hermes-agent/tools/credential_files.py
Frowtek c8882c141c fix(credentials): never mount master credential stores into skill sandboxes
register_credential_file() takes a skill-declared relative path from
required_credential_files frontmatter and bind-mounts it read-only into the
remote sandbox the skill's own code runs in. It validates that the resolved
path stays inside HERMES_HOME — the docstring names the threat directly:

    so that a malicious skill cannot declare
    required_credential_files: ['../../.ssh/id_rsa'] and exfiltrate
    sensitive host files into a container sandbox

Containment is the wrong boundary on its own, because HERMES_HOME is exactly
where the master credential stores live. Traversal is blocked; asking for the
keys by name is not:

    skill declares               mounted?   agent may read it?
    .env                         YES        DENIED
    auth.json                    YES        DENIED
    .anthropic_oauth.json        YES        DENIED
    cache/bws_cache.json         YES        DENIED
    mcp-tokens/srv.json          YES        DENIED
    google_token.json            YES        allowed
    ../../.ssh/id_rsa            no         n/a

Every row marked DENIED is refused by the canonical read guard
(agent.file_safety.get_read_block_error) — the agent cannot read_file them —
yet one line of hub-installed skill frontmatter gets them bind-mounted where
that skill can cat them. .env alone is every provider API key.

Reuse the canonical deny-list as the mount bar: what the agent is forbidden
to read is not mountable either, so the mount surface cannot hand a skill
what the read surface denies it. Fails CLOSED — if the guard can't be
consulted the mount is refused rather than risked.

The module keeps doing its job: a skill still mounts its own service token
(google_token.json, skills/*), and a refused entry is reported back through
register_credential_files' missing list instead of failing the batch.

The three prior PRs here (#3946, #3951, #4316) all hardened traversal; this
closes the half that traversal validation never covered.
2026-07-20 06:50:26 -07:00

