hermes-agent/hermes_cli/security_advisories.py
Teknium c1eb2dcda7
feat(security): supply-chain advisory checker + lazy-install framework + tiered install fallback (#24220)
* feat(security): supply-chain advisory checker + lazy-install framework + tiered install fallback

Three coordinated mitigations for the Mini Shai-Hulud worm hitting
mistralai 2.4.6 on PyPI (2026-05-12) and for the next single-package
compromise that follows.

# What this PR makes true

1. Users with the poisoned mistralai 2.4.6 in their venv get a loud
   detection banner with copy-pasteable remediation steps the moment
   they run hermes (and on every gateway startup).
2. One quarantined / yanked PyPI package can no longer silently demote
   a fresh install to 'core only' — the installer keeps every other
   extra and tells the user which tier landed.
3. Future opt-in backends (Mistral, ElevenLabs, Honcho, etc.) can
   lazy-install on first use under a strict allowlist, instead of
   eagerly pulling everything at install time.

# Detection: hermes_cli/security_advisories.py

- ADVISORIES catalog (one entry currently: shai-hulud-2026-05 for
  mistralai==2.4.6). Adding the next one is a single dataclass.
- detect_compromised() uses importlib.metadata.version() — no pip
  dependency, works in uv venvs that lack pip.
- Banner cache (~/.hermes/cache/advisory_banner_seen) rate-limits
  the startup banner to once per 24h per advisory.
- Acks persisted to security.acked_advisories in config.yaml; never
  re-banner after ack.
- Wired into:
  * hermes doctor — runs first, prints full remediation block
  * hermes doctor --ack <id> — dismisses an advisory
  * cli.py interactive run() and single-query branches — short
    stderr banner pointing at hermes doctor
  * gateway/run.py startup — operator-visible warning in gateway.log

# Lazy-install framework: tools/lazy_deps.py

- LAZY_DEPS allowlist maps namespaced feature keys (tts.elevenlabs,
  memory.honcho, provider.bedrock, etc.) to pip specs.
- ensure(feature) installs missing deps in the active venv via the
  uv → pip → ensurepip ladder (matches tools_config._pip_install).
- Strict spec safety regex rejects URLs, file paths, shell metas,
  pip flag injection, control chars — only PyPI-by-name accepted.
- Gated on security.allow_lazy_installs (default true) plus the
  HERMES_DISABLE_LAZY_INSTALLS env var for restricted/audited envs.
- Migrated three backends as proof of pattern:
  * tools/tts_tool.py — _import_elevenlabs() calls ensure first
  * plugins/memory/honcho/client.py — get_honcho_client lazy-installs
  * tts.mistral / stt.mistral entries pre-registered for when PyPI
    restores mistralai

# Installer fallback tiers

scripts/install.sh, scripts/install.ps1, setup-hermes.sh:

- Centralised _BROKEN_EXTRAS list (currently: mistral). Edit one
  array when a transitive breaks; users keep every other extra.
- New 'all minus known-broken' tier between [all] and the existing
  PyPI-only-extras tier. Only kicks in when [all] fails resolve.
- All three tiers explicit: every fallback announces which tier
  landed and prints a re-run hint when not on Tier 1.
- install.ps1 and install.sh both regenerate their tier specs from
  the same _BROKEN_EXTRAS array so updates stay in sync.

Side effect: install.ps1 Tier 2 spec previously hardcoded 'mistral'
in its extra list — bug fixed by the refactor (mistral is filtered
out).

# Config

hermes_cli/config.py — DEFAULT_CONFIG.security gains:
- acked_advisories: []  (advisory IDs the user has dismissed)
- allow_lazy_installs: True  (security gate for ensure())

No config version bump needed — both keys nest under existing
security: block, and load_config's deep-merge picks up DEFAULT_CONFIG
defaults for users with older configs.

# Tests

tests/hermes_cli/test_security_advisories.py — 23 tests covering:
- detect_compromised matches/non-matches, wildcard frozenset
- ack persistence, idempotence, blank rejection, config-failure path
- banner cache rate limiting + 24h re-banner + ack-stops-banner
- short_banner_lines / full_remediation_text / render_doctor_section /
  gateway_log_message
- shipped catalog well-formedness invariant

tests/tools/test_lazy_deps.py — 40 tests covering:
- spec safety: 11 safe parametrized + 18 unsafe parametrized
- allowlist: unknown-feature rejection, namespace.name shape,
  every shipped spec passes the safety regex
- security gating: config flag, env var, default, fail-open
- ensure() happy/sad paths: already-satisfied, install success,
  pip stderr surfaced on failure, install-succeeds-but-still-missing
- is_available, feature_install_command

Combined: 63 new tests, all passing under scripts/run_tests.sh.

