocol-relative paths (//evil.com), absolute URLs, and any /login or /auth/* loop. Dead cookies are cleared on the 401 path so the browser stops replaying invalid tokens. hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/routes.py: /auth/callback accepts next= query param and validates via _validate_post_login_target (same rules as the gate's _safe_next_target — defence-in-depth because next= survived a full IDP round trip and attacker-controlled state can re-enter via the callback URL). Open-redirect attempts land at '/' instead. web/src/lib/api.ts: fetchJSON parses the 401 envelope and full-page-navigates to body.login_url ONLY on the known session-expiry error codes. Domain-level 401s (e.g. permission errors) bubble up as regular errors. credentials: 'include' added so cookie auth works for all fetches routed through this wrapper. sessionStorage.lastLocation is preserved for future use by AuthWidget / hermes_status. Test files marked with pytest.mark.xdist_group so the four files that mutate web_server.app.state.auth_required serialize onto the same xdist worker — eliminates 'works locally, fails in CI' app-state bleed. 20 new tests in test_dashboard_auth_401_reauth.py: - set_session_cookies(refresh_token='') skips RT cookie - clear_session_cookies still emits RT deletion - 401 envelope shape (unauthenticated vs session_expired) - dead cookie cleared on invalid-token 401 - login_url carries next= for deep paths - login loop avoided when path is /login/auth/api-auth - protocol-relative URL rejected - _safe_next_target unit tests (accept same-origin, reject loops/abs) - /auth/callback respects safe next= but rejects open redirects 2 pre-existing tests updated to accept the new /login?next=%2F shape. Full dashboard-auth suite: 168 passed, 1 skipped (Phase 0 pre-existing).
300 lines
12 KiB
Python
300 lines
12 KiB
Python
"""Phase 6 — 401 re-auth + ``next=`` propagation tests.
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Verifies the contract documented in Phase 6 v2 of the plan:
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- API 401 responses carry ``{"error", "login_url", ...}`` so the SPA
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fetch wrapper can ``window.location.assign(body.login_url)``.
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- The ``login_url`` embeds a ``next=<original-path>`` query string so
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re-auth lands the user back where they were.
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- HTML redirects ALSO carry ``next=``.
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- ``next=`` validation: protocol-relative paths, absolute URLs, and
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loops back to ``/login`` / ``/auth/*`` are dropped.
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- Invalid/expired cookies are cleared on 401 so the browser doesn't
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keep replaying them.
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- ``set_session_cookies(refresh_token="")`` does NOT emit the
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``hermes_session_rt`` cookie (contract V1: no RT to persist).
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- ``/auth/callback?next=…`` honours the same-origin landing path.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from urllib.parse import quote
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import pytest
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# Phase 5 / Phase 6: these tests mutate ``web_server.app.state.auth_required``
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# at module level. Run them in the same xdist worker so they don't race
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# against each other (and against any other file that also touches
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# ``app.state``) — the marker name is shared across all dashboard-auth test
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# files that gate the app.
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pytestmark = pytest.mark.xdist_group("dashboard_auth_app_state")
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from fastapi import FastAPI
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from fastapi.responses import Response
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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from hermes_cli import web_server
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth import clear_providers, register_provider
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.cookies import (
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SESSION_AT_COOKIE,
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SESSION_RT_COOKIE,
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clear_session_cookies,
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set_session_cookies,
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)
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from tests.hermes_cli.conftest_dashboard_auth import StubAuthProvider
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Fixtures
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@pytest.fixture
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def gated_app():
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clear_providers()
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register_provider(StubAuthProvider())
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prev_host = getattr(web_server.app.state, "bound_host", None)
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prev_port = getattr(web_server.app.state, "bound_port", None)
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prev_required = getattr(web_server.app.state, "auth_required", None)
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web_server.app.state.bound_host = "fly-app.fly.dev"
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web_server.app.state.bound_port = 443
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web_server.app.state.auth_required = True
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client = TestClient(web_server.app, base_url="https://fly-app.fly.dev")
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yield client
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clear_providers()
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web_server.app.state.bound_host = prev_host
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web_server.app.state.bound_port = prev_port
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web_server.app.state.auth_required = prev_required
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# set_session_cookies(refresh_token="") skips the RT cookie
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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class TestRefreshTokenCookieDeprecation:
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def _build_app(self, *, refresh_token: str):
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app = FastAPI()
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@app.get("/set")
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def _set():
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r = Response("ok")
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set_session_cookies(
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r, access_token="AT", refresh_token=refresh_token,
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access_token_expires_in=3600, use_https=True,
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)
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return r
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return app
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def test_empty_refresh_token_does_not_emit_rt_cookie(self):
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client = TestClient(self._build_app(refresh_token=""))
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r = client.get("/set")
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cookies = r.headers.get_list("set-cookie")
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rt_cookies = [c for c in cookies if c.startswith(f"{SESSION_RT_COOKIE}=")]
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assert rt_cookies == []
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# AT cookie still set.
