hermes-agent/tests/gateway/test_slack_download_ssrf.py
Teknium 8e4b5d8774 harden(slack): CDN-allowlist inbound file URLs, DNS-pin token downloads, widen token-file perms warning
Follow-up hardening on top of the C14 cherry-picks (#57860/#44026/#66742/#60009):

- Slack file downloads (_download_slack_file/_download_slack_file_bytes)
  now require an https URL on a Slack CDN host (files.slack.com,
  *.slack.com Enterprise Grid, *.slack-files.com legacy shares) before
  attaching the bot token. url_private/url_private_download only ever
  point at the Slack CDN, so a forged file object from a malicious
  workspace app or compromised event stream pointing the Bearer-token
  download at an arbitrary PUBLIC host (token exfiltration) is now
  refused — a hole #44026's generic private-IP SSRF check alone could
  not close.
- The same two download paths now use create_ssrf_safe_async_client
  (from #57860) so the preflight-validated hostname is resolved once,
  validated, and dialed by IP — closing the DNS-rebinding TOCTOU window
  for the token-bearing inbound fetches as well.
- #60009's slack_tokens.json permission warning is generalized into
  utils.warn_if_credential_file_broadly_readable() (POSIX-only,
  fail-quiet) and wired into the other read path with the same gap:
  google_chat's load_user_credentials(). google_chat already writes
  0o600 via _write_private_json; the read-time warning covers
  hand-provisioned/legacy files. Nothing in-repo writes
  slack_tokens.json (user/OAuth-provisioned), so there is no write
  path to chmod for Slack.

Security tests both directions: non-CDN/lookalike/http URLs and
connect-time DNS rebinds are blocked before any TCP connect; real
files.slack.com, Enterprise Grid, and slack-files.com URLs still reach
the network layer; 0o600 files stay silent while 0o644/0o640 warn with
a chmod hint. A/B: all 10 new download-guard tests fail with the
hardening reverted and pass with it applied.
2026-07-23 11:44:43 -07:00