# Validation

- scripts/run_tests.sh tests/hermes_cli/test_security_advisories.py
  tests/tools/test_lazy_deps.py → 63/63 passing
- scripts/run_tests.sh tests/hermes_cli/test_doctor.py
  tests/hermes_cli/test_doctor_command_install.py
  tests/tools/test_tts_mistral.py tests/tools/test_transcription_tools.py
  tests/tools/test_transcription_dotenv_fallback.py → 165/165 passing
- scripts/run_tests.sh tests/hermes_cli/ tests/tools/ →
  9191 passed, 8 pre-existing failures (verified on origin/main
  before this change)
- bash -n on install.sh and setup-hermes.sh → OK
- py_compile on all modified .py files → OK
- End-to-end smoke test of detect_compromised + render_doctor_section
  + gateway_log_message with mocked installed version → produces
  copy-pasteable remediation output

# Community

Full advisory + remediation steps:
website/docs/community/security-advisories/shai-hulud-mistralai-2026-05.md

Short-form post drafts (Discord, GitHub pinned issue, README banner):
scripts/community-announcement-shai-hulud.md

Refs: PR #24205 (mistral disabled), Socket Security advisory
<https://socket.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-worm-pypi>

* build(deps): pin every direct dep to ==X.Y.Z (no ranges)

Companion to the supply-chain advisory work: replace every >=/</~= range
in pyproject.toml's [project.dependencies] and [project.optional-dependencies]
with an exact ==X.Y.Z pin sourced from uv.lock.

Why: ranges allow PyPI to ship a fresh version of any direct dep at any
time without a code review on our side. With ranges, the malicious
mistralai 2.4.6 release would have been pulled by every fresh
'pip install -e .[all]' for the hours between upload and PyPI's
quarantine — exactly the install window we got hit on. Exact pins close
that window: the only way a new package version reaches a user is via
an intentional update on our end.

What the user-facing change is: nothing, behavior-wise. Every package
resolves to the same version it was already resolving to via uv.lock —
the pins just remove the resolver's freedom to pick a different one.

Cost: any user installing Hermes alongside another package that requires
a newer pin gets a resolver conflict. Acceptable for our isolated-venv
install path; documented in the new comment block.

Build-system requires line (setuptools>=61.0) is intentionally left
as a range — pinning the build backend would block fresh pip from
bootstrapping the build on architectures where that exact wheel isn't
available.

mistral extra (mistralai==2.3.0) is pinned but stays out of [all]
(per PR #24205). 'uv lock' regeneration will fail until PyPI restores
mistralai; lockfile regeneration is gated behind that, NOT on every PR.

LAZY_DEPS in tools/lazy_deps.py also moved to exact pins so the lazy-
install pathway can never resolve a different version than the one
declared in pyproject.toml.

Validation:

- Cross-checked all 77 pinned direct deps in pyproject.toml against
  uv.lock — every pin matches the resolved version exactly.
- Cross-checked all LAZY_DEPS specs against uv.lock — same.
- 'uv pip install -e .[all] --dry-run' resolves 205 packages cleanly.
- tests/tools/test_lazy_deps.py + tests/hermes_cli/test_security_advisories.py
  → 63/63 passing (every shipped spec passes the safety regex).
- Doctor + TTS + transcription targeted suite → 146/146 passing.

* build(deps): hash-verify transitives via uv.lock; remove unresolvable [mistral] extra

You asked: 'what about the dependencies the dependencies rely on?' —
correctly noting that exact-pinning direct deps in pyproject.toml does
NOT cover the transitive graph. `pip install` and `uv pip install` both
re-resolve transitives fresh from PyPI at install time, so a compromised
transitive (e.g. `httpcore` if it got worm-poisoned tomorrow) would
still hit our users even with every direct dep exact-pinned.