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at_cookies = [c for c in cookies if c.startswith(f"{SESSION_AT_COOKIE}=")]
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assert len(at_cookies) == 1
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def test_present_refresh_token_still_emits_rt_cookie(self):
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client = TestClient(self._build_app(refresh_token="forward-compat"))
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r = client.get("/set")
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cookies = r.headers.get_list("set-cookie")
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rt_cookies = [c for c in cookies if c.startswith(f"{SESSION_RT_COOKIE}=")]
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assert len(rt_cookies) == 1
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assert "forward-compat" in rt_cookies[0]
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def test_clear_session_cookies_still_emits_rt_deletion(self):
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"""Even when we never wrote the RT cookie, logout/clear should
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emit a Max-Age=0 deletion to flush stale cookies from old
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deployments."""
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app = FastAPI()
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@app.get("/clear")
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def _clear():
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r = Response("ok")
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clear_session_cookies(r)
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return r
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client = TestClient(app)
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r = client.get("/clear")
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cookies = r.headers.get_list("set-cookie")
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assert any(
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c.startswith(f"{SESSION_RT_COOKIE}=") and "Max-Age=0" in c
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for c in cookies
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)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Gate middleware: 401 envelope + next= propagation
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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class TestApi401Envelope:
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def test_no_cookie_returns_unauthenticated_envelope(self, gated_app):
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r = gated_app.get("/api/status")
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assert r.status_code == 401
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body = r.json()
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assert body["error"] == "unauthenticated"
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assert "login_url" in body
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assert body["login_url"].startswith("/login")
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def test_invalid_cookie_returns_session_expired_envelope(self, gated_app):
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gated_app.cookies.set(SESSION_AT_COOKIE, "garbage")
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r = gated_app.get("/api/status")
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assert r.status_code == 401
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body = r.json()
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assert body["error"] == "session_expired"
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assert body["login_url"].startswith("/login")
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def test_invalid_cookie_clears_dead_cookie(self, gated_app):
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"""Dead-cookie cleanup — Phase 6 requirement so the browser
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doesn't keep replaying the stale token on every request."""
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gated_app.cookies.set(SESSION_AT_COOKIE, "garbage")
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r = gated_app.get("/api/status")
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set_cookies = r.headers.get_list("set-cookie")
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assert any(
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c.startswith(f"{SESSION_AT_COOKIE}=") and "Max-Age=0" in c
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for c in set_cookies
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)
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def test_login_url_carries_next_for_deep_api_path(self, gated_app):
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r = gated_app.get("/api/sessions?page=2")
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body = r.json()
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# next= is URL-encoded.
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assert "next=" in body["login_url"]
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assert quote("/api/sessions?page=2", safe="") in body["login_url"]
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class TestHtmlRedirectNext:
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def test_deep_html_path_redirects_with_next(self, gated_app):
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r = gated_app.get("/sessions", follow_redirects=False)
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assert r.status_code == 302
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assert r.headers["location"] == "/login?next=%2Fsessions"
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def test_root_path_redirects_with_next(self, gated_app):
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r = gated_app.get("/", follow_redirects=False)
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assert r.headers["location"] in ("/login", "/login?next=%2F")
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def test_login_loop_avoided(self, gated_app):
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"""A request to /login itself must not produce ``?next=/login``
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because that'd be a loop after re-auth."""
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# /login is on the public allowlist so it doesn't go through the
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# 401 path. But sanity: the page renders.
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r = gated_app.get("/login")
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assert r.status_code == 200
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def test_auth_loop_avoided(self, gated_app):
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"""A failed cookie on /auth/me (auth-required path) must drop
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the next= rather than risk a /login?next=/api/auth/me loop."""