513 lines
19 KiB
Python

"""File passthrough registry for remote terminal backends.
Remote backends (Docker, Modal, SSH) create sandboxes with no host files.
This module ensures that credential files, skill directories, and host-side
cache directories (documents, images, audio, screenshots) are mounted or
synced into those sandboxes so the agent can access them.
**Credentials and skills** — session-scoped registry fed by skill declarations
(``required_credential_files``) and user config (``terminal.credential_files``).
**Cache directories** — gateway-cached uploads, browser screenshots, TTS
audio, and processed images. Mounted read-only so the remote terminal can
reference files the host side created (e.g. ``unzip`` an uploaded archive).
Remote backends call :func:`get_credential_file_mounts`,
:func:`get_skills_directory_mount` / :func:`iter_skills_files`, and
:func:`get_cache_directory_mounts` / :func:`iter_cache_files` at sandbox
creation time and before each command (for resync on Modal).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import os
import posixpath
from contextvars import ContextVar
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Dict, List, Optional
from hermes_cli.config import cfg_get
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Session-scoped list of credential files to mount.
# Backed by ContextVar to prevent cross-session data bleed in the gateway pipeline.
_registered_files_var: ContextVar[Dict[str, str]] = ContextVar("_registered_files")
def _get_registered() -> Dict[str, str]:
"""Get or create the registered credential files dict for the current context/session."""
try:
return _registered_files_var.get()
except LookupError:
val: Dict[str, str] = {}
_registered_files_var.set(val)
return val
# Cache for config-based file list (loaded once per process).
_config_files: List[Dict[str, str]] | None = None
def _resolve_hermes_home() -> Path:
from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home
return get_hermes_home()
def register_credential_file(
relative_path: str,
container_base: str = "/root/.hermes",
) -> bool:
"""Register a credential file for mounting into remote sandboxes.
*relative_path* is relative to ``HERMES_HOME`` (e.g. ``google_token.json``).
Returns True if the file exists on the host and was registered.
Security: rejects absolute paths and path traversal sequences (``..``).
The resolved host path must remain inside HERMES_HOME so that a malicious
skill cannot declare ``required_credential_files: ['../../.ssh/id_rsa']``
and exfiltrate sensitive host files into a container sandbox.
Containment alone is not sufficient, because HERMES_HOME is exactly where
the MASTER credential stores live. A skill legitimately needs its own
service token (``google_token.json``); it never needs ``.env`` (every
provider key), ``auth.json`` (all provider tokens and OAuth grants),
``mcp-tokens/`` or the Bitwarden plaintext cache. Those are refused via
the canonical read deny-list (``agent.file_safety.get_read_block_error``)
— the same guard that stops the agent reading them with ``read_file``, so
the mount surface cannot hand a skill what the read surface denies it.
"""
hermes_home = _resolve_hermes_home()
# Reject absolute paths — they bypass the HERMES_HOME sandbox entirely.
if os.path.isabs(relative_path):
logger.warning(
"credential_files: rejected absolute path %r (must be relative to HERMES_HOME)",
relative_path,
)
return False
host_path = hermes_home / relative_path
# Resolve symlinks and normalise ``..`` before the containment check so
# that traversal like ``../. ssh/id_rsa`` cannot escape HERMES_HOME.
from tools.path_security import validate_within_dir
containment_error = validate_within_dir(host_path, hermes_home)
if containment_error:
logger.warning(
"credential_files: rejected path traversal %r (%s)",
relative_path,
containment_error,
)
return False
resolved = host_path.resolve()
if not resolved.is_file():
logger.debug("credential_files: skipping %s (not found)", resolved)
return False
# Master credential stores are never mountable, even though they sit
# inside HERMES_HOME and therefore pass the containment check above.
# Fails CLOSED: if the canonical guard can't be consulted we refuse the
# mount rather than risk bind-mounting auth.json into a sandbox.
try:
from agent.file_safety import get_read_block_error
denied = get_read_block_error(str(resolved))
except Exception as exc: # pragma: no cover - core module
logger.warning(
"credential_files: refusing %r — read guard unavailable (%s)",
relative_path, exc,
)
return False
if denied:
logger.warning(
"credential_files: refused %r — it is a credential store the agent "
"is denied from reading; a skill may mount its own service token, "
"not the master key files",
relative_path,
)
return False
container_path = f"{container_base.rstrip('/')}/{relative_path}"
_get_registered()[container_path] = str(resolved)
logger.debug("credential_files: registered %s -> %s", resolved, container_path)
return True
def register_credential_files(
entries: list,
container_base: str = "/root/.hermes",
) -> List[str]:
"""Register multiple credential files from skill frontmatter entries.
Each entry is either a string (relative path) or a dict with a ``path``
key. Returns the list of relative paths that were NOT found on the host
(i.e. missing files).
"""
missing = []
for entry in entries:
if isinstance(entry, str):
rel_path = entry.strip()
elif isinstance(entry, dict):
rel_path = (entry.get("path") or entry.get("name") or "").strip()
else:
