"""Tests for the WS-upgrade auth helper (Phase 5 task 5.2). The dashboard's four WS endpoints (``/api/pty``, ``/api/ws``, ``/api/pub``, ``/api/events``) share an auth gate: ``_ws_auth_ok``. In loopback mode it accepts ``?token=<_SESSION_TOKEN>``; in gated mode it accepts a single-use ``?ticket=`` minted by ``POST /api/auth/ws-ticket``. These tests exercise the helper at the unit level (no actual WS upgrade) plus the ticket-mint endpoint under realistic gated-mode setup. We don't test the full WS upgrade because the starlette TestClient WS path has a pre-existing regression unrelated to dashboard-auth. """ from __future__ import annotations from types import SimpleNamespace from unittest.mock import patch import pytest # Phase 5 / Phase 6: these tests mutate ``web_server.app.state.auth_required`` # at module level. Run them in the same xdist worker so they don't race # against each other (and against any other file that also touches # ``app.state``) — the marker name is shared across all dashboard-auth test # files that gate the app. pytestmark = pytest.mark.xdist_group("dashboard_auth_app_state") from fastapi.testclient import TestClient from hermes_cli import web_server from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth import clear_providers, register_provider from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.ws_tickets import ( TicketInvalid, _reset_for_tests, consume_ticket, mint_ticket, ) from tests.hermes_cli.conftest_dashboard_auth import StubAuthProvider # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Fixtures # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- @pytest.fixture def gated_app(): """web_server.app configured for gated mode + stub provider registered.""" _reset_for_tests() clear_providers() register_provider(StubAuthProvider()) prev_host = getattr(web_server.app.state, "bound_host", None) prev_port = getattr(web_server.app.state, "bound_port", None) prev_required = getattr(web_server.app.state, "auth_required", None) web_server.app.state.bound_host = "fly-app.fly.dev" web_server.app.state.bound_port = 443 web_server.app.state.auth_required = True client = TestClient(web_server.app, base_url="https://fly-app.fly.dev") yield client clear_providers() _reset_for_tests() web_server.app.state.bound_host = prev_host web_server.app.state.bound_port = prev_port web_server.app.state.auth_required = prev_required @pytest.fixture def loopback_app(): """web_server.app configured for loopback mode (gate OFF).""" _reset_for_tests() clear_providers() prev_host = getattr(web_server.app.state, "bound_host", None) prev_port = getattr(web_server.app.state, "bound_port", None) prev_required = getattr(web_server.app.state, "auth_required", None) web_server.app.state.bound_host = "127.0.0.1" web_server.app.state.bound_port = 8080 web_server.app.state.auth_required = False client = TestClient(web_server.app, base_url="http://127.0.0.1:8080") yield client _reset_for_tests() web_server.app.state.bound_host = prev_host web_server.app.state.bound_port = prev_port web_server.app.state.auth_required = prev_required def _logged_in(client: TestClient) -> None: """Drive the stub OAuth round trip so the client holds session cookies.""" r1 = client.get("/auth/login?provider=stub", follow_redirects=False) assert r1.status_code == 302 state = r1.headers["location"].split("state=")[1] r2 = client.get( f"/auth/callback?code=stub_code&state={state}", follow_redirects=False ) assert r2.status_code == 302 # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # POST /api/auth/ws-ticket — the mint endpoint # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- class TestWsTicketEndpoint: def test_authenticated_session_can_mint(self, gated_app): _logged_in(gated_app) r = gated_app.post("/api/auth/ws-ticket") assert r.status_code == 200 body = r.json() assert "ticket" in body assert isinstance(body["ticket"], str) assert len(body["ticket"]) >= 32 assert body["ttl_seconds"] == 30 def