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# /api/auth/me requires auth. Without cookie → 401 with login_url
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# but next= must NOT point at /api/auth/.
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r = gated_app.get("/api/auth/me")
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assert r.status_code == 401
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body = r.json()
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assert "next=" not in body["login_url"]
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Gate middleware: same-origin next= validation
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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class TestNextSameOriginValidation:
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def test_protocol_relative_path_dropped(self, gated_app):
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# `//evil.com/foo` parses to a protocol-relative URL — browser
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# would treat as cross-origin. We drop it at the gate; the path
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# we redirect to should NOT contain `//evil.com`.
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r = gated_app.get("//evil.com", follow_redirects=False)
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# Starlette likely normalizes the path before we see it, so the
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# gate may see "/evil.com" — either way the encoded value
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# in next= must be safe to feed to window.location.assign.
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# Just assert no protocol-relative form survives.
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assert r.status_code == 302
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location = r.headers["location"]
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assert "%2F%2Fevil" not in location # urlencoded // form
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assert "//evil" not in location
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def test_safe_next_validator_accepts_same_origin(self):
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.middleware import _safe_next_target
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class FakeRequest:
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def __init__(self, path, query=""):
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self.url = type("URL", (), {"path": path, "query": query})()
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assert _safe_next_target(FakeRequest("/sessions")) == "%2Fsessions"
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assert (
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_safe_next_target(FakeRequest("/sessions", "page=2"))
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== "%2Fsessions%3Fpage%3D2"
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)
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def test_safe_next_validator_rejects_protocol_relative(self):
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.middleware import _safe_next_target
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class FakeRequest:
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def __init__(self, path):
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self.url = type("URL", (), {"path": path, "query": ""})()
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assert _safe_next_target(FakeRequest("//evil.com")) == ""
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def test_safe_next_validator_rejects_login_loop(self):
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.middleware import _safe_next_target
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class FakeRequest:
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def __init__(self, path):
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self.url = type("URL", (), {"path": path, "query": ""})()
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assert _safe_next_target(FakeRequest("/login")) == ""
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assert _safe_next_target(FakeRequest("/auth/login")) == ""
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assert _safe_next_target(FakeRequest("/api/auth/me")) == ""
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# /auth/callback honours next= and validates it
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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class TestAuthCallbackNext:
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def _drive_oauth(self, gated_app, *, next_path: str = ""):
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next_qs = f"&next={quote(next_path, safe='')}" if next_path else ""
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r1 = gated_app.get(
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f"/auth/login?provider=stub{next_qs}", follow_redirects=False
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)
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state = r1.headers["location"].split("state=")[1]
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# next is preserved by the route (it's in the original URL — but the
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# stub IDP returns to /auth/callback. We need to pass next as a
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# separate query param on the callback URL to simulate what a real
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# IDP would do via state-bound storage. For this test, the
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# /auth/callback handler reads `next` directly from its own query
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# string, so just append it.
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return gated_app.get(
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f"/auth/callback?code=stub_code&state={state}{next_qs}",
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follow_redirects=False,
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)
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def test_callback_without_next_lands_at_root(self, gated_app):
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r = self._drive_oauth(gated_app)
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assert r.status_code == 302
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assert r.headers["location"] == "/"
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def test_callback_with_safe_next_lands_there(self, gated_app):
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r = self._drive_oauth(gated_app, next_path="/sessions")
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assert r.status_code == 302
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assert r.headers["location"] == "/sessions"
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def test_callback_with_query_string_in_next(self, gated_app):
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r = self._drive_oauth(gated_app, next_path="/sessions?page=2")
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assert r.status_code == 302
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assert r.headers["location"] == "/sessions?page=2"
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def test_callback_rejects_open_redirect(self, gated_app):
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# Attacker provides ``next=//evil.com`` hoping for an open redirect
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# after successful auth. Validator drops it; user lands at "/".
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r = self._drive_oauth(gated_app, next_path="//evil.com/steal")
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assert r.status_code == 302
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assert r.headers["location"] == "/"
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def test_callback_rejects_login_loop(self, gated_app):
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r = self._drive_oauth(gated_app, next_path="/login")
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assert r.status_code == 302
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assert r.headers["location"] == "/"
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