hermes-agent/docker/stage2-hook.sh
dusterbloom 79fc92e9cb fix(security): tighten .env file permissions to 0600 at all creation sites
.env holds API keys and secrets. Multiple creation sites used `cp` /
`touch` / `shutil.copy2` which obey the process umask — commonly
0o022, leaving the file at 0o644 (world-readable). Apply chmod 0o600
explicitly at every site that creates or copies .env.

Sites covered:
- docker/stage2-hook.sh: after the seed_one '.env' call, applied
  unconditionally (not just on first-seed) so a host-mounted .env with
  loose perms gets tightened on every container restart
- hermes_cli/doctor.py: 'hermes doctor --fix' touches an empty .env
  when missing
- hermes_cli/profiles.py: 'hermes profile create --clone' copies .env
  from the source profile; shutil.copy2 preserves source mode, so a
  source .env at 0o644 was being cloned into 0o644
- setup-hermes.sh: in-tree setup script's cp .env.example .env path,
  plus the already-exists branch (mirror of install.sh which already
  chmods 600 unconditionally on line 1442)

scripts/install.sh was NOT changed — it already chmod 600's the .env
unconditionally after the create/already-exists branches (line 1442).

Salvaged from PR #25726 by @dusterbloom. The docker/entrypoint.sh
portion of the original PR was dropped because main switched to an
s6-overlay shim — the .env creation logic moved to stage2-hook.sh,
which is where the chmod now lives.

Closes #25497 (subset — install.sh + setup-hermes.sh) and #8448
(subset — install.sh only) as superseded.

Co-authored-by: teknium1 <127238744+teknium1@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-25 03:40:47 -07:00