# What this commit fixes

1. **Both real installer scripts now prefer `uv sync --locked` as Tier 0.**
   uv.lock records SHA256 hashes for every transitive — a compromised
   package with a different hash gets REJECTED. Falls through to the
   existing `uv pip install` cascade if the lockfile is missing or
   stale, with a loud warning that the fallback path does NOT
   hash-verify transitives. Previously only `setup-hermes.sh` (the dev
   path) used the lockfile; `scripts/install.sh` and `scripts/install.ps1`
   (the paths fresh users actually run) skipped it.

2. **Removed the `[mistral]` extra entirely.** The `mistralai` PyPI
   project is fully quarantined right now — every version returns 404,
   so any pin we wrote was unresolvable, which broke `uv lock --check`
   in CI. Restoration is documented in pyproject.toml as a 5-step
   checklist (verify, re-add extra, re-enable in 4 modules, regenerate
   lock, optionally re-add to [all]).

3. **Regenerated uv.lock.** 262 packages, mistralai/eval-type-backport/
   jsonpath-python pruned. `uv lock --check` now passes.

# Defense-in-depth view

| Layer                      | Where             | Protects against                          |
|----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| Exact pins in pyproject    | direct deps       | new mistralai 2.4.6-style direct compromise |
| uv.lock + `--locked` install | transitive graph  | transitive worm injection                  |
| Tier-0 hash-verified path  | install.sh / .ps1 | actually USE the lockfile in fresh installs |
| `uv lock --check` CI gate  | every PR          | drift between pyproject and lockfile      |
| `hermes_cli/security_advisories.py` | runtime  | cleanup for users who already got hit      |

The exact pinning + hash verification together close the supply-chain
gap. Without the lockfile path, exact pins alone are theater.

# Validation

- `uv lock --check` → passes (262 packages resolved, no drift).
- `bash -n` on install.sh + setup-hermes.sh → OK.
- 209/209 tests passing across new + adjacent test files
  (test_lazy_deps.py, test_security_advisories.py, test_doctor.py,
  test_tts_mistral.py, test_transcription_tools.py).
- TOML parse OK.

* chore: remove community announcement drafts (PR body covers it)

* build(deps): lazy-install every opt-in backend (anthropic, search, terminal, platforms, dashboard)

Extends the lazy-install framework to cover everything that's not used by
every hermes session. Base install drops from ~60 packages to 45.

Moved out of core dependencies = []:
- anthropic   (only when provider=anthropic native, not via aggregators)
- exa-py, firecrawl-py, parallel-web (search backends; only when picked)
- fal-client  (image gen; only when picked)
- edge-tts    (default TTS but still optional)

New extras in pyproject.toml: [anthropic] [exa] [firecrawl] [parallel-web]
[fal] [edge-tts]. All added to [all].

New LAZY_DEPS entries: provider.anthropic, search.{exa,firecrawl,parallel},
tts.edge, image.fal, memory.hindsight, platform.{telegram,discord,matrix},
terminal.{modal,daytona,vercel}, tool.dashboard.

Each import site now calls ensure() before importing the SDK. Where the
module had a top-level try/except (telegram, discord, fastapi), the
graceful-fallback pattern was extended to lazy-install on first
check_*_requirements() call and re-bind module globals.

Updated test_windows_native_support.py tzdata check from snapshot
(>=2023.3 literal) to invariant (any version + win32 marker).

Validation:
- Base install: 45 packages (was ~60); 6 newly-extracted packages absent
- uv lock --check: passes (262 packages, no drift)
- 209/209 lazy_deps + advisory + doctor + tts/transcription tests passing
- py_compile clean on all 12 modified modules
2026-05-12 01:02:25 -07:00