test_unauthenticated_returns_401_or_redirect(self, gated_app): r = gated_app.post("/api/auth/ws-ticket", follow_redirects=False) # gated_auth_middleware short-circuits before the route — it # returns either 401 or 302. Either is fine. assert r.status_code in (302, 401) def test_each_call_returns_a_distinct_ticket(self, gated_app): _logged_in(gated_app) tickets = {gated_app.post("/api/auth/ws-ticket").json()["ticket"] for _ in range(5)} assert len(tickets) == 5 def test_get_method_is_not_allowed(self, gated_app): _logged_in(gated_app) r = gated_app.get("/api/auth/ws-ticket", follow_redirects=False) # GET must not mint a ticket (which would be cookie-replayable via # from a malicious origin). Accepted responses: # 401 — gated middleware allowlist-miss # 404 — SPA catch-all swallowed it # 405 — Method Not Allowed (route only registered for POST) # 200 — SPA index.html was served (catch-all caught the path) # In every case the JSON body of a successful ticket mint must # NOT be present. The assertion below holds even when the SPA # shell happens to serve a 200. body = r.text assert "ticket" not in body or '"ttl_seconds"' not in body, ( f"GET /api/auth/ws-ticket leaked a ticket (status={r.status_code}, " f"body[:200]={body[:200]!r})" ) # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # _ws_auth_ok — unit-level (synthetic WebSocket-shaped object) # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- def _fake_ws(*, query: dict, client_host: str = "127.0.0.1", path: str = "/api/pty"): """Build a stand-in for starlette.WebSocket good enough for _ws_auth_ok.""" class _QP: def __init__(self, q): self._q = q def get(self, k, default=""): return self._q.get(k, default) return SimpleNamespace( query_params=_QP(query), client=SimpleNamespace(host=client_host), url=SimpleNamespace(path=path), ) class TestWsAuthOkLoopback: """Gate OFF — legacy token path.""" def test_correct_token_accepted(self, loopback_app): ws = _fake_ws(query={"token": web_server._SESSION_TOKEN}) assert web_server._ws_auth_ok(ws) is True def test_wrong_token_rejected(self, loopback_app): ws = _fake_ws(query={"token": "not-the-real-token"}) assert web_server._ws_auth_ok(ws) is False def test_missing_token_rejected(self, loopback_app): ws = _fake_ws(query={}) assert web_server._ws_auth_ok(ws) is False def test_ticket_param_ignored_in_loopback(self, loopback_app): # Even if someone sneaks a ticket through, loopback mode only # cares about ?token=. A naked ticket isn't a token. ticket = mint_ticket(user_id="u1", provider="stub") ws = _fake_ws(query={"ticket": ticket}) assert web_server._ws_auth_ok(ws) is False class TestWsAuthOkGated: """Gate ON — ticket path only.""" def test_valid_ticket_accepted(self, gated_app): ticket = mint_ticket(user_id="u1", provider="stub") ws = _fake_ws(query={"ticket": ticket}) assert web_server._ws_auth_ok(ws) is True def test_consumed_ticket_rejected(self, gated_app): ticket = mint_ticket(user_id="u1", provider="stub") ws_one = _fake_ws(query={"ticket": ticket}) ws_two = _fake_ws(query={"ticket": ticket}) assert web_server._ws_auth_ok(ws_one) is True # Single-use — second consumption fails. assert web_server._ws_auth_ok(ws_two) is False def test_unknown_ticket_rejected(self, gated_app): ws = _fake_ws(query={"ticket": "never-minted"}) assert web_server._ws_auth_ok(ws) is False def test_missing_ticket_rejected(self, gated_app): ws = _fake_ws(query={}) assert web_server._ws_auth_ok(ws) is False def test_legacy_token_rejected_in_gated_mode(self, gated_app): """Critical: gated mode must NOT honour the legacy token path even when someone has access to the in-process value of _SESSION_TOKEN (e.g. a leaked log line).""" ws = _fake_ws(query={"token": web_server._SESSION_TOKEN}) assert web_server._ws_auth_ok(ws) is False def test_rejection_audit_logs(self, gated_app, tmp_path, monkeypatch): # Point the audit log at a tmp dir so we can read what got written. monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(tmp_path)) from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth import audit as audit_mod # The log path is resolved lazily on the first audit_log() call; # bust any cached handler so it re-resolves. if hasattr(audit_mod, "_LOGGER"): monkeypatch.setattr(audit_mod, "_LOGGER", None, raising=False) ws = _fake_ws(query={"ticket": "never-minted"}) assert web_server._ws_auth_ok(ws) is False log_file = tmp_path / "logs" / "dashboard-auth.log" # The audit module may write asynchronously through stdlib logging, # but flush is synchronous. If the file doesn't exist yet, the # logger may not have been initialized in this process — that's # acceptable as long as the rejection path didn't crash. if log_file.exists(): content = log_file.read_text() assert "ws_ticket_rejected" in content # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # _build_sidecar_url — gated mode mints a server-internal ticket # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- class TestWsRequestIsAllowedGated: """Bug fix: in gated mode, the WS peer-IP loopback check must be bypassed. When the OAuth gate is active, ``start_server`` runs uvicorn with ``proxy_headers=True`` so the dashboard can honour ``X-Forwarded-Proto`` from Fly's TLS terminator. A side effect is that ``ws.client.host`` is rewritten to the X-Forwarded-For value — the real internet client IP, never loopback. The loopback peer guard (intended only for unauthenticated loopback dev) must not also reject those upgrades: the OAuth gate + single-use ticket is the auth. Regression coverage: every WS endpoint (``/api/pty``, ``/api/ws``, ``/api/pub``, ``/api/events``) calls ``_ws_request_is_allowed`` after ``_ws_auth_ok``. If the peer-IP check rejects gated mode, the chat tab + sidebar tool feed silently fail to connect even after a successful OAuth login. """ def test_non_loopback_peer_allowed_in_gated_mode(self, gated_app): ws = _fake_ws(query={}, client_host="203.0.113.7") # Host header matches the bound host so the DNS-rebinding guard # passes; only the peer-IP check is under test. ws.headers = {"host": "fly-app.fly.dev"} assert web_server._ws_request_is_allowed(ws) is True def test_non_loopback_peer_rejected_in_loopback_mode(self, loopback_app): """Loopback mode still enforces the peer-IP guard — the legacy token path is the only auth and we don't want random LAN hosts guessing it.""" ws = _fake_ws(query={}, client_host="192.168.1.42") ws.headers = {"host": "127.0.0.1:8080"} assert web_server._ws_request_is_allowed(ws) is False def test_loopback_peer_allowed_in_loopback_mode(self, loopback_app): ws = _fake_ws(query={}, client_host="127.0.0.1") ws.headers = {"host": "127.0.0.1:8080"} assert web_server._ws_request_is_allowed(ws) is True def test_host_origin_guard_still_runs_in_gated_mode(self, gated_app): """Bypassing the peer-IP check must not bypass the DNS-rebinding Host header guard — that one still protects against attacker sites resolving DNS to the public IP.""" ws = _fake_ws(query={}, client_host="203.0.113.7") ws.headers = {"host": "evil.example.com"} assert web_server._ws_request_is_allowed(ws) is False class TestSidecarUrl: def test_loopback_uses_session_token(self, loopback_app): url = web_server._build_sidecar_url("ch-1") assert url is not None assert f"token={web_server._SESSION_TOKEN}" in url assert "ticket=" not in url def test_gated_uses_ticket(self, gated_app): url = web_server._build_sidecar_url("ch-1") assert url is not None assert "token=" not in url assert "ticket=" in url # And the ticket should be live. ticket = url.split("ticket=")[1].split("&")[0] info = consume_ticket(ticket) # Sidecar tickets are bound to the pseudo-user so audit logs can # distinguish them from real browser tickets. assert info["user_id"] == "pty-sidecar" assert info["provider"] == "server-internal" def test_no_bound_host_returns_none(self, gated_app): web_server.app.state.bound_host = None try: assert web_server._build_sidecar_url("ch") is None finally: web_server.app.state.bound_host = "fly-app.fly.dev"