hermes-agent/tests/hermes_cli/test_nous_inference_url_validation.py
2026-05-29 02:24:48 -07:00

213 lines
9 KiB
Python

"""Regression tests for Nous Portal inference_base_url host-allowlist validation.
A poisoned ``inference_base_url`` from a Portal refresh response (network
MITM, malicious response injection) would otherwise be persisted to
auth.json and forwarded with the user's legitimate invoke JWT
bearer on every subsequent proxy request, exfiltrating their inference
budget and opening a response-injection channel into the IDE / chat
client. ``_validate_nous_inference_url_from_network()`` blocks any URL
outside the allowlist at the source.
These tests verify:
1. The validator's host + scheme rules.
2. Each of the two NETWORK call sites in ``auth.py`` calls the validator
rather than the unrestricted ``_optional_base_url`` helper.
3. The proxy adapter applies the validator as belt-and-suspenders.
4. The env-var override path (``NOUS_INFERENCE_BASE_URL``) is NOT
gated by the validator — that's the documented dev/staging escape
hatch.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
from hermes_cli.auth import (
DEFAULT_NOUS_INFERENCE_URL,
_ALLOWED_NOUS_INFERENCE_HOSTS,
_validate_nous_inference_url_from_network,
)
class TestValidatorRules:
def test_allowlisted_https_host_returned(self):
url = "https://inference-api.nousresearch.com/v1"
assert _validate_nous_inference_url_from_network(url) == url
def test_trailing_slash_stripped(self):
url = "https://inference-api.nousresearch.com/v1/"
assert _validate_nous_inference_url_from_network(url) == url.rstrip("/")
def test_attacker_host_rejected(self, caplog):
with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="hermes_cli.auth"):
assert (
_validate_nous_inference_url_from_network("https://attacker.com/v1")
is None
)
assert any("attacker.com" in rec.message for rec in caplog.records)
def test_subdomain_of_allowlist_host_rejected(self):
"""*.nousresearch.com is NOT in the allowlist — exact hostname only.
A subdomain takeover or DNS hijack of *.nousresearch.com would
otherwise pass — keep the gate tight.
"""
assert (
_validate_nous_inference_url_from_network(
"https://evil.inference-api.nousresearch.com/v1"
)
is None
)
def test_http_scheme_rejected(self, caplog):
with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="hermes_cli.auth"):
assert (
_validate_nous_inference_url_from_network(
"http://inference-api.nousresearch.com/v1"
)
is None
)
assert any("non-https" in rec.message for rec in caplog.records)
def test_file_scheme_rejected(self):
assert (
_validate_nous_inference_url_from_network("file:///etc/passwd") is None
)
def test_javascript_scheme_rejected(self):
assert (
_validate_nous_inference_url_from_network(
"javascript:alert(document.cookie)"
)
is None
)
def test_empty_string_rejected(self):
assert _validate_nous_inference_url_from_network("") is None
def test_whitespace_only_rejected(self):
assert _validate_nous_inference_url_from_network(" ") is None
def test_none_rejected(self):
assert _validate_nous_inference_url_from_network(None) is None
def test_non_string_rejected(self):
assert _validate_nous_inference_url_from_network(12345) is None # type: ignore[arg-type]
assert _validate_nous_inference_url_from_network({"url": "x"}) is None # type: ignore[arg-type]
def test_malformed_url_rejected(self):
"""Even garbled input must fall back safely, not raise."""
assert (
_validate_nous_inference_url_from_network("not://a real url at all")
is None
)
def test_default_inference_url_is_in_allowlist(self):
"""Sanity check: DEFAULT_NOUS_INFERENCE_URL must itself validate.
If anyone retargets the default away from
``inference-api.nousresearch.com``, they MUST update the allowlist
in the same change — otherwise the allowlist would reject the
Portal's own legitimate default and break every install.