451 lines
16 KiB
Python

"""
Security advisory checker for Hermes Agent.
Detects known-compromised Python packages installed in the active venv
(supply-chain attacks like the Mini Shai-Hulud worm of May 2026 that
poisoned ``mistralai 2.4.6`` on PyPI) and surfaces remediation guidance to
the user.
Design goals:
- **Cheap.** A single ``importlib.metadata.version()`` call per advisory
package. Safe to run on every CLI startup.
- **Loud when it matters, silent otherwise.** If no compromised package is
installed, the user sees nothing.
- **Acknowledgeable.** Once the user has read and acted on an advisory they
can dismiss it via ``hermes doctor --ack <id>``; the ack is persisted to
``config.security.acked_advisories`` and survives restart.
- **Extensible.** Adding a new advisory is one entry in ``ADVISORIES``;
adding a new compromised version is a one-line edit. No code changes
needed when the next worm hits.
The check is invoked from three places:
1. ``hermes doctor`` (and ``hermes doctor --ack <id>``)
2. CLI startup banner (one short line, then full guidance via
``hermes doctor``)
3. Gateway startup (logged to gateway.log; first interactive message gets
a one-line operator banner)
This module is intentionally dependency-free beyond the stdlib so it can
run in environments where the rest of Hermes failed to import.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import os
import sys
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Iterable, Optional
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# =============================================================================
# Advisory catalog
#
# Each advisory is a community-facing security warning about one or more
# specific package versions that are known to be compromised. To add a new
# advisory:
#
# 1. Append a new ``Advisory`` to ``ADVISORIES`` below
# 2. Set ``compromised`` to a tuple of ``(pkg_name, frozenset_of_versions)``
# — version strings must match what ``importlib.metadata.version()``
# returns. Use an empty frozenset to flag *any installed version*
# (rare; only when the maintainer namespace itself is compromised).
# 3. Write 2-4 short ``remediation`` lines a non-expert can copy/paste.
#
# Do NOT remove old advisories. Once an advisory ships, leave it in place so
# users running an older release with the compromised package still get
# warned. Mark superseded ones via ``superseded_by`` if needed.
# =============================================================================
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Advisory:
"""One security advisory entry.
Attributes:
id: stable identifier used for acks (e.g. ``shai-hulud-2026-05``).
Lowercase-hyphen, never reused.
title: one-line headline shown in banners.
summary: 1-3 sentence description of what was compromised and how.
url: reference URL (Socket advisory, GitHub advisory, PyPI page).
compromised: tuple of ``(package_name, frozenset_of_versions)``
pairs. Empty frozenset means "any version of this package is
considered suspect" — use sparingly.
remediation: ordered list of steps the user should take. First step
should be the uninstall command; subsequent steps the credential
audit / rotation guidance.
published: ISO date string for sort order.
"""
id: str
title: str
summary: str
url: str
compromised: tuple[tuple[str, frozenset[str]], ...]
remediation: tuple[str, ...]
published: str = ""
severity: str = "high" # low / medium / high / critical
ADVISORIES: tuple[Advisory, ...] = (
Advisory(
id="shai-hulud-2026-05",
title="Mini Shai-Hulud worm — mistralai 2.4.6 compromised on PyPI",
summary=(
"PyPI quarantined the mistralai package on 2026-05-12 after a "
"malicious 2.4.6 release. The worm steals credentials from "
"environment variables and credential files (~/.npmrc, ~/.pypirc, "
"~/.aws/credentials, GitHub PATs, cloud SDK tokens) and exfils "
"them to a hardcoded webhook. If you ran any Python process that "
"imported mistralai 2.4.6 — including hermes when configured "
"with provider=mistral for TTS or STT — assume those credentials "
"are exposed."
),
url="https://socket.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-worm-pypi",
compromised=(
("mistralai", frozenset({"2.4.6"})),
),
remediation=(
"Run: pip uninstall -y mistralai (or: uv pip uninstall mistralai)",
"Rotate API keys in ~/.hermes/.env (OpenRouter, Anthropic, OpenAI, "
"Nous, GitHub, AWS, Google, Mistral, etc.).",
"Audit ~/.npmrc, ~/.pypirc, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml, "
"and any other credential files for tokens that may have been read.",
"Check GitHub for unexpected new SSH keys, deploy keys, or webhook "
"additions on repos you have admin on.",