267 lines
8.7 KiB
Python

"""SSRF regression tests for inbound Slack file downloads.
``_download_slack_file`` / ``_download_slack_file_bytes`` attach the bot
token and follow redirects, so they must validate the destination (CWE-918)
exactly like the already-guarded outbound ``send_image`` path: a pre-flight
``is_safe_url`` check plus a per-redirect guard.
"""
import asyncio
import sys
from types import SimpleNamespace
from unittest.mock import MagicMock
import pytest
from gateway.platforms.base import _ssrf_redirect_guard
def _ensure_slack_mock():
"""Install mock slack modules so SlackAdapter can be imported."""
if "slack_bolt" not in sys.modules:
for name in (
"slack_bolt",
"slack_bolt.adapter",
"slack_bolt.adapter.socket_mode",
"slack_bolt.adapter.socket_mode.async_handler",
"slack_bolt.async_app",
"slack_sdk",
"slack_sdk.web",
"slack_sdk.web.async_client",
"slack_sdk.errors",
):
sys.modules.setdefault(name, MagicMock())
if "aiohttp" not in sys.modules:
sys.modules.setdefault("aiohttp", MagicMock())
_ensure_slack_mock()
from plugins.platforms.slack.adapter import SlackAdapter # noqa: E402
def _fake_adapter():
self = SlackAdapter.__new__(SlackAdapter)
self.config = SimpleNamespace(token="xoxb-test-token")
self._team_clients = {}
return self
class _NetworkTouched(RuntimeError):
pass
class _RecordingClient:
"""Captures AsyncClient kwargs; refuses to perform real I/O."""
last_kwargs = None
def __init__(self, **kwargs):
type(self).last_kwargs = kwargs
async def __aenter__(self):
return self
async def __aexit__(self, *exc):
return False
async def get(self, *args, **kwargs):
raise _NetworkTouched("network access attempted")
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"method_name",
["_download_slack_file", "_download_slack_file_bytes"],
)
def test_unsafe_url_blocked_before_network(monkeypatch, method_name):
import tools.url_safety as url_safety
calls = {"checked": []}
def fake_is_safe_url(url, *a, **k):
calls["checked"].append(url)
return False
monkeypatch.setattr(url_safety, "is_safe_url", fake_is_safe_url)
# If the guard is bypassed, the fake client raises _NetworkTouched; a
# correct implementation raises ValueError *before* touching httpx.
monkeypatch.setattr("httpx.AsyncClient", _RecordingClient)
self = _fake_adapter()
method = getattr(self, method_name)
args = ("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/", ".jpg") \
if method_name == "_download_slack_file" \
else ("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",)
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
asyncio.run(method(*args))
assert calls["checked"], "download must call is_safe_url before fetching"
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"method_name",
["_download_slack_file", "_download_slack_file_bytes"],
)
def test_redirect_guard_is_wired(monkeypatch, method_name):
import tools.url_safety as url_safety
monkeypatch.setattr(url_safety, "is_safe_url", lambda *a, **k: True)
monkeypatch.setattr("httpx.AsyncClient", _RecordingClient)
self = _fake_adapter()
method = getattr(self, method_name)
args = ("https://files.slack.com/x.jpg", ".jpg") \
if method_name == "_download_slack_file" \
else ("https://files.slack.com/x.jpg",)
# The fake client raises when .get() is called; we only care that the
# client was constructed with the redirect guard hook.
with pytest.raises(_NetworkTouched):
asyncio.run(method(*args))
kwargs = _RecordingClient.last_kwargs
assert kwargs is not None
hooks = kwargs.get("event_hooks", {})
assert _ssrf_redirect_guard in hooks.get("response", []), (
"AsyncClient must register _ssrf_redirect_guard to block "
"redirect-based SSRF"
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Slack-CDN allowlist (follow-up hardening on top of #44026)
#
# ``url_private`` / ``url_private_download`` legitimately only ever point at
# the Slack CDN. Because the download attaches the bot token as a Bearer
# header, a forged file object (malicious workspace app / compromised event
# stream) pointing at ANY public host would exfiltrate the token — a hole the
# generic private-IP SSRF check cannot close. The adapter therefore refuses
# every non-Slack-CDN https URL up front.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"method_name",
["_download_slack_file", "_download_slack_file_bytes"],
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"url",
[
# Public non-Slack host: generic SSRF check passes, allowlist must not.
"https://attacker.example.com/steal-token",
# Lookalike host — suffix match must anchor on a dot boundary.
"https://files.slack.com.evil.example/x.jpg",
"https://notslack-files.example.com/x.jpg",
# Plain http is never a Slack CDN URL (token would go out in clear).
"http://files.slack.com/x.jpg",
],
)
def test_non_slack_cdn_url_blocked_before_network(monkeypatch, method_name, url):
import tools.url_safety as url_safety
monkeypatch.setattr(url_safety, "is_safe_url", lambda *a, **k: True)
monkeypatch.setattr("httpx.AsyncClient", _RecordingClient)
self = _fake_adapter()
method = getattr(self, method_name)
args = (url, ".jpg") if method_name == "_download_slack_file" else (url,)
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="non-Slack-CDN"):
asyncio.run(method(*args))
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"method_name",
["_download_slack_file", "_download_slack_file_bytes"],
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"url",
[
# The canonical file CDN host.
"https://files.slack.com/files-pri/T123-F456/image.png",
# Enterprise Grid workspaces serve from per-org subdomains.
"https://mycorp.enterprise.slack.com/files-pri/T123-F456/doc.pdf",
# Legacy public-share host.
"https://slack-files.com/T123-F456-abc",
"https://files.slack-files.com/T123-F456-abc",
],
)
def test_slack_cdn_urls_still_allowed(monkeypatch, method_name, url):
"""Legitimate Slack CDN URLs must reach the network layer (no regression)."""
import tools.url_safety as url_safety
monkeypatch.setattr(url_safety, "is_safe_url", lambda *a, **k: True)
monkeypatch.setattr("httpx.AsyncClient", _RecordingClient)
self = _fake_adapter()
method = getattr(self, method_name)
args = (url, ".png") if method_name == "_download_slack_file" else (url,)
# _NetworkTouched means the guard chain passed and the request was issued.
with pytest.raises(_NetworkTouched):
asyncio.run(method(*args))
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Connect-time DNS pinning (composition with #57860): a Slack-CDN hostname
# whose DNS answer flips from public at preflight to a metadata IP at connect
# time must be blocked before any TCP connect is attempted.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"method_name",
["_download_slack_file", "_download_slack_file_bytes"],
)
def test_download_blocks_connect_time_dns_rebind(monkeypatch, method_name):
import socket
import httpcore
from httpcore._backends.auto import AutoBackend
from tools.url_safety import SSRFConnectionBlocked
for proxy_var in (
"HTTP_PROXY",
"HTTPS_PROXY",
"ALL_PROXY",
"http_proxy",
"https_proxy",
"all_proxy",
):
monkeypatch.delenv(proxy_var, raising=False)
# First resolution (is_safe_url preflight) sees a public IP; the
# connect-time resolution sees the metadata IP — classic rebinding TOCTOU.
answers = iter(("93.184.216.34", "169.254.169.254"))
def fake_getaddrinfo(_host, port, *_args, **_kwargs):
ip = next(answers)
return [(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, "", (ip, port or 0))]
connect_attempts = []
async def fake_connect_tcp(
_self,
host,
port,
timeout=None,
local_address=None,
socket_options=None,
):
connect_attempts.append((host, port))
raise httpcore.ConnectError("stop before network")
monkeypatch.setattr(socket, "getaddrinfo", fake_getaddrinfo)
monkeypatch.setattr(AutoBackend, "connect_tcp", fake_connect_tcp)
self = _fake_adapter()
method = getattr(self, method_name)
url = "https://files.slack.com/files-pri/T123-F456/image.png"
args = (url, ".png") if method_name == "_download_slack_file" else (url,)
with pytest.raises(SSRFConnectionBlocked):
asyncio.run(method(*args))
assert connect_attempts == []