continue
if not rel_path:
continue
if not register_credential_file(rel_path, container_base):
missing.append(rel_path)
return missing
def _load_config_files() -> List[Dict[str, str]]:
"""Load ``terminal.credential_files`` from config.yaml (cached)."""
global _config_files
if _config_files is not None:
return _config_files
result: List[Dict[str, str]] = []
try:
from hermes_cli.config import read_raw_config
hermes_home = _resolve_hermes_home()
cfg = read_raw_config()
cred_files = cfg_get(cfg, "terminal", "credential_files")
if isinstance(cred_files, list):
from tools.path_security import validate_within_dir
for item in cred_files:
if isinstance(item, str) and item.strip():
rel = item.strip()
if os.path.isabs(rel):
logger.warning(
"credential_files: rejected absolute config path %r", rel,
)
continue
host_path = hermes_home / rel
containment_error = validate_within_dir(host_path, hermes_home)
if containment_error:
logger.warning(
"credential_files: rejected config path traversal %r (%s)",
rel, containment_error,
)
continue
resolved_path = host_path.resolve()
if resolved_path.is_file():
container_path = f"/root/.hermes/{rel}"
result.append({
"host_path": str(resolved_path),
"container_path": container_path,
})
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Could not read terminal.credential_files from config: %s", e)
_config_files = result
return _config_files
def get_credential_file_mounts() -> List[Dict[str, str]]:
"""Return all credential files that should be mounted into remote sandboxes.
Each item has ``host_path`` and ``container_path`` keys.
Combines skill-registered files and user config.
"""
mounts: Dict[str, str] = {}
# Skill-registered files
for container_path, host_path in _get_registered().items():
# Re-check existence (file may have been deleted since registration)
if Path(host_path).is_file():
mounts[container_path] = host_path
# Config-based files
for entry in _load_config_files():
cp = entry["container_path"]
if cp not in mounts and Path(entry["host_path"]).is_file():
mounts[cp] = entry["host_path"]
return [
{"host_path": hp, "container_path": cp}
for cp, hp in mounts.items()
]
def get_skills_directory_mount(
container_base: str = "/root/.hermes",
) -> list[Dict[str, str]]:
"""Return mount info for all skill directories (local + external).
Skills may include ``scripts/``, ``templates/``, and ``references/``
subdirectories that the agent needs to execute inside remote sandboxes.
**Security:** Bind mounts follow symlinks, so a malicious symlink inside
the skills tree could expose arbitrary host files to the container. When
symlinks are detected, this function creates a sanitized copy (regular
files only) in a temp directory and returns that path instead. When no
symlinks are present (the common case), the original directory is returned
directly with zero overhead.
Returns a list of dicts with ``host_path`` and ``container_path`` keys.
The local skills dir mounts at ``<container_base>/skills``, external dirs
at ``<container_base>/external_skills/<index>``.
"""
mounts = []
hermes_home = _resolve_hermes_home()
skills_dir = hermes_home / "skills"
if skills_dir.is_dir():
host_path = _safe_skills_path(skills_dir)
mounts.append({
"host_path": host_path,
"container_path": f"{container_base.rstrip('/')}/skills",
})
# Mount external skill dirs
try:
from agent.skill_utils import get_external_skills_dirs
for idx, ext_dir in enumerate(get_external_skills_dirs()):
if ext_dir.is_dir():
host_path = _safe_skills_path(ext_dir)
mounts.append({
"host_path": host_path,
"container_path": f"{container_base.rstrip('/')}/external_skills/{idx}",
})
except ImportError:
pass
return mounts
_safe_skills_tempdir: Path | None = None
def _safe_skills_path(skills_dir: Path) -> str:
"""Return *skills_dir* if symlink-free, else a sanitized temp copy."""
global _safe_skills_tempdir
symlinks = [p for p in skills_dir.rglob("*") if p.is_symlink()]
if not symlinks:
return str(skills_dir)
for link in symlinks:
logger.warning("credential_files: skipping symlink in skills dir: %s -> %s",
link, os.readlink(link))
import atexit
import shutil
import tempfile
# Reuse the same temp dir across calls to avoid accumulation.
if _safe_skills_tempdir and _safe_skills_tempdir.is_dir():
shutil.rmtree(_safe_skills_tempdir, ignore_errors=True)
safe_dir = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="hermes-skills-safe-"))
_safe_skills_tempdir = safe_dir
for item in skills_dir.rglob("*"):
if item.is_symlink():
continue
rel = item.relative_to(skills_dir)
target = safe_dir / rel
if item.is_dir():
target.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
elif item.is_file():
target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
shutil.copy2(str(item), str(target))
def _cleanup():
if safe_dir.is_dir():
shutil.rmtree(safe_dir, ignore_errors=True)
atexit.register(_cleanup)
logger.info("credential_files: created symlink-safe skills copy at %s", safe_dir)
return str(safe_dir)
def iter_skills_files(
container_base: str = "/root/.hermes",
) -> List[Dict[str, str]]:
"""Yield individual (host_path, container_path) entries for skills files.
Includes both the local skills dir and any external dirs configured via
skills.external_dirs. Skips symlinks entirely. Preferred for backends
that upload files individually (Daytona, Modal) rather than mounting a
directory.
"""
result: List[Dict[str, str]] = []
hermes_home = _resolve_hermes_home()
skills_dir = hermes_home / "skills"
if skills_dir.is_dir():
container_root = f"{container_base.rstrip('/')}/skills"