"After cleanup: hermes doctor --ack shai-hulud-2026-05 to dismiss "
"this warning.",
),
published="2026-05-12",
severity="critical",
),
)
# =============================================================================
# Detection
# =============================================================================
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class AdvisoryHit:
"""One package-version match against an advisory."""
advisory: Advisory
package: str
installed_version: str
def _installed_version(pkg_name: str) -> Optional[str]:
"""Return the installed version of ``pkg_name``, or None if not installed.
Uses ``importlib.metadata`` so we don't depend on pip being importable
inside the active venv (uv-created venvs may lack pip).
"""
try:
from importlib.metadata import PackageNotFoundError, version
except ImportError: # py<3.8 — Hermes requires 3.10+ but defensive.
return None
try:
return version(pkg_name)
except PackageNotFoundError:
return None
except Exception:
# Some metadata corruption modes raise ValueError or OSError. Don't
# let advisory checking crash the CLI startup path.
logger.debug("importlib.metadata.version(%s) raised", pkg_name, exc_info=True)
return None
def detect_compromised(
advisories: Iterable[Advisory] = ADVISORIES,
) -> list[AdvisoryHit]:
"""Scan installed packages and return all advisory hits.
A "hit" means an advisory's listed package is installed AND the version
is in the compromised set (or the compromised set is empty, meaning
*any* version is suspect).
"""
hits: list[AdvisoryHit] = []
for advisory in advisories:
for pkg_name, bad_versions in advisory.compromised:
installed = _installed_version(pkg_name)
if installed is None:
continue
if not bad_versions or installed in bad_versions:
hits.append(AdvisoryHit(
advisory=advisory,
package=pkg_name,
installed_version=installed,
))
return hits
# =============================================================================
# Acknowledgement persistence
#
# Acks live under ``security.acked_advisories`` in config.yaml as a list of
# advisory IDs. The list is the only state — no per-host data, no
# timestamps, no fingerprints. Users sharing a config.yaml across machines
# (rare but possible) get the same dismissal everywhere, which is the
# correct behavior for a global advisory.
# =============================================================================
def get_acked_ids() -> set[str]:
"""Return the set of advisory IDs the user has dismissed.
Returns an empty set if config can't be loaded (don't block startup
just because config is broken — the advisory will keep firing until
config is repaired, which is fine).
"""
try:
from hermes_cli.config import load_config
cfg = load_config()
except Exception:
logger.debug("Could not load config for advisory acks", exc_info=True)
return set()
sec = cfg.get("security") or {}
raw = sec.get("acked_advisories") or []
if not isinstance(raw, list):
return set()
return {str(x).strip() for x in raw if str(x).strip()}
def ack_advisory(advisory_id: str) -> bool:
"""Persist an ack for ``advisory_id``. Returns True on success.
Idempotent — acking an already-acked ID is a no-op.
"""
advisory_id = advisory_id.strip()
if not advisory_id:
return False
try:
from hermes_cli.config import load_config, save_config
except Exception:
logger.warning("Could not import config module to persist ack")
return False
try:
cfg = load_config()
sec = cfg.setdefault("security", {})
existing = sec.get("acked_advisories") or []
if not isinstance(existing, list):
existing = []
if advisory_id not in existing:
existing.append(advisory_id)
sec["acked_advisories"] = existing
save_config(cfg)
return True
except Exception:
logger.exception("Failed to persist advisory ack for %s", advisory_id)
return False
def filter_unacked(hits: list[AdvisoryHit]) -> list[AdvisoryHit]:
"""Return only hits whose advisories the user has not dismissed."""
if not hits:
return []
acked = get_acked_ids()
return [h for h in hits if h.advisory.id not in acked]
# =============================================================================
# Rendering helpers
# =============================================================================
def _term_supports_color() -> bool:
if os.environ.get("NO_COLOR"):
return False
if not sys.stdout.isatty():
return False
return True
def short_banner_lines(hits: list[AdvisoryHit]) -> list[str]:
"""Return 1-3 short lines suitable for a startup banner.
Caller is responsible for color/styling. Always names the worst hit
explicitly so the user knows what's wrong without running doctor.
"""
if not hits:
return []
primary = hits[0]
lines = [
f"SECURITY ADVISORY [{primary.advisory.id}]: {primary.advisory.title}",
f" Detected: {primary.package}=={primary.installed_version}",