"""
assert (
_validate_nous_inference_url_from_network(DEFAULT_NOUS_INFERENCE_URL)
== DEFAULT_NOUS_INFERENCE_URL.rstrip("/")
)
def test_allowlist_contains_inference_api_host(self):
"""The default's host must be in the allowlist set."""
from urllib.parse import urlparse
host = urlparse(DEFAULT_NOUS_INFERENCE_URL).hostname
assert host in _ALLOWED_NOUS_INFERENCE_HOSTS
class TestCallSiteWiring:
"""Verify the validator is actually wired into all auth.py NETWORK call sites.
These are not behaviour-end-to-end tests (the surrounding code is
several hundred lines per site with extensive HTTP mocking
requirements). They're text-grep contracts: if anyone replaces
``_validate_nous_inference_url_from_network`` with the un-validated
``_optional_base_url`` again, the test catches it.
Each site lives inside ``resolve_nous_runtime_credentials`` and one
helper (``_extend_state_from_refresh``). The shape we guard against
is ``<helper>_url = _optional_base_url(<payload>.get("inference_base_url"))``
— that's what the unsafe pre-fix code looked like, and the only
semantic difference between the safe and unsafe helpers is the
host-allowlist check.
"""
def _read_auth_source(self):
import hermes_cli.auth as _auth_mod
from pathlib import Path
return Path(_auth_mod.__file__).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
def test_no_unvalidated_inference_base_url_assignments_remain(self):
"""No remaining ``_optional_base_url(...inference_base_url...)`` reads
from Portal payloads. If you see a failure here, you've either
added a new NETWORK site that needs validation, or downgraded an
existing one back to the unsafe helper."""
source = self._read_auth_source()
for needle in (
'_optional_base_url(refreshed.get("inference_base_url"))',
'_optional_base_url(mint_payload.get("inference_base_url"))',
):
assert needle not in source, (
f"Found unvalidated network read: {needle!r}. "
f"Use _validate_nous_inference_url_from_network() instead."
)
def test_validator_wired_at_all_known_call_sites(self):
"""All 2 known auth.py NETWORK sites use the validator. If this count
drops, someone removed protection; if it grows, audit the new
site to be sure validation is appropriate."""
source = self._read_auth_source()
refresh_count = source.count(
'_validate_nous_inference_url_from_network(refreshed.get("inference_base_url"))'
)
mint_count = source.count(
'_validate_nous_inference_url_from_network(mint_payload.get("inference_base_url"))'
)
assert refresh_count == 2, f"expected 2 refresh sites, found {refresh_count}"
assert mint_count == 0, f"expected 0 mint sites, found {mint_count}"
def test_proxy_adapter_also_validates(self):
"""The Nous proxy adapter applies the validator as defense-in-depth
even though auth.py already validates at the source, so a future
bypass at the source layer still gets caught at the forward
boundary."""
from pathlib import Path
import hermes_cli.proxy.adapters.nous_portal as _nous_adapter
source = Path(_nous_adapter.__file__).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
assert "_validate_nous_inference_url_from_network" in source
class TestEnvOverrideNotGated:
"""The documented dev/staging env-var override must keep working.
``NOUS_INFERENCE_BASE_URL`` is read by ``resolve_nous_runtime_credentials``
via ``os.getenv`` — that path doesn't pass through the validator
(env values are trusted because the user set them themselves).
Verify the env-var read site does NOT consult the validator, so a
user running against a non-allowlisted staging host via env is not
inadvertently broken by this fix.
"""
def test_env_override_path_does_not_call_validator(self):
"""In resolve_nous_runtime_credentials, the env override is
read via os.getenv directly, not via the validator. Grep the
source to confirm: the env line should NOT mention the
validator."""
import hermes_cli.auth as _auth_mod
from pathlib import Path
source = Path(_auth_mod.__file__).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
# Find the env-override read line.
for line in source.splitlines():
if "NOUS_INFERENCE_BASE_URL" in line and "os.getenv" in line:
assert "_validate_nous_inference_url_from_network" not in line, (
"env override path must not gate through the network "
"validator — it would break documented dev/staging use."
)