for item in skills_dir.rglob("*"):
if item.is_symlink() or not item.is_file():
continue
rel = item.relative_to(skills_dir)
result.append({
"host_path": str(item),
"container_path": f"{container_root}/{rel}",
})
# Include external skill dirs
try:
from agent.skill_utils import get_external_skills_dirs
for idx, ext_dir in enumerate(get_external_skills_dirs()):
if not ext_dir.is_dir():
continue
container_root = f"{container_base.rstrip('/')}/external_skills/{idx}"
for item in ext_dir.rglob("*"):
if item.is_symlink() or not item.is_file():
continue
rel = item.relative_to(ext_dir)
result.append({
"host_path": str(item),
"container_path": f"{container_root}/{rel}",
})
except ImportError:
pass
return result
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Cache directory mounts (documents, images, audio, videos, screenshots)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The cache subdirectories that should be mirrored into remote backends.
# Each tuple is (new_subpath, old_name) matching hermes_constants.get_hermes_dir().
_CACHE_DIRS: list[tuple[str, str]] = [
("cache/documents", "document_cache"),
("cache/images", "image_cache"),
("cache/audio", "audio_cache"),
("cache/videos", "video_cache"),
("cache/screenshots", "browser_screenshots"),
("cache/web", "web_cache"),
("cache/delegation", "delegation_cache"),
]
def get_cache_directory_mounts(
container_base: str = "/root/.hermes",
) -> List[Dict[str, str]]:
"""Return mount entries for each cache directory that exists on disk.
Used by Docker to create bind mounts. Each entry has ``host_path`` and
``container_path`` keys. The host path is resolved via
``get_hermes_dir()`` for backward compatibility with old directory layouts.
"""
from hermes_constants import get_hermes_dir
mounts: List[Dict[str, str]] = []
for new_subpath, old_name in _CACHE_DIRS:
host_dir = get_hermes_dir(new_subpath, old_name)
if host_dir.is_dir():
# Always map to the *new* container layout regardless of host layout.
container_path = f"{container_base.rstrip('/')}/{new_subpath}"
mounts.append({
"host_path": str(host_dir),
"container_path": container_path,
})
return mounts
def map_cache_path_to_container(
host_path: str,
container_base: str = "/root/.hermes",
) -> Optional[str]:
"""Map a host cache path to its mounted path under *container_base*.
Returns the POSIX container path when *host_path* lives under one of the
auto-mounted cache directories, otherwise ``None``. Backend-agnostic: the
caller decides which ``container_base`` applies (Docker ``/root/.hermes``,
SSH ``<remote_home>/.hermes``, etc.) and whether translation is wanted.
Always joins with ``posixpath`` because container/remote paths are POSIX
regardless of the host OS.
"""
path = Path(host_path)
for mount in get_cache_directory_mounts(container_base=container_base):
host_dir = Path(mount["host_path"])
try:
rel = path.relative_to(host_dir)
except ValueError:
continue
return posixpath.join(mount["container_path"], rel.as_posix())
return None
def from_agent_visible_cache_path(
container_path: str,
container_base: str = "/root/.hermes",
) -> str:
"""Translate a sandbox/container cache path back to its host path.
Inverse of :func:`to_agent_visible_cache_path`. Returns the input unchanged
when the active backend is not Docker, or when the path is not under any
auto-mounted cache directory — the caller then treats a still-container
path as "no host file" and falls back to an in-container read.
"""
if os.environ.get("TERMINAL_ENV", "local") != "docker":
return container_path
path = Path(container_path)
for mount in get_cache_directory_mounts(container_base=container_base):
try:
rel = path.relative_to(mount["container_path"])
except ValueError:
continue
return str(Path(mount["host_path"]) / rel)
return container_path
def to_agent_visible_cache_path(
host_path: str,
container_base: str = "/root/.hermes",
) -> str:
"""Translate a host cache path to its mounted path inside the sandbox.
Returns the input unchanged if it is not under any auto-mounted cache
directory, or if the active terminal backend does not require path
translation (only Docker for now).
"""
# Only Docker backend requires translation at this time. Other backends
# (Modal, Daytona) use different mount semantics and will be
# addressed separately if needed. Backend is identified by TERMINAL_ENV
# (same env var tools/terminal_tool.py reads in _get_environment_config).
if os.environ.get("TERMINAL_ENV", "local") != "docker":
return host_path
mapped = map_cache_path_to_container(host_path, container_base=container_base)
return mapped if mapped is not None else host_path
def iter_cache_files(
container_base: str = "/root/.hermes",
) -> List[Dict[str, str]]:
"""Return individual (host_path, container_path) entries for cache files.
Used by Modal to upload files individually and resync before each command.
Skips symlinks. The container paths use the new ``cache/<subdir>`` layout.
"""
from hermes_constants import get_hermes_dir
result: List[Dict[str, str]] = []
for new_subpath, old_name in _CACHE_DIRS:
host_dir = get_hermes_dir(new_subpath, old_name)
if not host_dir.is_dir():
continue
container_root = f"{container_base.rstrip('/')}/{new_subpath}"
for item in host_dir.rglob("*"):
if item.is_symlink() or not item.is_file():
continue
rel = item.relative_to(host_dir)
result.append({
"host_path": str(item),
"container_path": f"{container_root}/{rel}",
})
return result
def clear_credential_files() -> None:
"""Reset the skill-scoped registry (e.g. on session reset)."""
_get_registered().clear()