" Run 'hermes doctor' for remediation steps.",
]
if len(hits) > 1:
lines.insert(1, f" ({len(hits) - 1} additional advisor"
f"{'ies' if len(hits) > 2 else 'y'} also active.)")
return lines
def full_remediation_text(hit: AdvisoryHit) -> list[str]:
"""Return a multi-line block describing the advisory + remediation."""
a = hit.advisory
lines = [
f"=== {a.title} ===",
f"ID: {a.id} Severity: {a.severity} Published: {a.published}",
f"Detected: {hit.package}=={hit.installed_version}",
f"Reference: {a.url}",
"",
a.summary,
"",
"Remediation:",
]
for i, step in enumerate(a.remediation, 1):
lines.append(f" {i}. {step}")
return lines
# =============================================================================
# Startup-banner gating
#
# We do NOT want to hammer the user with the banner on every command. Once
# they've seen it inside a 24h window we cache that fact in
# ``~/.hermes/cache/advisory_banner_seen`` (a single line per advisory ID:
# ``<id> <iso8601_timestamp>``).
#
# Acked advisories never re-banner. Cached-but-not-acked advisories
# re-banner after 24h so the user doesn't fully forget.
# =============================================================================
_BANNER_CACHE_FILE = "advisory_banner_seen"
_BANNER_REPEAT_HOURS = 24
def _banner_cache_path() -> Optional[Path]:
try:
from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home
cache_dir = Path(get_hermes_home()) / "cache"
cache_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
return cache_dir / _BANNER_CACHE_FILE
except Exception:
return None
def _read_banner_cache() -> dict[str, float]:
p = _banner_cache_path()
if p is None or not p.exists():
return {}
out: dict[str, float] = {}
try:
for line in p.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines():
line = line.strip()
if not line:
continue
parts = line.split(None, 1)
if len(parts) != 2:
continue
advisory_id, ts = parts
try:
out[advisory_id] = float(ts)
except ValueError:
continue
except Exception:
return {}
return out
def _write_banner_cache(seen: dict[str, float]) -> None:
p = _banner_cache_path()
if p is None:
return
try:
lines = [f"{aid} {ts}" for aid, ts in seen.items()]
p.write_text("\n".join(lines) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
except Exception:
logger.debug("Could not write advisory banner cache", exc_info=True)
def hits_due_for_banner(
hits: list[AdvisoryHit],
*,
repeat_hours: int = _BANNER_REPEAT_HOURS,
) -> list[AdvisoryHit]:
"""Return only hits whose banner is due (not acked, not recently shown).
Side effect: stamps the banner cache for any hit that's about to be
shown. Callers should subsequently render the result.
"""
import time
fresh = filter_unacked(hits)
if not fresh:
return []
now = time.time()
cache = _read_banner_cache()
cutoff = now - (repeat_hours * 3600)
due: list[AdvisoryHit] = []
for hit in fresh:
last = cache.get(hit.advisory.id, 0.0)
if last < cutoff:
due.append(hit)
cache[hit.advisory.id] = now
if due:
_write_banner_cache(cache)
return due
# =============================================================================
# Public entry points used by doctor / CLI / gateway
# =============================================================================
def render_doctor_section(hits: list[AdvisoryHit]) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]:
"""Render the security-advisory section for ``hermes doctor``.
Returns ``(has_problems, lines)``. Caller is responsible for printing
with whatever color scheme it uses.
"""
fresh = filter_unacked(hits)
if not fresh:
return False, ["No active security advisories. ✓"]
lines: list[str] = []
for i, hit in enumerate(fresh):
if i:
lines.append("")
lines.extend(full_remediation_text(hit))
return True, lines
def startup_banner(hits: list[AdvisoryHit]) -> Optional[str]:
"""Return a printable startup banner, or None if nothing is due.
Updates the banner cache as a side effect (so the next call within
24h returns None for the same hit).
"""
due = hits_due_for_banner(hits)
if not due:
return None
lines = short_banner_lines(due)
if _term_supports_color():
red = "\x1b[1;31m"
reset = "\x1b[0m"
return red + "\n".join(lines) + reset
return "\n".join(lines)
def gateway_log_message(hits: list[AdvisoryHit]) -> Optional[str]:
"""Return a one-line log message for gateway operators, or None."""
fresh = filter_unacked(hits)
if not fresh:
return None
if len(fresh) == 1:
h = fresh[0]
return (f"Security advisory [{h.advisory.id}] active: "
f"{h.package}=={h.installed_version} matches {h.advisory.title}. "
f"See {h.advisory.url}")
return (f"{len(fresh)} security advisories active "
f"(IDs: {', '.join(h.advisory.id for h in fresh)}). "
f"Run `hermes doctor` on the gateway host for details.")