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The dashboard's public /api/status liveness endpoint is in PUBLIC_API_PATHS
and bypasses dashboard auth, yet it returned absolute hermes_home,
config_path, env_path, the gateway PID, and the internal gateway health URL.
That exceeds the shape its own allowlist documents as public ("version,
gateway state, active session count, and the dashboard auth-gate shape. No
bodies, no session content, no secrets"), leaking deployment recon to any
unauthenticated caller on a network-exposed (gated) bind.
Withhold host-local detail unless the bind is loopback / --insecure, where
the dashboard is local-only and the caller is already inside the trust
envelope -- the same split should_require_auth draws. The NAS liveness probe
and the auth-gate badge are unaffected.
Adds invariant tests for both modes (gated withholds, loopback keeps).
135 lines
5.7 KiB
Python
135 lines
5.7 KiB
Python
"""Phase 7 — /api/status exposes auth-gate state + AuthWidget integration.
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The dashboard's status endpoint now reports ``auth_required`` and
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``auth_providers`` so the AuthWidget + StatusPage can render the
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correct "gated / loopback" badge without a separate round trip. This
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test asserts both shapes (gated and loopback).
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The AuthWidget itself is .tsx — no Python test here. The widget's
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behaviour (renders nothing on 401, shows truncated user_id, etc.) is
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documented in AuthWidget.tsx; covered manually via the Phase 4.2
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smoke test against staging Portal.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import pytest
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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from hermes_cli import web_server
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth import clear_providers, register_provider
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from tests.hermes_cli.conftest_dashboard_auth import StubAuthProvider
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# These tests mutate ``web_server.app.state.auth_required`` so they share
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# the same xdist group as the other dashboard-auth gated_app tests.
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pytestmark = pytest.mark.xdist_group("dashboard_auth_app_state")
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@pytest.fixture
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def gated_client():
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clear_providers()
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register_provider(StubAuthProvider())
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prev_host = getattr(web_server.app.state, "bound_host", None)
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prev_port = getattr(web_server.app.state, "bound_port", None)
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prev_required = getattr(web_server.app.state, "auth_required", None)
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web_server.app.state.bound_host = "fly-app.fly.dev"
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web_server.app.state.bound_port = 443
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web_server.app.state.auth_required = True
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client = TestClient(web_server.app, base_url="https://fly-app.fly.dev")
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yield client
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clear_providers()
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web_server.app.state.bound_host = prev_host
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web_server.app.state.bound_port = prev_port
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web_server.app.state.auth_required = prev_required
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@pytest.fixture
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def loopback_client():
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clear_providers()
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prev_host = getattr(web_server.app.state, "bound_host", None)
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prev_port = getattr(web_server.app.state, "bound_port", None)
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prev_required = getattr(web_server.app.state, "auth_required", None)
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web_server.app.state.bound_host = "127.0.0.1"
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web_server.app.state.bound_port = 8080
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web_server.app.state.auth_required = False
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client = TestClient(web_server.app, base_url="http://127.0.0.1:8080")
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yield client
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web_server.app.state.bound_host = prev_host
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web_server.app.state.bound_port = prev_port
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web_server.app.state.auth_required = prev_required
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def test_status_reports_auth_required_in_gated_mode(gated_client):
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# No ``_login()`` call — ``/api/status`` is in the shared
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# ``PUBLIC_API_PATHS`` allowlist precisely so external probes (and
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# the SPA's pre-login bootstrap) can read the gate's shape without
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# a cookie. Hit it cold.
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r = gated_client.get("/api/status")
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assert r.status_code == 200
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body = r.json()
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assert body["auth_required"] is True
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assert body["auth_providers"] == ["stub"]
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def test_status_reports_auth_disabled_in_loopback_mode(loopback_client):
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r = loopback_client.get("/api/status")
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assert r.status_code == 200
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body = r.json()
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assert body["auth_required"] is False
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# Loopback mode has no registered providers (the Nous plugin's env
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# vars aren't set in test).
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assert body["auth_providers"] == []
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def test_status_preserves_existing_fields(loopback_client):
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"""Defence-in-depth: adding auth_required/auth_providers must not
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have dropped any previous field (the dashboard's React StatusPage
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relies on the full payload shape)."""
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r = loopback_client.get("/api/status")
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body = r.json()
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expected_keys = {
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"version", "release_date", "hermes_home", "config_path", "env_path",
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"config_version", "latest_config_version", "gateway_running",
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"gateway_pid", "gateway_health_url", "gateway_state",
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"gateway_platforms", "gateway_exit_reason", "gateway_updated_at",
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"active_sessions", "auth_required", "auth_providers",
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}
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missing = expected_keys - set(body.keys())
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assert not missing, f"/api/status dropped fields: {missing}"
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# Host-local detail (absolute paths, PID, internal gateway URL) is deployment
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# recon a liveness probe never needs. ``/api/status`` bypasses dashboard auth
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# (it is in ``PUBLIC_API_PATHS``), so on a network-exposed bind it must not
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# leak that detail to anonymous callers.
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_HOST_DETAIL_FIELDS = frozenset({
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"hermes_home", "config_path", "env_path", "gateway_pid",
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"gateway_health_url",
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})
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def test_status_withholds_host_detail_in_gated_mode(gated_client):
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"""On a gated (non-loopback) bind, the public ``/api/status`` probe must
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expose only the liveness + auth-gate shape — never absolute host paths,
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the gateway PID, or the internal gateway health URL. The endpoint
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bypasses dashboard auth, so anyone who can reach the host hits it cold."""
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r = gated_client.get("/api/status")
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assert r.status_code == 200
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body = r.json()
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# Liveness / auth-gate shape stays public.
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for key in ("version", "gateway_state", "auth_required", "auth_providers"):
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assert key in body, f"liveness field {key!r} must stay public"
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# Deployment recon must be withheld from the anonymous public probe.
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leaked = _HOST_DETAIL_FIELDS & set(body.keys())
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assert not leaked, f"/api/status leaked host detail under the gate: {leaked}"
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def test_status_includes_host_detail_in_loopback_mode(loopback_client):
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"""Counterpart to the gated case: a loopback bind is local-only, so the
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full payload (including host paths and PID) is still served — preserving
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the StatusPage / ``hermes status`` experience for local operators."""
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r = loopback_client.get("/api/status")
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assert r.status_code == 200
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body = r.json()
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missing = _HOST_DETAIL_FIELDS - set(body.keys())
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assert not missing, f"loopback /api/status should keep host detail: {missing}"
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