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#!/bin/sh
# s6-overlay stage2 hook — runs as root after the supervision tree is
# up but before user services start. Handles UID/GID remap, volume
# chown, config seeding, and skills sync.
#
# Per-service privilege drop happens inside each service's `run` script
# (and in main-wrapper.sh) via s6-setuidgid, not here.
#
# Wired into the image as /etc/cont-init.d/01-hermes-setup by the
# Dockerfile. The shim at docker/entrypoint.sh forwards to this script
# so external references to docker/entrypoint.sh still work.
#
# NB: cont-init.d scripts run with no arguments — the user's CMD args
# are NOT visible here. That's fine: we use Architecture B (s6-overlay
# main-program model), so main-wrapper.sh runs the CMD with full
# stdin/stdout/stderr access and handles arg parsing there.
set -eu
HERMES_HOME="${HERMES_HOME:-/opt/data}"
INSTALL_DIR="/opt/hermes"
# --- UID/GID remap ---
if [ -n "${HERMES_UID:-}" ] && [ "$HERMES_UID" != "$(id -u hermes)" ]; then
echo "[stage2] Changing hermes UID to $HERMES_UID"
usermod -u "$HERMES_UID" hermes
fi
if [ -n "${HERMES_GID:-}" ] && [ "$HERMES_GID" != "$(id -g hermes)" ]; then
echo "[stage2] Changing hermes GID to $HERMES_GID"
# -o allows non-unique GID (e.g. macOS GID 20 "staff" may already
# exist as "dialout" in the Debian-based container image).
groupmod -o -g "$HERMES_GID" hermes 2>/dev/null || true
fi
# --- Fix ownership of data volume ---
actual_hermes_uid=$(id -u hermes)
needs_chown=false
if [ -n "${HERMES_UID:-}" ] && [ "$HERMES_UID" != "10000" ]; then
needs_chown=true
elif [ "$(stat -c %u "$HERMES_HOME" 2>/dev/null)" != "$actual_hermes_uid" ]; then
needs_chown=true
fi
if [ "$needs_chown" = true ]; then
echo "[stage2] Fixing ownership of $HERMES_HOME to hermes ($actual_hermes_uid)"
# In rootless Podman the container's "root" is mapped to an
# unprivileged host UID — chown will fail. That's fine: the volume
# is already owned by the mapped user on the host side.
chown -R hermes:hermes "$HERMES_HOME" 2>/dev/null || \
echo "[stage2] Warning: chown failed (rootless container?) — continuing"
# The .venv must also be re-chowned when UID is remapped, otherwise
# lazy_deps.py cannot install platform packages (discord.py, etc.).
chown -R hermes:hermes "$INSTALL_DIR/.venv" 2>/dev/null || \
echo "[stage2] Warning: chown .venv failed (rootless container?) — continuing"
fi
# Always reset ownership of $HERMES_HOME/profiles to hermes on every
# boot. Profile dirs and files can land owned by root when commands
# are invoked via `docker exec <container> hermes …` (which defaults
# to root unless `-u` is passed), and that breaks the cont-init
# reconciler (02-reconcile-profiles) which runs as hermes and walks
# the profiles dir. Idempotent; skipped on rootless containers where
# chown would fail.
if [ -d "$HERMES_HOME/profiles" ]; then
chown -R hermes:hermes "$HERMES_HOME/profiles" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
# --- config.yaml permissions ---
# Ensure config.yaml is readable by the hermes runtime user even if it
# was edited on the host after initial ownership setup.
if [ -f "$HERMES_HOME/config.yaml" ]; then
chown hermes:hermes "$HERMES_HOME/config.yaml" 2>/dev/null || true
chmod 640 "$HERMES_HOME/config.yaml" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
# --- Seed directory structure as hermes user ---
# Run as hermes via s6-setuidgid so dirs end up owned correctly (matters
# under rootless Podman where chown back to root would fail).
#
# Use direct `mkdir -p` invocation (no `sh -c "..."` wrapper) so the
# shell isn't a second interpreter — defends against $HERMES_HOME values
# containing shell metacharacters. PR #30136 review item O2.
s6-setuidgid hermes mkdir -p \
"$HERMES_HOME/cron" \
"$HERMES_HOME/sessions" \
"$HERMES_HOME/logs" \
"$HERMES_HOME/hooks" \
"$HERMES_HOME/memories" \
"$HERMES_HOME/skills" \
"$HERMES_HOME/skins" \
"$HERMES_HOME/plans" \
"$HERMES_HOME/workspace" \
"$HERMES_HOME/home"
# --- Install-method stamp (read by detect_install_method() in hermes status) ---
# Preserved from the tini-era entrypoint (PR #27843). Must be written as
# the hermes user so ownership matches the file's documented owner.
# tee is invoked directly via s6-setuidgid (no `sh -c` wrapper) for the
# same shell-metacharacter safety described above.
printf 'docker\n' | s6-setuidgid hermes tee "$HERMES_HOME/.install_method" >/dev/null \
|| true
# --- Seed config files (only on first boot) ---
seed_one() {
dest=$1
src=$2
if [ ! -f "$HERMES_HOME/$dest" ] && [ -f "$INSTALL_DIR/$src" ]; then
s6-setuidgid hermes cp "$INSTALL_DIR/$src" "$HERMES_HOME/$dest"
fi
}
seed_one ".env" ".env.example"
seed_one "config.yaml" "cli-config.yaml.example"
seed_one "SOUL.md" "docker/SOUL.md"
# .env holds API keys and secrets — restrict to owner-only access. Applied
# unconditionally (not only on first-seed) so a host-mounted .env that was
# created with a permissive umask gets tightened on every container start.
if [ -f "$HERMES_HOME/.env" ]; then
chown hermes:hermes "$HERMES_HOME/.env" 2>/dev/null || true
chmod 600 "$HERMES_HOME/.env" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
# auth.json: bootstrap from env on first boot only. Same semantics as the
# pre-s6 entrypoint — the [ ! -f ] guard is critical to avoid clobbering
# rotated refresh tokens on container restart.
if [ ! -f "$HERMES_HOME/auth.json" ] && [ -n "${HERMES_AUTH_JSON_BOOTSTRAP:-}" ]; then
printf '%s' "$HERMES_AUTH_JSON_BOOTSTRAP" > "$HERMES_HOME/auth.json"
chown hermes:hermes "$HERMES_HOME/auth.json" 2>/dev/null || true
chmod 600 "$HERMES_HOME/auth.json"
fi
# --- Sync bundled skills ---
# Invoke the venv's python by absolute path so we don't need a `sh -c`
# wrapper to source the activate script. This is safe because
# skills_sync.py doesn't depend on any environment exports beyond what
# the python binary's own bin-stub already sets up (sys.path is rooted
# at the venv's site-packages by virtue of running .venv/bin/python).
if [ -d "$INSTALL_DIR/skills" ]; then
s6-setuidgid hermes "$INSTALL_DIR/.venv/bin/python" "$INSTALL_DIR/tools/skills_sync.py" \
|| echo "[stage2] Warning: skills_sync.py failed; continuing"
fi
echo "[stage2] Setup complete; starting user services"